Notes
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates in this book are BCE.
2 I use the term “associate” to refer to all of those people who spent time with Socrates. This includes students, friends, and fellow philosophers.
3 All references to Plato's dialogues are to a standard pagination, called “Stephanus pagination,” after a Renaissance edition of Plato's works. All translations of Plato are from J. M. Cooper, ed., Plato: Compete Works (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, Inc., 1997).
4 The Greek word nomizōn can also mean “honoring” or “recognizing.”
5 The Greek phrase here translated “gentleman” is kalos kagathos. This is a standard description of an excellent life. The word kalos is difficult to translate. It may mean, in some contexts, “beautiful” in an aesthetic sense. Some translators use “fine” to capture the range it covers. In the phrase kalos kagathos, however, it has a distinctly moral tone, which I translate “admirable.” A life that is kalos is one that is beautiful, fine, in being legitimately worthy of admiration.
6 For a discussion of the rival interpretations of the trial, see Mark Ralkowski, “The Politics of Impiety: Why was Socrates Prosecuted by the Athenian Democracy?” in John Bussanich and Nicholas D. Smith, eds. The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 301–327 and 371–378.
7 Myles Burnyeat, “The Impiety of Socrates,” Ancient Philosophy 17 (1997), 4.
8 Again, the Greek phrase is kalos kagathos.
2
Socratic Method
The “Socratic Problem”
When we begin to inquire into Socrates’ philosophical views, we face a problem that must be addressed, though I believe it cannot be solved. Though we know some things about Socrates the man, we have no direct evidence concerning Socrates the philosopher. Even in talking about Socrates the man, we have to rely on sources, such as the works of Xenophon and Plato, for information. The situation is the same when we discuss Socrates’ philosophy. Socrates has left us no written evidence of his views or his methods. What we know or believe about Socrates we owe to the works of other authors. The first of these is Aristophanes, the second is Xenophon, and the third is Plato. All three of these knew Socrates personally. A fourth source is Aristotle, who was not an associate of Socrates because he was not born until fifteen years after Socrates’ death. Aristotle was a member of Plato's Academy, the first institution of higher education in the West, during the last twenty years of Plato's life. He comments on occasion about Socrates in his own works, especially when offering an account of the historical background of the subject under consideration.
It would be convenient if these sources all coalesced to give us a single picture of Socrates, but they do not. Aristophanes portrays Socrates as an intellectual poseur and mountebank, head of a school called the phrontistērion or “think-tank,” in which students learn all sorts of pseudo-science as well as “Unjust Argument,” and in which they learn to despise the traditional gods. As we saw in Chapter 1, Plato names Aristophanes in his Apology as one source of Socrates’ bad reputation. Both Xenophon and Plato attempt to show that this Aristophanic portrait is a distortion of the truth. For both of these, Socrates was a noble man, a hero in fact, of the highest ethical standards and personal piety. They differed in their understanding of Socrates’ philosophy, but they both understood him as a man who was, in the traditional Greek phrase for excellence of character, kalos kagathos, “admirable and good.” Clearly, Socrates made a powerful impression on both men, with the result that they wrote about him extensively.
In the years following Socrates’ death a genre of writing arose that Aristotle refers to as “the Socratic conversation” (Poetics 1447b10). A Socratic conversation shows Socrates in conversation with another individual or individuals on a variety of topics, usually of an ethical nature. Plato and Xenophon were not the first or the only associates of Socrates who wrote Socratic conversations, but their works are the ones that have survived intact. Xenophon wrote four “Socratic” works, an Apology and a Symposium, thought to be modeled on Plato's works of the same names, a set of memoirs of Socrates entitled the Memorabilia, and a work on estate management entitled the Oeconomicus. Plato wrote over twenty dialogues, the majority of which feature Socrates as the main speaker. It is chiefly thanks to these works that we have an abundance of “information” about Socrates. I put the word “information” in quotes because none of these works provide a straightforward set of biographical facts about Socrates. Both Plato and Xenophon use Socrates as a character in works that display a considerable amount of freedom in the topics they discuss and in the words they attribute to those who discuss them. Plato in particular wrote works of philosophy, works in which Socrates debates ethical subjects with various conversation partners, interlocutors. How much of these conversations was based on things that Socrates may actually have said and how much was Platonic invention is something that we cannot determine. Some interpreters have described these works as philosophical fictions. Much of Aristotle's interpretation of Socrates’ philosophy is based on his reading of Plato's dialogues. Some scholars have therefore dismissed or downplayed Aristotle as a source.
