by Demosthenes
[8] Now apart from all this, whenever a man lodges with the judicial Archons an objection against a decree or law, that law or decree is invalid and the mover or proposer has not the impudence to employ violence, but loyally accepts your decision, even if he is the foremost orator or administrator in your city. Yet is it not absurd that, while decrees passed by you in full assembly as in accordance with the laws should be invalid, you should imagine that you ought to make the whim of Aristogeiton to flout the laws more authoritative than the laws themselves?
[9] πάλιν τοίνυν ὅταν τις ἐπεξιὼν μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, ἐφ᾽ οἷς οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσι τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ γράφεσθαι μηδ᾽ ἀπάγειν μηδ᾽ ἐφηγεῖσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον παρὰ ταῦτ᾽ οὐδεὶς οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν τῶν ἐνόχων ὄντων τούτοις τοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις. Ἀριστογείτονι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μόνῳ τῶν ἁπάντων οὐδὲν οὔτε δικαστήριον οὔτε νόμος κυριώτερόν ἐστι τῆς αὑτοῦ βουλήσεως.
[9] Again, when a plaintiff fails to obtain a fifth part of the votes, in cases where the laws forbid him henceforward to indict anyone or arrest him or give him into custody, in the same way none of those liable to these disqualifications ever dreams of defying them. But for Aristogeiton, it seems, and for Aristogeiton alone, no court, no law has authority higher than his own caprice.
[10] καὶ ταῦτα πάνθ᾽ οὕτω διαφυλάττουσιν οὐδεπώποτ᾽ οὔθ᾽ ὑμῖν οὔτε τοῖς προγόνοις μετεμέλησεν. ἔστι γὰρ δημοκρατίας φυλακὴ τῶν μὲν ἐχθρῶν ἢ βουλευομένους ἢ μαχομένους περιεῖναι, τῶν δὲ νόμων ἢ προαιρουμένους ἢ συναναγκαζομένους ἡττᾶσθαι. καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὅτι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον προσήκει πράττεσθαι, καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ τούτου συνωμολόγηται.
[10] Neither you nor your ancestors ever repented of observing these rules, for it is the salvation of democracy that it overcomes its enemies either by good counsel or by arms, but submits to its laws either by free choice or under constraint; and that this principle is sound, is allowed even by the defendant himself.
[11] ὅτε γὰρ Ὑπερείδης ἔγραψε, τῶν περὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἀτυχημάτων τοῖς Ἕλλησι γενομένων, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐδαφῶν εἰς κίνδυνον μέγιστον κατακεκλειμένης, εἶναι τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους, ἵν᾽ ὁμονοοῦντες ἅπαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας προθύμως ἀγωνίζωνται, ἐάν τις κίνδυνος τηλικοῦτος καταλαμβάνῃ τὴν πόλιν, τούτου τοῦ ψηφίσματος γραφὴν παρανόμων ἀπενέγκας ἠγωνίζετ᾽ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ.
[11] For after the disasters to the Greek forces at Chaeroneia, when the very foundations of our State were threatened with the utmost danger, when Hypereides proposed that the disfranchised citizens should be reinstated in order that, if any such danger should menace our State, all classes might unite wholeheartedly in the struggle for liberty, the defendant indicted this decree as unconstitutional and conducted his case in court.
[12] καίτοι πῶς οὐ δεινὸν εἰς μὲν τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος σωτηρίαν μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν Ἀριστογείτονα τουτονὶ συγχωρῆσαι τυχεῖν τῆς ἐπιτιμίας, εἰς δὲ τὴν αὑτοῦ παρανομίαν παρὰ πάντων ὑμῶν ἀξιοῦν λαμβάνειν τὴν αὐτὴν δωρειάν; καίτοι πολύ γε νομιμώτερον καὶ δικαιότερον τὸ ψήφισμ᾽ ἐκεῖν᾽ ἦν οὗ σὺ νῦν ἀξιοῖς ψηφίσασθαί σοι τουτουσί.
