Compromise for late payment
40.00
Total amount due
P2,707.44
===========
2.
Additional residence tax for 1945
P14.50
===========
3.
Real Estate dealer's tax for the fourth quarter of 1946 and the whole year of 1947
P207.50
===========
Manuel B. Pineda, who received the assessment, contested the same. Subsequently, he appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals alleging that he was appealing "only that proportionate part or portion pertaining to him as one of the heirs."
After hearing the parties, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the Commissioner on the ground that his right to assess and collect the tax has prescribed. The Commissioner appealed and this Court affirmed the findings of the Tax Court in respect to the assessment for income tax for the year 1947 but held that the right to assess and collect the taxes for 1945 and 1946 has not prescribed. For 1945 and 1946 the returns were filed on August 24, 1953; assessments for both taxable years were made within five years therefrom or on October 19, 1953; and the action to collect the tax was filed within five years from the latter date, on August 7, 1957. For taxable year 1947, however, the return was filed on March 1, 1948; the assessment was made on October 19, 1953, more than five years from the date the return was filed; hence, the right to assess income tax for 1947 had prescribed. Accordingly, We remanded the case to the Tax Court for further appropriate proceedings.1
In the Tax Court, the parties submitted the case for decision without additional evidence.
On November 29, 1963 the Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment holding Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment corresponding to his share of the following taxes:
Deficiency income tax
1945
P135.83
1946
436.95
Real estate dealer's fixed tax 4th quarter of 1946 and whole year of 1947
P187.50
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has appealed to Us and has proposed to hold Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment of all the taxes found by the Tax Court to be due from the estate in the total amount of P760.28 instead of only for the amount of taxes corresponding to his share in the estate.1awphîl.nèt
Manuel B. Pineda opposes the proposition on the ground that as an heir he is liable for unpaid income tax due the estate only up to the extent of and in proportion to any share he received. He relies on Government of the Philippine Islands v. Pamintuan2 where We held that "after the partition of an estate, heirs and distributees are liable individually for the payment of all lawful outstanding claims against the estate in proportion to the amount or value of the property they have respectively received from the estate."
We hold that the Government can require Manuel B. Pineda to pay the full amount of the taxes assessed.
Pineda is liable for the assessment as an heir and as a holder-transferee of property belonging to the estate/taxpayer. As an heir he is individually answerable for the part of the tax proportionate to the share he received from the inheritance.3 His liability, however, cannot exceed the amount of his share.4
As a holder of property belonging to the estate, Pineda is liable for he tax up to the amount of the property in his possession. The reason is that the Government has a lien on the P2,500.00 received by him from the estate as his share in the inheritance, for unpaid income taxes4a for which said estate is liable, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 315 of the Tax Code, which we quote hereunder:
If any person, corporation, partnership, joint-account (cuenta en participacion), association, or insurance company liable to pay the income tax, neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in favor of the Government of the Philippines from the time when the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interest, penalties, and costs that may accrue in addition thereto upon all property and rights to property belonging to the taxpayer: . . .
By virtue of such lien, the Government has the right to subject the property in Pineda's possession, i.e., the P2,500.00, to satisfy the income tax assessment in the sum of P760.28. After such payment, Pineda will have a right of contribution from his co-heirs,5 to achieve an adjustment of the proper share of each heir in the distributable estate.
All told, the Government has two ways of collecting the tax in question. One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. This remedy was adopted in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Pamintuan, supra. In said case, the Government filed an action against all the heirs for the collection of the tax. This action rests on the concept that hereditary property consists only of that part which remains after the settlement of all lawful claims against the estate, for the settlement of which the entire estate is first liable.6 The reason why in case suit is filed against all the heirs the tax due from the estate is levied proportionately against them is to achieve thereby two results: first, payment of the tax; and second, adjustment of the shares of each heir in the distributed estate as lessened by the tax.
Another remedy, pursuant to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all property and rights to property belonging to the taxpayer for unpaid income tax, is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of the tax due, the estate. This second remedy is the very avenue the Government took in this case to collect the tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue should be given, in instances like the case at bar, the necessary discretion to avail itself of the most expeditious way to collect the tax as may be envisioned in the particular provision of the Tax Code above quoted, because taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need.7 And as afore-stated in this case the suit seeks to achieve only one objective: payment of the tax. The adjustment of the respective shares due to the heirs from the inheritance, as lessened by the tax, is left to await the suit for contribution by the heir from whom the Government recovered said tax.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified. Manuel B. Pineda is hereby ordered to pay to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the sum of P760.28 as deficiency income tax for 1945 and 1946, and real estate dealer's fixed tax for the fourth quarter of 1946 and for the whole year 1947, without prejudice to his right of contribution for his co-heirs. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 87479 June 4, 1990
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE PROVINCE OF ALBAY, ALBAY GOVERNOR ROMEO R. SALALIMA, and ALBAY PROVINCIAL TREASURER ABUNDIO M. NUÑEZ, respondents.