This problem that we have with our sources is known as the “Socratic Problem,” the problem of deciding which of our sources gives us the most accurate portrait of the historical Socrates. As I have said above, I believe this problem is unsolvable. It is similar to the problem of finding the historical Jesus in the Gospels. There is no question that the historical Socrates lies behind the various portraits of him in Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and even Aristophanes, but we have no way of knowing which portrait is closest to the truth. I do not wish to dismiss this problem as unimportant; many important problems are insoluble. I don't, however, attempt to propose a solution to this problem in this book. When it comes to the primary task of this work, which is the understanding of the philosophy of Socrates, we need not answer the question of what views the historical Socrates held and what methods he practiced. The philosophy of Socrates that has captivated interpreters in the past and continues to captivate them today is, by and large, the philosophy presented in the works of Plato. There have been moments in the history of Western culture when Xenophon's works were held in as high esteem as Plato's, or even higher, but for the most part it has been Plato's portrayal of Socrates that has been preeminent. The reasons for this are the artistic quality of Plato's works, which is unexcelled in ancient philosophy, and the richness of the philosophy they contain. This is not to say that Plato did not attempt to explain to his readers what his mentor and philosophical model Socrates was actually like. He did, but his portrayal of Socrates is enmeshed with Plato's own philosophical creativity in ways that make it impossible for us to separate them. In any case, when we discuss the philosophy of Socrates today, it is first and foremost the philosophy of Plato's Socrates that we discuss. The Socrates who primarily interests us is the character in those works. In this book, therefore, we shall investigate the philosophy of Socrates as it is presented in Plato's works. I shall mention at times the historical Socrates, but when I do I shall distinguish him from the Socrates of Plato's dialogues.
The Nature of Socrates’ Philosophy
Plato portrays Socrates as a man whose life was dedicated to philosophy; but what does philosophy mean to Plato's Socrates? Is it primarily a method of inquiry, a particular approach to certain problems, or is it primarily a set of solutions to these problems? Is Socrates an investigator, searching for a truth he does not possess, or an expounder of a set of philosophical beliefs? In Plato's works we can find evidence for both answers to these questions. In some of his works Plato portrays Socrates as an inquirer, a man with questions and a method for exploring those questions, but without philosophical doctrines, that is without settled convictions that he has reached as a result of philosophical inquiry. A prime example of this portrait of Socrates can be found in Plato's Apology, whi
ch was a focus of the previous chapter. In other works Plato portrays Socrates as a man with answers to the questions he raises. A prime example of this portrait can be found in Plato's Republic. The Republic is one of Plato's longest works: it was divided in ancient times into ten “books.” In the first book Socrates and several interlocutors discuss the nature of justice, but reach no definitive conclusions about it. In Books II–X Socrates presents a positive account of the nature of justice in both the city and the individual person, accompanied by accounts of the nature of the human soul, reality, and knowledge. These books contain the most comprehensive set of philosophical views found in the dialogues, and they are all expounded by the character Socrates.
