In another five days, before the night was half over, Chang Liang went there. In a little while the old man also arrived and was happy. "This is the way it should be," he said. Then, taking out a book, he continued: "If you read this you can become a teacher of kings. Ten years from now you will flourish. In thirteen years you will see me on the northern bank of the Chi River. The yellow rock at the foot of Ku-ch'eng Mountain will be me." Then he departed without another word, never to be seen again. In the morning Chang Liang looked at the book and discovered it to be the T'ai Kung's military strategy. He thereafter regarded it as something exceptional and constantly studied and worked over the book.
The old man may have been a proud descendant of Ch'i's official state historian, a Worthy whose family had preserved the secret teachings for generations. According to the military historian General Hsu Tel-ken, this is sug gested by his knowledge of the area, which was so detailed that he identified himself with a large yellow rock (huang shih)-a reference that would eventually give the book its name, Three Strategies of the Duke of Yellow Rock.' Because Ch'i was one of the last states vanquished by the infamous Ch'in, the Duke of Yellow Rock would have been amply motivated to assist in overthrowing the now-tortured dynasty. Providing this essential work of strategy to a young fugitive who was being hunted for his attempted assassination of the emperor would have been a highly appropriate gesture.
There are actually five basic views concerning the origin of the Three Strategies, with the first, traditional one just discussed attributing it directly to the T'ai Kung. The second, a variation on the first, ascribes it to the disciples or later military followers of the T'ai Kung. This view envisions a prototypical text that evolved around a kernel of concepts over the centuries until it eventually underwent extensive revision in the pre-Ch'in period, which accounts for the anachronistic language and concepts and for the possibility that it may also have influenced Sun-tzu and Wei Liao-tzu (rather than the reverse). The third view assumes that rather than simply handing down the writings of the T'ai Kung, Huang Shih-kung wrote the book himself shortly before the famous incident. This would equally explain the concepts and language, especially the highly visible Taoist influence. The fourth view, which is essentially identified with conservative classical scholars, derisively terms the book a blatant forgery of the Wei-Chin period or later. Some scholars, such as Cheng Yuan, characterized the Three Strategies as having stolen the empty words of Taoism and being a useless book,' whereas others excoriated its brutality or attacked the rusticity of its language.'
The final view-advanced by the contemporary scholar Hsu Pao-lin based on the concepts, language, and historical references incorporated in the text-concludes that the work was written around the end of the Former Han dynasty, probably by a reclusive adherent of the Huang-Lao school who had expert knowledge of military affairs.' In addition, this view holds that the book transmitted to Chang Liang was not the present Three Strategies but the Six Secret Teachings-the T'ai Kung's military thought-as is stated by Ssu-ma Ch'ien in the Shih chi biography.' (Huang Shih-kung's book, now known as the Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung, was originally titled The Records of Huang Shih-kung and only acquired its present name during the Sui dynasty.') This explains the reference to powerful families usurping power, the prevalence of Huang-Lao thought amid concepts from many schools, and the narrow focus on government affairs in an age of peace. Although elements of Hsu's arguments seem somewhat tenuous, in the absence of archaeological evidence to the contrary, his general conclusions should probably be accepted and the Three Strategies acknowledged as the last of the truly ancient works, with a likely composition date somewhere around A.D. 0.10
Basic Content and Focus
The tone of the Three Strategies is far less strident than that of the Six Secret Teachings and other works on which its author clearly drew, presumably because the brutal, monumental task of consolidating the empire and establishing enlightened rule had already been accomplished by the Han dynasty. Although many of the themes and ideas of the previous five Military Classics are represented in the Three Strategies, it focuses primarily on government and military administration and control. With the possible exception of a brief passage advancing a theory of strongpoints,l' discussions of campaign strategy and battle tactics are absent. Instead the text concentrates on concepts of government; the administration of forces; the unification of the people; the characteristics of a capable general; methods of nurturing a sound material foundation; motivation of subordinates and the soldiers; implementation of rewards and punishments; ways to foster majesty-which was a critical concept-and the need to balance between the hard and the soft.
Four main threads of thought-their differences apparently reconciled and their viewpoints remarkably integrated-are clearly present in the Three Strategies.12 Further study is required to determine whether the author deliberately fashioned a grand synthesis on the new intellectual ground of Huang-Lao thought, as claimed by the scholar Hsu Pao-lin, or whether contemporary researchers are simply succumbing to the temptation to creatively perceive unity after extensively pondering and analyzing the text. Generally speaking, the fundamental concepts of Confucianism-such as benevolence, righteousness, the practice of humanitarian government, the promotion of the welfare of the people, rule by Virtue, and the employment of the Worthy-underlie the entire work. Pivotal measures espoused by the Legalists-such as strengthening the state, rigorously enforcing the laws, strictly implementing rewards and punishments, and ensuring that the ruler retains power and exercises authority-supplement the original Confucian approach, bringing the entire work much closer in tenor and outlook to Hstin-tzu than Confucius and Mencius. The Taoist spirit-which emphasizes the passive, being harmonious, not contending, preserving life, the Tao and Te (Virtue), and especially the evilness of warfare-pervades the book but is modified to accept the reality of righteous warfare and contending for harmony.
