by Gurbir Singh
Over a decade later, when the Indian government approved the heavier INSAT series of satellites in 1987, which mandated a heavy-lift launch vehicle, the quest for cryogenic engine started again. However, this quest took place against the backdrop of a tumultuous period in recent history. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, a redrawn map of Europe and the two superpowers reduced to just one.
India’s Cryogenic Engine
India’s first foray into cryogenic technology started in 1970, led by V.R. Gowariker, who had been instrumental in establishing the solid propellant provision in Thumba. He established a small team to develop the Cryogenic Technology Project for rocket engines based on LOX as oxidiser and LH2 as fuel. That was the end goal. They started with a semi-cryogenic fuel pair (LOX and Kerosene), and the plan was to move on to LOX and gaseous hydrogen and eventually to LOX and LH2.
Despite the limited access to LOX and LH2 in India during the early 1970s, this small team of ISRO engineers successfully met several of the challenges of cryogenic-engine technology.[593] By the end of 1971, a semi-cryogenic engine was tested for a few seconds.[594] However, a decision was taken in 1974 to disband the Cryogenic Technology Project. The premature death of Sarabhai and the focus on the development of liquid-engine technology with support from France had shifted the priorities within ISRO. Development of liquid propellant engines that eventually became the Vikas engines used in PSLV shifted the culture within ISRO away from semi-cryogenic and cryogenic technologies. In retrospect, the seminal 1974 decision resulted in ISRO’s long struggle with cryogenic-engine technology, from which it is only now emerging.
In December 1982, six months after the PSLV design was finalised and approved, Dhawan established the Cryogenic Study Team. Its remit was to come up with a cryogenic stage replacement for PSLV's liquid fourth stage.[595] A year later, the team produced a 15-volume report recommending the development of a cryogenic engine for use by a future launch vehicle with the capacity to launch to GEO. It was from this work that the GSLV emerged. Dhawan's successor, U.R. Rao, secured Rs.16.30 crore, most of which was used to establish a Cryogenic Engineering Laboratory in 1986. A decade after it had been abandoned, India returned to developing cryogenic-engine engine. Within three years, this laboratory had built and tested small-scale, water-cooled cryogenic engines using LOX and gaseous hydrogen. Following this tentative success, ISRO added a 25-tonne (CE-25) cryogenic engine to its development programme, in addition to its 12-tonne (C-12) engine.[596]
Figure 11‑1 Cryogenic Engine CE25 used on GSLV Mk3. Credit ISRO
The progress in the 1980s was on sub-scale 1-tonne engineering models. This work allowed ISRO engineers to experiment with different designs and subsystems. One of the key requirement was an engine cooling subsystem. The primary combustion chamber operates at a very high temperature for efficiency. However, to prevent extremely high temperatures that may result in catastrophic destruction, the engine must be cooled when operating. During the 1980s, ISRO engineers used a variety of techniques, including a heat sink, water cooling and using one of the propellants as a cooling agent instead of water. This work was done by 1989, which helped ISRO engineers finalise some of the design parameters, fabrication processes and configuration techniques for the eventual full-scale engines. But ISRO's work on cryogenic-engine technology stalled once again. This time because of an imminent deal with the USSR that included cryogenic-engine technology transfer.
Russian Roulette
The USSR had developed a cryogenic engine, the KDV-1, for its Moon mission during the 1960s, which had been cancelled. The engines had been built but never flown and, therefore, had not generated a return despite the investment. Also, the space programme in USSR had peaked several years earlier, and the demand for these engines no longer existed in USSR.[597] The political unrest in the late 1980s led to the break-up of the USSR. India sought something that Russia possessed and had no plans to use. A potential deal with India would not only be good for India, but it also made commercial sense for Russia.
The Russian offer included two cryogenic C-12 KDV-1 engines, cryogenic technology transfer including the building of a third C-12 engine in India, training of Indian engineers in Russia, transfer of documents, support with specialist materials and components and assistance during the testing and development phase. India signed this agreement in January 1991 for Rs.230 crore ($128 million) with Glavkosmos, the Russian Space Agency founded in 1985 under President Mikhail Gorbachev.[598] A year after the agreement was signed, the role of Glavkosmos was transferred to a private company the Russian Federal Space Agency.[599]
By going with Russia and its cryogenic-engine technology, ISRO had negotiated a deal that cost an order of magnitude less than other offers.[600] There were two reasons why ISRO was able to conclude a favourable deal. The primary one was that KDV-1 had not been tested in spaceflight and, at the time, Russia had no plans to use them. Secondly, the engines Glavkosmos would deliver were not complete. They contained only functional elements, such as pumps, combustion chambers, valves and actuators. It was up to ISRO to provide the interfaces and electronic controls and make the engines operational.[601]
India signed the deal with the USSR in January 1991, but on 26 December of the same year, the USSR formally ceased to exist, and the Cold War came to an end. In May 1992, using the sanctions under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the US imposed a 2-year ban on all US-licensed exports, imports and contracts between India and Russia.[602] Despite representations from the Indian and Russian leaders, the US would not rescind. In October 1993, Russia evoked the force majeure clause and told India it could no longer service the contract to transfer cryogenic technology as had been agreed.
