It is a similar story elsewhere. The turnover of trade between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan doubled in the first six months of 2018 compared to the same period the year before.21 In Iran and Azerbaijan, meanwhile, “all necessary preparations have been made for cooperation in strategic projects such as in the energy sector,” according to Mahmoud Vaezi, chief of staff to the President of Iran, following a meeting in Baku in the early summer of 2018.22
Agreements concerning academic cooperation as well as those relating to pipeline construction have heralded a period of closer ties between Afghanistan and Tajikistan in the years ahead.23 More important is the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which became operational in June 2018, that links the Shah Deniz II gas field in Azerbaijan with south-eastern Europe—even if some argue that its long-term role in the energy supply for Europe as a whole may be limited in the medium term.24
TANAP is just one of many similar projects at various stages of development that connect to resource-rich countries lying in the centre of Asia. Another is the Central Asia–South Asia power project (CASA-1000), which will transmit surplus energy generated from hydroelectric power plants in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Pakistan and Afghanistan by 2020.25 Such is the strengthening of ties that the Kyrgyz ambassador to Pakistan, Erik Beishembiev, recently talked about improving bilateral links between the governments in Bishkek and Islamabad, because the two countries “have historical roots, common religion, similar traditions and worldview on many issues.”26
Shared mutual interests have also underpinned talks between Russia and the other members of the Eurasian Economic Union (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus) with Iran about the creation of a free-trade zone, joint investments and interbank agreements—a key stumbling block—that would be mutually beneficial, but also important, according to Vyacheslav Volodin, Speaker of the Russian Duma.27
This is part of a wider consolidation in Central Asia in which Russia and Iran also play a key role. Increasing trade, improving relations and working to cut down cross-border smuggling are not just theoretical priorities but are being actively worked on and developed through institutional reforms and through the establishment of bodies to oversee and coordinate areas of obvious mutual interest. These serve as sign parts of a desire to strengthen ties and improve political ties, too.28
A typical example of the way in which the heart of the world is being knitted together comes from a conference held in Samarkand in November 2017 where senior officials from the Central Asian republics, as well as from Afghanistan, Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan, met to discuss ways of working together to deal with terrorism, religious extremism, transnational organised crime and drug trafficking—under the theme “Central Asia: one past and a common future, cooperation for sustainable development and mutual prosperity.”29
Of course, such conferences—and frothy statements about the solidarity of peoples living along the Silk Roads—can flatter to deceive and are expressions of goodwill as much as an attempt to resolve substantive issues. In the case of Central Asia, however, there has been progress with the thorny issue of border disputes, where historical and ethnic tensions have often soured relations to the point where some observers have warned of the potential for military conflict.30 These too have started to be settled. Perhaps the most significant step in the consolidation in the heart of the world is an agreement over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, an issue that has been a stumbling block for large-scale cooperation between Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan—especially in the energy sector. Striking outline terms that are mutually acceptable to all sides has taken decades; but the landmark agreement may well serve to transform oil and gas supplies not just across the region but for markets all around the world, so great are the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian littoral countries and of the Caspian itself.31 However, as some observers point out, although the agreement signed in August 2018 is clearly an important step forward, much remains unresolved and it is by no means certain when, if or how all the issues that were not addressed will finally be dealt with.32
The agreements that were reached were nevertheless the latest in a series of steps forward that have started removing obstacles and improved long-term prospects for cooperation across the spine of Asia. One example comes with discussions about a possible land swap between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as part of the process of agreeing the border between the two countries.33 Another example comes with a meeting held in Astana in April 2018 that enabled Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to sign off on an agreed set of frontiers. “There are no unresolved border issues,” announced President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, while noting, along with his counterpart, President Rahmon of Tajikistan, a renewed commitment to cooperate closely on the question of water resources in the region.34
The issue of water is one of the most significant across Central Asia—starkly illustrated by the near-disappearance of the Aral Sea since the 1960s, when the rivers that fed it were diverted to support misguided Soviet agricultural initiatives. The tensions and practical difficulties this caused are hard to underestimate, in terms of the devastation of the physical landscape, environmental pollution as well as public-health issues that range from respiratory diseases and cancer to infant mortality rates.35
At the end of May 2018, storms blew salt from the now dried-up sea floor and enveloped parts of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, covering wheat and cotton fields with as much as a centimetre of salt—at a time when water shortages had already resulted in crop failures in the season.36 The fact that efforts to restore water levels appear to be having an effect, albeit slowly, is therefore welcome news indeed.37
This does not help Afghanistan, though, where a precipitation deficit of 70 per cent led to the United Nations issuing a warning in June 2018 that harvests had failed, rivers had dried up and 2 million people were expected to become food insecure by the end of the year—a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in the making in a country that has been ravaged by almost non-stop war for four decades.38 “I would do anything to save my son from hunger,” one farmer said. “I would join Daesh or the Taliban.”39
Part of the problem is that the three major rivers in Central Asia—the Syr Darya, Amu Darya and Irtysh—are transboundary waterways, which means that decisions in one country have an impact on what happens downstream. The significance of this can be shown by noting that about 70 per cent of developmental problems in the region are caused by freshwater shortages.40 As a result, finding a way to resolve water management in the optimum fashion has, not surprisingly, been a matter of particular interest and concern for some time.41
