"At the moment the general has designated with them, it will be as if they ascended a height and abandoned their ladders. The general advances with them deep into the territory of the feudal lords and then releases the trig- ger.15 He commands them as if racing a herd of sheep-they are driven away, driven back, but no one knows where they are going.
"Assembling the masses of the Three Armies, casting them into danger, is the responsibility of the general.
"The nine transformations of terrain-the advantages deriving from contraction and expansion, the patterns of human emotions-must be investigated.
"In general, the Tao of the invader is [this]: 176
"When the troops have penetrated deeply, they will be unified, but where only shallowly, they will [be inclined to] scatter.
"When [the army] has left the state, crossed the [enemy's] border, and is on campaign, it is `isolated terrain.'
"When the four sides are open [to others], this is `focal terrain.'
"When you have advanced deeply, it is `heavy terrain.'
"If you have penetrated only shallowly, it is `light terrain.'
"If you have strongholds behind you and constrictions before you, it is `encircled terrain.'
"If there is no place to go, it is `fatal terrain.' 177
"For this reason on dispersive terrain I unify their will.
"On light terrain I have them group together.
"On contentious terrain I race our rear elements forward.178
"On traversable terrain I focus on defense.19
"On focal terrain I solidify our alliances.180
"On heavy terrain I ensure a continuous supply of provisions.181
"On entrapping terrain I [speedily] advance along the roads.
"On encircled terrain I obstruct any openings.182
"On fatal terrain I show them that we will not live.
"Thus it is the nature of the army to defend when encircled;183 to fight fervently when unavoidable; and to follow orders when compelled [by circumstances].
"For this reason one who does not know the plans of the feudal lords cannot forge preparatory alliances. One who does not know the topography of mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes cannot maneuver the army. One who does not employ local guides will not secure advantages of terrain. One who does not know one of these four or five cannot [command] the army of a hegemon or a true king.184
"Now when the army of a hegemon or true king attacks a great state, their masses are unable to assemble. When it applies its awesomeness to the enemy, their alliances cannot be sustained. For this reason it does not contend with any alliances under Heaven.185 It does not nurture the authority [ch'uan] of others under Heaven. Have faith in yourself, apply your awesomeness to the enemy. Then his cities can be taken, his state can be subjugated.
"Bestow rewards not required by law, impose exceptional governmental orders. Direct the masses of the Three Armies as though commanding one man. Press affairs upon them, do not explain the purpose to them. Compel them with [prospects for] profit, but do not inform them about the [potential] harm.
"Cast them into hopeless situations and they will be preserved; have them penetrate fatal terrain and they will live. Only after the masses have penetrated dangerous [terrain] will they be able to craft victory out of defeat.
"The prosecution of military affairs lies in according with and [learning] in detail the enemy's intentions.186 If one then focuses [his strength] toward the enemy, strikes a thousand li away, and kills their general, it is termed 'being skillful and capable in completing military affairs.'
"For this reason on the day the government mobilizes the army, close the passes, destroy all tallies, and do not allow their emissaries to pass through. Hold intense strategic discussions"' in the upper hall of the temple in order to bring about the execution of affairs.
"If the enemy opens the door, you must race in.
"[Attack] what they love first. Do not fix any time for battle; assess and react to the enemy in order to determine the strategy for battle.
"For this reason at first be like a virgin [at home]; later-when the enemy opens the door-be like a fleeing rabbit. The enemy will be unable to withstand you."
Sun-tzu said:
"There are five types of incendiary attack: The first is to incinerate men, the second to incinerate provisions, the third to incinerate supply trains, the fourth to incinerate armories, and the fifth to incinerate formations.'S"
"Implementing an incendiary attack depends on the proper conditions. Equipment for incendiary attack should be fully prepared before required. Launching an incendiary attack has its appropriate seasons, igniting the fire the proper days. As for the seasons, it is the time of the dry spell; as for the day, when the moon is in chi, pi, i, or chen. When it is in these four lunar lodges, these are days the wind will arise.
"In general, in incendiary warfare you must respond to the five changes of fire:
"If fires are started within [their camp], then you should immediately respond [with an attack] from outside.
"If fires are ignited but their army remains quiet, then wait; do not attack.
"When they flare into a conflagration, if you can follow up, then do so; if you cannot, then desist.
"If the attack can be launched from outside without relying on inside [assistance], initiate it at an appropriate time.
"If fires are ignited upwind, do not attack downwind.
"Winds that arise in the daytime will persist; those that arise at night will stop.
"Now the army must know the five changes of fire in order to defend against them at the astrologically appropriate times. Thus using fire to aid an attack is enlightened, using water to assist an attack is powerful. Water can be used to sever, but cannot be employed to seize.
"Now if someone is victorious in battle and succeeds in attack but does not exploit the achievement, it is disastrous, and his fate should be termed `wasteful and tarrying.' Thus it is said the wise general ponders it, the good general cultivates it.