Romulo L. Ricafort and Jesus R. Cornago for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) questions the power of the provincial government of Albay to collect real property taxes on its properties located at Tiwi, Albay, amassed between June 11, 1984 up to March 10, 1987.
It appears that on March 14 and 15, 1989, the respondents caused the publication of a notice of auction sale involving the properties of NAPOCOR and the Philippine Geothermal Inc. consisting of buildings, machines, and similar improvements standing on their offices at Tiwi, Albay. The amounts to be realized from this advertised auction sale are supposed to be applied to the tax delinquencies claimed, as and for, as we said, real property taxes. The back taxes NAPOCOR has supposedly accumulated were computed at P214,845,184.76.
NAPOCOR opposed the sale, interposing in support of its non-liability Resolution No. 17-87, of t
he Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), which provides as follows:
BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, That the tax and duty exemption privileges of the National Power Corporation, including those pertaining to its domestic purchases of petroleum and petroleum products, granted under the terms and conditions of Commonwealth Act No. 120 (Creating the National Power Corporation, defining its powers, objectives and functions, and for other purposes), as amended, are restored effective March 10, 1987, subject to the following conditions: 1
as well as the Memorandum of Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, which also states thus:
Pursuant to Sections 1 (f) and 2 (e) of Executive Order No. 93, series of 1986, FIRB Resolution No. 17-87, series of 1987, restoring, subject to certain conditions prescribed therein, the tax and duty exemption privileges of NPC as provided under Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended, effective March 10, 1987, is hereby confirmed and approved. 2
On March 10, 1989, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order directing the Albay provincial government "to CEASE AND DESIST from selling and disposing of the NAPOCOR properties subject matter of this petition. 3 It appears, however, that "the temporary restraining order failed to reach respondents before the scheduled bidding at 10:00 a.m. on March 30, 1989 ... [h]ence, the respondents proceeded with the bidding wherein the Province of Albay was the highest bidder. 4
The Court gathers from the records that:
(1) Under Section 13, of Republic Act No. 6395, amending Commonwealth Act No. 120 (charter of NAPOCOR):
Section 13. Non-profit Character of the Corporation; Exemption from All Taxes, Duties, Fees, Imposts and Other Charges by the Government and Government Instrumentalities. The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall devote all its returns from its capital investment as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion, To enable the Corporation to pay its indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance and effective implementation of the policy enunciated in Section One of this Act, the Corporation, including its subsidiaries, is hereby declared exempt from the payment of all forms of taxes, duties, fees, imposts as well as costs and service fees including filing fees, appeal bonds, supersedeas bonds, in any court or administrative proceedings. 5
(2) On August 24, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 776 was promulgated, creating the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB). Among other things, the Board was tasked as follows:
Section 2. A Fiscal Incentives Review Board is hereby created for the purpose of determining what subsidies and tax exemptions should be modified, withdrawn, revoked or suspended, which shall be composed of the following officials:
Chairman - Secretary of Finance
Members - Secretary of Industry
- Director General of the National Economic and
Development Authority
- Commissioner of Internal Revenue
- Commissioner of Customs
The Board may recommend to the President of the Philippines and for reasons of compatibility with the declared economic policy, the withdrawal, modification, revocation or suspension of the enforceability of any of the abovestated statutory subsidies or tax exemption grants, except those granted by the Constitution. To attain its objectives, the Board may require the assistance of any appropriate government agency or entity. The Board shall meet once a month, or oftener at the call of the Secretary of Finance. 6
(3) On June 11, 1984, Presidential Decree No. 1931 was promulgated, prescribing, among other things, that:
Section 1. The provisions of special or general law to the contrary notwithstanding, all exemptions from the payment of duties, taxes, fees, impost and other charges heretofore granted in favor of government-owned or controlled corporations including their subsidiaries are hereby withdrawn. 7
(4) Meanwhile, FIRB Resolution No. 10-85 was issued, "restoring" NAPOCOR's tax exemption effective June 11, 1984 to June 30, 1985;
(5) Thereafter, FIRB Resolution No. 1-86 was issued, granting tax exemption privileges to NAPOCOR from July 1, 1985 and indefinitely thereafter;
(6) Likewise, FIRB Resolution No. 17-87 was promulgated, giving NAPOCOR tax exemption privileges effective until March 10, 1987; 8
(7) On December 17, 1986, Executive Order No. 93 was promulgated by President Corazon Aquino, providing, among other things, as follows:
SECTION 1. The provisions of any general or special law to the contrary notwithstanding, all tax and duty incentives granted to government and private entities are hereby withdrawn, except. 9
and
SECTION 2. The Fiscal Incentives Review Board created under Presidential Decree No. 776, as amended, is hereby authorized to:
a) restore tax and/or duty exemptions withdrawn hereunder in whole or in part;
b) revise the scope and coverage of tax and/or duty exemption that may be restored;
c) impose conditions for the restoration of tax and/or duty exemption;
d) prescribe the date or period of effectivity of the restoration of tax and/or duty exemption;
e) formulate and submit to the President for approval, a complete system for the grant of subsidies to deserving beneficiaries, in lieu of or in combination with the restoration of tax and duty exemptions or preferential treatment in taxation, indicating the source of funding therefor, eligible beneficiaries and the terms and conditions for the grant thereof taking into consideration the international commitments of the Philippines and the necessary precautions such that the grant of subsidies does not become the basis for countervailing action. 10
(8) On October 5, 1987, the Office of the President issued the Memorandum, confirming NAPOCOR's tax exemption aforesaid. 11
The provincial government of Albay now defends the auction sale in question on the theory that the various FIRB issuances constitute an undue delegation of the taxing Power and hence, null and void, under the Constitution. It is also contended that, insofar as Executive Order No. 93 authorizes the FIRB to grant tax exemptions, the same is of no force and effect under the constitutional provision allowing the legislature alone to accord tax exemption privileges.