Water is also a problem in South Asia, where India’s construction of the Kishanganga dam and hydroelectric plant has been a source of great concern for the government of Pakistan, who argue that these projects violate the treaty of 1960 that split the water resources of the Indus River between Pakistan and India. Anxieties about the dam, which was formally opened in May 2018, have been heightened by proposals to build as many as twelve hydroelectric plants on the River Kabul in Afghanistan—which would put further pressure on the resources of cities like Karachi, whose population is growing at more than 5 per cent per year and whose water board is only able to supply 50 per cent of its needs as it is.42 Not surprisingly, the Kishanganga dam has been referred to the International Court for Arbitration, and, perhaps equally unsurprisingly, the dispute has resulted in recriminations, soul-searching and suspicions of sabotage and conspiracy in the press in both India and Pakistan.43
Then there is the impact of climate change, which according to recent research will cause the Urumqi Glacier No. 1 to lose some 80 per cent of its ice volume in the next three decades—which will have obvious implications for Central Asia as well as for western China, where this and other glaciers play an important role in providing water for rivers but also as standby resources in times of drought.44
The pro
blems posed by water shortages can be illustrated by the protests that broke out in Iran in the spring of 2018. With the Islamic Republic of Iran Meteorological Organization estimating that 97 per cent of the country is experiencing drought to some degree, entire towns and villages have been abandoned by their population. Shortages led to riots, which were strongly repressed by security forces in some parts of the country.45 The situation was so acute that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, mentioned it in his Nowruz (New Year) address, acknowledging that the dry conditions had brought hardship, and praying that “divine grace” would resolve the problem shortly.46
In addition to the prayers, Iran has also taken more constructive steps to resolve the water conditions, which are so dire that some of the country’s energy supply has been affected by hydroelectric plants that have stopped working properly.47 Discussions with neighbouring Afghanistan have intensified recently about restoring the flow of the Helmand River and the supply of water to the Hamoon wetlands. According to Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, an agreement has been reached that will result in 850 million cubic metres of water a year flowing into Iran in the future.48
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Progress has been made elsewhere to move beyond framework agreements that have been signed in the past but were then held back by the lack of political goodwill between states—and their leaders—which often perceived and treated each other as rivals. The death of President Karimov of Uzbekistan in 2016 and his replacement by Shavkat Mirziyoyev has helped break the stalemate and brought about new opportunities for discussion and action. “Problems of water, peace and security are inextricably linked,” Mirziyoyev told the General Assembly at the United Nations in New York in September 2017. “There is no alternative to addressing the water problem other than equally taking into account the interests of the countries and nations of the region.”49
The new administration of Mirziyoyev has blown other winds of change into Uzbekistan, including steps towards long-hoped-for improvements on human rights, press freedoms and other indices where the country—like many of its neighbours—has traditionally scored very poorly.50 For the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, for example, there were no journalists behind bars as of May 2018, when a judge released two men who had been accused of writing articles that were critical of the government and plotting its overthrow.51
According to a report by US-based Freedom House in the autumn of 2017, subjects that were previously taboo in public, such as “failing currency-exchange policies” and “the large number of Uzbek labour migrants in Russia” are now discussed openly, while “a slight opening for civic activism” was also noteworthy, alongside a relaxing of the hard-line attitudes towards religious freedom.52
That improvements such as these have caught the attention of mainstream media outlets on the other side of the world shows just how significant the transformation may turn out to be. Indeed, within less than a fortnight the New York Times carried two major features on the positive changes in Uzbekistan and heralded the dawn of a new era of openness.53 Others have been more circumspect. While welcoming the steps taken to improve human rights, a joint statement by a group of twelve non-governmental organisations (NGOs) pointed out that “internet censorship, politically motivated imprisonment, torture, a lack of competitive electoral processes, and a lack of justice for serious past abuses remain to be addressed.”54 Whether the reforms are real, or a case of window-dressing, is still not clear. Some experts are prepared to concede positive steps have been taken but remain unconvinced that a decisive corner has been turned.55
More is going on, however, beyond eye-catching headlines, speeches at the UN and apparent steps forward in human rights. Removing barriers, increasing cooperation and helping facilitate trade requires discussions and decisions at every level. Recent discussions between officials from Tajikistan and Turkmenistan about consular issues between the two countries were noteworthy in this regard—as was mention of “the mining and oil and gas industry, energy sector and mineral resources processing” and “infrastructure projects of regional importance.”56
This provides one example of closer ties being sought across the length of the Silk Roads. A joint venture by the state-owned oil companies of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan to develop fields in the Caspian provides another.57 So do the new train lines that have been built criss-crossing the Silk Roads. These include the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars track that was inaugurated in October 2017, new tracks connecting Yiwu with Tehran in Iran and also the upgrading of rail lines that transport freight to Europe.58
“There is much scope for increasing cooperation,” said President Rouhani of Iran at a meeting of the heads of the states bordering the Caspian in August 2018. If Kazakhstan and Iran built transit networks, “Kazakhstan may be linked to the Southern waters through Iran, and Iran can be connected to China via Kazakhstan,” he said—urging investment into new transport infrastructure to tie not just two countries, but a wider region together.59
The development of a new “International North–South transport corridor” that connects South East Asia and northern Europe has also made progress and seen government bodies in Azerbaijan, Russia and Iran working closely with each other. “This project will involve our transport ministries,” said Sergei Lavrov, Russian’s foreign minister, “which will consider technical and financial aspects, as well as interaction between our customs and consular services.”60 Discussions are also continuing about expanding this corridor to enable the participation of Indian goods and services.61
The significance of the corridor is clear from the fact that some estimates suggest that if accompanied by investment into new rail lines, it might boost India’s trade with countries in Eurasia from around $30bn a year by nearly six times.62 Separate analysis suggests that Iran alone might generate $2bn of transit fees from the rise in trade across the region—with some officials stating that the country could expect fees of $50 per ton.63 Even if such figures are wildly optimistic, they point to expectations of what improved infrastructure, transport and communication ties might deliver.
