Organization and Unity
Wei Liao believed in a strict hierarchical organization solidified by a mutual guarantee system that bonds men into units of five and ten and imposed linkages at all levels.14 The ruler exercises supreme authority, although the commanding general replaces him in the field. The civilian populace as well as the members of the army should respond as "the limbs respond to the mind." Strict enforcement of the mutual guarantee system, originated by Lord Shang, implicates all of the unit or squad members in the transgressions of any one of them. Whether in society or in battle, failure to discover and report another's crime, prevent a comrade's death, or fight with determination was punished with the same severity as if the negligent person had committed the offense himself. Contrary to Confucian belief, under this system a father could not conceal his son's crimes nor a son his father's. Systematic drilling and army training ensures that the soldiers are solidly bonded into squads, respond to commands, are fully cognizant of their responsibilities to each other and their commanders, and are capable of executing maneuvers and engaging the enemy without panicking in the chaos and stress of battle.I"
Rewards and Punishments
Every military analyst emphasized the irreplaceable function of rewards and punishments in society and the army. Much of the Wei Liao-tzu is devoted to explicating the essential principles for implementing an effective system of rewards and punishments, the majority of which are common to the other military and Legalist writings of the time. The most basic principles include establishing severity in punishments and (contrary to the belief of Lord Shang) generosity in rewards, strictly imposing punishments on even the highest ranks and granting rewards to the lowest ranks, and never pardoning offenses-although certain losses and reversals in battle could be redeemed by valiant actions that result in commensurate or surpassing achievements. The standards of conduct as well as the laws and regulations must all be clear and well publicized. No deviation-such as spontaneous acts of individual courage-is to be tolerated. Rewards should be granted solely in accord with battlefield achievements, and rank should similarly be restricted to those who have proven themselves in the test of combat. Delays in punishing and rewarding should never be allowed because their impact is diminished accordingly.
Spirit and Courage
Wei Liao believed that the army's ch'i essentially determined a battle's outcome; thus he extensively analyzed the nature and effects of spirit and courage, virtually formulating a detailed psychology of combat. The fundamental problem is simply that people fear danger and do not want to die, even for their native state. Comprehensive measures are necessary to forge an effective army:
People do not take pleasure in dying, nor do they hate life, [but] if the commands and orders are clear and the laws and regulations carefully detailed, you can make them advance. When, before [combat], rewards are made clear and afterward punishments are made decisive, then when [the troops] issue forth they will be able to realize an advantage, and when they move they will be successful.
(Chapter 3: Discussion of Regulations)
Wei Liao believed that by nurturing the people's allegiance to their ruler and the soldiers' love for their commander and combining the resultant positive motivation with their fear of harsh, certain punishment, a powerful, well-disciplined army could be fashioned. The key lies in ensuring that when battlefield fears of death and of the enemy inevitably arise, they are insignificant compared with the soldier's terror at the thought of the punishment they will certainly suffer for cowardice or defeat:
Now the people do not have two things they fear equally. If they fear us then they will despise the enemy; if they fear the enemy they will despise us. The one who is despised will be defeated; the one who establishes his awesomeness will be victorious. In general, when the general is able to implement the Way [to awesomeness], his commanders will fear him. When the commanders fear their general, the people will fear their commanders. When the people fear their commanders, then the enemy will fear the people. For this reason those who would know the Tao of victory and defeat must first know about the balance of power of "fearing" and "despising."16
(Chapter 5: Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks)
Creating certainty and fostering commitment are paramount because when the commander exudes confidence and the orders are clear, when doubts have no chance to arise, the men will be confident and assured in their actions. Enthusiastic, unquestioned commitment will dispel doubt, carry men through battle, and terrorize the enemy-as does a warrior in the marketplace:
If a warrior wields a sword to strike people in the marketplace, among ten thousand people there will not be anyone who does not avoid him. If I say it is not that only one man is courageous but that the ten thousand are unlike him, what is the reason? Being committed to dying and being committed to seeking life are not comparable.
(Chapter 3: Discussion of Regulations)
Wei Liao-tzu accordingly believed in Sun-tzu's tactics to "rob the enemy of his spirit," to cause fear, consternation, and confusion. A general's weaknesses can be exploited to create doubt, and deception employed to surprise and terrorize the unprepared. When neither Virtue can cause the enemy's soldiers to be ashamed and willingly submit nor awesomeness compel them to flee without being overwhelmed in battle, then such measures must be employed and the victory delivered.
