In fact, cooler heads prevailed and an uneasy truce was agreed. But the threat of escalation was clear from comments made by the chief of the Indian General Staff, General Bipin Ravat, who at the height of the Doklam dispute stated the Indian armed forces needed to be upgraded and put on a war footing. Although he recognised that “not even a single bullet has been fired on the Indo-China border” and that there were ways of defusing the situation, there should be no doubt, he said, that India was “fully ready for a two-and-a-half front war.” He meant that the army was ready to simultaneously engage with China and Pakistan, if needed, as well as being able to deal with civil disobedience and uprisings within India itself.147
It would be going too far to talk of a siege mentality developing in India when discussing relations with two of its neighbours with whom it often does not see eye to eye and whom it instinctively distrusts. But senior officers thinking, talking and preparing for large-scale action can sometimes create the context for self-fulfilling prophecies. This was the case just over a century ago, when those who went to war in 1914 did so thinking they were taking defensive action.148
The concerns of the Indian military are not only based on what is happening in Kashmir and the Himalayas, but also on the fact that the Indian Ocean is emerging as a contested space. In the summer of 2016 Pakistan announced that it would spend $5bn to buy eight modified diesel-electric attack submarines from China—most probably lighter export versions of the Type 039, but possibly even new Type 041 Yuan-class conventional attack submarines.149 That is a concern for India, as is the fact that Pakistan has already conducted a test flight on the Babur-3, a modified-for-submarine version of the Babur-2 ground-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile.150
That is only part of the picture, however, because in addition to Pakistan’s increasing capabilities and ambitions are those of China itself in the Indian Ocean. Although the government in Pakistan has insisted that Gwadar and its facilities are open only to commercial shipping and not to the Chinese navy, Indian defence chiefs have already started to think of how to deal with the situation if this changes in the future. The fact that there has been a minimum of eight Chinese naval vessels in the Indian Ocean at any one time—and on one occasion as many as fourteen on patrol—has also been noted at the highest levels in the Indian armed forces.151
It is not just the presence of Chinese warships that has become a concern. So too has an increasingly confrontational posture. An Indian navy spokesman was forced to deny that Chinese vessels that included missile destroyers had been threatened with a warning shot and “war drill” in February 2018.152 This was the second denial in a month that the two sides had come close to engaging each other.153
The challenges cut both ways. China has paid considerable attention to the Maldives as part of what one commentator has called a “chain of military installations and economic projects aimed at projecting Chinese power in the Indian Ocean.”154 When the chief justice and a former president of the Maldives were arrested, and a state of emergency declared in the spring of 2018, there were reports that India was preparing to send troops to restore order. These were met with a stark warning from Beijing: if India sent troops to the Maldives, “China will take action to stop New Delhi. India should not underestimate China’s opposition to unilateral military intervention.” India should exercise restraint. If it did not do so, there would be dire consequences. “Unauthorised military intervention in Malé must be stopped.”155
Then there are the elevated fears of rising military confrontation as a result of missile development in India. The successful testing of pre-induction trials of the Agni-V Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) from a road-mobile launcher in early 2018 raised alarm bells in Beijing, where it was described as “a direct threat to China’s security.” This was not surprising, given that Indian defence analysts themselves have noted that with a range of “easily more than 5,500 km, the Agni-V clearly confers upon India the ability to hold all of China’s Eastern Seaboard cities at risk from Peninsular India.” The fact that the need to develop “a longer-ranged and heavier missile that will carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles” in order to “guarantee penetration against China’s [anti–ballistic missile defence] system in the decades ahead,” shows the stakes involved as a new world emerges.156
In March 2018 joint operations between the naval forces of twenty-three states, including India, Australia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Oman and Cambodia, brought a stern warning in the Global Times, a mouthpiece for the government in Beijing. These exercises will inflame tensions with China, the paper warned, and expand the potential for conflict from land to sea. It was likely that the participants would have China at the top of the agenda, with plans to create ties that would “make China a target.” If there was “any unreasonable provocation” during the exercises, China “should be prepared for a military response.”157
Blunt warnings such as these underline the fragilities of the modern age. It does not take much to see that provocations, intentional or otherwise, can be easily misconstrued or acted upon in a way that escalates quickly. But nor does it take great insight to recognise that heavy-handed comments like these end up pushing rivals together by accentuating common interests, demonstrating that there is substance to concerns that Beijing is willing to use pressure—and force if necessary—to get its own way.
