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By the end of 2018, a new sense of urgency was finally starting to emerge, along with the first signs of a concrete plan. Much of the energy in the US has gone into vocal and persistent criticism of China in general and of the Belt and Road Initiative in particular. At the APEC summit in Papua New Guinea, for example, Vice President Mike Pence talked at length about the flaws of China’s plans. “As we are all aware,” he said, “some [countries] are offering infrastructure loans across the Indo-Pacific and around the world.” These usually had “strings attached”—and were “often unsustainable.” All should know, he went on, that “the US offers a better option. We don’t drown our partners in a sea of debt, we don’t coerce, or compromise your independence. We don’t offer a restricting belt or a one way road.”101 US companies, Pence had said in the days before the summit, “really provide jobs and come to the region and deliver prosperity to the region.” Unlike the “dangerous debt diplomacy” offered by China, the US was a good partner to work with.102 Criticising China and offering promises of an easy alternative are all well and good. What matters is how the US actually follows through on its promises to lead or take part in major infrastructure projects in faraway countries where it remains necessary to engage and deal with entrenched elites for whom opaque contracts can sometimes offer positive benefits. Moreover, while the reminders of the dangers and realities of excessive debts can hardly be argued with, being constructive and pragmatic usually proves more useful.
In the Philippines, for example, a decision has been made to engage with China, rather than fight at windmills and wait for investment and support from the US that might come. “China is already in possession” of key parts of the South China Sea, said President Duterte. It was unrealistic for the Philippines to think in terms of “military activity that will prompt a response” from Beijing.103 Rather, it would be more useful to reach an accommodation by thinking carefully about not only which projects to cooperate on, but also getting the terms right.104
One solution might come from discussions in Washington around the BUILD Act, which has made it US policy “to provide countries with a robust alternative to state-directed investments by authoritarian governments”—a clear reference to China and the Belt and Road plans.105 Precisely what resources are committed to this proposal, on what terms, and how private sector investors and contractors can be persuaded to fund projects in Asia, along the Silk Roads or for that matter elsewhere, remains to be seen. It is not easy to see how supporting investments in faraway countries is squared with calls to put America First.
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For the moment, at least, much of Washington’s energy is going into criticising China, its methods and its plans. China, said National Security Advisor John Bolton, “uses bribes, opaque agreements and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and demands.” Like Russia, which is increasingly active in Africa, Bolton was not concerned with African states themselves, but with the impact of Chinese and Russian “predatory practices” on “the national security interest of the United States.” It was time for a new approach, he said, under which “every decision we take, every policy we pursue and every dollar of aid we spend will further US priorities in the region.”106
At face value, the principle of US support being matched to US priorities seems fair enough. The problem is both that US priorities do not necessarily align with local needs, and also that rather than develop an independent approach, the US is going toe-to-toe with Beijing and Moscow. US policy, in other words, is being developed in response to Chinese and Russian plans, rather than offering an independent and autonomous vision that offers longer-lasting, practical support.
For one thing, it is a game the US are unlikely to win given the considerable strategic advantages that their rivals have when it comes to limiting transparency, to the speed of decision-making processes and to the ability and willingness to work alongside governments across Africa and provide support for plans developed locally. For another, the epiphany that more needs to be done in Africa and indeed elsewhere in the world stands in stark contrast to the repeated and consistent aims of the Trump administration of a massive reduction in international development funds, and the proposed elimination of entities such as the US African Development Foundation.107
Increasingly, American foreign policy is shaped by competing with China and Russia—not only in Africa. In December 2018, it was reported that the US would begin to withdraw from Afghanistan, with US negotiators asking the Taliban for a six month cease-fire to help effect the safe extraction of American forces. But the US wants to retain a military presence in the country after the pullout, keeping three bases in Afghanistan. Assurances have been given, according to well-placed sources, that the US “would not interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs” and would play no role in security matters. “The bases would only serve to safeguard [US] interests in the region, especially against Russia and China.”108
It is no surprise, then, that the competing impulses of retreat on the one hand and dogmatic engagement on the other lead to chaos and confusion. “We remain committed…to ensure an enduring defeat of ISIS,” read a statement released by Operation Inherent Resolve in December 2018, adding that “any reports indicating a change in the US position with respect to these efforts is false and designed to sow confusion and chaos.”109 This came days after Brett McGurk, special presidential envoy for the Global Coalition to defeat ISIS had said that “we can’t just pick up and leave” after ISIS was defeated. “Nobody is saying they will disappear,” he said, adding, “Nobody is that naïve. So we want to stay on the ground and make sure that stability can be maintained.”110
