There is no evidence that Varus engaged in such blatant profiteering, although the historian Velleius Paterculus claimed that during his time in Syria he had gone ‘to a rich province as a poor man, and left a poor province as a rich man’. Later he was blamed for assuming that the German province was securely settled, and for despising the tribesmen, seeing them as ‘human only in shape and speech, and that though they would not be subdued by the sword would nevertheless submit to law’. This was the wisdom of hindsight, and it is hard to know whether or not Varus was unusually contemptuous and complacent. The arrogance, brutality and extortion so commonly encountered in provincial government under the Republic did not vanish with the coming of the Principate. One of the leaders of the great Pannonian revolt against Augustus complained that ‘You Romans are to blame for this; for you send as guardians to your flocks, not dogs or shepherds, but wolves.’20
Taxation was a common cause of friction, whether from its sheer scale or the way that it was collected. The Frisii, one of a handful of Germanic peoples living east of the Rhine who stayed under Roman control after AD 9, were subject to an annual levy of ox hides and appear to have paid this without excessive hardship or resentment for more than a generation. In AD 28 the army officer put in charge of supervising the levy announced that from now on each hide must be of a set size and chose the immense forest aurochs as the standard. The Frisii were unable to supply these in quantity – Tacitus noted that cattle in Germany were smaller than those in the empire, something confirmed by archaeology. When the Frisians werre unable to meet their obligations, the Romans began to seize their land as well as women and children to sell as slaves in lieu of the debts. As was often the case, the explosion of resentment was not instant, but when it came it was especially savage. The soldiers supervising the levy were crucified, although, like Decianus Catus, the officer in charge made his escape. The legate of Lower Germany responded with a punitive expedition, but the campaign was mishandled and resulted in heavy losses. Two detachments were left behind when the column retreated, one to be wiped out and the other preferring suicide to capture. Tacitus accused the Emperor Tiberius of suppressing the scale of the casualties because he did not want to entrust anyone with the responsibility of fighting a major war on this frontier to avenge the defeat.21
Levies might be in money, kind or a quota of recruits for the auxilia. A rebellion occurred in Thrace under Tiberius when a rumour spread that Thracian auxiliaries would no longer serve in neighbouring provinces, but be sent to the far corners of the empire. Some tribes rebelled, but others stayed loyal and aided the Roman army, which arrived and broke the rebels’ spirit in a rapid campaign. In AD 70 the previously loyal Batavians – a Germanic tribe who had migrated across the Rhine and been settled in what is now Holland – were provoked by the ‘greed and licence’ of the officers in charge of recruiting. This was the only tax burden placed on these communities, and Batavian auxiliaries had a reputation as some of the finest soldiers in the army. One trick was to conscript the elderly and infirm, forcing their families to pay for them to be released and to provide a substitute to serve in their place. There were also cases where underage boys were enrolled and then raped by the recruiting officer. The levy was ordered during the chaotic year and a half of civil war after the death of Nero, which may have encouraged the men in charge to think that they could act as they wished without fear of punishment. Anger at this mistreatment grew, fighting against a long habit of loyalty, and it took the grievances and ambitions of a number of local leaders to convert discontent into rebellion. All of these men were Roman citizens, many equestrians, and representatives of a local aristocracy who had gained a good deal through joining the empire.22
The same was true in AD 9. Plenty of German leaders had welcomed the Romans as strong friends or, after resisting for a while, had submitted and come to terms. A number of German aristocrats were regular dinner guests at Varus’ table. Arminius of the Cherusci was in his twenties and already a Roman citizen and an equestrian, having led auxiliary soldiers from his people in a number of campaigns. Fluent in Latin – he may well have been educated in the empire or Rome itself – he appeared to be the perfect example of Rome’s talent for winning over local elites. Yet at some point he decided to turn against Rome, and became the leader of a group of other nobles who met in secret and plotted rebellion. Another German chieftain openly accused him to Varus, but the legate dismissed this as no more than mud-slinging between rivals for his favour.23
The plan was carefully prepared and carried out, reflecting Arminius’ considerable skill and his experience of the Roman army. In the summer of AD 9 Varus marched with a force of three legions and nine auxiliary units to parade Rome’s military might around the province. Arminius and his confederates persuaded him to send out small detachments to different communities on various pretexts, weakening his force, and then lured him back to the eastern end of the province to deal with an outbreak of rebellion which faded away as soon as he approached. It was late in the season when the Roman column began to march back to its winter quarters. Arminius was with them, leading a force of tribesmen who acted as guides and scouts until they left to join the rebels, who were waiting in a series of carefully prepared ambushes. Stumbling along, the Roman column was whittled down in several days of fighting on ground where everything favoured the Germans. Varus was wounded and then despaired and killed himself – something no Roman nobleman was supposed to do when fighting a foreign enemy. All three legions – XVII, XVIII, and XIX – were wiped out along with the auxiliaries, with only a few fugitives managing to get away. Senior officers taken prisoner were sacrificed, other captives tortured to death or kept as slaves.24
In the weeks that followed, the detachments throughout the rest of the province were slaughtered or chased back to the Rhine. The province between the Rhine and Elbe was lost and never regained. Roman armies drove deep into Germany several times in the next seven years and Arminius was beaten in battle, but never decisively. Lack of resources in the short term and lack of political will in the longer term meant that the effort to conquer Germany was never renewed. Arminius fought and defeated a rival Germanic leader, Maroboduus of the Suebi, only to be murdered by a group of his own noblemen who resented the permanent dominance of one man. At the end of the first century AD Tacitus said that the Romans had still not achieved victory in the struggle with the Germans, which had already lasted 210 years, but still seemed to expect that one day this victory would be achieved. It never was.25
Arminius won a great victory on the battlefield. If Vercingetorix had defeated Julius Caesar or Boudicca had managed to destroy Suetonius Paulinus’ small army, then their rebellions may also have succeeded. The Romans were surprised by the outbreak of all three rebellions, not least because they began among peoples and leaders considered to be securely under their rule and because their attention was currently elsewhere. Their military response was always the same, gathering whatever troops could be mustered and striking at the heart of the rebellion as soon as possible. Varus did this in AD 9, heading immediately for the reported rising in the east of the province. It was late in the season, his army was encumbered with more than the usual amounts of baggage and camp followers because he was planning a return to winter quarters, but even so his instinctive response was to strike at the threat. He had done much the same on his interventions in Judaea in 4 BC.