[12] But is it not monstrous that, where the safety of the State is involved, the defendant should allow none of his fellow-citizens to obtain enfranchisement, but should claim that same favour from you all, in order to cover his own lawlessness? Yet the former vote, Aristogeiton, was far more lawful and equitable than the vote which you now require the jurors to cast in your favour.
[13] τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον καὶ κοινὸν ἅπασι τοῖς πολίταις ἦν, τὸ δ᾽ ἄνισον καὶ σοὶ μόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὴν πλεονεξίαν κατασκευάζον: καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ γενέσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην ἐφ᾽ ᾧ θ᾽ ἕνα κύριον τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας καταστῆναι, τὸ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ τουτωνὶ δόγματα καὶ νόμιμα ἐκ παλαιοῦ παραδοθένθ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων σοὶ μόνῳ δεδόσθαι ἐξουσίαν ἀδεῶς παραβαίνοντι καὶ πράττοντι ὅ τι ἂν βουληθῇς.
[13] For the one was fair and equal for all citizens alike, but this is unfair and brings profit to you alone of all the people of Athens. The first was intended to prevent a peace by which one man would have been put in control of the whole government; the effect of this vote will be that you have received authority to transgress with impunity the decisions of the jury and the laws handed down by our ancestors — to do, in fact, whatever you please.
[14] ἡδέως δ᾽ ἂν ἔγωγ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐρωτήσαιμι πότερ᾽ ἔννομον καὶ δικαίαν ἐποιήσατο τοῦ ψηφίσματος τὴν γραφὴν ἢ τοὐναντίον ἄδικον καὶ παράνομον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀσύμφερον καὶ τῷ δήμῳ βλαβεράν, δι᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δικαίως ἂν ἀποθάνοι: εἰ δὲ συμφέρουσαν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὠφέλιμον, διὰ τί νῦν τἀναντί᾽ οἷς αὐτὸς ἔγραψας ψηφίζεσθαι τούτους ἀξιοῖς; ἀλλ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνα δίκαια οὔτε ταῦτ᾽ ἔννομ᾽ οὐδὲ συμφέροντ᾽ ἐστὶν ὑμῖν.
[14] I should like to ask him whether his indictment of the decree was lawful and right or on the other hand unjust and illegal. For if the indictment was inexpedient and against the interests of the people, on that very ground he richly deserves death; but if it was useful and advantageous to the majority, why, pray, do you now insist on the jury giving a verdict which is contrary to your indictment? No; your proceedings then were unjust and now are neither lawful nor beneficial to the citizens.
[15] ὁρῶ δ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἔγωγ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτην ἔχοντας τὴν γνώμην καὶ περὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν: πολλὰς γὰρ ἐνδείξεις ἤδη κατεψηφίσασθ᾽ ἰδιωτῶν ἀνθρώπων. καίτοι πῶς οὐ δεινὸν ἐφ᾽ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἐξετάζεσθαι ἀκριβῶς τοὺς νόμους, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν περιεργαζομένων τι καὶ κοινῇ πάντας ἐνοχλούντων καὶ προσποιουμένων ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι ῥᾳθύμως οὕτως ἔχειν;
[15] I can see that you, men of Athens, are of this opinion in your own behalf, for you have ere now decided many such “informations” laid against private men. Yet is it not all wrong that in your own case you should so scrupulously examine the laws, but in the case of these mischief-makers, who annoy everyone alike and pretend to be superior to the rest, you should display such indifference?
[16] οὐ γὰρ δή τινες ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὡς προσῆκον μὲν ταῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τὴν Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ τὸ χρήσι�
�ον αὐτὸν ὑμῖν εἶναι παροπτέον τι καὶ παρανομοῦντ᾽ αὐτόν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ πονηρὸς καὶ τὸν τρόπον δεινῶς ἄδικος, ἱκανῶς ὑμῖν, ὡς ἔγωγ᾽ οἶμαι, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων Λυκοῦργος ἐπιδέδειχεν: ὅτι δ᾽ οὐδὲ χρήσιμος, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πολιτευμάτων ἄν τις αὐτοῦ θεωρήσειεν.