It is to be pointed out that under Presidential Decree No. 776, the power of the FIRB was merely to "recommend to the President of the Philippines and for reasons of compatibility with the declared economic policy, the withdrawal, modification, revocation or suspension of the enforceability of any of the above-cited statutory subsidies or tax exemption grants, except those granted by the Constitution." It has no authority to impose taxes or revoke existing ones, which, after all, under the Constitution, only the legislature may accomplish. 12 The question therefore is whether or not the various tax exemptions granted by virtue of FIRB Resolutions Nos. 10-85, 1-86, and 17-87 are valid and constitutional.
We shall deal with FIRB No. 17-87 later, but with respect to FIRB Resolutions Nos. 10- 85 and 1-86, we sustain the provincial government of Albay.
As we said, the FIRB, under its charter, Presidential Decree No. 776, had been empowered merely to "recommend" tax exemptions. By itself, it could not have validly prescribed exemptions or restore taxability. Hence, as of June 11, 1984 (promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1931), NAPOCOR had ceased to enjoy tax exemption privileges.
The fact that under Executive Order No. 93, the FIRB has been given the prerogative to "restore tax and/or duty exemptions withdrawn hereunder in whole or in part," 13 and "impose conditions for ... tax and/or duty exemption" 14 is of no moment. These provisions are prospective in character and can not affect the Board's past acts.
The Court is aware that in its preamble, Executive Order No. 93 states:
WHEREAS, a number of affected entities, government and private were able to get back their tax and duty exemption privileges through the review mechanism implemented by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB); 15 but by no means can we say that it has "ratified" the acts of FIRB. It is to misinterpret the scope of FIRB's powers under Presidential Decree No. 776 to say that it has. Apart
from that, Section 2 of the Executive Order was clearly intended to amend Presidential Decree No. 776, which means, mutatis mutandis, that FIRB did not have the right, in the first place, to grant tax exemptions or withdraw existing ones.
Does Executive Order No. 93 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power? It is to be stressed that the provincial government of Albay admits that as of March 10, 1987 (the date Resolution No. 17-87 was affirmed by the Memorandum of the Office of the President, dated October 5, 1987), NAPOCOR's exemption had been validly restored. What it questions is NAPOCOR's liability in the interregnum between June 11, 1984, the date its tax privileges were withdrawn, and March 10, 1987, the date they were purportedly restored. To be sure, it objects to Executive Order No. 93 as alledgedly a delegation of legislative power, but only insofar as its (NAPOCOR's) June 11, 1984 to March 10, 1987 tax accumulation is concerned. We therefore leave the issue of "delegation" to the future and its constitutionality when the proper case arises. For the nonce, we leave Executive Order No. 93 alone, and so also, its validity as far as it grants tax exemptions (through the FIRB) beginning December 17, 1986, the date of its promulgation.
NAPOCOR must then be held liable for the intervening years aforesaid. So it has been held:
xxx xxx xxx
The last issue to be resolved is whether or not the private-respondent is liable for the fixed and deficiency percentage taxes in the amount of P3,025.96 (i.e. for the period from January 1, 1946 to February 29, 1948) before the approval of its municipal franchises. As aforestated, the franchises were approved by the President only on February 24,1948. Therefore, before the said date, the private respondent was liable for the payment of percentage and fixed taxes as seller of light, heat, and power which, as the petitioner claims, amounted to P3,025.96. The legislative franchise (R.A. No. 3843) exempted the grantee from all kinds of taxes other than the 2% tax from the date the original franchise was granted. The exemption, therefore, did not cover the period before the franchise was granted, i.e. before February 24, 1948. ... 16
Actually, the State has no reason to decry the taxation of NAPOCOR's properties, as and by way of real property taxes. Real property taxes, after all, form part and parcel of the financing apparatus of the Government in development and nation-building, particularly in the local government level, Thus:
SEC. 86. Distribution of proceeds. — (a) The proceeds of the real property tax, except as otherwise provided in this Code, shall accrue to the province, city or municipality where the property subject to the tax is situated and shall be applied by the respective local government unit for its own use and benefit.
