39. Ghost of Napoleon, pp. 120–122. See also his The British Way in Warfare (London, 1932), ch. 1, and for a similar interpretation, A. Lauterbach, “Roots and Implications of the German Idea of Military Society,” Military Affairs, V (Spring 1941), pp. 3ff. Erich Ludendorff, a true glorifier of violence as an end in itself, however, was a more perceptive reader of On War and recognized the basic difference between Clausewitz and himself. See The Nation at War (London, 1936), pp. 11–24. In his more recent Strategy (New York, 1954), pp. 352–357, Liddell Hart tempers somewhat his earlier strictures of Clausewitz.
Chapter 3 — The Military Mind
1. For discussion of the military mind, see Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics (New York, 1948), p. 83; Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (New York, 1937), pp. 11–21; Herbert Richmond, “The Service Mind,” Nineteenth Century and After, CXIII (June 1933), 90–97; R. P. Patterson, “The Military Mind,” Infantry Journal, LXI (July 1947), 13; W. R. Kintner, “Sound Thinking in the Army,” ibid., LXIII (October 1948), 17–22; “The U.S. Military Mind,” Fortune, XLV (February 1952), 9Iff.; A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Generals in Politics,” Reporter, VI (April 1, 1952), 33–36; Drew Middleton, “The Enigma Called ‘The Military Mind,’ ” New York Times Magazine, Apr. 18, 1948, pp. 13ff.; J. P. Marquand, “Inquiry Into the Military Mind,” ibid., Mar. 30, 1952, pp. 9ff.; L. B. Blair, “Dogs and Sailors Keep Off,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXVI (October 1950), 1095–1103; Burton M. Sapin, Richard C. Snyder, andH. W. Bruck, An Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign Policy-making: A Research Note (Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 4, Organizational Behavior Section, Princeton Univ., July 1954), pp. 24–33, 42–51. W. R. Schilling’s contrasts between civilian and naval thinking in World War I may also be extended into general patterns. “Civil-Naval Politics in World War I,” World Politics, VII (July 1955), 578–579. For pungent attacks on the quality of the military mind, see David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (Boston, 6 vols., 1933–37), VI, 338–344; J. F. Dobie, “Samples of the Army Mind,” Harper’s, CXCIII (December 1946), 529–536; and contra, J. J. McCloy, “In Defense of the Army Mind,” ibid., CXCIV (April 1947), 341–344. On the military personality, see Hanson Baldwin in Lester Markel (ed.), Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York, 1949), pp. 118–120; W. T. Colyer, “The Military Mind,” Independent, LXXXIX (Jan. 1, 1917), 22; Field Marshal Earl Wavell, The Good Soldier (London, 1948), pp. 27–28; Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, Military Leadership (London, 1946), pp. 15–16; Cdr. H. E. Smith, “What is the Military Mind?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXIX (May 1953), pp. 509ff.; The Officer’s Guide (Harrisburg, Pa., 19th ed., 1952), p. 270. For a priori definitions of the substance of the military mind, see W. O. Douglas, “Should We Fear the Military?” Look, XVI (Mar. 11, 1952), 34; Albert Salomon, “The Spirit of the Soldier and Nazi Militarism,” Social Research, IX (February 1942), 95; Quincy Wright, “The Military and Foreign Policy,” in Jerome Kerwin (ed.), Civil-Military Relationships in American Life (Chicago, 1948), pp. 116–120; Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago, 1951), pp. 111–113. For literary portrayals, see Tolstoy, War and Peace; Stendhal, Lucien Leuwen; and Proust, The Guermantes Way. Among contemporary fiction, there is Norman Mailer, The Naked and the Dead; James Gould Cozzens, Guard of Honor; James Jones, From Here to Eternity; and, most especially, John P. Marquand, Melville Goodwin, USA.
2. Friedrich von Bemhardi (Gen, Ger), On War of To-Day (London, 1912), p. vi. On the universality of conflict, see Sir Reginald Bacon (Adm, GB) and Francis E. McMurtrie, Modern Naval Strategy (London, 1940), pp. 15–16; W. D. Bird (Gen, GB), The Direction of War: A Study of Strategy (Cambridge, 1920), p. 1; Hermann Foertsch (Col, Ger), The Art of Modern Warfare (New York, 1940), p. 3; Stewart L. Murray (Maj, GB), The Peace of the Anglo-Saxons (London, 1905), p. 9.
