Augustus spent most of his reign away from Italy, touring the provinces, organising them, dealing with petitions, travelling and working hard even when he was an old man. He supervised many of the major campaigns, and the rest were led by a close associate, usually a member of his extended family. Tiberius was close to his fifty-sixth birthday when he succeeded Augustus, and had a long record of active and successful military command so he did not have to prove himself as a general. He also had little appetite for travel, or indeed for the dull routine followed by Augustus, and after a few years spent more and more time in the country. In AD 27 he went to live on the island of Capri and did not return to Rome for the last ten years of his life. In the early years of his reign, his nephew and adopted son Germanicus commanded in Germany and the east, acting in place of the princeps much as Tiberius and others had done for Augustus. Germanicus died in AD 19, and Tiberius’ own son Drusus was only briefly used in a similar way and then in turn died four years later. The princeps did not choose to employ any other family members in a similar fashion.
It is important to stress just how far Tiberius’ style of rule differed from that of Augustus, for this would do far more to influence the behaviour of later emperors. Augustus spent much of his long reign on the move, visiting almost every province at least once, and employing close associates and family to act in the same way in other parts of the empire. Of his successors, only Hadrian travelled on anything like the same scale. None were able to find so many family members to act in their stead. Usually this was a question of trust, for Augustus was the son of the divine Julius, the victor of Actium, the father of his country. His relatives won glory for themselves, but at the same time reinforced his far greater prestige. They were not and could not be equals or rivals, even when granted some of his powers. In many ways this was the leadership of two or more principes rather than one princeps, but the dominance of Augustus was unquestioned. No one else was ever as secure.
Lacking trustworthy relatives, the alternatives were to go and preside over a major war in person, or to entrust this to a senatorial legate, but that risked giving that man fame and glory, perhaps even allowing him to subvert the loyalty of the soldiers under his command. Tiberius was already a proven commander and by now had had enough of life in the field. Unwilling to campaign in person, he did not trust family or senators to hold too many major commands. Ordinary provincial legates never controlled more than four, later three legions, and did not on their own have enough military force to overthrow the emperor. They could only do so if several joined together, and the competitive instincts of Roman aristocrats made this unlikely in most circumstances. Wars were fought to maintain the empire, but significant expansion would require greater resources than those at the disposal of a legate governing a single province.27
Caligula was young, had no military experience, and spent some time with the army but achieved nothing. Claudius was older, just as inexperienced, and had been proclaimed as emperor by the praetorian guard – household troops formed by Augustus to have a military force at his immediate disposal since he did not want to station any legion in Italy. In AD 43, two years after coming to power, Claudius launched an invasion of Britain, entrusting command to a legate, Aulus Plautius. Even so, the elderly and infirm emperor travelled to the island to command in person for the capture of the main tribal capital. Claudius spent just sixteen days in Britain, but made sure that the chief credit for the victory was his, although he was also generous with honours to all those senators involved in any way. This adventure satisfied his need for glory. A few years later Cnaeus Domitius Corbulo, one of his provincial legates, had begun to advance deep into Germany, but was recalled by the emperor. The man made the rueful comment, ‘How lucky Roman generals were in the old days’ of the Republic, but obeyed.28
Nero showed little interest in war, although he was praised for waging war against the Parthians rather than accepting a ‘shameful peace’ and entrusting a major command to Corbulo. Even so, a few years later he summoned the latter and ordered him to commit suicide. Nero’s death in AD 68 prompted the civil war in which Galba, Otho and Vitellius reigned in turn until Vespasian managed to restore some stability in AD 69. A year later his older son Titus presided over the capture of Jerusalem, breaking the heart of the Jewish rebellion, and this success was paraded as justification for their rule as emperors – for instance with the construction of the Arch of Titus and the Colosseum. Proven commanders, neither man chose to go on campaign while they were emperor, but they did permit aggressive warfare and expansion by their legates in Britain. Vespasian’s younger son Domitian came to power when Titus died suddenly after only a short reign. He could not boast a military record, and spent several years campaigning against the Germanic tribes and the Dacians. There were some gains in territory – or at least an advance of the army’s line of bases facing the German tribes – but he suffered at least two serious defeats at the hands of the Dacians and accepted a peace treaty which involved paying money to the Dacian king and giving him other aid. This further damaged his already poor reputation among the senatorial class.29