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Working out how to cope with, respond to and understand China’s expanding ambitions and presence is one reason why defence spending is rising in South and South East Asia and also in Oceania and the Pacific, where Chinese projects to build new airports, wharfs, facilities and to make a further series of investments in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have not just raised eyebrows in Australia but led to discussions about how best to respond to them.158
While some politicians have reverted to name-calling, such as Concetta Fierravanti-Wells, Australia’s former international development minister, saying that China was funding expensive, “useless buildings,” “roads to nowhere” and construction projects that build “something for the heck of building it,” more active steps have also been taken.159 These include increasing aid to the region, the laying of expensive underwater cables (to prevent Chinese contractors doing so) and approving a $38bn deal to buy twelve new submarines from France.160 Such steps—like the decision to spend $7bn on a small fleet of drones—were taken to try to compete with China in the future. “It is very important,” said Christopher Pyne, the Australian defence industry minister, “to know who is operating in our area and to be able to respond if necessary to any threats.”161
The extent of the concern can also be seen from the strategic defence policy statement released by the government of New Zealand in July 2018. “New Zealand is navigating an increasingly complex and dynamic international security environment,” the document says. “We will face compounding challenges of a scope and magnitude not previously seen in our neighbourhood.”162 This is the prelude for a proposed new security agreement with Australia and a series of Pacific states, driven largely by the increasing Chinese activities in the region.163
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Competition is even sharper and more immediate in Djibouti, where one of the many modern versions of the Great Game is being played out. Strategically located in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti sits at the chokepoint between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea (which connects to the Suez Canal), and sees 30 per cent of global shipping sail past each year. Djibouti has been home to a French military base since it gained independence from France in 1977 after more than a century as a colony, with the French garrison playing a role in the security of the country as well as performing anti-piracy patrols in the sea off East Africa. As recently as 2014 there were plans to cut the size of the force by half because of budget deficits in Paris.164
Since then, however, the region has become a honey
-pot for other states, with Saudi Arabia proposing to build a base in Djibouti because “we are one people who share the same values, and we have the same issues and problems.”165 Turkey is also highly active nearby, as is clear from its embassy in Somalia, which is the largest Turkish diplomatic mission in the world.166 Turkey too is building a military installation in the region, with plans to construct a base in Somalia well under way.167
This will be located not far from Japan’s military establishment in Djibouti—which is in the process of being expanded.168 Both will be close to a reinforced facility at Assab in the south of Eritrea that is being built by the United Arab Emirates; already operational, in addition to docking for corvettes and bigger naval craft, it can also accommodate attack aircraft and tanks.169 Not too far up the coast, a new seaport at Suakin on the coast of Sudan is being built with $4bn of funding from Qatar—which will be the biggest port on the Red Sea, and will have military capabilities as well.170
The scramble for strategic position has drawn in all comers—including Russia, who are reportedly in discussions with Somaliland to establish a military base to include facilities capable of servicing two destroyers, four frigates and two submarine pens, as well as hosting a garrison. In return, Moscow will apparently set about helping the breakaway republic establish its independence from Somalia and be internationally recognised as a sovereign state.171
But for the US the region has become more than one of interest. It is now of pivotal importance for the military and for America’s regional, international and global policies. The construction of a base in Djibouti was described in 2016 by Tom Kelly, then ambassador to the country, as “the biggest active military construction project in the entire world….It’s number one of everything we’re doing.”172 Djibouti plays a key role for the US military mission not only in Africa, but also in Europe, Asia and globally. “It’s very, very important to us,” General Thomas D. Waldhauser told the House Armed Services Committee in the spring of 2018.173
It has also become important to China, which began construction of its own naval base in 2016. When the government of Djibouti terminated the contract of Dubai-based DP World, the operator of the Doraleh container terminal, in a move the company termed “oppressive and cynical,” it was widely believed that the reason for doing so was to hand control of the terminal to China, either as a reward for the loans, or perhaps in lieu of some of the debt repayments of a state that the IMF says faces a “high risk of debt distress,” which has increased significantly since 2014 as a result of “large externally financed infrastructure projects”—almost all financed by China.174
While the Chinese military base is officially linked to providing “better logistics and [to] safeguard Chinese peacekeeping forces in the Gulf of Aden, offshore Somalia and other humanitarian assistance tasks of the UN,” satellite images of the building of a heavily fortified base just a few miles from the US military compound bear witness to a statement of intent.175 Above all this includes what a defence white paper published by the State Council of China in 2015 called the “long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests.”176 As history shows, expanding economic and political interests go hand in hand with taking steps to protect them.