3. J. F. C. Fuller (Gen, GB), The Foundations of the Science of War (London, 1926), pp. 34–35; Ardant du Picq (Col, Fr), Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle (New York, 1921), pp. 48–51, 96–97, 111, 118; U.S. Dept, of Defense, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington, 1950), p. 131.
4. On War (New York, 1943), pp. 32–33, 53–55; Foertsch, Modern Warfare, p. 24; U.S. Dept, of Defense, Armed Forces Officer, p. 131; Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies, pp. 39–40; U.S. Dept, of War, Field Service Regulations: Operations (FM 100–5, June 15, 1944), p. 27.
5. Colmar von der Goltz (Lt Col, Ger), The Nation in Arms (London, 1887), p. 37.
6. Charles de Gaulle, (Gen, Fr), The Army of the Future (Philadelphia, 1941), pp. 115–116; Clausewitz, On War, pp. 128–131; Auguste Frederic Marmont (Marshal, Fr), The Spirit of Military Institutions (Philadelphia, 1862), pp. 243–256, 271.
7. B. H. Liddell Hart (Capt, GB), The Strategy of Indirect Approach (London, 1941), ch. 1; von Moltke, quoted in Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army (London, rev. ed., 1913), pp. 164–165; Sir H. W. Richmond (Adm, GB), National Policy and Naval Strength and Other Essays (London, 1928), pp. 255–293; A. T. Mahan (Adm, US), “Subordination in Historical Treatment,” Naval Administration and Warfare (Boston, 1918), pp. 245–272.
8. Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, quoted in Combat Forces Journal, IV (July 1954), 14.
9. J. F. C. Fuller, Armament and History (New York, 1945), pp. 11–14, 20–21.
10. The classic formulation of course is Clausewitz, On War, pp. 594–601. See also Jomini, Summary of the Art of War (New York, 1854), p. 25; Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, II, 182–202; Foertsch, Modern Warfare, pp. 6–8; B. H. Liddell Hart, Paris or the Future of War (London, 1925), p. 91; von der Goltz, Nation in Arms, p. 117. On the limitation of war, see Fuller, Armament and History, pp. 35ff., 343ff., and Vagts, A History of Militarism, pp. 397, 410.
11. Liddell Hart, Paris, p. 8; Lopez Valencia (Gen, Sp), quoted in Military Review, XXIX (January 1950), 83; J. J. Graham (Lt Col, GB), Elementary History of the Progress of the Art of War (London, 1858), p. 1; J. F. C. Fuller, The Reformation of War (London, 1923), p. 7; von der Goltz, Nation in Arms, p. 386.
12. Murray, Peace of the Anglo-Saxons, p. 13; Bacon and McMurtrie, Naval Strategy, p. 30; Moltke quoted in Vagts, History of Militarism, p. 427; von der Goltz, Conduct of War, p. 2; Liddell Hart, Paris, pp. 7ff.; Cecil Battine (Maj, GB), “What is Militarism?” Fortnightly, CXI (March 1919), 378–379.
13. See U.S. Army, Field Service Regulations: Operations (FM 100–5, June 15, 1944), p. 36.
14. Sir Richard Gale (Gen, GB), “The Impact of Political Factors on Military Judgment,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, XCIX (February 1954), 37.
15. See von Seeckt (Gen, Ger), The Future of the German Empire (New York, 1930), pp. 151–153.
16. See Bird, Direction of War, p. 8; Walter H. James (Lt Col, GB), Modern Strategy (Edinburgh, 1907), p. 10. For the attitudes of the military and others on preventive war, see Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York, 1956), ch. 8.
17. Quoted respectively in Vagts, History of Militarism, p. 13, and Carlos G. Calkins (Lt, US), “How May the Sphere of Usefulness of Naval Officers Be Extended in Time of Peace with Advantage to the Country and the Naval Service?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, IX (1883), 178. See also De Tocqueville’s comments, Democracy in America (Cambridge, 2 vols. 1863), II, 333–335.
18. See Ashton, Nineteenth Century and After, CXXXVI, 633–634; Vagts, History of Militarism, p. 15; Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies, pp. 14, 224; V. Derrécagaix (Col, Fr), Modern War (Washington, 3 vols., 1888), I, 81.