[16] It is impossible that any of you are of opinion that things ought to be as I say, but that, because of the decorous behavior of Aristogeiton and his usefulness to you, you ought to wink even at his violation of the laws. I think Lycurgus in his speech has satisfactorily proved that the defendant is an unscrupulous man and has an extraordinary faculty for injustice; and that he is not a useful citizen, anyone can see from his public performances.
[17] τίνα γὰρ παραγαγὼν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὧν ᾐτιᾶτο, τούτων καὶ ᾕρηκεν καὶ εἷλεν; ἢ ποῖον πόρον ὑμῖν πεπόρικεν; ἢ τί ψήφισμα γέγραφεν ᾧ πεισθέντες ὑμεῖς οὐ πάλιν μετανοῆσαι προείλεσθε; καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα: οὕτω σκαιός ἐστι καὶ βάρβαρος τὸν τρόπον ὥστε, ὅταν ὑμᾶς ἴδῃ πρός τινας ὀργισθέντας τι καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος παροξυνθέντας, τηνικαῦτα παρὰ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑμῶν τὰ βουλήματα λαβὼν τοῖς καιροῖς ἐναντιοῦται.
[17] For whom has he brought into court that he succeeded in convicting on the charges that he laid against him? Or what source of revenue has he provided for you? Or what decree has he ever drafted that you were not afterwards glad to disown? The truth is, he is so tactless, so un-Greek in his temperament, that when he sees you somewhat angry with anyone and rather more exasperated than the occasion calls for, he at once anticipates your wishes in the moment of your wrath and so opposes your interests.
[18] δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολιτευόμενον ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν οὐχὶ τοῖς ἐξαίφνης μετ᾽ ὀργῆς πάθεσιν ὑμῖν συμπίπτουσιν ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι καιροῖς: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ταχὺ μεταπίπτειν εἴθισται, τὰ δὲ διαμένειν καὶ πλείω χρόνον ὑπάρχειν: ὧν οὗτος οὐδὲν ἐνθυμούμενος ἐλέγχει τἀπόρρητα τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστε ταὔτ᾽ ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ κύρια καὶ πάλιν ἄκυρα ποιεῖν.
[18] But a statesman, acting on your behalf, ought not to follow up the hasty sentiments that accompany your anger, but should be guided by reasons, by events, by the opportunities that present themselves. For sentiments are wont to change quickly, but reasons to subsist for a longer period. Paying no regard to this the defendant detects the secret weakness of community, so that the same policy is bound to be ratified one day and repealed the next.
[19] ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ὅτι πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀεὶ προαιρεῖται λοιδορεῖσθαι καὶ διαβοᾶσθαι καὶ μέμφεσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα, διὰ ταῦτα περιποιῆσαι νῦν αὐτὸν ἁρμόττει. ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε νὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ὄνειδός ἐστιν, ἄνδρες δικασταί, τῇ πόλει γιγνόμεν᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος, καὶ διὰ τὰς τούτων ἀπονοίας ἐπονείδιστον ἤδη τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ὑμῶν ἐστιν. εἰ δ᾽ οὖν τινι τοῦθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐν ἡδονῇ συμβέβηκεν, οὐκ ἀπορήσετε τῶν τοιαῦτα ποιησόντων, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν μεστὸν τὸ βῆμ᾽ ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς συμβεβουλευμένοις χαλεπόν, ἀλλὰ συμβουλεῦσαι καὶ πεῖσαί τι τῶν δεόντων ὑμᾶς ψηφίσασθαι.
[19] But perhaps because the role he adopts is to rail at everyone, to shout people down and find fault with their speeches, therefore it is convenient in these times to protect him. Gentlemen of the jury, I swear by the goddess of Athens that what takes place on the hustings is a disgrace to our city, and it is through the recklessness of such speakers that political life is now discredited with all decent citizens. But if any of you happen to like that sort of thing, you will never want for such performers. Why, even now the platform swarms with them. For to pick holes in the counsel offered is not difficult, but it is difficult to advise you and persuade you to pass any indispensable resolution.