Strategic and Tactical Conceptions
If we accept the Wei Liao-tzu as a product of the mid- to late Warring States period, the development and refinement of certain topics previously expressed in the Ssu-ma Fa, Art of War, Wu-tzu, Mo-tzu, and Sun Pin's Military Methods become apparent. Of particular importance is the new, self-reliant attitude expressed from the inception of the conversations because Wei Liao rejected not only the yin-yang practices flourishing in his time but also all reliance on Heaven and the spirits. Human effort constitutes the sole means to achievement; therefore, the ruler must ensure that the state creates regulations and implements practices appropriate to the contemporary situation and fully exploits human potential. This is attained through the development of surpassing internal strength-both economic and military-in some views synonymous with the concept of hsing (shape, form) and its unfolding throughout the empire as necessary as shih (strategic advantage conveyed by deployment of force).17
Wei Liao's campaign army would be characterized by a complete discipline and thorough integration that would allow great flexibility in deploying and subsequently executing complex battle plans. His tactics emphasized selected principles advanced in the other military texts, particularly speed; deception; concentration of force; assaulting weak points while avoiding strengths; acting on the most complete intelligence; seizing and maintaining the initiative; and always being active rather than passive. Sun-tzu's vision of orthodox [cheng] and unorthodox [ch'i] forces, which is generally equated with orthodox forces initiating a direct attack and unorthodox ones executing flanking or indirect attacks, evolved further into a concept of interrelationship, as one changes into the other.'8 When discipline, speed, command expertise, and the orthodox/unorthodox are integrated and fully realized, dramatic results can be attained with small forces.19
Wei Liao and the History of the Text
The Wei Liao-tzu was undoubtedly composed between the late fourth and late third centuries B.C., or roughly the middle to late Warring States period. However, contemporary scholarship continues to debate whether the early texts had any connection with either of the historical Wei Liaos, when they attained final form, and whether the present book has been accurately transmitted from the originals. Because the various positions draw radically different conclusions from the textual materials, they merit brief summation here and in the accompanying notes.
Traditional studies have all observed that the Han shu bibliography lists a Wei Liao-tzu in twenty-nine sections in the miscellaneous category20-with Pan Ku's annotation that it is by a Wei Liao of the Six States (Warring States) period-and another, identically titled book of th
irty-one sections in the Ping hsing-shih21 military subclassification. Prior to the 1972 discovery of the bamboo slip edition at Lin-i, virtually all writings from the Sung dynasty onward labeled the Seven Military Classics edition a forgery or bemoaned the heavy losses that had reduced the original to only twenty-four sections. Those critics who condemned the Six Secret Teachings as an obvious forgery because of its purported brutality and the espousal of doctrines that could not possibly have been associated with true Sages equally found fault with the Wei Liao-tzu; they especially objected to the passage which asserts that a truly effective commander can "kill" half of his men.22 Among the latter group of critics, Yao Chi-heng also observed that the Wei Liao-tzu not coincidentally contains a passage from Mencius-which states that the "seasons of Heaven are not as good as the advantages of Earth"-and cited it as evidence that the author borrowed extensively from such writings to fabricate the book found in the miscellaneous category.23
Traditionalists have also tended to recognize the existence of two distinct texts, speculating on which one provides the basis for the present work. Commenting on the miscellaneous entry, Yen Shih-ku identified Wei Liao as a student of Lord Shang,24 which caused some analysts to focus almost exclusively on this aspect and ignore many concepts historically associated with the Confucians and Taoists.25 Others have held that the military text has been largely preserved and faithfully transmitted whereas the miscellaneous work has vanished, thus equally ignoring significant contents .2' A third view, discussed below, proposed that there was only a single book but that it existed in different versions.
Inherently connected with the issue of textual transmission is the intricate question regarding the possible relationship of the present Wei Liao-tzu with the historically identified authors. One contemporary viewpoint suggests that in the absence of reliable proof to the contrary, particularly with the discovery of the bamboo slip edition, the contents should be attributed to the mendicant persuader Wei Liao because they are a record of the advice he proffered to King Hui. (The possibility of later accretions, revisions, and adjustments can easily be encompassed within this view.) This judgment is founded on the reference to Wei Liao at the beginning of the book; the continued submissive viewpoint of a subject speaking to a ruler throughout; the king's weakness and ignorance coupled with the state's debilitated condition; and the nature of the historical references.27
A second perspective holds that the concepts expressed within the Wei Liao-tzu and the scope of warfare it reflects clearly indicate that it should date from the late Warring States period and its authorship be identified with the Wei Liao who ventured to advise the king of Ch'in.28 Moreover, this Wei Liao's surname was perhaps Liao, and he held the essentially honorary position of "wei," or commandant.29 This would account for the detailed knowledge of what appears to be Ch'in's military organization preserved in the last half of the present book30 but unfortunately not for the pretense of advising King Hui because the political realities of the two states were radically different.
