That did not happen, and the pattern of his first interventions in Gaul was repeated time and again over the next few years. Over the winter reports came to him that the Belgic tribes were exchanging hostages and ‘conspiring’ against the Roman people. Most likely the arrival of a Roman army so close to their territory – the legions wintered among the Sequani – appeared to the Belgians as a direct threat. It was certainly not something they could ignore, and the leaders of one tribe decided to deal with the new situation in a different way. The Remi sent a deputation to Caesar and surrendered themselves to the fides and might of the Roman people, offering hostages as surety as well as practical support such as grain to feed his soldiers. They also provided him with information about the plans and strengths of the other Belgic tribes.27
Caesar took care to treat the Remi well, force-marching troops to protect one of their oppida when it was threatened by warriors from the other tribes. Besieging the main town of another tribe, the Suessiones, he accepted their surrender readily when the Remi spoke up on their behalf. Soon afterwards he similarly was generous in the terms he gave to the Bellovaci, when Diviciacus of the Aedui espoused their cause. Leaders and peoples who welcomed Rome and proved loyal and supportive did very well out of Caesar’s presence. A favour done on behalf of the Aedui or Remi placed the recipients in their debt as well as that of Caesar and Rome. Simply having to request it made clear their acceptance of Rome’s superiority. In the next few years the Aedui were restored to pre-eminence in central Gaul, with many other peoples placed under obligation to them. The Remi rose to be second only to the Aedui in matters of status.28
The presence of a Roman army, let alone its advance into a region, could not be ignored, especially when it was strong and led by so energetic and aggressive a governor as Caesar. Although only a few other proconsuls ever enjoyed comparably long and large-scale provincial commands, his behaviour was not fundamentally different from that of other governors granted lesser resources and shorter spells in office. The Romans were strong and might well prove willing to intervene and shatter the existing balance of power. Their friends – at least those who behaved in a suitably submissive way – might be able to harness this strength to their own advantage. In every province the Romans were met with leaders and communities who wanted their support. Through winning Caesar’s trust, Diviciacus regained the prominence he had lost in competition with his brother and other leaders. The Aedui as a whole regained their prestige and influence over other tribes because they were seen as able to win favours from the Romans. Other tribes, such as the Remi, also did well, and so did individual noblemen. Caesar’s favour was enough to raise some chieftains to be tribal leaders and kings.29
It is a mistake to view this process purely from the viewpoint of Roman expansion, and with the benefit of hindsight to see the creation of the empire as inevitable. In 58 BC few were likely to have guessed that Gaul would be ruled by Rome for the next 500 years. Roman intervention did not always translate into a permanent military presence instead of simply a system of alliances with independent peoples. Far more importantly, we must not assume that feelings towards Rome were foremost in the minds of leaders in Gaul or anywhere else. Noblemen were competing for rank and pre-eminence among their own peoples long before Caesar arrived. A wider aristocracy and the institutions of a state had in relatively recent memory supplanted the rule of kings, but the dream of achieving monarchy remained an attractive one for many. Tribes fought with tribes for dominance, to control valuable assets, or simply to protect themselves by intimidating potential aggressors. None of this was created by Rome, let alone by Caesar, although the growth of trade with the developed economies of the Mediterranean world may have escalated competition and war by increasing the prizes falling to the successful.
When Caesar chose to intervene against the Helvetii a new factor was introduced to this ongoing competition. Leaders and whole peoples had the choice between welcoming or resisting it. It was difficult for anyone to ignore the arrival of the legions, and attempts to stand apart risked an existing local rival harnessing Roman power for their own benefit, giving them a great advantage. On balance, well-established rivalries and old grudges counted for far more than attitudes to Rome. Exactly the same was true of the arrival of the Helvetii or Ariovistus and his Germans – better if possible to come to terms with them before competitors did.