The chaotic impression of US policy was made clear days later when President Trump tweeted, “We have defeated ISIS in Syria”—to the surprise of most in the US military—“my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency,” announcing a complete withdrawal of US troops from Syria.111 There are, naturally, good reasons not to be the “policeman of the world” as Jim Mattis put it in his letter of resignation the following day—and not to expose American servicemen to danger, or American taxpayers to expensive wars abroad. But knee-jerk decisions like this, apparently made on the spur of the moment during a phone conversation between Trump and President Erdoğan of Turkey, catch everyone by surprise—not least Erdoğan himself, as well as Mattis and Brett McGurk, who resigned almost immediately, and Kurdish military groups who have been fighting alongside US forces in the region for several years.112
It also delivers an opportunity to others. For some time, the Russians and the Iranians have been talking about pushing the US out of the Middle East. “The main threat to Syria’s territorial integrity,” said Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in September 2018, comes from the “illegal activities” being pursued by the US, including the establishment of “independent autonomous entities” east of the Euphrates.113 The decisions made by the US in Syria, President Erdoğan told Vladimir Putin shortly beforehand, were the greatest threat to Syria’s future.114 It was simple, said President Rouhani of Iran: Iran, Turkey and Russia need to “resolve the situation and force America out” of Syria.115
Many commentators assume that US departure from Syria presents opportunities for Russia, Turkey and Iran to reshape the Middle East individually and collectively.116 Whether that is actually the case remains to be seen: the idea that Moscow, Ankara and Tehran will prove more effective in dealing with ISIS and its successors than Washington has been requires several leaps of faith—as does the idea that the US withdrawal will lead to other states with interests across the region finding a way to see eye-to-eye, let alone a way to cooperate fruitfully. Nevertheless, the shift in direction is remarkable, given that John Bolton had been saying just three months before Trump’s withdrawal order that the US forces were “not going to leave as long as Iranian troops are o
utside Iranian borders.”117
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What is unmistakable in this moving series of events is that the US reactions to China’s strategic plans and to those of others around the world are a response to a new world being born. It is a world of increasing connections, greater cooperation and widening collaboration. None of those are easy or straightforward to get right, and it is important to recognise that rivalry, competition and tensions can be hidden by glossy statements of superficial friendships—such as the agreed statement made by the leaders of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and India, which noted that events like the FIFA World Cup, the International Wushu (martial arts) competition in Chongqing and the International Yoga Day taking place in 2018 “will contribute to stronger friendship, mutual understanding and peace.”118 That seems optimistic, to put it mildly.
Yet cooperation between states is often not straightforward—because of strategic rivalries, competition for resources and personality clashes between leaders who might be described as charismatic visionaries by their supporters and as having autocratic instincts by their critics. One example comes with the high-profile case of an ethnic Kazakh Chinese citizen who crossed illegally from China into Kazakhstan to join her family, and whose trial effectively forced the decision over whether agreeing to Beijing’s demands for deportation or risk angering the latter and providing asylum was the lesser of two evils.119
A similar example of the fragility of how difficult the practicalities are of cooperation in the new world that is emerging comes with the case of Russia’s relations with Turkey. On one level, both are aligned in their disposition towards the West at a time when both countries have been experiencing bumpy relationships with the EU and with the US. The fact that Vladimir Putin offered Recep Tayyip Erdoğan support during the attempts to remove him from office in 2016 helped improve ties, not least since the Russian leader either tipped off his Turkish counterpart before the coup, or managed to convince media outlets afterwards that he had done so.120 The importance of bilateral trade also provides considerable common ground between the two.121
But there are important areas where Russia and Turkey have aims that are not so much divergent as positively at odds. Following the Russian annexation of Crimea, Erdoğan urged NATO to take action. “The Black Sea,” he told Jens Stoltenberg, NATO secretary-general, “has almost become a Russian lake. If we don’t act now, history will not forgive us.”122 His alarm was not surprising, not least since Putin had long been triumphantly celebrating the fact that Russia had turned Crimea into “a fortress both by land and by sea” that would never fall.123 This is not how Erdoğan sees it. “We neither did, nor will we, recognise the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia,” he declared during a visit to Kyiv in October 2017.124
Concern about Russian ambitions, meanwhile, led to changes in the most recent update to Kazakhstan’s Military Doctrine, which explicitly discusses the threat that Russia poses to the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty—hardly an indication of the expectation that relations between the countries will be smooth and easy in the coming years.125