The agreement with Russia was in place for almost three years.[603] For the most part over that time, the contract played out as planned. India made the payments and Russia delivered on its obligations. Many ISRO engineers received training in Moscow, and a significant part of the technical drawings for the cryogenic engine were transferred to India. ISRO scientists and engineers were based in Russia developing the engines using Russian test facilities. India, at the time, had very little cryogenic infrastructure.
Since Russia was no longer able to deliver the technology transfer element of the agreement, the agreement was renegotiated over several days in December 1993 in Bangalore (now Bengaluru). Originally, Glavkosmos had agreed to deliver two working C-12 engines, two mock-up engines, as well as the technology transfer. In the amended agreement, two more working engines (now a total of 4) were added in the place of technology transfer. To buy time to develop its GSLV, ISRO purchased an additional three engines (now a total of 7) for a $9 million (Rs.28.3 crore). A schedule was agreed for the delivery of all seven working engines plus two mock-ups that would start in 1997 at the rate of one engine every six months. The forced renegotiation of the agreement included a requirement that India make payments in USD and not Rupees. According to ISRO, this change in currency alone increased the cost of the agreement by 30%. However, an independent assessment concluded that the price had doubled.[604]
During the mid-1990s, ISRO overstated, or at least inaccurately assessed, how much it had learned from the Russian technology transfer that had been completed before the agreement ended. Further, ISRO over-optimistically projected that an indigenous cryogenic engine could be built by 1998. Independent assessment by an investigative journalist who had sought out views from ISRO engineers involved in building the cryogenic engine concluded that a flight worthy engine was a decade away.[605] The consequences for ISRO were not only the increased cost and a long delay in mastering the cryogenic-engine technology but it commitment ISRO to an increasingly outdated design.[606] When the CE-25 engine was first proposed in the 1990s, the average mass of a communication satellite was increasing from about 1 tonne to over 2 tonnes. Today, payload capacities of heavy-launch vehicles have increased to around 10 tonnes, and some can achieve over 14 ton
nes. The cryogenic-engine technology agreement between ISRO and the USSR was signed in January 1991, first suspended and then ended in October 1993. The events surrounding the deal resulted in one of the most controversial phases in ISRO’s history. It generated an atmosphere of political distrust, suspicion of industrial espionage and allegations of secret deals in the pursuit of commercial advantage and national defence. The instrument that caused the break-up of the agreement, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) had been in place only for about 4 years.
Missile Technology Control Regime
The MTCR was established in 1987 and was made mandatory under US law in 1990. It was designed to limit the spread of missile technology that could use unmanned vehicles to deliver large payloads (of half a tonne) of traditional explosives over a distance of 300 km. Countries with this capability clubbed together to ensure that others could not acquire it. The nature and type of equipment that fell in the scope of MTCR were vague and broad. It was not just missile technology, but anything that could be used in support of missile technology. Once a component or a system was deemed to be in the scope of MTCR, it would be subject to export controls. The US was the only and final arbiter. Components or systems that were defined to be “dual use” were particularly problematic. It prevented India from developing its space programme and other industries, including aerospace, avionics, manufacturing, computing and transport.
ISRO’s solid and liquid stages in development from the 1970s possessed the capability of carrying half a tonne of explosives over a distance of 300 km. India was already in breach of MTCR when it was established in 1987 but had gone unchallenged. Further, by early 1990s, India already had a well-established missile programme. The US had first become aware of India’s capability to launch missiles as early as 1974.[607] A national space programme, in every nation where it has emerged, has had a strong connection with national security. India, despite its frequently stated primary objective for societal development was no different. In January 1975, M.G.K. Menon who had temporarily stepped in to lead ISRO while waiting for Satish Dhawan to return from the US and take up the post, said “I tried to tailor the policy to have a commonality of technology so that without too much more effort you could produce an entire family of missiles with the same basic pieces like a Meccano or Lego set from which you could build all sorts of things.”[608] Following his work leading the SLV-3 programme, Abdul Kalam moved from ISRO to DRDO to develop India's intermediate range ballistic missile and concluded that “SLVs and missiles can be called first cousins: they are different in concept and purpose, but come from the same bloodline of rocketry.”[609]
The USA was most likely motivated to invoke MTCR following India's nuclear tests in mid-May 1998 followed by those in Pakistan's two weeks later. The tension of a new nuclear arms race in Asia raised anxiety around the world. The US's focus returned to India's space programme and the role it could play in a potential regional arms race. During testimony before the Committee on Science in the House of Representatives, Professor Gary Milhollin stated that India's SLV-3 was an exact copy of the US Scout rocket and that the first stage of the SLV-3 was also the first stage of Agni, an intercontinental range ballistic missile developed by India. He went on to assert that “India's biggest nuclear missile is an international product” with the second stage from the USSR, the liquid-fuel technology from France and the guidance control system from Germany.[610] India was clearly in breach of the MTCR and had been for many years. ISRO’s infrastructure and experience had matured to a capability sufficient for military use. However, the US had made no effort to stop the Glavkosmos agreement that had been concluded openly just 15 months earlier.[611]
Above all, the case for a cryogenic engine powering a missile for military use was not a logical one. Even though the cryogenic engine capability at the heart of the India-USSR deal took India beyond the capacity limit set by MTCR, cryogenic technology is practical only for vehicles readied and launched immediately and not for weapons that must be on standby for an extended period of time. Missiles of the Cold War in the US or USSR had not used cryogenic rocket engines. Commercial considerations, however, may have also played a part in the US's insistence that India comply with MTCR.