Plenty of men did well from aligning themselves with Caesar and Rome. Those with existing connections such as Diviciacus and the Aedui in general were very well placed to achieve this – as indeed did the Sequani after the defeat of Ariovistus. The relationship between the Remi and Rome was new, since they lived too far from Transalpine Gaul for there to have been any earlier contact, but they nevertheless benefited on a grand scale. Apart from backing well-disposed leaders and having to provide soldiers – usually cavalry – and supplies on request, there was no interference in internal affairs.
Yet for all those who gained by friendship with the newly arrived Romans, there were others who lost out. Ariovistus’ recent acknowledgement by Rome was trumped by the coincidence of the Aedui’s older link and Caesar’s current ambitions. Had the Helvetii not migrated and prompted the proconsul to respond, he might well have focused entirely on the Balkans and let the status quo in Gaul continue. Dumnorix had hoped to gain through support from the Helvetii once they established themselves. Instead they were defeated and he watched as his brother once again became ascendant in their tribe. Diviciacus may well have been dead by 54 BC, when his younger brother assured the ruling council of the Aedui that Caesar planned to install him as their king. In fact the proconsul continued to be suspicious of him and was determined that he should be one of the Gallic noblemen to accompany the Roman army when it crossed to Britain that summer. Dumnorix tried to avoid this, and then spread rumours that the Romans planned to kill these men once they were out of sight of the rest of Gaul. Meeting in secret with others, he wanted them to swear an oath to join together and act for Gaul, implying the expulsion of Caesar and his army. Several of the men informed on him to the proconsul to prove their own loyalty. Dumnorix slipped away from the camp, but was caught and killed when he resisted his pursuers. Caesar had given explicit orders allowing them to do this if he could not be brought back alive. The band of Aedui with him returned to the army and continued to serve alongside the legions.30
In spite of the circumstances of his death, Dumnorix appears only to have become a clear enemy of the Romans at a late stage, when he found that his ambitions were blocked by Caesar’s distrust. A similar situation occurred a little earlier in 54 BC among the Treveri, a people famous for their excellent cavalry, who had sought alliance with the Romans three years before. Two chieftains were now competing for primacy over the tribe, and one of them, Cingetorix, decided to go to Caesar and pledge his loyalty. The other, his father-in-law Indutiomarus, began raising bands of warriors to fight and win control of the tribe through civil war. He only changed his mind when a steady stream of aristocrats going to Caesar made him doubt that he had sufficient support to win such a struggle. Finally he too went to the Roman camp, bringing as requested 200 hostages, including his son and other relatives, and pledging his loyalty. In meetings with the tribal nobility, Caesar persuaded them to back Cingetorix. It was a reward for loyalty, but also a pragmatic decision that it was better to have a reliable man – and one in his debt – leading the tribe.31
Indutiomarus resented the eminence of his rival, and the consequent diminishing of his own status and influence. He did not see the favour shown by the Romans to Cingetorix as the end of the game. Later in the same year the king appointed by Caesar to rule the Carnutes tribe was killed by ambitious noblemen after a two-year reign. The Senones tried to do the same thing to the king imposed on them by the proconsul, although in this case their king managed to escape to the Roman camp. Indutiomarus knew that it was unwise to act alone, since no single tribe stood a chance against Caesar’s army, and apart from that h
e could not be sure of more than a fraction of his own people. He tried without success to persuade some of the German leaders from the far side of the Rhine to support him with their warriors. He did manage to convince two chieftains in a neighbouring Gallic tribe, the Eburones, to attack the force of one and a half Roman legions wintering in their territory. The annihilation through treachery of this garrison gave Indutiomarus enough popularity to expel Cingetorix and win leadership of the Treveri. The success proved brief, for when he attempted to attack another Roman fort he was specifically targeted and killed by a carefully prepared sally.32