Domitian was murdered in AD 96 in a palace conspiracy, and the Senate chose the elderly and inoffensive Nerva as princeps. He then adopted Trajan, legate in command of one of the Rhine provinces and its army, who succeeded to power two years later. Although he had spent an above-average amount of time serving with the legions, the new emperor could not boast of any major successes. This soon changed when he embarked upon full-scale war against the Dacians, culminating in the creation of the new province. Dacia was wealthy from its mineral deposits, and Dacian gold paid for the lavish construction of the Forum of Trajan in Rome, which covered an area bigger than Caesar’s Forum and Augustus’ Forum put together. The prestige won on the Danube encouraged Trajan to launch his great eastern expedition, which at least in part was inspired by the dream of matching the glory of Alexander the Great. The Romans reached the Persian Gulf and the emperor compared himself to Alexander, but rebellions soon broke out in much of the newly conquered territory, and at the same time there was a revolt by the substantial Jewish populations of Egypt, Cyrenaica and Cyprus.30
Trajan’s health failed him and he died. It was claimed that in his last days he announced that he planned to adopt his relative Hadrian and name him as successor, but there was suspicion that this was a story invented as his widow and palace officials looked around for someone to succeed the princeps. Given the doubts about this, it is unsurprising that Hadrian wanted to get back to Rome rather than spend years in difficult operations to suppress rebellions, and so he abandoned the new provinces and withdrew. Much of his reign was spent touring the empire, and especially the military provinces, inspecting the army and watching the soldiers train. In several cases this led to redeployment of the units and most famously the construction of Hadrian’s Wall in northern Britain. There were no fresh wars of conquest, but there were operations on the frontiers and a long and difficult campaign to suppress a rebellion in Judaea.31
In AD 137 Hadrian died – it was claimed that he was such a skilled astrologer that he predicted the day and the hour – and was followed by Antoninus Pius, who was so secure in spite of his lack of any real military experience that he never left Italy and let provincial legates command in all the wars of his reign. None of these involved substantial conquest, although Hadrian’s Wall was decommissioned almost as soon as it was completed and the army moved north to the Antonine Wall on the Forth–Clyde line. At the end of his reign the Parthians attacked Rome’s eastern provinces – perhaps the only time under the Principate when they began a conflict. Antoninus Pius’ successors, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus ruling as colleagues, responded, the latter presiding over an expedition that went and sacked the Parthian capital city of Ctesiphon, just as Trajan had done. They did not revive that emperor’s new provinces, and the expeditionary force brought back with it a plague that devastated the empire over the next few years. Verus died young, and M
arcus Aurelius spent the second half of his reign almost permanently on campaign against the Germanic peoples living between the Rhine and Danube. New provinces were planned, briefly occupied, and then abandoned when he died in AD 180, his son Commodus preferring to return to Rome. He never again led an army in the field, even though he was young and active.32
Commodus’ murder on the last day of AD 192 led to civil war within a matter of months, and this time it took four years to resolve the conflict, as three provincial legates battled for power. The victor, Septimius Severus, twice embarked on major foreign wars, first in the east and then in Britain. It was no coincidence that these were the bases for his two rivals for the imperial throne, and one purpose of the campaigns was to confirm the loyalty of the armies based there. Dio Cassius, a senator of Greek extraction, was a contemporary and reports that Severus claimed that his new province of Mesopotamia was a ‘bulwark’ or ‘shield’ for Syria, making that province more secure. Dio was unconvinced, seeing the seizure of so much territory from the Parthians as provocative and too expensive.33