(b) Barrio shares in real property tax collections. — The annual shares of the barrios in real property tax collections shall be as follows:
(1) Five per cent of the real property tax collections of the province and another five percent of the collections of the municipality shall accrue to the barrio where the property subject to the tax is situated.
(2) In the case of the city, ten per cent of the collections of the tax shag likewise accrue to the barrio where the property is situated.
Thirty per cent of the barrio shares herein referred to may be spent for salaries or per diems of the barrio officials and other administrative expenses, while the remaining seventy per cent shall be utilized for development projects approved by the Secretary of Local Government and Community Development or by such committee created, or representatives designated, by him.
SEC. 87. Application of proceeds. — (a) The proceeds of the real property tax pertaining to the city and to the municipality shall accrue entirely to their respective general funds. In the case of the province, one-fourth thereof shall accrue to its road and bridge fund and the remaining three-fourths, to its general fund.
(b) The entire proceeds of the additional one per cent real property tax levied for the Special Education Fund created under R.A. No. 5447 collected in the province or city on real property situated in their respective territorial jurisdictions shall be distributed as follows:
(1) Collections in the provinces: Fifty per cent shall accrue to the municipality where the property subject to the tax is situated; twenty per cent shall accrue to the province; and thirty per cent shall be remitted to the Treasurer of the Philippines to be expended exclusively for stabilizing the Special Education Fund in municipalities, cities and provinces in accordance with the provisions of Section seven of R.A. No. 5447.
(2) Collections in the cities: Sixty per cent shall be retained by the city; and forty per cent shall be remitted to the Treasurer of the Philippines to be expended exclusively for stabilizing the special education fund in municipalities, cities and provinces as provided under Section 7 of R.A. No. 5447.
However, any increase in the shares of provinces, cities and municipalities from said additional tax accruing to their respective local school boards commencing with fiscal year 1973-74 over what has been actually realized during the fiscal year 1971-72 which, for purposes of this Code, shall remain as the based year, shall be divided equally between the general fund and the special education fund of the local government units concerned. The Secretary of Finance may, however, at his discretion, increase to not more than seventy-five per cent the amount that shall accrue annually to the local general fund.
(c) The proceeds of all delinquent taxes and penalties, as well as the income realized from the use, lease or other disposition of real property acquired by the province or city at a public auction in accordance with the provisions of this Code, and the proceeds of the sale of the delinquent real property or, of the redemption thereof shall accrue to the province, city or municipality in the same manner and proportion as if the tax or taxes had been paid in regular course.
(d) The proceeds of the additional real property tax on Idle private lands shall accrue to the respective general funds of the province, city and municipality where the land subject to the tax is situated. 17
To all intents and purposes, real property taxes are funds taken by the State with one hand and given to the other. In no measure can the Government be said to have lost anything.
As a rule finally, claims of tax exemption are construed strongly against the claimant. 18 They must also be shown to exist clearly and categorically, and supported by clear legal provisions. 19
Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation. 20 Their primary purpose is to generate funds for the State to finance the needs of the citizenry and to advance the common weal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs. The auction sale of the petitioner's properties to answer for real estate taxes accumulated between June 11, 1984 through March 10, 1987 is hereby declared valid.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., concurs in the result.
Regalado, J., took no part.
Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
G.R. No. L-24756 October 31, 1968
CITY OF BAGUIO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FORTUNATO DE LEON, defendant-appellant.
The City Attorney for plaintiff-appellee.
Fortunato de Leon for and in his own behalf as defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
In this appeal, a lower court decision upholding the validity of an ordinance1 of the City of Baguio imposing a license fee on any person, firm, entity or corporation doing business in the City of Baguio is assailed by defendant-appellant Fortunato de Leon. He was held liable as a real estate dealer with a property therein worth more than P10,000, but not in excess of P50,000, and therefore obligated to pay under such ordinance the P50 annual fee. That is the principal question. In addition, there has been a firm and unyielding insistence by defendant-appellant of the lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Baguio, where the suit originated, a complaint having been filed against him by the City Attorney of Bagui
o for his failure to pay the amount of P300 as license fee covering the period from the first quarter of 1958 to the fourth quarter of 1962, allegedly, inspite of repeated demands. Nor was defendant-appellant agreeable to such a suit being instituted by the City Treasurer without the consent of the Mayor, which for him was indispensable. The lower court was of a different mind.