Chang Lieh, who has written several articles on the dates and background of the military writings, is a proponent of the late Warring States viewpoint for several interesting reasons.31 First, because King Hui and Lord Shang were known historical protagonists, if Wei Liao had been associated with the latter in any way or had espoused doctrines associated with him, he would hardly have dared to seek an audience with King Hui.32 Second, the amalgamation of Confucian concepts of righteousness and benevolence with a state policy sanctioning aggressive warfare (ostensibly to chastise the evil) did not evolve until late in the Warring States period, when it was synthesized by Hsun-tzu. Earlier, during King Hui's reign-in direct opposition to Confucians such as Mencius-Lord Shang had advocated eliminating virtue and its associated concepts from society and political life and relying instead on strength, rewards, and punishments. The Wei Liao-tzu, on the contrary, integrates virtue and might while stressing both severe punishments and gen erous rewards-the latter in direct contradiction of Lord Shang. Accordingly, the historical author should intellectually and temporally postdate Lord Shang and Hsun-tzu.33 Third, he embraces and continues other ideas of Hsun-tzu, such as relying on men rather than Heaven and enriching the people.34 Finally, noting Wei Liao's trepidations as chronicled by the Shih chi, Chang suggests they stemmed from his daunting championship of virtue and righteousness within an extremely inhospitable context of brutality and militarism. Chang therefore concludes that the text was written near the end of the Warring States period and that it is properly attributed to the late historical adviser to the young king.3s
In one of the initial articles analyzing the bamboo slips and the contemporary Wei Liao-tzu, Ho Fa-chou offers some general observations and conclu- sions.36 First, he believes that the bamboo slip edition, the four chapters preserved in the Ch'un-shu chip-yao,37 and the text classified in the miscellaneous category were originally identical. However, he feels that the Seven Military Classics version originates in the one subsumed under the military category. Furthermore, an analysis of the extant writings causes him to conclude that both Han shu texts were originally variations of the same book, the miscellaneous version simply being characterized by more Confucian and Taoist terms and concepts. Correspondingly, the military materials in the military text were given greater prominence and the language was simplified, but the subject matter and conclusions remain congruent.38
Ho also raises the intriguing question as to why, if the work is posited as a forgery, it would be imputed to an unknown sophist in an obscure presentation to a ruler remembered mostly for his failures. Because the Wei Liao-tzu contains numerous admonitions and correctives that could only have been directed to a weak ruler-rather than to the despot of a strong state such as Ch'in-Ho concludes it must be a record of an actual audience rather than a later confabulation. Further evidence is garnered from the historical events and figures Wei Liao cites-in particular his employment of Wu Ch'i as an exemplar-and the likelihood that Wei Liao was merely continuing to espouse practices and measures in concord with Wei's strong administrative and early Legalist tradition.39 Furthermore, Wei's debilitated condition had prompted King Hui to actively seek external advice and receive proponents of virtually every position, thus stimulating an interchange of ideas and prin-40 ciples among Confucians, Taoists, Legalists, and others-such as Wei Liao.
Robin D. S. Yates, in a seminal article, has summarized many of these views and contributed his own interpretations.41 He finds internal evidence for having classified the Wei Liao-tzu under the military subcategory "form and positional advantage" (hsing-shih) lacking and questions whether the extant texts are actually the ones seen by the Han shu bibliography's compil- ers.42 He further suggests that the book's identification with Wei Liao is essentially a matter of convenient attribution to foster a sense of authority and lacks any inherent justification. 43 Based on its Confucian and Taoist materials coupled with the diatribes against the use of divination, Yates then postulates lates a likely composition date that is slightly post-Mencius.
Finally, in the critical introduction to his 1989 annotated Wei Liao-tzu ch'ien-shuo,45 Hsu Yung thoroughly reviews the above material-only to creatively revive the original theory that naively believed the historical figures, although active in two distinct periods, were actually a single individual. Unconvinced by the arguments for attributing the text to either the earlier or the later Wei Liao, Hsu emphasizes the minimal likelihood that two men with identical names could have appeared within a century of each other in the Warring States era.46 In addition, the contents of the second part of the book clearly detail the forms of military organization and principles for army practice that probably characterized Ch'in's forces.47 The concept of benevolence constituting the proper foundation for all warfare, which is prominent in the first part of the Wei Liao-tzu, is also thought to have arisen late in the Warring States period. Because Hsu Yung believes the book is basically homogeneous, he consciously draws the inevitable conclusion that it is t
he work of a single thinker. He is then compelled to resolve the problem apparently posed by the unbelievable longevity required for Wei Liao to have been active in two courts nearly a century apart by redefining King Hui's period of reign. In brief, Hsu calculates that King Hui did not die until 310 B.c., nine years after the traditionally ascribed date.48 Therefore, if a very young Wei Liao-a native of Wei-had been granted an audience at a time when the king was soliciting advice from all persons and quarters, including Mencius, his subsequent interview with a very youthful king of Ch'in would have occurred when he was in his early nineties.49 Nothing is heard of him thereafter because he probably died from old age rather than actively assuming some post.50 Accordingly, the first twelve chapters of the present book would stem from the miscellaneous text-a product of his youth-and the remaining twelve from the writings consigned to the military classificationthe work of his final years.51 Thus in Hsu's view, all sixty sections originally existed in Pan Ku's time-with the historian perhaps separating them into two works-but they were combined, with losses and accretions over the ages, until constituting the present Wei Liao-tzu.52
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 29