Rome under the emperors justified its war-making as it had always done, claiming to fight only in defence of its interests and allies. There were plenty of pretexts for war but, as under the Republic, the reasons for embarking on it often had more to do with domestic politics than anything else. Augustus received appeals from exiled British leaders to restore them to power and did not act upon them because he had plenty of other concerns. Claudius received a similar appeal at a time when he was insecure and desperate to win military renown and so invaded. Our sources do not suggest that senators or anyone else felt that the cause was not a just one. Dio also felt that Trajan responded to a real threat in breaking Domitian’s treaty with Dacia and going to war, but was less convinced that the Parthian expedition was anything more than a quest for glory. Imperium sine fine did not absolve Rome’s duty to act honourably, and genuine challenges or even insults to Roman supremacy were cause for war, while war for the sake of glory and nothing else was not honourable. Yet the dream remained, for emperors and senators still read Virgil and all the other authors who spoke of Rome’s destiny, and they thrilled at the stories of Alexander the Great and his victories, and indeed of Caesar and Augustus. As always, wars expanding Roman power did not have to mean the acquisition of new provinces, simply the humbling of enemies, as well as glory and plunder.34
Territorial expansion was unusual after AD 14. A few emperors needed military victories and so conquered new lands, but made sure that they gained the lion’s share of the credit. The best way to do this was to go to the war in person, which most were not inclined to do, while at the same time they were afraid to let a subordinate take charge. None ever assembled a team of senior colleagues and assistants to match those of Augustus, and so large-scale aggressive warfare became rare. Yet politics and war had always been intimately linked at Rome, and the emperors had to appear successful militarily. If wars occurred they must be won, and if they did not break out, then this must be because the might of Rome was so great that no one dared to be hostile. The growing sense that it was the duty of Rome to keep the peace and allow its allies and subjects to go about their business in safety became a central attribute of the emperor. Strabo claimed that ‘Never have the Romans and their allies thrived in such peace and plenty as that which was afforded them by Augustus Caesar, from the time he assumed absolute authority, and is now being afforded them by his son and successor, Tiberius.’35
Not only was war banished from the greater part of the world, but internally the provinces were safer and more settled because of the peace brought by Rome and its emperors. Velleius Paterculus, who served as an army officer and senator under Augustus and Tiberius, spoke in glowing terms of the world under their rule. ‘The pax augusta, which has spread to the regions of the east and of the west and to the bounds of the north and of the south, preserves every corner of the world safe from the fear of brigandage.’ Bandits were hunted down, pirates driven from the seas, and everywhere was peace and prosperity based on the strength and continued military power of the emperor. That at least was the proud boast of imperial propaganda.36
VIII
REBELLION
‘Passing to your present passion for liberty, I say that it comes too late. The time is past when you ought to have striven never to lose it. For servitude is a painful experience and a struggle to avoid it . . . is just. But the man who having once accepted the yoke then tries to cast it off is a contumacious slave, not a lover of liberty.’ – Josephus’ version of King Herod Agrippa II’s unsuccessful attempt to deter rebels in Jerusalem in AD 66.1
‘MUST EVERYONE ACCEPT SERVITUDE?’
While the pace of conquest slowed after Augustus, when it did occur the process was much the same as ever, save that it was more tightly controlled. Only the emperor could give the order and commit the necessary resources, which were usually substantial. For his invasion of Britain, Claudius mustered four legions supported by auxiliary infantry and cavalry, as well as transport ships and their crews and some warships. If the units were anywhere near their theoretical strength, then something like 40,000–50,000 men participated in the invasion. Julius Caesar had as many, and perhaps somewhat more men, in the later campaigns in Gaul, but few proconsuls under the Republic were ever given command of so many troops. The forces operating on the frontier with Germany after AD 9 were substantially larger, and the defeat of the Pannonian rebellion required twice as many soldiers, but even so this was a large force, amounting to at least 15 per cent of the entire Roman army.2
Roman wars were fought against political groups – states, kingdoms, tribes – and not simply to control ground. In AD 43 the first target of Claudius’ great expeditionary force was a confederation of tribes, centred around the Catuvellauni and Trinovantes, their heartland north of the River Thames. These were defeated in several battles and their capital at Camulodunum (near modern Colchester) was stormed. The Emperor Claudius made his brief visit to Britain to be present at this dramatic moment, before recrossing the Channel to Gaul and beginning the long journey back to Rome and his victory celebrations. Once the confederation had been broken up, the opposition was focused instead on individual tribes acting independently and fielding smaller armies.