Socratic vs. Platonic Philosophy
Does the philosophical system expounded in Books II–X of the Republic belong to Socrates? In one sense, the obvious answer is yes, since Socrates is the speaker of the dialogue who expounds them. The vast majority of interpreters, however, regard this system as Plato's, not Socrates’. They believe that Socrates in Republic II–X is a spokesman, a “mouthpiece,” for Plato's own ideas. Whether the doctrines attributed to Socrates in the Republic are really Plato's and not Socrates’ is a question that has been debated since antiquity. A doctrine that is of central importance in the Republic concerns the nature of reality, what Socrates calls “being.” The view expressed there is that reality consists of a set of intelligible objects called “Forms” or “Ideas,” which exist in separation from the world that we experience through our senses. The sensible world, according to this view, is only an image of the real world of the Forms. Aristotle thought that this doctrine of separately existing Forms was Plato's, not Socrates’; Socrates, he states, sought universal definitions of terms but “did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart” (Metaphysics M.4, 1078b30–31). Aristotle also attributes to Socrates a view that can be found in Plato's Protagoras, that moral weakness, knowing what is right but doing what is wrong, is impossible (Nicomachean Ethics VII.2, 1145b25–27). Aristotle is sometimes accused of deriving his knowledge of what Socrates thought solely from reading Plato's dialogues, but in these cases he seems certain that some of the doctrines attributed by Plato to Socrates are actually Socratic, whereas others (specifically the doctrine of separate Forms) are Platonic, despite the fact that both doctrines are attributed in the dialogues to Socrates. Plato in Book IV of the Republic divides the human soul into three parts – reason, spirit, and appetite – and allows the possibility that spirit or appetite might overpower reason on occasion, which would seem to make moral weakness possible. If so, then Plato allows for something that Socrates does not, though both views are attributed by Plato to Socrates.
Socratic Dialogues
Interpreters have attempted to distinguish among the Platonic works those which express Plato's philosophical views from those that express the views of Socrates. The Republic and Phaedrus, for instance, contain the theory of the tripartite soul; several dialogues – the Cratylus, Symposium, and Phaedo as well as the Republic and Phaedrus – espouse the separate existence of the Forms. Works that do not contain either theory but which still feature Socrates as the main speaker include the Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Menexenus, Meno, Protagoras, and the first book of the Republic. These dialogues are often grouped together as “Socratic” dialogues. Apart from the fact that they do not contain either the theory of the tripartite soul or the theory of separate Forms, they have in common the fact that they were all written early in Plato's career. They are often therefore referred to as the “early” dialogues. This is a bit misleading, because the Cratylus, Phaedo, and Symposium also seem to have been written early in Plato's career; still, all of the above dialogues are in fact among Plato's early works.1
The Socratic Elenchus
What do these dialogues have in common, besides an early date and the absence of certain doctrines? Almost all of them describe or practice a certain method, known as the elenchus. “Elenchus” means “examination” or “test.” Socrates uses this distinctive method to examine people, usually people who claim to have knowledge concerning a subject Socrates is interested in investigating. Because the result of this examination is almost always the proof that Socrates’ interlocutor does not have the knowledge he claims to have, the word “elenchus” is often translated “refutation.” As one interpreter notes, in these dialogues “we may almost say that Socrates never talks to anyone without refuting him.”2 It is the elenchus, more than an early date or the absence of certain doctrines, that marks these works as “Socratic.” Socrates is, in essence, the philosopher who practices the elenchus. This method of argument is so closely associated with Socrates’ name that a modern variation of it is still practiced in higher education, and in particular in law schools, as “the Socratic method.” In the modern variation a questioner, usually the instructor, examines an answerer, usually a student, on a question, usually a point of law. In the modern variation the aim of the examination is to lead the student to the truth. Socrates’ elenchus aims at the truth as well, but it nearly always results in the refutation of the person being examined.