19. Moltke, quoted in Wilkinson, Brain of an Army, p. 165. Prior to the nineteenth century the word “strategy” was generally employed in the sense of stratagem. Since then it has been used to identify the permanent core of military science. See Admiral Castex (Fr), Théories Stratégiques (Paris, 5 vols., 1929–1935), I, 3–27; A. R. Maxwell (Gen, US), “This Word ‘Strategy’” Air Univ. Quarterly Review, VII (Spring 1954), 66–74. For the principles of war, see Cyril Falls (Capt, GB), Ordeal by Battle (London, 1943), c
h. 5; Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, I, 30–43; Alfred Higgins Burne (Lt Col, GB), The Art of War on Land (London, 1944); C. R. Brown (Adm, US), “The Principles of War,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXV (June 1949), 621–633; Marshal Foch, Precepts and Judgments (London, 1919), pp. 215–218; Sir F. Maurice (Gen, GB), British Strategy (London, 1929), ch. 2; and for a critical discussion, Bernard Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” World Politics, I (July 1944), 466–488.
20. Gale, Jour. Royal United Service Inst., XCIX, 37.
21. Von Moltke, quoted in Liddell Hart, Strategy of Indirect Approach, p. 185; pp. 184–189 of this volume contain an excellent brief statement of the responsibilities of the military commander in relation to the statesman.
22. A. T. Mahan, “The Military Rule of Obedience,” Retrospect and Prospect (Boston, 1902), p. 283; Derrecagaix, Modern War, I, 78. For an excellent statement by a civilian, see T. V. Smith, “Ethics for Soldiers of Freedom,” Ethics, LX (April 1950), 157–168.
23. See B. H. Liddell Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon (New Haven, 1934), pp. 171–177; Richmond, National Policy and Naval Strength, pp. 217–230.
Chapter 4 — Power, Professionalism, and Ideology
1. For other theoretical analyses of civil-military relations, see Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. II, bk. 3, chs. 22–26; Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York, 1939), ch. 9; Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning (New York, 1950), pp. 127–131; Stanislaw Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society (London, 1954); Morris Janowitz, “The Professional Soldier and Political Power: A Theoretical Orientation and Selected Hypotheses” (Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, Univ. of Michigan, 1953; mimeo.); Burton Sapin, Richard C. Snyder, and H. W. Bruck, An Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign Policy-making: A Research Note (Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 4, Organizational Behavior Section, Princeton Univ., 1954).
Friedrich’s general distinction between objective functional responsibility and subjective political responsibility in the public service is relevant to the distinctions here made between the varieties of civilian control. Carl J. Friedrich, et al., Problems of the American Public Service (New York, 1935), pp. 36–37.
2. The analysis of the concept of “power” goes back, of course, to Machiavelli and Aristotle. Some of the more helpful recent discussions are: Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York, 1936), and Power and Personality (New York, 1948); Charles E. Merriam, Political Power (New York, 1934), and Systematic Politics (Chicago, 1945); Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (New York, 1938); Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York, 1939); Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston, 1950); Robert M. Maclver, The Web of Government (New York, 1947); Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power (New York, 1949); Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning (New York, 1950); Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, 1950); H. Goldhamer and E. A. Shils, “Types of Power and Status,” Amer. Jour. of Sociology, XLV (1939), 171–182; Reinhard Bendix, “Bureaucracy and the Problem of Power,” Public Administration Review, V (1945), 194–209; H. A. Simon, “Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power,” Journal of Politics, XV (November 1953), 500–516; Robert Bierstedt, “An Analysis of Social Power,” American Sociological Review, XV (December 1950), 730–738; F. L. Neumann, “Approaches to the Study of Political Power,” Pol. Science Quarterly, LXV (June 1950), 161–180.
