At the end of the century, Septimius Severus’ legions took Ctesiphon again, in a war fought as much for glory and to secure the loyalty of the eastern armies as to deal with any perceived Parthian threat. He added a new province of Mesopotamia, claiming it would be a ‘bulwark’ for the eastern provinces, but Dio was sceptical of this boast. Two out of three wars were clearly caused by the aggression of Roman emperors, the other by the ambitions of a Parthian monarch – though obviously a ruler who was aware of past attacks by Rome. Between each of these conflicts were some four decades where the relationship returned to the pattern set in the previous century, with a peace that was always wary, sometimes uneasy or tense, but seen as being in the interest of both sides. Roman military superiority continued to grow, but was not so overwhelming that it prompted more frequent conflict, which suggests that the lure of conquest and expansion was not so strong that most emperors were unable to resist its siren call.46
Elsewhere, relations between the Roman Empire and its neigh-bours were complicated by the absence of strong central authority, each province bordering on the lands of many different communities and leaders. An emperor could not hope to keep track of all of these in the way that he could observe events in Parthia and gain a sense of the likely attitude of its king. Legates were better placed, aided by their headquarters staff with its record archive and accumulated experience, although no doubt it took time and diligence to become familiar with the local situation during their tenure. A glimpse of a report intended either for the garrison commander or the provincial legate – or both – may come from one of the Vindolanda tablets, dating to the end of the first century AD. Sadly only a fragment survives, which states that ‘the Britons are unprotected by armour. There are very many cavalry. The cavalry do not use swords nor do the Brittunculi mount [or stay mounted?] to throw javelins.’ The contemptuous diminutive ‘little Britons’ is not known from other sources, and may or may not reflect a widespread disdain for the locals.47
Given the slow pace of communications, emperors could not direct diplomatic and military activity in the provinces on a day-to day basis, so that legates were permitted a good deal of initiative and freedom of action. This was confined by their mandata and by the regular exchange of correspondence with the emperor. Often they acted and then sought approval in the knowledge that this was only likely if they had kept to the spirit of their orders. Even so, these men commanded armies numbering anywhere between 10,000 and 40,000 men, forces as big as or bigger than those of most governors under the Republic. A legate had usually served in his late teens or early twenties as the senior tribune in a legion, and then in his thirties commanded a legion. In the case of provinces with only one legion in garrison, this post was combined with that of provincial legate. Bigger provinces would be granted a decade later, to men in their early forties, and the prized and prestigious commands of Britain, Lower Pannonia and Syria, which held the largest armies, tended to go to men who had already governed an ordinary military province. Service on the staff of a relative or friend provided some men with additional experience of government and campaigning. All in all, the legates of the Principate had on average only a little more military experience than the governors of the Republic. They were selected by the emperor, who took account of talent and experience, but was also swayed by an individual’s family and connections, and especially his perceived loyalty.48
Augustus left much of the army grouped together and ready to carry out major offensive operations if necessary. This was most marked on the Rhine, where even after AD 16 there were several bases where two legions as well as auxiliaries were stationed. Two of the legions in Spain were similarly brigaded together, and it is likely that the practice was also followed elsewhere. Such strong concentrations of troops, very much in the tradition of hiberna for an army waiting to resume mobile warfare, became less common by the later first century AD. The last two-legion camp was closed by Domitian, who moved the garrisons to separate locations. In this case his motive was fear after a legate of Upper Germany had used the accumulated savings in such a base to fund a rebellion against him. Although this may have been a factor in the earlier dispersal of these big garrisons, it is more probable that they were moved because the troops were of better use elsewhere.49
Major offensive operations, let alone attempts at conquest, had to be ordered by the emperor, who also retained control of the military resources of the empire. Only he could transfer legions, auxiliaries or detachments from one province to another, or authorise the recruitment of regular troops. New legions were usually formed in Italy under direct imperial supervision, while auxiliary units were naturally raised in the provinces. Thus the emperor decided upon the current priorities and shifted men and supplies accordingly. No doubt there was some inertia in the system, units remaining where they were even when the original reason had gone, but the deployment was not rigid. Units were redeployed, and over time the size of the army grew to meet new commitments.