"If it is not advantageous, do not move. If objectives cannot be attained, do not employ the army. Unless endangered do not engage in warfare. The ruler cannot mobilize the army out of personal anger. The general cannot engage in battle because of personal frustration. When it is advantageous, move; when not advantageous, stop. Anger can revert to happiness, annoyance can revert to joy, but a vanquished state cannot be revived, the dead cannot be brought back to life.
"Thus the enlightened ruler is cautious about it, the good general respectful of it. This is the Tao for bringing security to the state and preserving the army intact."
Sun-tzu said:
"When you send forth an army of a hundred thousand on a campaign, marching them out a thousand li, the expenditures of the common people and the contributions of the feudal house will be one thousand pieces of gold per day. Those inconvenienced and troubled both within and without the border, who are exhausted on the road or unable to pursue their agricultural work, will be seven hundred thousand families.
"Armies remain locked in a standoff for years to fight for victory on a single day, yet [generals] begrudge bestowing ranks and emoluments of one hundred pieces of gold and therefore do not know the enemy's situation. This is the ultimate inhumanity. Such a person is not a general for the people, an assistant for a ruler, or the arbiter of victory.
"The means by which enlightened rulers and sagacious generals moved and conquered others, that their achievements surpassed the masses, was advance knowledge.
"Advance knowledge cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, inferred from phenomena, or projected from the measures of Heaven, but must be gained from men for it is the knowledge of the enemy's true situation.
"Thus there are five types of spies to be employed: local spy, internal spy, turned spy [double agent], dead [expendable] spy, and the living spy. When all five are employed together and no one knows their Tao, this is termed "spiritual methodology." They are a
ruler's treasures.
"Local spies-employ people from the local district.
"Internal spies-employ their people who hold government positions.
"Double agents-employ the enemy's spies.
"Expendable spies-are employed to spread disinformation outside the state. Provide our [expendable] spies [with false information] and have them leak it to enemy agents.189
"Living spies-return with their reports.
"Thus of all the Three Armies' affairs,190 no relationship is closer than with spies; no rewards are more generous than those given to spies; no affairs are more secret than those pertaining to spies.
"Unless someone has the wisdom of a Sage, he cannot use spies; unless he is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is subtle and perspicacious, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports. It is subtle, subtle! There are no areas in which one does not employ spies.
"If before the mission has begun it has already been exposed, the spy and those he informed should all be put to death.
"In general, as for the armies you want to strike, the cities you want to attack, and the men you want to assassinate, you must first know the names of the defensive commander, his assistants, staff, door guards, and attendants. You must have our spies search out and learn them all.
"You must search for enemy agents who have come to spy on us. Tempt them with profits, instruct and retain them. Thus double agents can be obtained and employed. Through knowledge gained from them, you can recruit both local and internal spies. Through knowledge gained from them, the expendable spy can spread his falsehoods, can be used to misinform the enemy. Through knowledge gained from them, our living spies can be employed as times require.
"The ruler must know these five aspects of espionage work. This knowledge inevitably depends on turned spies; therefore, you must be generous to double agents.
"In antiquity, when the Yin arose, they had I Chih in the Hsia. When the Chou arose, they had Lu Ya [the T'ai Kung] in the Yin.19' Thus enlightened rulers and sagacious generals who are able to get intelligent spies will invariably attain great achievements. This is the essence of the military, what the Three Armies rely on to move."
Translator's Introduction, 191
1. Planning for the State, 206
2. Evaluating the Enemy, 210
3. Controlling the Army, 214
4. The Tao of the General, 217
5. Responding to Change, 219
6. Stimulating the Officers, 223
UNLIKE the semilegendary Sun-tzu, Wu Ch'i-who was also called Wu-tzu by later generations-was a famous historical figure. His exploits and achievements, both military and administrative, are portrayed as truly outstanding, and shortly after his death his name became inextricably linked with Sun-tzu's. According to the Shih chi, whenever people discussed military theory Sun and Wu were invariably mentioned together, and Ssu-ma Ch'ien's famous biographical chapter permanently canonized that bond.
Wu Ch'i was a complex man of many contradictions, and even his biography in the Shih chi does not depict him favorably. He was an extremely talented individual who advocated the fundamental Confucian beliefs, although his behavior visibly contradicted them. He embraced the concept of benevolence as the essential foundation for government, yet he reputedly killed his own wife. He ignored his mother's mourning rites-a heinous offense in Confucian eyes-in order to keep a vow, clearly emphasizing trustworthiness over filial emotion and its respectful expression. Although he attained great power and encouraged the development and preservation of distinctions, he personally eschewed the visible comforts available to a commanding general and shared every misery and hardship with his troops.
Born about 440 B.C. into the tumultuous era that witnessed the initial conflicts of the incessant warfare that eventually reduced the number of powerful states in China from seven to one, Wu Ch'i realized that states could survive only if they fostered both military strength and sound government. As a young man he reportedly studied with two of the founding disciples of Confucianism, perhaps for as long as three years. Subsequently, he journeyed to find a receptive ear, yet lost favor even after great accomplishments. Eventually he was murdered in Ch'u around 361 B.C., a victim of the enmity incurred because of his draconian measures to strengthen the military and the state.