Local rivalries, rather than hostility or affection for Caesar and Rome, seem to have been the driving force behind the power struggles within the tribes. Decisions were made on a pragmatic assessment of personal advantage and the prospects of success. As the legions approached, the Senones began to mobilise their forces, but realised that they were not ready so sent to Caesar offering to surrender. In a familiar pattern the Aedui spoke up for them and so the request was granted. The Remi spoke up for the Carnutes, similarly securing them peace in return for handing over hostages. War was waged on the Treveri, now led by a relative of Indutiomarus – presumably one not given over as a hostage. They were defeated, and he fled to take shelter among the Germans. Caesar reinstalled Cingetorix at the head of the tribe. The territory of the Eburones was devastated, and at the end of the year the proconsul ordered the execution of Acco, the principal leader of the coups among the Senones and Carnutes. He was beaten to death in a public display of Roman retribution.33
RESISTING ROME
By the winter of 53–52 BC, the mood of the Gallic aristocracy shifted. Men who had welcomed Caesar’s arrival and done well from his support and protection now realised that this was to be no short intervention. The Romans appeared to be in Gaul to stay, and it seemed unlikely that they would withdraw back to Transalpine Gaul even when Caesar’s term of command expired. Dumnorix had been killed for refusing to obey Caesar and Acco executed, demonstrating the Romans’ willingness to dispose of even the most distinguished chieftains as it suited them. Neither man had been fighting against Rome when punishment was inflicted. In essence there was a realisation that Gaul had been conquered, similar to the change of heart when the Sequani understood that their ally Ariovistus had become their overlord. This was a blow to pride, especially since the Romans – like the German war leader – had again and again claimed to have intervened only to protect their allies. Even Caesar felt that it was natural for the Gauls, like all men, to fight for their freedom – not that this ever led him or his fellow citizens to question whether it was right for them to take it away.
At this late stage, hatred of the Roman invaders spread. The first organised meetings occurred secretly in the territory of the Carnutes. It is possible that there was a religious element, for it was among this people that the druidic cult traditionally assembled, and their authority in arbitrating disputes within and between tribes had been usurped by Caesar. Yet even now there remained an important element of pragmatism, just as there had been from the start. Caesar had prevented the Helvetii from shifting the balance of power in central Gaul, removed Ariovistus and stopped other Germanic groups from forcing their way across the Rhine. Leaders and tribes who had gained from Roman backing wondered whether this connection would continue to be so advantageous. It imposed limits on how much power an ambitious leader could achieve, especially outside his own people. From the beginning Gallic chieftains had matched Caesar in cynicism, using him just as much as he had used them. For many it now seemed that his usefulness to them was outweighed by the better prospects offered by his expulsion from the region.34
The main leader of the rising that followed was Vercingetorix of the Arverni. Caesar mentions that his father had been one of the most important chieftains in all Gaul, and claims that the son had staged a revolution within the tribe to make himself king. Another source says that the proconsul had shown him a good deal of favour and support. This was certainly true of Commius, another of the prominent commanders of the Gauls during this campaign. Caesar had employed him on a number of important tasks, and then further demonstrated his faith by making Commius king of the Atrebates and subjecting neighbouring tribes to his supervision.35
At first the Aedui stood apart from the war with the Romans, more concerned with a bitter dispute for the office of chief magistrate or vergobret. In spite of the ongoing campaign, the proconsul went in person to arbitrate, deciding in favour of one of the two candidates. His efforts to keep the Aedui firm in their alliance with Rome failed when the newly confirmed vergobret decided to join the rebellion. Caesar says that the new vergobret had received gifts from the Arverni which he shared with many young noblemen, speaking to them of their lost freedom. It may well have grated that the magistrate’s appointment had needed to be confirmed by the proconsul – something which Caesar no doubt expected would win gratitude. Turning against the Romans would demonstrate that he was his own man. On top of that the majority of tribes had already joined the alliance against Rome and things did not appear to be going well for Caesar. If the legions were defeated then it was better to have joined the rising early enough to claim a share of the credit for the victory – being left as the most prominent ally of a defeated Rome was not an appealing prospect.36