Not surprisingly, while happy to talk about cooperation with their neighbour in public, the Kazakhs have also been keen to keep their options open and to find a balance that prevents Russian—or Chinese—attentions from becoming overwhelming. This is one reason why Kazakhstan has agreed to provide support to US operations in Afghanistan in order to maintain good links with Washington.126 This had already caught Moscow’s eye. So when the government of Nursultan Nazarbayev allowed the US military to use two ports on the Caspian Sea to transport materials in June 2018, the then Kazakh foreign minister, Kairat Abdrakhmanov, was given a dressing-down by his Russian opposite number, Sergei Lavrov, who reportedly subjected him to an almighty grilling about how and why the decision was made to be so accommodating to the United States. There was no commercial or logistical sense to reaching this agreement with the US; clearly the Kazakhs were up to something—not least since they had not informed Moscow what it was.127 There was no question of American military bases being built in the Caspian, protested Abdrakhmanov, who said in an interview to calm the situation that people who claimed otherwise did not know what they were talking about.128
China’s efforts to build a brave new world are also not as popular as they might first seem. Land purchases in Siberia have prompted a rash of headlines in the local press not only about the effect of price rises and the influx of outsiders, but warning that the Chinese had territorial intentions over Lake Baikal and the surrounding area.129 Such anxieties were hardly calmed by statements on tourism websites in China that the region had once been under Chinese control.130
The changing world is also not easy to navigate. In an unusual turnaround, land reform was put on hold in Kazakhstan in the summer of 2016 after unrest triggered by Chinese buyers acquiring leases for large areas of farmland, and proposed changes to the land code. Local farmers were concerned that they would not be able to compete with better-resourced rivals, while others voiced their unease that the country’s prime land was being parcelled off without thought of what the long-term consequences would be.131
The complexities that stem from the hard-line US approach to Iran provide another useful reminder of the realities that accompany a world on the move. If Trump implements his threat to squeeze Iran’s oil exports, said President Rouhani, “Tehran is prepared to escalate against the US to impose direct costs for global oil markets.”132 If Iran is not allowed to ship its oil through the Gulf, said Mohammad Bahgeri, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, “there will be no security for others, either, and no crude will be exported from this region.”133
The threat to disrupting shipments through the Gulf has in turn been countered by major exercises by the US Navy across the region to ensure stability and security “anywhere, anytime.” The US 5th Fleet, supported by F-35B jets (“the world’s most advanced fighter aircraft”) will “ensure the freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce.”134
This may not be all plain sailing. After all, specialists have long been concerned about military cooperation between Iran and North Korea and the striking similarities of their ballistic missile programmes, and especially the reliance that Tehran has on technologies developed by the regime of Kim Jong-un—although there have also been instances of advancements made in Iran being shared with North Korea. Of particular concern in this context are the capabilities of the Ghadir-class submarine, which include the potential to launch cruise missiles against surface shipping as well as land-based targets.135
The dispatch of the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis at the end of 2018 was designed to ensure naval and air superiority, as was the adoption of new tactics. “We want to be operationally unpredictable to our enemies, but strategically predictable to our partners,” said Lieutenant Chloe Morgan, spokeswoman for the US 5th Fleet.136 “We do not consider the arrival of the US aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf as a significant threat,” said Iranian Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari after its arrival in the region, claiming that the US Navy does “not have the courage or ability to take any measures against us.”137
Such wishful thinking, the buildup of diplomatic, economic and military pressure on Iran should not conceal the very real threat of hostilities breaking out in the near future. Fears of an escalation with Iran, or even a restriction in the passage of hydrocarbons through the Gulf, should set alarm bells off in London and elsewhere. With 30 per cent of all seaborne-traded crude oil and liquefied natural gas passing through the Strait of Hormuz, any disruption would have both a direct hit on the UK—which imports considerable quantities from Gulf countries—and a heavy indirect hit as a result of the impact of slowdowns in related economies that would follow.138 While some argue that many nations would be keen to resolve a dispute as quickly as possible, countless examples from the past can point to the
fact that optimism that arguments can be brought to a swift conclusion is often, if not usually, misplaced.139
Rouhani’s comments about a potential blockade also brought a strongly worded response—from Beijing. Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong said that Iran “should do more to benefit peace and stability in the region, and jointly protect peace and stability there.” The country should spend less time issuing threats and more time focusing on “being a good neighbour and co-existing peacefully.” It is not hard to understand the context for these comments: China also relies heavily on oil from the Middle East and North Africa, which accounts for nearly 50 per cent of its imports.140 Any dislocation in supply as a result of Iran’s efforts to respond to US sanctions will have an immediate impact on China itself. Hence Chen’s advice that “all sides” agree “to meet each other halfway and give consideration to each other’s concerns.”141
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These examples illustrate the difficulties of managing situations where interests do not overlap. So too does the decision by Rosneft, an oil company with close ties to the Kremlin, to drill in a block in the South China Sea that lies within what Vietnam claims to be its territorial waters, but lies within the waterways about which China is so sensitive. Rosneft’s action met with a stern rebuke from Beijing: no state or corporation should “carry out exploration activity in the maritime area under China’s sovereignty,” unless it had obtained prior permission from Beijing.142
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