According to subsequent historical writings, not only was Wu Ch'i never defeated in battle but he rarely suffered the ignominy of a stalemate, while compiling a remarkable record of decisive victories against the superior forces of entrenched states. He has been widely regarded as China's first great general-a view that obviously ignores the T'ai Kung and Ssu-ma Jang-chu-and has been credited with such notable achievements as governing and holding the West Ho region, pacifying Yueh (the south China region), commanding the forces of Lu to gain an overwhelming victory against Ch'i, leading Wei numerous times to thrash Ch'in's growing power, and stabilizing the government of Ch'u. Thus his views and methods, to the extent that they may be preserved in Wu-tzu, are not merely theoretical but were founded and thoroughly tested in reality.
Wu-tzu's reputation for having made impressive administrative contributions-especially for instituting innovative measures and controls to organize the state and instill order, first as Protector of the West River commandery and later as prime minister of Ch'u-have frequently caused him to be ranked with the famous Legalist Lord Shang.' Numerous anecdotes describe his emphasis on certitude, one of the few virtues he both espoused and personally embodied. Stories about him abound in works originating in the centuries after his death, such as the Chan-kuo tse (Intrigues of the Warring States), the Han Fei-tzu, and the Lu-shih Ch'un-ch'iu.2
The Wu-tzu not only constitutes one of the Seven Military Classics but also has long been valued as one of the basic foundations of Chinese military thought. Although less strident than the Art of War, it seriously considers all aspects of war and battle preparation and suggests generally applicable strategies for resolving certain tactical situations. Over the centuries traditional Confucian scholars-with their classical prejudices toward style and artifice-denigrated the Wu-tzu because of the comparative simplicity of the language; they also condemned its realistic policies and perceived brutality.3 However, the text remains lucid and commanding.
The core of the Wu-tzu was probably composed by Wu Ch'i himself, then expanded and revised by his disciples-perhaps from their own memories or from court records. Much of the original version appears to have been lost; what remains has been edited into a succinct, fairly systematic, and remarkably comprehensive work. Although earlier versions of the text apparently date back to at least the fourth century B.C., it probably assumed its present form during the Han dynasty. Fortunately, unlike some of the military classics, few textual problems exist, and only small differences are found among the various editions. Naturally, some passages are common to other, presumably later works; but the focus, concepts, and stage of development are distinctly different.'
Wu Ch'i's life and values were closely intertwined, and because of his apparent historical importance his biography from the Shih chi-which was composed around 100 B.c.-demands inclusion here:s
Wu Ch'i, a native of Wey, loved military operations.' He once studied with Tseng-tzu,7 then went on to serve the ruler of Lu. When the state of Ch'i attacked Lu, Lu's ruler wanted to commission Wu Ch'i as a general, but since he had taken a woman of Ch'i as his wife,8 he was suspicious. Thereupon Wu Ch'i, who wanted to become famous, killed his wife9 to show he had no connection with Ch'i. Lu finally appointed him as a general, and in this capacity he attacked Ch'i, destroying their forces.
Someone in Lu who hated Wu Ch'i said to the ruler: "Wu Ch'i is cruel and suspicious. When he was young his family had accumulated a thousand chin of gold. He traveled about seeking official appointment but was never successful, eventually exhausting the family's resources. When members of his district laughed at him he killed more than thirty of his detractors and then went east, through the gate of Wey's
outer wall. On parting from his mother he bit his arm [so that it bled] and swore an oath: `Until I become a ranking minister I will not reenter Wey.' Then he went to serve Tseng-tzu. He had only been there a short while when his mother died, but he didn't return home. Tseng-tzu despised him [for failing to perform the mourning rites10] and severed all relationship with him.
"Wu Ch'i then went to Lu and studied military arts in order to serve you. You doubted his intentions, so he killed his wife to obtain the post of general. Now Lu is a small state, and if it should attain a reputation for being victorious in battle, the other feudal lords will plot against it. Moreover Lu and Wey are brothers, so if you employ Wu Ch'i you will be casting aside Wey."
The ruler grew suspicious of Wu Ch'i and dismissed him.
At that time Wu Ch'i happened to hear that Marquis Wen of Weil' was a Worthy and wanted so serve in his court. Marquis Wen questioned Li K'o12 about him: "What sort of a man is Wu Ch'i?" Li K'o replied: "Ch'i is greedy and licentious, but in the employment of troops even the famous general Ssu-ma Jang-chu13 could not surpass him." Upon hearing this Marquis Wen appointed him as a general. Wu Ch'i [commanded the army] in an attack on Ch'in, seizing five cities.
In his position as general, Wu Ch'i's custom was to wear the same clothes and eat the same food as the men in the lowest ranks. When sleeping he did not set out a mat, while on the march he did not ride a horse14 or in a chariot. He personally packed up his leftover rations, and shared all labors and misery with the troops.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 23