As such, while the fact that General Waldhauser noted that “the consequences could be significant” if competition developed between the US and China for control of the shipping port in Djibouti, it seems inevitable that there will be similar rivalries elsewhere around the world. A senior advisor to the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association is quoted as saying that “more overseas logistic bases will be built in the future to assist the PLA Navy [the Chinese navy] to conduct operations globally”—with the stated aim being to rival the US. “There is no need to hide the ambition of the PLA Navy,” said Xu Guangyu; the purpose is “to gain an ability like the US Navy so that it can conduct operations globally.”177
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West Africa provides an example of just how—and where—this is happening. The tiny state of São Tomé e Príncipe has relatively little going for it, at least according to the World Bank, which describes the country as one which has “no single economic activity that serves as a driver for growth”—a polite way of saying that it is both sleepy and lacking in prospects.178
The country does have one thing going for it, however: a location that lends itself as a perfect potential strategic and economic hub for all of West Africa—not least since the small size of the island archipelago and its equally small population mean that it is less exposed to political fragilities than some of the many countries that it is well placed to service. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, it has been the subject not only of Chinese attention but of major investment, with a deep-water port under construction at an estimated cost of $800m.179
Although there is no military component to the development in Sāo Tomé e Príncipe, winning friends in strategically important locations is useful—both now and in the future. The offer of additional collaboration, as well as well-chosen words by Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, which note that “China advocates that all countries, big or small, be on an equal footing,” do much to improve relations and create a common narrative that is particularly appealing to countries that feel marginalised or excluded from the mainstream of international affairs.180
The approach can also bring more direct rewards. In the case of São Tomé e Príncipe that included the decision to rescind its recognition of Taiwan as an independent state, and the transference of allegiance to Beijing.181 This finds a parallel with Panama, where Chinese companies with close ties to the government agreed to invest almost $1bn in upgrading port facilities that would help with ever-larger ships.182 Not long after, Panama—one of a small and shrinking number of countries that recognised Taiwan—broke with Taipei and established diplomatic relations with Beijing.183 The Dominican Republic, which will receive investment worth $3bn, did the same in May 2018, with the country’s president announcing that “there is a single China in the world, and Taiwan forms an inalienable part of Chinese territory.”184
El Salvador was the next to switch allegiance in the summer of 2018. “We are convinced that this is a step in the right direction,” said the El Salvadorean president in a televised address.185 The agreement reached with the Vatican over the appointment of Catholic bishops in China likewise would seem to have a context of Beijing seeking to draw support away from Taiwan—even if senior figures in Rome gave assurances that there were “no diplomatic or political connotations” to the accord.186
Chinese sensitivities about Taiwan were clearly not helped by the fact that the island’s president was the first world leader that Donald Trump decided to call after being elected president at the end of 2016, in an act described by the Economist as a bull entering a China shop.187 Six months later, Trump took a different approach. President Xi “is a friend of mine,” he said, who was “doing an amazing job as leader and I wouldn’t want to do anything that comes in the way of that. So I would certainly want to speak to him first” before calling Taipei again.188
China’s manoeuvres have extended to putting pressure on international airlines to amend the maps on their websites and inflight magazine to reflect Beijing’s views of the status of Taiwan—dismissed by Trump’s White House as “Orwellian nonsense” and part of an attempt “to impose Chinese political correctness on American companies and citizens.”189 The question of the status of Taiwan is a highly delicate one, noted Yan Xuetong, one of the most influential and prominent foreign-policy experts: “The core of the Cold War was about ideology, and only by preventing ideological tensions can we prevent a Cold War” between China and the US. It is therefore imperative to “build effective prevention mechanisms” to avoid a crisis—or perhaps worse.190
“One of the biggest problems we will have to deal with,” said Yan, is “Trump’s unpredictability,” because “he makes dec
isions according to his own [whims and] there is little continuity between his decisions.”191 Understanding this, and dealing with it correctly, requires both skill, patience and no little luck in being able to second-guess what the president will do next and if, when or why he will change his mind. Particularly worrying is the case of Taiwan. The status of this island, and how the US and China handle it, represents the “biggest danger” to world peace in the next decade, said Yan.
The competition between Washington and Beijing has local consequences too. In September 2018, for example, the US recalled its ambassadors from El Salvador, Panama and the Dominican Republic for consultations over the recognition of Taiwan by the three states and to discuss how the US “can support strong, independent, democratic states” in Central America and the Caribbean.192 Put more bluntly, this meant working out what steps to take against those who had chosen to support China.
Countries like El Salvador would be sorry, the White House press secretary had already warned; China’s economic inducements only facilitate “economic dependency and domination, not partnership.”193 Others are keen to take more direct measures—with four senators introducing the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act to allow the US to “downgrade” relations and “suspend or alter US foreign assistance” to any government that supports China over the status of Taiwan.194
Avoiding the escalation of rivalries and preventing them spilling over into a dangerous conclusion is of global significance. In that sense, the tensions and competition engendered by China’s vision for the world fit into the wider question of how to assess or manage the rise of Beijing, which is seen by many as an economic, military and strategic threat—especially in the United States.
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