In its decision of December 19, 1964, it declared the above ordinance as amended, valid and subsisting, and held defendant-appellant liable for the fees therein prescribed as a real estate dealer. Hence, this appeal. Assume the validity of such ordinance, and there would be no question about the liability of defendant-appellant for the above license fee, it being shown in the partial stipulation of facts, that he was "engaged in the rental of his property in Baguio" deriving income therefrom during the period covered by the first quarter of 1958 to the fourth quarter of 1962.
The source of authority for the challenged ordinance is supplied by Republic Act No. 329, amending the city charter of Baguio2 empowering it to fix the license fee and regulate "businesses, trades and occupations as may be established or practiced in the City."
Unless it can be shown then that such a grant of authority is not broad enough to justify the enactment of the ordinance now assailed, the decision appealed from must be affirmed. The task confronting defendant-appellant, therefore, was far from easy. Why he failed is understandable, considering that even a cursory reading of the above amendment readily discloses that the enactment of the ordinance in question finds support in the power thus conferred.
Nor is the question raised by him as to the validity thereof novel in character. In Medina v. City of Baguio,3 the effect of the amendatory section insofar as it would expand the previous power vested by the city charter was clarified in these terms: "Appellants apparently have in mind section 2553, paragraph (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, which empowers the City of Baguio merely to impose a license fee for the purpose of rating the business that may be established in the city. The power as thus conferred is indeed limited, as it does not include the power to levy a tax. But on July 15, 1948, Republic Act No. 329 was enacted amending the charter of said city and adding to its power to license the power to tax and to regulate. And it is precisely having in view this amendment that Ordinance No. 99 was approved in order to increase the revenues of the city. In our opinion, the amendment above adverted to empowers the city council not only to impose a license fee but also to levy a tax for purposes of revenue, more so when in amending section 2553 (b), the phrase 'as provided by law' has been removed by section 2 of Republic Act No. 329. The city council of Baguio, therefore, has now the power to tax, to license and to regulate provided that the subjects affected be one of those included in the charter. In this sense, the ordinance under consideration cannot be considered ultra vires whether its purpose be to levy a tax or impose a license fee. The terminology used is of no consequence."
It would be an undue and unwarranted emasculation of the above power thus granted if defendant-appellant were to be sustained in his contention that no such statutory authority for the enactment of the challenged ordinance could be discerned from the language used in the amendatory act. That is about all that needs to be said in upholding the lower court, considering that the City of Baguio was not devoid of authority in enacting this particular ordinance. As mentioned at the outset, however, defendant-appellant likewise alleged procedural missteps and asserted that the challenged ordinance suffered from certain constitutional infirmities. To such points raised by him, we shall now turn.
1. Defendant-appellant makes much of the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Baguio in the suit for the collection of the real estate dealer's fee from him in the amount of P300. He contended before the lower court, and it is his contention now, that while the amount of P300 sought was within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Baguio where this action originated, since the principal issue was the legality and constitutionality of the challenged ordinance, it is not such City Court but the Court of First Instance that has original jurisdiction.
There is here a misapprehension of the Judiciary Act. The City Court has jurisdiction. Only recently, on September 7, 1968 to be exact, we rejected a contention similar in character in Nemenzo v. Sabillano.4 The plaintiff in that case filed a claim for the payment of his salary before the Justice of the Peace Court of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur. The question of jurisdiction was raised; the defendant Mayor asserted that what was in issue was the enforcement of the decision of the Commission of Civil Service; the Justice of the Peace Court was thus without jurisdiction to try the case. The above plea was curtly dismissed by Us, as what was involved was "an ordinary money claim" and therefore "within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court where it was filed, considering the amount involved." Such is likewise the situation here.
Moreover, in City of Manila v. Bugsuk Lumber Co.,5 a suit to collect from a defendant this license fee corresponding to the years 1951 and 1952 was filed with the Municipal Court of Manila, in view of the amount involved. The thought that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction apparently was not even in the minds of the parties and did not receive any consideration by this Court.
Evidently, the fear is entertained by defendant-appellant that whenever a constitutional question is raised, it is the Court of First Instance that should have original jurisdiction on the matter. It does not admit of doubt, however, that what confers jurisdiction is the amount set forth in the complaint. Here, the sum sought to be recovered was clearly within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Baguio.