Julius Caesar also hurried to his army and began an immediate counter-attack against Vercingetorix, just as he had hastened to relieve the legion besieged by rebels in the winter of 54–53 BC. In each case his army was scattered and not concentrated for the campaign, so that he had far fewer soldiers than he would have liked. The forces available were not prepared for operating in the field, having little time to gather supplies and few opportunities to forage from the winter landscape. One of the reasons Caesar attacked the Gallic oppida in early 52 BC was to seize their stocks of grain and feed his soldiers.
At the start of a rebe
llion much of the wider population was watching to see what happened. In the past the Romans had proved unbeatable – after all, a revolt could occur only after they had come to dominate a region. Only the truly desperate and thoroughly disaffected would risk open resistance and the inevitable retribution of Rome. Varus’ march to Jerusalem in 4 BC was marked by burning settlements and mass crucifixions. If terrible punishment of this sort happened quickly, then it confirmed the invincibility of Rome and deterred the uncommitted from joining the rising. If the Romans waited to muster their strength, then with each passing day the confidence of the rebels would grow and belief that they might succeed would spread.26
Delay favoured the rebels, while a rapid counter-attack meant a display of Roman confidence and force which might be enough to crush the rising before it gathered momentum. It was a risk, since it often meant taking the field with a small and poorly supplied force. Sometimes this was enough, as when the Iceni and their allies were defeated in AD 48 by a column composed solely of auxiliaries – the governor even dismounted cavalrymen so that they could help to storm the ramparts of the town. Roman soldiers were professionals, the army had drills and a clear command structure, making it much more flexible than clumsy tribal armies, and often this was sufficient to let them smash far more numerous rebel forces. At times little fighting was needed, and the mere appearance of Roman soldiers was enough to overawe opposition. Reputation counted for a lot, and even a small force represented the army that had conquered much of the world and was known to be stubbornly determined and ruthless in its pursuit of victory.27
Yet the aura of invincibility projected by the empire and its army could be broken. Military reverses elsewhere weakened it, and those on the spot could shatter it altogether. This was the great gamble in responding so quickly to a rebellion. In AD 60 the 200 men sent by Decianus Catus to Camulodunum could do no more than perish with the garrison and colonists. The intervention by a detachment of Legio IX Hispana was a far more serious effort and if the Iceni and their allies had been less numerous, less determined or less lucky, then it might have worked. Only part of the legion was involved, along with some auxiliary forces, but at most there were a few thousand men and it is unlikely that they were prepared to fight a long war of manoeuvre. It was not enough, and instead they were cut to pieces. Roman delay strengthened the rebels and bolstered their confidence, but a disaster like this was an even faster way to recruit more rebels.