The works of the previous military strategists-especially the Wei Liaotzu and the Six Secret Teachings (which is sometimes quoted as the Military Pronouncements)-provide essential concepts for government administration, organization, and control. Many of the amalgamated Confucian and Legalist policies, such as treating the people as the basis and rigidly implementing rewards and punishments, have long traditions among the strategists. Some of these have been described as reaching their pinnacle in the Three Strategies, although this might merely be a question of emphasis. Clearly, the text is more complex philosphically than a simple work on military administration and therefore requires further study. Due to various limitations, such detailed analysis must be left to specialized monographs, with the introduction below supplying only a brief summary of salient points as a guide to Huang Shih-kung's world.
Hierarchy of Strategies
In its present form the work consists of three sections denominated in the traditional way as upper, middle, and lower. Unfortunately, these terms are open to two interpretations: as simple indicators of position in the work or as indicating some assigned value or priority. A passage in the book itself, which may be a commentator's interpolation rather than the author's own thoughts, clearly states that each of the sections is both necessary and appropriate to its own period of moral and political deterioration.13 There is no identification of the hierarchy of chapters as being respectively appropriate to different styles of government and ages of virtue, as might have been expected.
Over the millennia Chinese intellectuals have conceptualized their history in terms of recurring dynastic cycles superimposed on a general pattern of moral decline. Starting with the age of true Sage Emperors, civilization became more complex, artificial, and perverse-culminating in the period when mere men usurped power and disputants had to consciously create and espouse concepts of virtue in a futile attempt to master evil. Each philosophic school interpreted this decline from its own, self-serving perspective. In extremely simplified form, the Confucians viewed the creation of culture and civilization as the great ac
complishment of former Sages and culture heroes and as the means by which to ensure and preserve an ordered society wherein Virtue should prevail and morality rule. The Taoists, championed by their paragon Lao-tzu, decried the creation of concepts of virtue and the chains of civilization as serving solely to further hasten the already precipi tous decline from spontaneity, simplicity, and natural harmony. The Legalists derived a very different lesson from this deterioration, envisioning it as proof of the absolute need for draconian measures: for law and authority to prevent civil disorder, foster a strong state, and guarantee the ruler's security.
Mankind's apparent passage through several dramatically different forms of government, each characterized by distinctive virtues and policies, was seen to furnish illustrative justification for these respective theories. It is tempting to view Huang Shih-kung as having directed each of the three strategies to a particular style of government and degree of aggressive administration. However, the present text makes no such assertion, and in fact the "Superior Strategy" "establishes the forms of propriety and rewards"-clearly not the method of the earliest Sages. In harmony with the Legalists, who felt that laws must be newly created for each age, Huang Shih-kung proclaims that all three theories are necessary for their respective periods of decadence. Each section provides the ruler with functionally specific techniques for attaining his administrative objectives:
The Sage embodies Heaven, the Worthy model on Earth, and the wise find their teachers in antiquity. Thus the Three Strategies has been written for a period of decadence. The "Superior Strategy" establishes the forms of propriety and rewards, discriminates between evildoers and the valiant, and makes clear success and defeat. The "Middle Strategy" makes out the differences in Virtue and behavior and makes manifest changes in the balance of power [ch'uan]. The "Inferior Strategy" arrays the Tao and Virtue, investigates security and danger, and makes clear the calamity of harming the Worthy.
Thus if the ruler thoroughly understands the "Superior Strategy" he will be able to employ the Worthy and seize his enemies. If he thoroughly understands the "Middle Strategy" he will be able to employ and control his generals and unite the people. If he thoroughly understands the "Inferior Strategy" he will be able to discern the sources of flourishing and decline and understand the regulations for governing a state. If his subordinates thoroughly understand the "Middle Strategy" they will be able to achieve merit and preserve themselves.
Despite the above passage, a close examination of the book's contents suggests this interpretation lacks a strong textual basis. Although there is some difference in emphasis among the strategies, essentially the same themes and concerns underlie all three sections. The first chapter contains most of the writing, whereas the other two introduce some new subjects and expand on others. Whether this resulted from the text having been tampered with or whether the transmission has been imperfect and large sections lost can never be known. This sort of textual imbalance is unusual, but the author may have simply expressed his ideas without concern for symmetry and length.
Concepts of Government
By accepting the historical "decline" theory, the Three Strategies commits itself to a program that stresses the cultivation of Virtue and the simultaneous implementation of aggressive government policies to cope with an age in decline. In concord with the Six Secret Teachings and the Wu-tzu it emphasizes nurturing the people, fostering their allegiance and willing support,14 and integrating them under a moral leader and a vigorous government. Because the highest ideal is the Sage King, the author advocates essentially Confucian measures designed to promote the people's material welfare and engender their voluntary adherence. The ruler and also the general should act to ease distress, remove evil, and increase prosperity. Consequently, they should minimize taxes and labor duties, avoid disrupting the critical agricultural seasons, and nurture stability and tranquility. Because it is expected that the well-ordered, ideally governed state can mobilize its citizens when confronted by hostilities, military matters-apart from actual strategy and tactics-essentially become questions of civilian government and administration. Conscripts provide the basis for military strength, and defensive capabilities are stressed.