Nor could it be plausibly maintained that the validity of such ordinance being open to question as a defense against its enforcement from one adversely affected, the matter should be elevated to the Court of First Instance. For the City Court could rely on the presumption of the validity of such ordinance,6 and the mere fact, however, that in the answer to such a complaint a constitutional question was raised did not suffice to oust the City Court of its jurisdiction. The suit remains one for collection, the lack of validity being only a defense to such an attempt at recovery. Since the City Court is possessed of judicial power and it is likewise axiomatic that the judicial power embraces the ascertainment of facts and the application of the law, the Constitution as the highest law superseding any statute or ordinance in conflict therewith, it cannot be said that a City Court is bereft of competence to proceed on the matter. In the exercise of such delicate power, however, the admonition of Cooley on inferior tribunals is well worth remembering. Thus: "It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility."7 While it remains undoubted that such a power to pass on the validity of an ordinance alleged to infringe certain constitutional rights of a litigant exists, still it should be exercised with due care and circumspection, considering not only the presumption of validity but also the relatively modest rank of a city court in the judicial hierarchy.
2. To repeat the challenged ordinance cannot be considered ultra vires as there is more than ample statutory authority for the enactment thereof. Nonetheless, its validity on constitutional grounds is challenged because of the allegation that it imposed double taxation, which is repugnant to the due process clause, and that it violated the requirement of uniformity. We do not view the matter thus.
As to why double taxation is not violative of due process, Justice Holmes made clear in this language: "The objection to the taxation as double may be laid down on one side. ... The 14th Amendment [the due process clause] no more forbids double taxation than it does doubling the amount of a tax, short of confiscation or proceedings unconstitutional on other grounds."8With that decision rendered at a time when American sovereignty in the Philippines was recognized, it possesses more than just a persuasive effect. To some, it
delivered the coup de grace to the bogey of double taxation as a constitutional bar to the exercise of the taxing power. It would seem though that in the United States, as with us, its ghost as noted by an eminent critic, still stalks the juridical state. In a 1947 decision, however,9 we quoted with approval this excerpt from a leading American decision:10 "Where, as here, Congress has clearly expressed its intention, the statute must be sustained even though double taxation results."
At any rate, it has been expressly affirmed by us that such an "argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city ..., it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof."11
The above would clearly indicate how lacking in merit is this argument based on double taxation.
Now, as to the claim that there was a violation of the rule of uniformity established by the constitution. According to the challenged ordinance, a real estate dealer who leases property worth P50,000 or above must pay an annual fee of P100. If the property is worth P10,000 but not over P50,000, then he pays P50 and P24 if the value is less than P10,000. On its face, therefore, the above ordinance cannot be assailed as violative of the constitutional requirement of uniformity. In Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco,12 Justice Laurel, speaking for the Court, stated: "A tax is considered uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found."
There was no occasion in that case to consider the possible effect on such a constitutional requirement where there is a classification. The opportunity came in Eastern Theatrical Co. v. Alfonso.13 Thus: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation; ..." About two years later, Justice Tuason, speaking for this Court in Manila Race Horses Trainers Assn. v. De la Fuente14 incorporated the above excerpt in his opinion and continued: "Taking everything into account, the differentiation against which the plaintiffs complain conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution."
To satisfy this requirement then, all that is needed as held in another case decided two years later, 15 is that the statute or ordinance in question "applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation." This Court is on record as accepting the view in a leading American case16 that "inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation."17
It is thus apparent from the above that in much the same way that the plea of double taxation is unavailing, the allegation that there was a violation of the principle of uniformity is inherently lacking in persuasiveness. There is no need to pass upon the other allegations to assail the validity of the above ordinance, it being maintained that the license fees therein imposed "is excessive, unreasonable and oppressive" and that there is a failure to observe the mandate of equal protection. A reading of the ordinance will readily disclose their inherent lack of plausibility.
3. That would dispose of all the errors assigned, except the last two, which would predicate a grievance on the complaint having been started by the City Treasurer rather than the City Mayor of Baguio. These alleged errors, as was the case with the others assigned, lack merit.
In much the same way that an act of a department head of the national government, performed within the limits of his authority, is presumptively the act of the President unless reprobated or disapproved,18 similarly the act of the City Treasurer, whose position is roughly analogous, may be assumed to carry the seal of approval of the City Mayor unless repudiated or set aside. This should be the case considering that such city official is called upon to see to it that revenues due the City are collected. When administrative steps are futile and unavailing, given the stubbornness and obduracy of a taxpayer, convinced in good faith that no tax was due, judicial remedy may be resorted to by him. It would be a reflection on the state of the law if such fidelity to duty would be met by condemnation rather than commendation.
So, much for the analytical approach. The conclusion thus reached has a reinforcement that comes to it from the functional and pragmatic test. If a city treasurer has to await the nod from the city mayor before a municipal ordinance is enforced, then opportunity exists for favoritism and undue discrimination to come into play. Whatever valid reason may exist as to why one taxpayer is to be accorded a treatment denied another, the suspicion is unavoidable that such a manifestation of official favor could have been induced by unnamed but not unknown consideration. It would not be going too far to assert that even defendant-appellant would find no satisfaction in such a sad state of affairs. The more desirable legal doctrine therefore, on the assumption that a choice exists, is one that would do away with such temptation on the part of both taxpayer and public official alike.