Conquest was rare and always ordered by the princeps. Large-scale invasion of the provinces was similarly rare, if only because of the political disunity of neighbouring peoples. Occasionally one leader or tribe grew more powerful, or several banded together to create big armies capable of acting aggressively. Strong leaders like Decebalus had this potential, and if war resulted it was likely to be large-scale, but the unity they created also made it easier to observe and negotiate with them. In the long run they could not match Rome’s greater strength and resources any more than the Parthians. Power struggles within and between peoples living outside the empire are almost invisible to us, occurring beyond the range and interest of our literary sources, all written within the empire. Archaeology can detect breaks in settlement pattern or major shifts in material culture, but such changes can be explained in more than one way. Academic fashion has turned against interpretations based on widespread migrations of peoples, who supplanted others and sometimes created a ripple effect that set several tribes on the move. If women are mentioned as accompanying tribal armies, they are dismissed as just the politically significant wives and daughters of kings and chieftains. As so often, the pendulum of opinion has swung too far. It is wrong to think of vast, unending waves of ‘barbarians’ washing against the frontiers of the empire, fleeing from enemies and desperate for new land. Yet sometimes large numbers of people did move over considerable distances and did seek admission to the empire or attempt to occupy land controlled by the Romans.50
Much of the activity on the frontiers was relatively small in scale, and even in the periods when we have detailed narrative sources, these pay less attention to the fringes of the empire than to the politics of Rome and the imperial court. We hear of the occasional major operations and wars, but only rarely of anything else. A memorial inscription recording the career of the senator Tiberius Plautius Silvanus Aelinaus tells us about some of the events during his term as legate of Moesia under Nero:
. . . he brought over more than a hundred thousand of the peoples from across the Danube to pay tribute, along with their wives, children and chieftains or kings; he put down an incipient movement of the Sarmatians, although he had sent a considerable portion of its army to take part in the invasion of Armenia; kings hitherto unknown or hostile to the Roman people he brought over to the river bank under his protection to pay homage to the Roman standards; to the kings of the Bastarnae and Roxolani he returned their sons, to the king of the Dacians his brothers, captured or carried off from the enemy; from them he received hostages, by which achievements he both assured the peaceful conditions of the province and advanced it, having removed the king of the Scyths from his siege of Chersonesus beyond the Dnieper.51
Vespasian awarded triumphal honours to Plautius Silvanus for his term in Moesia, praising his conduct. No doubt the text presents his record in the most favourable light, but his activities are interesting. It is unclear whether or not his army actually fought anyone, but they certainly crossed beyond the Danube and the threat
of force backed up the intensive diplomatic activity. The balance of power between the peoples and leaders outside the empire was redrawn by his actions, making some of them return hostages they had taken while others gave them to the Romans. Ceremonies where foreign leaders made public acknowledgement of their submission to Rome in front of a governor and his paraded soldiers were a long-established feature of Roman imperialism. The number of tribesmen and their families brought across the river and settled within the province may be exaggerated, although in the circumstances it is at least possible that an accurate count was made.
All in all, most of what this imperial legate did is reminiscent of the actions of Julius Caesar in Gaul – with the difference that the former did not use his interventions as a basis for overrunning and occupying great swathes of new territory. From the latter days of Augustus, the borders of the empire settled down, only shifting occasionally. Such changes are significant and need to be understood, but just as important are the workings of the frontiers in general, where so much of the army was stationed.
XIII
GARRISONS AND RAIDS
‘Besides these battles, many others less worthy of mention were fought in various parts of Gaul, which it would be superfluous to describe, both because their results led to nothing worthwhile, and because it is not fitting to spin out a history with insignificant details.’ – Ammianus Marcellinus, late fourth century AD.1
‘CLANDESTINE CROSSINGS’
In AD 17 Tacfarinas and his followers began to raid the province of Africa. He was one of the Musulamii, a people living on the fringe of the province in land that today straddles the Algerian and Tunisian border. They were one of several tribes mentioned in our sources, along with broader groups such as Numidians, Moors and Gaetulians, but the impression is that Greek and Roman observers did not understand the relationship between them with any clarity, let alone appreciate their social and political structure. Very little is known about Tacfarinas, save that he had served in the auxilia and then deserted. It is possible that, like Arminius, he was from an aristocratic family and led a contingent of his people in Roman service until he became disillusioned and turned against his former allies. He does not appear to have gained citizenship or other honours, which in itself could be a cause of anger. On the other hand he may have served in the ranks and deserted because of some injustice, slight, misdemeanour or a growing resentment of Roman occupation. Whatever his background, Tacfarinas was a formidable soldier and talented leader, and early successes drew more and more men to join him. Tacitus dismisses his first followers as outcasts, and perhaps some of them were, but he admits that Tacfarinas swiftly became the acknowledged war leader of the entire Musulamii.2
Several campaigns had been fought in the area during the reign of Augustus, the most recent concluded in AD 6. Since then the Romans had begun surveying the area and organising it for taxation, marking out regions using boundary stones, and had constructed roads through tribal territory. Perhaps this fuelled resentment, but it was the early phase of conquest when resistance and rebellion were common in many regions. The Romans may also have interfered with or tried to restrict existing patterns of raiding and warfare, for most of the victims of Tacfarinas and his men were locals rather than Roman settlers or other representatives of the imperial power. Plunder and glory drew men to him as much as any cause, and soon he allied with Mazippa, a Moorish leader. Later they were joined by another group, the Cinithii, and Tacitus says that this was through compulsion, giving them the choice of either being subject to raids or taking part in them. Tacfarinas aimed at creating a solid power base, and some of his men were organised into formal units, equipped and trained on the Roman model. These were kept as a reserve in camp while the Moors and others roved in raiding bands spreading ‘fire, slaughter and terror’.3
Early successes led to over-confidence, and when the Roman governor mustered his army and advanced, Tacfarinas was willing to meet him in open battle. The Roman proconsul – Africa was still a senatorial province at this date – had Legio III Augusta, at least two alae of cavalry and some cohorts of auxiliary infantry. Numbers heavily favoured his opponents but, as so often in the past, the confidence, discipline and organisation of the well-equipped Romans were decisive. Tacfarinas’ army was routed, and the Roman proconsul awarded the insignia of a triumph.