To deal with the new situation, the expeditionary force split into several battlegroups, each based around a single legion and auxiliaries, to wage war at a slightly lower level. Some tribes were politically united and might be defeated in a single battle or by the capture of a central capital, while others had a much looser socio-political structure. The future emperor Vespasian commanded Legio II Augusta and operated in southern Britain, where he ‘fought thirty engagements, overcame two powerful tribes, more than twenty walled towns, and the Island of Vectis (the Isle of Wight)’. One of the tribes was the Durotriges, whose territory is filled with the remains of hill-forts, many of them large and surrounded with more than one line of ditches and ramparts, all of which suggests the presence of many rival chieftains rather than a strong central leader. The sites at Maiden Castle and Hod Hill have both revealed signs of Roman attack, and the latter was subsequently garrisoned by a detachment of Vespasian’s men.3
The Roman army adapted to defeat different opponents, changing the scale of its operations and the focus of its effort, but it did not fight for the sake of fighting. Diplomacy preceded the legions, and in Britain as everywhere else there were always local leaders and communities eager to ally with Rome. The dominance of the Catuvellauni and Trinovantes in the south-east was achieved after Julius Caesar’s forays to Britain by the subjugation of other peoples. Augustus and Caligula both received exiled British rulers driven out during these power struggles, and it was one such fugitive, King Verica, who fled to Claudius and provided the public justification for Roman intervention. When Camulodunum fell, the emperor personally received the honourable submission of eleven British rulers. Some may well have been allies before the Romans invaded, perhaps receiving s
ubsidy or other support. Others decided to join the stronger power, or preferred alliance with Rome to the domination of the tribal confederation. As elsewhere, particular leaders and the factions around them made these choices on the basis of personal advantage or because a rival within or from another tribe committed to the other side. Many leaders and some whole tribes seem never to have fought against Rome.
There is also no good evidence to suggest that the Catuvellauni and Trinovantes were hostile to Rome before AD 43. There was a lot of trade between the tribes of Britain and the empire, and the leaders of the confederation were as eager as other chieftains and kings to benefit from this and to gain access to the luxury goods that helped to bolster their status. The community of Roman merchants living semi-permanently on the Thames in what would become Londinium existed quite happily with their neighbours. Exiles were received by the emperors, but it was only Claudius’ need for glory as proof of his right to rule that prompted large-scale military intervention instead of simply diplomatic activity. The leaders of the confederation may well have been just as surprised as Ariovistus was in 58 BC at the sudden change in Roman attitude and the arrival of the legions.
Two brothers, Caratacus and Togodumnus, led the Catuvellauni and Trinovantes when the Romans attacked. Togodumnus died in the early fighting, but his brother survived and continued to fight. Existing alliances, new friendships or his reputation as a war leader and personal charisma allowed him to move to what is now Wales and rally the tribes there to join his own followers. Eight years later he was defeated in battle, once again escaping and this time going to the Brigantes, a very large tribe living in northern England. Their queen was a Roman ally and decided that it was in her best interest to maintain this link, so handed over the fugitive as a prisoner. In Rome he was brought before Claudius and carried himself with dignity, declaring that, if circumstances had been different, he would surely have been welcomed as a worthy ally. As it was, the hard fight he had made only added to the glory of Roman victory. ‘I had horses and warriors, arms and wealth – can you wonder that I wanted to keep them? For if you wish to rule the world, must everyone accept servitude?’ The words were written by the Roman historian Tacitus, but whatever was actually said, Claudius spared the lives of Caratacus, his family and followers and gave them a comfortable captivity. The defeated leader was no longer a danger, allowing the emperor to make this public display of mercy.4
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