By the end of 1991, the USSR had ceased to exist. The US saw itself as the Cold War victor and, perhaps, felt strong enough to assert its new-found authority. With a long history of achievements in space and founded on the principles of liberal economic principles, the US had become the dominant player in the commercial space market. ISRO had already demonstrated its expertise and confidence in designing, building, launching and operating spacecraft for scientific research, remote sensing and communication. Its world-class satellites for EO, Indian Remote Sensing Satellites (IRS-1A and IRS-1B), were already in orbit and their data was subject to commercial agreement with EOSAT on the international stage. In addition, ISRO was making good progress with its launcher programme. The Satellite Launch Vehicle, SLV-3, programme was already complete, the ASLV was almost complete, and the PSLV was in advance design. ISRO's capability to routinely build and launch satellites was imminent. Consequently, ISRO was “posing a serious commercial threat to established space powers.”[612] The US may have seen ISRO as a new competitor in the emerging commercial space market.
ISRO was surprised that the US used the MTCR to impose sanctions. However, given the tumultuous events of the early 1990s, ISRO should have “read the writing on the wall with respect to the MTCR and its consequences for importing cryogenic technology”. Someone did. S. Chandrashekar, based in the Launch Vehicle Programme Office at the ISRO headquarters in Bangalore, saw the peril of ISRO's decision to engage with the USSR for cryogenic-engine technology. Chandrashekar insisted “The cryogenic engine deal clearly violated the provisions of the MTCR, and so sanctions demanded by the US law were inevitable. I was convinced that the USSR, in the political and economic situation it found itself, was not going to be able to withstand the US pressure. But no one in ISRO was willing to listen to me.”[613]
The US asserted that the agreement with Russia for cryogenic engines and technology transfer was designed to enhance India’s military programme and established a set of international sanctions against India. The sanctions demanded that many high-tech space-qualified components, such as thermal blankets and inertial sensors could only be used in Indian Satellites if those satellites were launched from Western countries. India was not new to sanctions. It had been subject to international sanctions following its first nuclear test conducted in 1974, in the deserts of Rajasthan.[614] The termination of the India-Russian deal would prevent, or at least severely delay, the rate at which India would progress with cryogenic technology and thus develop a heavy-lift capability.
The US went further and extended the embargo to agreements for technology that had already been signed but not delivered. A potential for military application was considered sufficient to evoke MTCR sanctions. It was a blunt instrument. The effects of the embargo even extended to transactions completed long before it was imposed. For example, a tape recorder for use aboard IRS-1C had been returned by ISRO to Lockheed Martin in the US for repair, and it became subject to the embargo. A satellite cannot always transmit data immediately after it is captured for many reasons. It may not be over a ground station, or it may not be possible to orientate the antenna to point to the ground station or even available electrical power may be limited at the time, so data is stored temporarily and transmitted later. The tape recorder (modern satellites use solid state storage) is critical. By recording data, IRS-1C would be able to transmit it to Earth when a ground station came in view. With insufficient time before launch to develop an alternative, ISRO planned to launch IRS-1C without a tape recorder, knowing that some data would be lost and mission efficiency would be undermined.
The Chairman of ISRO, Professor U.R. Rao, went to the US to remonstrate over the numerous sanctions that impacted several ISRO projects. In an hour-long meeting with the Vice President Al
Gore (Albert Arnold Gore Jr., born 1948) on 11 June 1993, Rao reiterated that the agreement with Russia had already been in place for over two years, insisted on the civilian nature of India's space programme and underscored the inappropriateness of the cryogenic engine for missiles. Gore highlighted the close connection between ISRO and India's DRDO. Several of ISRO's senior scientists and engineers, including Dr Abdul Kalam, had gone from ISRO to the DRDO. Rao countered that while up to six scientists had gone to DRDO, 10 had gone from ISRO to NASA, and as a democracy, India was in no position to dictate where individuals should go.[615] However, Gore insisted that India terminate its cryogenic-engine agreement with Russia, but he did offer to reconsider the impact of the retrospective embargo on a case by case basis.