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of December 19, 1964, is hereby affirmed. Costs against defendant-appellant.
Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-26862 March 30, 1970
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Enrique M. Reyes for plaintiff-appellant.
Angel A. Sison for defendant-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The right of a holder of a backpay certificate to use the same in the payment of his taxes has been recognized by law.1 Necessarily, this Court, in Tirona v. Cudiamat,2 yielding obedience to such statutory prescription, saw nothing objectionable in a taxpayer taking advantage of such a provision. That much is clear; it is settled beyond doubt. What is involved in this appeal from a lower court decision of November 24, 1965, dismissing a complaint by plaintiff-appellant Republic of the Philippines, seeking the invalidation of the payment by defendant-appellee Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. for the registration fees3 of its motor vehicles in the sum of P78,636.17, in the form of such negotiable backpay certificates of indebtedness, is the applicability of such a provision to such a situation. The lower court held that it did. The Republic of the Philippines appealed. While originally the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals, it was certified to us, the decisive issue being one of law. The statute having restricted the privilege to the satisfaction of a tax, a liability for fees under the police power being thus excluded from its benefits, we cannot uphold the decision appealed from. We reverse.
The complaint of plaintiff-appellant Republic of the Philippines was filed on January 17, 1963 alleging that defendant-appellee, as the registered owner of two hundred thirty eight (238) motor vehicles, paid to the Motor Vehicles Office in Baguio the amount of P78,636.17, corresponding to the second installment of registration fees for 1959, not in cash but in the form of negotiable certificate of indebtedness, the defendant being merely an assignee and not the backpay holder itself. The complaint sought the payment of such amount with surcharges plus the legal rate of interest from the filing thereof and a declaration of the nullity of the use of such negotiable certificate of indebtedness to satisfy its obligation. The answer by defendant-appellee, filed on February 18, 1963, alleged that what it did was in accordance with law, both the Treasurer of the Philippines and the General Auditing Office having signified their conformity to such a mode of payment. It sought the dismissal of the complaint.
After noting the respective theories of both parties in its pleadings, the lower court, in its decision, stated that th
e issue before it "is whether or not the acceptance of the negotiable certificates of indebtedness tendered by defendant bus firms to and accepted by the Motor Vehicles Office of Baguio City and the corresponding issuance of official receipts therefor acknowledging such payment by said office is valid and binding on plaintiff Republic."4
In the decision now on appeal, the lower court, after referring to a documentary evidence introduced by plaintiff-appellant continued: "From the evidence adduced by defendant bus firm, it appears that as early as August 28, 1958, the National Treasurer upon whom devolves the function of administering the Back Pay Law (Republic Act 304 as amended by Republic Act Nos. 800 and 897), in his letter to the Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office who in turn quoted and circularized same in his Circular No. 5 dated September 1, 1958, to draw the attention thereto of all Motor Vehicle Supervisors, Registrars and employees ..., had approved the acceptance of negotiable certificates of indebtedness in payment of registration fees of motor vehicles with the view that such certificates 'should be accorded with the same confidence by other governmental instrumentalities as other evidences of public debt, such as bonds and treasury certificates'. Significantly, the Auditor General concurred in the said view of the National Treasurer."5
The argument of plaintiff-appellant that only the holders of the backpay certificates themselves could apply the same to the payment of motor vehicle registration fees did not find favor with the lower court. Thus, "[Plaintiff] Republic urges that defendant bus firm being merely an assignee of the negotiable certificates of indebtedness in question, it could not use the same in payment of taxes. Such contention, this Court believes, runs counter to the recitals appearing on the said certificates which states that 'the Republic of the Philippines hereby acknowledges to (name) or assigns ...', legally allowing the assignment of backpay rights."6
It therefore, as above noted, rendered judgment in favor of defendant-appellee "upholding the validity and efficacy" of such payment made and dismissing the complaint. Hence this appeal which, on the decisive legal issue already set forth at the outset, we find meritorious.