Suetonius Paulinus did not have as strong a field force as he wanted when he faced Boudicca. He had summoned an additional legion to join him, but it did not arrive because its acting commander chose to disobey the order. We do not know why this man acted as he did, although belief that he could not safely move away from the area he garrisoned in the south-west is most likely. (He took his life in the aftermath of the revolt as penance for letting his legion miss the great victory.) Whatever the reason, when Suetonius Paulinus fought the most decisive battle on the island since AD 43 he commanded an army less than a quarter of the size of the original invasion force. Up until now Boudicca’s warriors had been successful wherever they went. Avoiding a battle would seem like fear and give them even more momentum, perhaps persuading still loyal tribes to join the queen – it was late in the campaign of 52 BC when the Aedui defected to the rebels. Paulinus had little to gain by delay, since this was unlikely to add significantly to his forces, and Dio claims that he was also running short of food. The Roman commander gambled on a battle and won. In AD 9 Arminius so skilfully orchestrated the rebellion that Varus was given no real chance.28
WINNING AND LOSING A PROVINCE
Arminius’ victory overthrew Roman rule between the Elbe and the Rhine and the province was never retaken. Caesar broke the back of the rebellion in 52 BC by winning at Alesia, and Suetonius Paulinus’ defeat of Boudicca did the same in AD 60. Both Roman commanders then spent many months attacking the homelands of the rebellious tribes, forcing each in turn to submit. The punishment for rebellion was terrible, but alongside this came conciliation – if only in Britain after the recall of Paulinus. It is unlikely that the entire population of any province ever rebelled, not least because the provinces were artificial creations of the conquering power with little to unify their inhabitants. The Romans thought in terms of Gauls, Germans and Britons, but these knew themselves to be members of a particular tribe, clan, community or loyal to a particular leader. A charismatic leader and shared resentment might unite them for a while, but strain was always likely. In 52 BC some peoples rebelled, but preferred to fight on their own rather than join the common effort, while others like the Aedui bickered over who would command. Arminius was not always able to persuade other leaders to follow his plan, and in the end was murdered because he tried to unite several peoples under his own rule.29
In AD 9 Arminius’ brother remained loyal to Rome and continued to serve in the Roman army. The man who warned Varus about the rebellion was also a prince of the Cherusci and Arminius’ father-inlaw. After the first great success he joined in the rebellion, feeling that he could not resist the enthusiasm of his warriors. His son had been enrolled as a priest of the cult of Rome and Augustus established for the new province, but proved far more eager and was with the rebels from the very start. It was rumoured that he mistreated Varus’ corpse in the aftermath of the massacre. Later father and son defected to the Romans and were installed in comfortable exile to the west of the Rhine. Few leaders were implacably pro- or anti-Roman, and very few of the latter were beyond reconciliation as long as they were willing to submit to Rome.30
All three rebellions occurred relatively soon after initial conquest – within a generation. Arminius won his war where Vercingetorix and Boudicca lost. The lowlands of Britain were untroubled by any other serious revolts. While Gaul never again experienced a rising on the same scale as 53–52 BC, it took longer for it to become wholly peaceful. Julius Caesar was able to withdraw most of his army to fight the civil war without threatening Rome’s hold on the newly conquered province. Details are few, but there was trouble in Gaul during the dictatorship, and on several occasions under Augustus. In each case the unrest came from no more than a handful of tribes and there was no great alliance to expel the occupying Romans. The sources link many of these rebellions with attacks by Germanic raiders from across the Rhine. The failure of the Romans to prevent them from happening made them seem less reliable allies and also suggested that their military dominance was no longer so strong. It is more than likely that some of the Germans came as allies to ambitious leaders from Gaul, following in the footsteps of Ariovistus.31
A succession of censuses and the taxation that followed encouraged ill-feeling. Many nobles complained to Augustus about the freedman who collected extra money for his two invented months and this was stopped. The man claimed that he had taken the money for the good of the empire, since it prevented the noblemen of Gaul from having the wealth to fund rebellion. We do not know whether or not the cash was returned to them or went into the state treasury. The leaders of an outbreak of rebellion in AD 21 were all heavily indebted aristocrats. These tribal noblemen were Roman citizens and, as Tacitus points out, their families had gained the honour when it was still a rare thing. Maintaining prominence among their tribes as part of a Roman province was expensive, and this rather than the overall burden of taxation may have placed them irrevocably into debt. There is no hint of unusual abuses in levying of tax in Gaul at this time.32
Desperate aristocrats from many tribes began to communicate and meet in secret, for once again this was not a spontaneous out-burst but a slowly matured plan, formed in the belief that Tiberius’ rule was unpopular and the legions disaffected. The leaders were Julius Florus of the Treveri and Julius Sacrovir of the Aedui – the Julius in each name showing citizenship granted either by Augustus or Caesar – but at the beginning they remained behind the scenes. Groups rebelled in two tribes and were swiftly suppressed by the Romans’ routinely quick counter-attack. In one case the urban cohor
t – a paramilitary force guarding the imperial mint at Lugdunum (Lyons) and numbering at most 1,000 men – was sufficient to crush the rebels. A detachment of legionaries from the Rhineland dealt with the other. These were aided by local allies, including a contingent led by the still openly loyal Sacrovir, who fought bareheaded, boasting that he wanted his bravery to be seen by all. Prisoners claimed that he did it to be recognised so that he did not get hurt. Tacitus blamed Tiberius for ignoring these warnings.
Florus attempted to suborn a cavalry regiment or ala raised from his own tribe, but few joined him to swell the band formed by his own clients and some desperate debtors. All were quickly hunted down by columns sent from the armies on the Rhine, including many loyal auxiliaries. One of the most active officers chasing the rebels was himself a Treviran nobleman, a certain Julius Indus who was a long-standing personal rival of Florus. (A cavalry regiment known as the ala Gallorum Indiana existed in the Roman army for many generations and was probably named after him.) The insurgents were hunted down and killed or caught. Florus was at large for a while, but was eventually cornered and took his own life.33
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