3. Classic statements of the Liberal position will be found in the writings of Locke, the French Enlightenment thinkers, Bentham, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Kant, T. H. Green, and Croce. For analysis of the historical components of liberalism, see Harold J. Laski, The Rise of Liberalism (New York, 1936), Guido de Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism (London, 1927), and A. D. Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State (New York, vol. I, 1947). The best sources for fascist ideology are Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Mussolini’s The Doctrine of Fascism, and Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts. For analysis of fascist ideas, see W. Y. Elliott, The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics (New York, 1928); Hermann Rauschning, The Revolution of Nihilism (New York, 1939); Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth (New York, 2d ed., 1944); William Ebenstein, The Nazi State (New York, 1943). I have attempted to place this analysis of fascist ideas at a sufficiently abstract level so as to include both Italian and German fascism, although there are of course many specific differences between the two. The most useful writings for the political theory of Marxism are Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, and V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution and Imperialism. Emile Burns, Handbook of Marxism (New York, 1935) is a useful compendium. An excellent brief critical analysis is R. N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism (New York, 1951). The classic statement of conservatism is, of course, by Edmund Burke, particularly in Reflections on the French Revolution and Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs. For analysis of conservatism as an ideology, see Karl Mannheim, “Conservative Thought,” Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology (New York, ed. by Paul Kecskemeti, 1953).
Chapter 5 — Germany and Japan
1. Quoted in Paul von Hindenburg, Out of My Life (London, 1920), p. 220; Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day (London, 2 vols., 1912), II, 182–183; Hajo Holborn, “Moltke and Schlieffen: The Prussian-German School,” in Edward Mead Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1952), pp. 175–176. Compare Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk (Munich, 1954), I, 246–261; Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945 (Oxford, 1955), pp. 195–196, 216.
2. Quoted in John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918–1945 (London, 1953), p. 86, n. 3. See also Essays, Speeches, and Memoirs of Count Helmuth von Moltke (London, 2 vols., 1893), II, 50; Helmuth von Moltke, The Franco-German War of 1870–1871 (London, 1891), p. 1. Moltke did say in a much quoted letter that “Eternal peace is a dream and not even a beautiful dream,” but this was immediately followed by a lamenting of the horrible sufferings which inevitable war occasioned.
3. Quoted in Alfred Vagts, “Land and Sea Power in the Second German Reich,” Jour, of the Amer. Mil. Institute, III (Winter 1939), 213.
4. Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (London, 1939), pp. 107–108; Walter Görlitz, The German General Staff: Its History and Structure, 1657–1945 (London, 1953), p. 139; Christian W. Gässler, Offizier und Offizierkorps der Alten Armee in Deutschland (Wertheim a.M., 1930), Appendix 4.
5. Rosinski, German Army, pp. 96–98; Görlitz, General Staff, p. 95; Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe (Cambridge, 1950), p. 12.
6. Quoted in G. P. Gooch, Germany (New York, 1925), p. 96. On the fundamental shift in German values, see also Meinecke, German Catastrophe, pp. 1–24; Koppel S. Pinson, Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization (New York, 1954), pp. 251–273, 291–312; Hans Kohn (ed.), German History: Some New German Views (Boston, 1954), passim; John H. Hallowell, The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology in Germany (Berkeley, 1943), passim.
7. German Army, pp. 100–104.
8. See John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Wooden Titan: Hindenburg in Twenty Years of German History, 1914–1934 (New York, 1936), pp. 137–140; Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, The War and German Society (New Haven, 1937), pp. 106–117; and R. H. Lutz (ed.), The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918 (Stanford University, 1934), pp. 22–24, 199–201, for the failure of German civilian leadership.
9. The Nation at War (Eng. trans of Der Totale Krieg, London, 1936), pp. 23–24, 175, 180.
10. Quoted in Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich (New York, 1952), p. 16.
11. Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier (London, 1930), pp. 5–6.
12. Quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power, p. 116.
13. Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier, pp. 77–80.
14. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power, pp. 108–110.
15. Görlitz, General Staff, p. 302; Hermann Foertsch, Th
e Art of Modern Warfare (New York, 1940).
16. Görlitz, General Staff, p. 294. On the general contrast between military and Nazi values, see Hermann Rauschning, The Revolution of Nihilism (New York, 1939), pp. 123–176.
17. General Dittmar, quoted in B. H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill (London, rev. ed., 1951), p. 59.
18. On the November meeting, the Czech crisis, Beck’s opposition, and the Halder plot, see Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, 8 vols. and 2 supplements, 1946), I, 377–387; Görlitz, General Staff, pp. 324–339; Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power, pp. 395–424; JIans Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler (Hinsdale, 111., 1948), pp. 58–63.
19. Quoted in Fabian von Schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed Hitler (New York, 1947), pp. 34–35.
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