Exercise of Authority
Both the "Superior" and "Inferior Strategies" discuss the numerous problems that arise when the ruler has lost effective control of the government, the evil have gained control of offices and power, and parties and cliques dispense governmental largess. The Three Strategies warns against allowing these situations to develop, following the essential Legalist doctrine that the ruler himself must wield as well as theoretically hold power. The key to preventing the encroachment of the great families, the ruler's relatives, and even powerful military men is the successful employment of Sages and Worthies. (This represents a deviation from standard Legalist principles, which held that moral worth and individual talent cannot and should not be relied on. In contrast, the Mohists and Confucians stressed the role and importance of sagely paragons, a policy the author of the Three Strategies envisioned as "according with the subtle," "according with the Tao.") When the good are recognized and advanced and the evil removed and punished, the proper context for true, effective, benevolent government will have been established, and the people will naturally regard the court in a positive light.
Military Preparation, Management, and Execution
As mentioned above, a Taoist influence pervades the book-from the overall unification in the practice of the Way (Tao)15 to the general recognition that warfare is inauspicious and evil and that it violates what the Taoists perceive as the natural tendency to life.16 In contrast to the positive attitude of the Six Secret Teachings and other works, which still deem warfare to be of momentous importance to the nation, the negative or dark side of military affairs also commands attention in the Three Strategies. The army must be employed with restraint; however, when absolutely necessary to preserve the state, uphold the principles of civilization, and protect life, its use accords with the Tao. Because hesitation and doubt doom military enterprises, once the decision to employ the army has been reached, its use should be decisive: "The Sage King does not take any pleasure in using the army. He mobilizes it to execute the violently perverse and punish the rebellious. ... Weapons are inauspicious implements, and the Tao of Heaven abhors them. However, when their employment is unavoidable it accords with the Tao of Heaven." Lao-tzu's famous sentence ("the army is an inauspicious implement" 17 ) has clearly been modified to accept the reality of Huang-Lao thought in the Three Strategies.
The foundation, the possibility of military action always remains the people. In many states the populace is impoverished and disaffected; the populace of the true ruler should be adequately nourished, clothed, rested, and strongly bound to its king and state. Immigrants and the persecuted as well as the worthy and talented should all be welcomed and granted refuge, thereby strengthening the country. Once they are brought under the sway of government policies, all the people will be forged into a cohesive, integrated whole.
Motivating the People
The Three Strategies discusses in some detail the age-old problem of motivation, directing attention to the entire spectrum of commoners, bureaucrats, ministers, generals, officers, and soldiers. It even identifies around twenty types of individuals by their predominant character or behavioral tendencies and suggests means to use each type to the state's advantage.18 However, stability and prosperity are essential because without security, enjoyment becomes impossible and without prosperity, the government will lack adequate resources to offer the necessary incentives. If men are to exert themselves for the state, they must have prospects of appropriate rewards; if they are to die for it, they must be strongly stimulated with the promise of material goods as well as abstract honor.19
The nature and form of incentives must be suited precisely to the individual because men differ in their values and requirements. For example, although many enthusiastically pursue great profits, the pure and inc
orruptible are motivated only by fame, honor, and position. The proper combination of respect-both public and private-and material gain must be determined and employed. Allegiance must be gained through the benevolent, enlightened government policies discussed previously; and the submission of the men's minds (which is attained through pleasure) as opposed to just their bodies (attained through their conformance-willing or otherwise-to the forms of propriety and the laws of the land) is vital. Thereafter, virtually everyone can be attracted and utilized by playing on their characters and desires. However, only Virtue will attract the Worthy; thus the ruler and commander should continually strive to perfect themselves.
Military and Tactical Concepts
Although Huang Shih-kung focuses on problems of administrative control, several important military concepts found in the Three Strategies merit attention: generalship, swiftness, authority, integration and balance, and the hard and soft.
From the time of the Spring and Autumn period, the commanding general was entrusted increasingly not only with tactical command but also with complete governing authority for the military and its related, largely civilian support groups. With few exceptions the measures discussed for the civilian sphere are equally applicable in the military realm. Once the general assumes his duties his authority must be unquestioned. Because of the breadth of his powers and the range of his responsibilities, only a man of wide comprehension, decisiveness, and extensive abilities can master the problem. He should be emotionally controlled and never display doubt or indecision. Furthermore, he must be receptive to suggestions and criticism, although his authority must still be unquestioned. Swiftness, secrecy, unity, and uprightness should characterize his execise of power. His anger should be righteous and result in the punishment of offenders.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 35