The Aedui turned against Caesar in a series of impulsive acts amid a flood of false rumours. Almost immediately they challenged Vercingetorix for control of the campaign, trying to exploit the fact that they held many hostages on behalf of the proconsul and so were able to send these back to their homes. Even so, this attempt failed and they co-operated rather sullenly in the rest of the fighting. The Remi – recent friends and never spoken of as ‘brothers’ – stayed loyal to the Romans, as did their allies the Lingones. All of the other tribes joined the rising, but in spite of this Caesar’s luck, skill and the stubborn determination of his legions ended the war in Roman victory.37
Vercingetorix surrendered and was held as a prisoner until he was executed in Caesar’s delayed triumph in 46 BC. Commius fought on, survived two attempts to kill him – one when he had agreed to negotiate with the Romans. Eventually he escaped to Britain, declaring that he never wished to see the face of another Roman. Many tribes were severely punished by the enslavement of their captured warriors and the levying of heavy penalties. Caesar was lenient to the Arverni and the Aedui, releasing some 20,000 prisoners he had taken from them. New hostages were demanded and the proconsul spent the winter at Bibracte, but overall both tribes continued to enjoy a favoured status under Roman rule. In the short term legions were stationed in or near their territory to keep a close eye on them. Two years were spent in mopping-up operations and intensive diplomacy:
Caesar had one main aim, keeping the tribes friendly, and giving them neither the opportunity nor cause for war. . . . And so, by dealing with the tribes honourably, by granting rich bounties to the chieftains, and by not imposing burdens, he made their state of subjection tolerable, and easily kept the peace in a Gaul weary after so many military defeats.38
Although there were revolts in Gaul in the decades after Caesar left, they were not on the same scale as the great rebellion in 53–52 BC, and it never again looked as if the Romans might be driven from the province. Some of this rested on the fear of Rome’s military might, and also because conditions were made acceptable to the Gauls, and especially the aristocracy. There continued to be very little interference in the day-to-day affairs of the tribes. Only occasionally did the constraints on chieftains’ ambitions provoke men to the desperate alternative of resorting to violence.39
Caesar overran Gaul in less than a decade. He spoke of ‘pacifying’ regions far from the borders of the Roman province, and treated as an act of hostility any welcome short of immediate surrender to his power. The speed of this conquest came from a combination of the peculiar political situation which gave a governor such a long command and the restless energy and skill of Caesar. Elsewhere i
n the empire things often happened more slowly, sometimes over several generations, but the processes themselves were similar. Regional and local politics were dynamic and saw ongoing competition, often vigorous and sometimes openly violent. When the Romans appeared on the scene they simply added a new element to this. In many cases it was not seen as the most important factor, and only hindsight makes us assume this.40
Leaders and communities in the wider world did their best to exploit Roman power for their own advantage. Sometimes they sought Roman help, like the Aedui against the Sequani, because their neighbours benefited from the support of some other external power. Equally, a Roman intervention on behalf of one group made others search for outside help to counter this. In most cases attitudes to Rome – or indeed the other powers – were far less important than the desire for short-term gain. Local ambition was the driving force, and this is something that would continue as a theme throughout the centuries to come.
Caesar exploited the rivalries within and between tribes, as did other governors in Gaul and throughout the empire. Rome did not always choose to intervene, and acknowledgement of friendship did not guarantee aid when requested. Cynicism and self-interest were common on both sides – something which should not surprise us. The leaders of the rising in Gaul hoped to be great and powerful men if they won. In most tribes there were others who managed to switch sides in time or who remained loyal. We hear of one Arvernian chief described as ‘most friendly to the Roman people’ who handed over a rebel leader to the Romans in 51 BC. Some tribes suffered badly – the archaeological record for the Belgic region suggests that this was devastated during Caesar’s campaigns. Yet these were not wars of extermination. Most tribes were still there at the end of the wars, and many continued to prosper. Old friends of the Roman people flourished and new ones joined them.
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