1. If a registration fee were a tax, then what was done by defendant-appellee was strictly in accordance with law and its nullity, as sought by plaintiff-appellant Republic of the Philippines, cannot be decreed. But is it? The answer to that question is decisive of this controversy. A tax refers to a financial obligation imposed by a state on persons, whether natural or juridical, within its jurisdiction, for property owned, income earned, business or profession engaged in, or any such activity analogous in character for raising the necessary revenues to take care of the responsibilities of government.7 An often-quoted definition is that of Cooley: "Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions from persons and property levied by the state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all public needs."8
As distinguished from other pecuniary burdens, the differentiating factor is that the purpose to be subserved is the raising of revenue. A tax then is neither a penalty that must be satisfied or a liability arising from contract.9 Much less can it be confused or identified with a license or a fee as a manifestation of an exercise of the police power. It has been settled law in this jurisdiction as far back as Cu Unjieng v. Potstone, decided in 1962, 10 that this broad and all-encompassing governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. Unlike a tax, it has not for its object the raising of revenue but looks rather to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and the political society. To quote from Cooley anew: "Legislation for these purposes it would seem proper to look upon as being made in the exercise of that authority ... spoken of as the police power." 11
The registration fee which defendant-appellee had to pay was imposed by Section 8 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. 12 Its heading speaks of "registration fees." The term is repeated four times in the body thereof. Equally so, mention is made of the "fee for registration." 13 A subsection starts with a categorical statement "No fees shall be charged." 14 The conclusion is difficult to resist therefore that the Motor Vehicle Act requires the payment not of a tax but of a registration fee under the police power. Hence the inapplicability of the section relied upon by defendant-appellee under the Back Pay Law. It is not held liable for a tax but for a registration fee. It therefore cannot make use of a backpay certificate to meet such an obligation.
Any vestige of any doubt as to the correctness of the above conclusion should be dissipated by Republic Act No. 5448. 15 A special science fund was thereby created and its title expressly sets forth that a tax on privately-owned passenger automobiles, motorcycles and scooters was imposed. The rates thereof were provided for in its Section 3 which clearly specifies that "additional tax" was to be paid as distinguished from the registration fee under the Motor Vehicle Act. There cannot be any clearer expression therefore of the legislative will, even on the assumption that the earlier legislation could be stretching the point be susceptible of the interpretation that a tax rather than a fee was levied. What is thus most apparent is that where the legislative body relies on its authority to tax it expressly so states, and where it is enacting a regulatory measure, it is equally explicit.
It may further be stated that a statute is meaningful not only by what it includes but also by what it omits. What is left out is not devoid of significance. As observed by Frankfurter: "An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. 16 In the light of this consideration, the reversal of the appealed judgment is unavoidable.
2. In the brief for plaintiff-appellant Republic of the Philippines, filed by the then Solicitor General, now Justice Antonio P. Barredo, the principal error imputed to the trial court is its failure to hold that the Back Pay Law prohibits an assignee, as is defendant-appellee, from using certificates of indebtedness to pay their taxes. In view of the conclusion reached by us that the liability of defendant-appellee under the Motor Vehicle Act does not arise under the taxing power of the state, there is no need to pass upon this particular question.
3. The Republic of the Philippines, in its brief, likewise assigned as error the failure of the lower court to hold that estoppel does not lie against the government for mistakes committed by its agents. As could be discerned from an excerpt of the decision earlier referred to, the lower court was impressed by the fact that the national treasurer to whom it correctly referred as being vested with the function of administering the backpay law did in a communication to the Motor Vehicles Office approve the acceptance of negotiable certificate of indebtedness in payment of registration fees, a view with which the Auditor General was in concurrence. The appealed decision likewise noted: "By the testimonies of Pedro Flores, the then Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Baguio City and Casiano Catbagan, the Cashier of the Bureau of Public Highways in the same city, defendant bus firm has undisputedly shown that, after the said certificates of indebtedness were properly indorsed in favor of the Motor Vehicles Office of Baguio City and accepted by the Bureau of Public Highways on May 29, 1959, it was duly and properly issued official receipts ... acknowledging full payment of its registration fees for the second installment of 1959 of its 238 vehicles, and that the Bureau of Public Highways, thru its collecting and disbursing officer, was validly and regularly authorized to receive such payment." 17
Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by the then Solicitor General, conclude that the government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the auditor general. It would consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law. Estoppel does not lie. Such a principle dates back to Aguinaldo de Romero v. Director of Lands, 18 a 1919 decision. Insofar as the taxing power is concerned, Pineda v. Court of First Instance, a 1929 decision, speaks categorically: "The Government is never estopped
by mistake or error on the part of its agents. It follows that, in so far as this record shows, the petitioners have not made it appear that the additional tax claimed by the Collector is not in fact due and collectible. The assessment of the tax by the Collector creates, it must be remembered, a charge that is at least prima facie valid." 19 That principle has since been subsequently followed. 20 While the question here is one of the collection of a regulatory fee under the police power, reliance on the above course of decisions is not inappropriate. There is nothing to stand in the way, therefore, of the collection of the registration fees from defendant-appellee.
WHEREFORE, the decision of November 24, 1965 is reversed and defendant-appellee ordered to pay the sum of P78,636.17. With costs against defendant-appellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
Barredo, J., took no part.
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