Tacfarinas’ prestige had taken a blow, but he and many of his men escaped and were determined to continue the fight. In AD 18 he began to raid again, at first on a small scale, with little bands moving too quickly to be caught. Once again success helped him to draw followers to him. The attacks became larger, and entire villages were overrun and plundered. Encouraged by this, Tacfarinas risked attacking a more dangerous target and blockaded a cohort garrisoning a position near the River Pagyda. The place cannot be identified, and it is not clear whether the ‘Roman cohort’ was detached from the legion or was an auxiliary unit. Their commander, an experienced officer named Decrius, responded to the threat with the confidence typical of the Roman army, and deployed his men in formation outside the rampart to meet the enemy in the open. His enthusiasm was not shared by his men, who broke and fled when the Numidians charged them. Perhaps Decrius was unpopular or new to the command and a stranger to his men, but they ignored him as he tried to rally them. He was wounded twice, losing an eye, but fought on until he was cut down.
The total Roman losses are unknown, but the new proconsul ordered the survivors of this rout to be decimated. One soldier in ten was chosen by lot and beaten to death by the others, whose wheat ration was replaced with barley – the food of slaves or animals – and who were made to camp apart from the rest of the army until they redeemed themselves. It was an archaic punishment, revived by several commanders including Antony and Augustus during the civil wars, and seen as stern even by Roman standards.* Tacitus claimed that the appalling punishment stiffened the morale of the rest of the army. A little later, the same force that had routed Decrius’ men attacked another garrison, this time consisting of some 500 veterans – legionaries who had already served twenty years and remained with the colours for another five years performing lighter duties. Tacitus’ account is vague, so it is uncertain whether they came out to fight in the open or defended the encampment, but either way the Numidians were put to flight. During the fighting a legionary named Marcus Helvius Rufus saved the life of another soldier and was decorated, subsequently being awarded the corona civica. He may not have been a veteran, so perhaps other soldiers were present.
Then or later Helvius Rufus was also commissioned as a centurion, and eventually rose to become primus pilus and added Civica to his name. An inscription from Tivoli in Italy records his gift of a bath house to the community.4
This reverse persuaded Tacfarinas to avoid settlements protected by garrisons. Instead his men struck at the unprotected communities, and avoided any significant force of soldiers. Try as they might, the Romans were far too few to protect every settlement, and had to guess where best to place their garrisons. They chased the raiders, making long marches through difficult country, but were unable to catch them and inflict any serious damage on the fast-moving bands. This went on for several years, and once again success brought the war leader new problems, as he began to attack the more fertile country near the coast. The spoils were considerable, but needed to be gathered, transported and protected. Tacfarinas built a camp as a base for the plundering raids, where the booty was guarded as more was brought in. The Romans learned of this, and a force of auxiliaries backed by some of the fitter legionaries was put under the command of the governor’s son and sent against them. They moved quickly and Tacfarinas did not receive sufficient warning to concentrate his men and carry away the plunder in time. The Numidians were badly beaten and scattered, and a second Roman proconsul was awarded the ornaments of a triumph.5
Yet once again Tacfarinas recovered and resumed his raiding. Tiberius wrote to the Senate advising them to choose a man of proven military ability as the
next proconsul of Africa. It helped that the likely candidate, Quintus Junius Blaesus, was also the uncle of the praetorian prefect Sejanus. The emperor’s suggestion was duly enacted by the Senate, and Blaesus given additional resources by the transfer of Legio IX Hispana from Pannonia to join the forces in Africa. At this point Tacfarinas attempted to negotiate, sending an embassy threatening ‘unending war’ unless he and his men were granted land. Tiberius was outraged at this ‘arrogance’ of a brig-and presuming to dictate terms to Rome at the height of its power, and ordered Blaesus to press the war with vigour. Tacfarinas was excluded, but other leaders were offered an amnesty and many chose to surrender.6
Blaesus split his army into three mobile columns to advance from different directions and drive raiding bands onto a network of fortified outposts – an early version of the use of blockhouses in the later stages of the Second Anglo-Boer War. Several successes were scored as groups were caught or trapped. The proconsul then split his columns up into even smaller forces commanded by centurions, and continued to hound Tacfarinas and his allies throughout the summer. He kept his weary men in the field well after the end of the normal campaigning season. More fortified outposts were built, and the mobile forces, growing used to operating in desert conditions, kept chasing the enemy. Tacfarinas was pursued from one camp to another. He managed to evade capture, but his brother was taken, and at this point Blaesus called an end to active operations and withdrew the army to winter quarters. Victory was declared, a third Roman commander was awarded the ornaments of a triumph and in this case the additional, rare honour of being hailed as imperator by his men. Blaesus was permitted to keep the title, but did not get to celebrate a triumph when he returned home. Legio IX Hispana returned to the Danube around the same time.7
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