Then there is the “Ashgabat agreement” that was signed in 2011 by India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Oman, which seeks to deepen cooperation, facilitate the movement of goods and enable visa-free travel between the countries—although the tangible fruits are still elusive.64 More promising is the proposal to introduce a “Silk Visa” in 2019 to enable visa-free travel in Central Asia, with plans to expand the scheme into Azerbaijan and Turkey too.65
Another of the plethora of schemes intended to tie the heart of the world together is the “Lapis Lazuli” corridor that connects Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. The $2bn proposal, which took four years to negotiate, aims to establish motorway and rail links between the city of Torgundi in the Afghan province of Herat and Ashgabat and the port of Turkmenbashi on the Caspian Sea. The corridor would then connect Baku with Tbilisi and Ankara with branches to Poti and Batumi, and then from the Turkish capital to Istanbul.66
This is to be supplemented, according to reports, by a new sixteen-lane expressway costing $2.4bn that will link Ashgabat with Turkmenabat on the border with Uzbekistan—and be studded with recreation centres, shops, restaurants, motels, open and covered parking lots, fuel stations and more besides—in a utopian vision of what motorway travel might be like in a country where summer temperatures regularly exceed 40°C.67
This extravagant building is part of a pattern that includes new port facilities at Turkmenbashi on the Caspian Sea, constructed at a reported cost of $1.5bn. Such projects show that significant investment is going into large-scale infrastructure projects—even if, in the case of Turkmenistan at least, most commentators doubt whether the volume of cargo or passenger numbers will ever reach the levels that justify the outlay.68
Indeed, the opening ceremony of the new facilities in May 20
18 focused less on the port playing a central role as a logistics hub than on the perennial favourite pursuit of Turkmen leaders: setting world records. The first guest introduced at the port’s opening was a representative of the Guinness Book of Records, who was there to note the facility was the largest built below sea level in the world—an anomaly of Turkmenbashi’s physical position.69 This earned the port a place alongside earlier awards that include the world’s highest concentration of buildings lined with white marble, the world’s tallest flagpole (a title subsequently ceded to Tajikistan), the largest handmade woven carpet, the largest indoor Ferris wheel, the most number of people singing in the round, the largest star-shaped roof on a building and the largest symbol of a horse in the world.70
More substantive progress is apparent elsewhere, however. Discussions about mutual interests in the energy sector have led to proposals to connect the electrical grids of Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran to enable the latter to export electricity—as it already does to Iraq and Afghanistan.71 Negotiations advanced quickly, with the first sale taking place between Iran and Azerbaijan just months after terms were agreed.72
The rewards of such large-scale infrastructure projects have been borne quickly. In the summer of 2017, Ebrahim Mohammadi, the deputy head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railways, noted that freight transport was up 55 per cent compared to the same period a year before.73 According to Iran’s Trade Promotion Organisation, in the fiscal year ending 20 March 2018 transit revenues were up by 20 per cent compared to the previous twelve-month period.74
The prospects of future growth across Central Asia have been discerned by many. At a summit in Astana in the spring of 2018, the Turkish foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, talked about boosting bilateral trade between Turkey and Kazakhstan to $5bn or even $10bn in the future, a significant improvement on current figures. “Turkish companies have played a very important role in the development of Kazakhstan,” he noted, and had excellent potential to grow further in the future.75 This is part of the wider emergence of a pan-Turkic sentiment and of the desire of Central Asian states—and Turkey—to collaborate and work more closely together economically, politically and culturally.
The New Silk Roads Page 5