The Apology and the Elenctic Dialogues
In this study we shall examine several works from the list above that are characterized by the Socratic elenchus. In most cases these will be dialogues in which Socrates uses the elenchus to examine various people. I shall refer to these works as “elenctic dialogues.” The Apology is something of an exception. Though there is a relatively brief passage in which Socrates examines his chief accuser Meletus, most of the Apology is not made up of elenctic examination. The reason for this is that the Apology, though usually referred to as a dialogue, is not actually a dialogue but a speech. It is the speech in which, in addition to defending himself against the charges raised by his various accusers, Socrates defends his philosophical activity, which is to say his life. Since that activity consists in large part of examining others, the Apology gives Socrates’ defense of his practice of the method of elenchus. The Apology is important because it is one of the few places in Plato's works where Socrates attempts to explain, and in fact to justify, his practice of elenchus.3 The Apology gives a rationale for Socrates’ elenctic activity, the activity that we see in the dialogues in the above list. This rationale is different from the rationale described in the Meno, as we shall see. The contrast between these two rationales provides a basis for the interpretation of Socratic philosophy found in this book.
Elenchus in the Apology
Interpreters often claim that in the dialogues listed above there is a single philosophy expressed. There is in fact a single method practiced in most of these dialogues (the Menexenus, like the Apology, is another exception; it is for the most part not a dialogue but a speech), but when it comes to the question of a single point of view or philosophical doctrine, matters are not so simple. Let us begin with the method of the elenchus, and specifically with Socrates’ account of its nature in the Apology. Socrates describes his life in terms of a mission undertaken on behalf of the god Apollo, whose oracle is at Delphi. As Socrates tells the story, his associate Chaerephon went to Delphi to ask the priestess whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates. The priestess said, “no one,” and Chaerephon transmitted that answer to Socrates. Now Socrates was puzzled at the oracle's pronouncement; he saw it as a riddle. (Oracles were well known for speaking in riddles; even today an “oracular utterance” may be thought of as one whose meaning is obscure.) “Whatever does the god mean?” he asked himself. “I am very conscious that I am not wise at all; what then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest?” (21b).
Socrates did not think the god would lie, but he could not work out his meaning. So, he set out to investigate the oracle's meaning, thinking that he might test (or refute) the oracle by finding someone wiser than himself. So he went, “very reluctantly,” he says, to one of the “public men” of the city. “I thought that he
appeared wise to many people and especially to himself, but that he was not,” Socrates states (21c). Socrates then tried to show the man that he lacked wisdom, but only earned his dislike and that of those around him. “So I withdrew and thought to myself, ‘I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know’” (21d). He then went to a second public figure, a man thought to be even wiser than the first, with the same result. As I noted in Chapter 1, Socrates describes this as the source of his unpopularity. Following his examination of the political leaders of the city, Socrates says he proceeded “systematically” (21e): he went next to the poets, where he reached the same conclusion as he had with the politicians. They thought they understood their own works, but almost anyone of the bystanders could have explained their poems better than they. They said fine things, but did not understand them. They composed not by knowledge but by inspiration. Moreover, they thought that they knew other things as well, but they did not. Socrates again concluded that he was wiser in this respect than those he had examined.
Finally, Socrates went to the artisans. He thought that they would know things he did not, and he was correct. Again, however, they thought that their knowledge of their crafts made them wise in “other most important pursuits, and this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had” (22d–e). Again, Socrates thought he was better off than they. Finally, he reached the conclusion that the oracle was correct all along: “what is probable, gentlemen, is that in fact the god is wise and that his oracular response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing, and that when he says this man, Socrates, he is using my name as an example, as if he said: ‘This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands that his wisdom is worthless’” (23a–b). Socrates had examined the leading candidates for wisdom in Athens, and discovered that he was wiser than all of them; but his wisdom consisted in the fact that he knew nothing about the “most important pursuits.” He does not explain in this passage what those pursuits are; presumably they are the subjects that he later (29d–e) says he continually asks his fellow citizens to pursue above wealth, reputation, and honors: namely wisdom, truth, and the best possible state of their souls. What the Athenians don't know is how they ought to live. They ought to live in such a way as to perfect their souls, but they pursue other goals instead. They are ignorant about what really matters in life.
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