[20] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὲν μὴ καὶ πρότερον τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις χρώμενος λόγοις ἐξηπάτησεν ὑμᾶς, ὅτ᾽ ἠγωνίσατο τὴν προτέραν ἔνδειξιν, ἦν μὲν οὐδ᾽ οὕτω δίκαιον παρὰ τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας νόμους τι συγχωρεῖν （οὐ δεῖ γὰρ παρανομεῖν δόντας τισὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀξιοῦν πράττειν）, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως γ᾽ εὐλογώτερον ἦν τὸ πιστεῦσαι καὶ καταχαρίσασθαι καὶ προέσθαι τι τῶν τοιούτων.
[20] Furthermore, if he had not already deceived you by using these same arguments, when he was on trial at the earlier information, even so it would not be just to make any concession contrary to the existing laws; for you must not allow some persons to break the law and insist on the rest obeying it. Yet just possibly it might then have been more reasonable to trust him and grant him privileges and sacrifice some of these principles.
[21] ἐπειδὴ δὲ τότ᾽ ἀφέντες ἐπὶ ταῖς ὁμολογουμέναις ἐλπίσιν, μικρὸν ὕστερον τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ, πάλιν ἐκολάσατε, τίς ὑπολείπεται σκῆψις ὑμῖν ἁρμόττουσα, ἂν νῦν παρακρουσθῆτε; ὧν μὲν γὰρ ἔργῳ πεῖραν εἰλήφατε, τί δεῖ τοῖς λόγοις πιστεύειν; ὧν δὲ μηδέπω τὴν δοκιμασίαν ἔχετ᾽ ἀκριβῆ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ἴσως ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι κρίνειν.
[21] But after you had let him off, admittedly in hope of amendment, and then shortly after had to punish the same man again for speaking and acting against the best interests of the city, what reasonable excuse is left you if you are a second time hoodwinked? When you have tried him by deeds, why need you trust his words? In cases where you have not yet an accurate test ready to hand, it may perhaps be necessary to judge by words.
[22] θαυμάζω δ᾽ ἔγωγε τῶν οὕτως ἐχόντων ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἴδια τοῖς ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων χρόνων οὖσιν ἐπιεικέσι, τούτοις παρακατατίθεσθαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κοινὰ τοῖς ὁμολογουμένως ἐξεληλεγμένοις οὖσι φαύλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. καὶ κύνα μὲν ἐπὶ ποίμνην ἀγεννῆ καὶ φαῦλον οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἐπιστήσειε φυλάττειν: ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ πράττοντας τοὺς τυχόντας ἀνθρώπους φασὶν ἔνιοι φύλακας δεῖν ἐπιπέμπειν, οἳ προσποιούμενοι μηνύειν τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας αὐτοὶ τῆς μεγίστης εἰσὶ φυλακῆς δεόμενοι.
[22] But, for myself, I am amazed that there are men so constituted that, though they deposit private property with those only whose past record shows them to be honest, they entrust public affai
rs to men who have been admittedly proved unscrupulous. No one would dream of setting a sorry mongrel to guard a flock; yet some people say that, to keep watch on those who administer the State, one need only employ the first comers, men who pretend to detect delinquents, but need the most careful watching themselves.
[23] ὧν, ἐὰν ἔχητε νοῦν, ἐνθυμούμενοι τοὺς μὲν φάσκοντας τούτους τῷ λόγῳ φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς χαίρειν ἐάσετε, αὐτοὶ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παραφυλάξετε, ὅπως μηδενὶ δῶτ᾽ ἐξουσίαν ἀκύρους τοὺς νόμους ποιεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πλήθους καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν δύνασθαι προσποιουμένων. ὡς πάνδεινόν ἐστιν τοὺς μὲν προγόνους ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καταλυθῆναι τοὺς νόμους ἀποθνῄσκειν τολμᾶν, ὑμᾶς δὲ μηδὲ τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας εἰς αὐτοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸν μὲν γράψαντα τοὺς νόμους Σόλωνα ἐψηφίσθαι χαλκοῦν ἐν ἀγορᾷ στῆσαι, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν νόμων ὀλιγωροῦντας φαίνεσθαι, δι᾽ οὓς κἀκεῖνον ὑπερβαλλόντως συμβέβηκε τιμᾶσθαι.