If you dismiss one good [man], then a myriad good [acts] will decline. If you reward one evil [man], then a myriad evils will be drawn to you. When the good are rewarded and the evil suffer punishment, the state will be secure, and the multitudes of good people will come.
When the masses are doubtful, there are no settled states. When the masses are deluded, there are no governed people. When doubts are settled and the deluded returned, then the state can be secure. When one order is contravened, then a hundred orders will be disobeyed. When one evil act is done, a hundred evils will form. Thus if you put good into effect amidst a compliant people and impose harsh measures on wicked people, orders will be implemented without any discontent.
Employing the discontented to govern the discontented is termed "contrary to Heaven."" Having the vengeful control the vengeful, an irreversible disaster will result. Govern the people by causing them to be peaceful. If one attains peace through purity, then the people will have their places, and the world will be tranquil.
If those who oppose the ruler are honored, while the greedy and uncivilized are enriched, then even if there is a Sage ruler he cannot realize a wellordered government. If those who oppose the ruler are punished, while the greedy and uncivilized are arrested, then a transformation will be effected and the myriad evils eliminated.
Pure, incorruptible officers cannot be enticed with rank and salary. Selfconstrained, righteous officers cannot be coerced with awesomeness or punishment. Thus when the enlightened ruler seeks the Worthy, he must observe what will attract them. To attract pure, incorruptible officers he perfects his observance of the forms of propriety. To attract self-constrained, righteous officers he perfects himself in the Tao. Only thereafter will they be attracted and the ruler's reputation preserved.
The Sage and perfected man perceive the sources of flourishing and decline, understand the beginnings of success and defeat, have attained true knowledge of the crux [chi] of governing and turbulence, and know the measure of coming and going. Such men, even in poverty, will not hold a position in a doomed state. Though lowly, they will not eat the rice of a turbulent country. They conceal their names and cling to the Way [Tao]. When the proper time comes they move, reaching the pinnacle which a subject can attain. When they encounter Virtue that accords with them, they will establish extraordinary achievements. Thus their Tao is lofty, and their names will be praised in later generations.
The Sage King does not take any pleasure in using the army. He mobilizes it to execute the violently perverse and punish the rebellious. Now using the righteous to execute the unrighteous is like releasing the Yangtze and Yellow rivers to douse a torch, or pushing a person tottering at the edge of an abyss. Their success is inevitable! Thus [when action should be taken] one who hes itates and is quiet, without advancing, seriously injures all living beings. Weapons are inauspicious instruments, and the Tao of Heaven abhors them. However, when their employment is unavoidable it accords with the Tao of Heaven. Now men in the Tao are like fish in water. If they have water they will live; if not they will die. Thus the ruler must constantly be afraid and dare not lose the Tao.
When prominent, powerful families gain control of official duties, the state's awesomeness weakens. When the power of life and death lies with the prominent, powerful families, the state's strategic power [shih] is exhausted. If the prominent, powerful families bow their heads in submission, then the state can long endure. When the power of life and death lies with the ruler, then the state can be secure.
When the four classes of people26 have nothing for their use, then the state will lack all stores. When the four classes have enough for their use, then the state will be secure and happy.
When Worthy ministers are brought inside government, depraved ones will be outside. When depraved ministers are inside, Worthy ministers will perish. When within and without lose what is appropriate, disaster and disorder will last through generations.
If the major ministers doubt the ruler, a myriad evils will accumulate and gather. If the ministers usurp the respect that should be due the ruler, then the upper and lower ranks will be confused. When the ruler [effectively] occupies the position of a minister, upper and lower [ranks] lose their order.
If someone injures the Worthy, the calamity will extend three generations. If someone conceals the Worthy, he himself will suffer the harm. If someone is jealous of the Worthy, his reputation will not be complete. If someone advances the Worthy, the blessings will flow to his sons and grandsons. Thus the ruler is anxious to advance the Worthy and thereby make his good name illustrious.
If you profit one person but injure a hundred, the people will leave the city. If you profit one person and harm ten thousand, [the populace of] the state will think about dispersing. If you get rid of one and thereby profit a hundred, the people will long for your munificence. If you get rid of one and thereby profit ten thousand, your government will not be disordered.
Translator's Introduction, 311
BookI 321
Book II 336
Book III 350
THROUGH POLITICAL MEASURES and the brutal, unremitting implementation of aggressive military strategies, the brief Ch'in dynasty unified the empire in 221 B.C. Within two decades it had been supplanted by the glorious Han, whose reign encompassed four centuries of centralized, prosperous rule and civilization until itself perishing. Thereafter, China was again characterized by political fragmentation during the period of Disunion, which ended when the dynamic Emperor Sui Wen-ti seized power in A.D. 581. The historical legacy of his dynasty mirrors that of the Ch'in because he not only reunified the country geographically but also imposed central bureaucratic institutions that regained political control of the populace and made local bureaucracy an instrument of the state. Furthermore, he conducted extensive efforts to culturally integrate the north and the south; displace the powerful, entrenched aristocratic families; and reform the tax system. The many institutions created under his reign subsequently provided the foundation for the illustrious T'ang.l
Unfortunately, his heir, Sui Yang-ti (reigned A.D. 604-618), quickly displayed many of the reprehensible traits characteristic of archetypical last rulers, historically associated with the loss of Heaven's Mandate. Foremost among these traits was his extravagance, particularly in the area of public works. Millions of people were pressed into service for such projects as restoring the Great Wall, rebuilding and extending canals, and constructing the new capital. Furthermore, in the period A.D. 611 to 614, Sui Yang-ti mounted three disastrous expeditions to impose Chinese suzerainty over Korea, largely by conscripting men from the northeast region. The heritage of these onerous state policies was impoverishment, discontent, and death-inevitably stimulating more than two hundred factions to revolt.
Li Yuan, the powerful Sui official who eventually founded the T'ang dynasty (reigning under the title T'ang Kao-tsu), has traditionally been portrayed as having been forced into revolting by the combined influences of popular prophecies and the machinations of his son, Li Shih-min (T'ang T'ai-tsung).2 Li Yuan not only commanded the strongest provincial army but was directly related to the Sui imperial family as well as to powerful semibarbarian aristocratic families in the northwest region. Entrusted with suppressing several of the sporadic revolts that had begun to appear in A.D. 613, his success augmented his authority and solidified his control over the strategic province of Shansi. Initiated in the fifth month of A.D. 617, the revolt quickly gathered major support from a number of other rebels and strong generals; by the eleventh month of that year, Li Yuan had captured the capital. In the fifth month of A.D. 618, the year of Sui Yang-ti's murder, he formally ascended the throne to establish the T'ang dynasty.
During the rise of both the Sul and T'ang, the nomadic powers outside the historical borders had become fragmented, with some of the Turks nominally acknowledging Chinese suzerainty and many of their tribesmen even serving in the imperial military forces. The Eastern Turks provided significant support to Li Yuan's revo
lt in its formative stages-not only by furnishing horses, men, and limited supplies but also by essentially foregoing any opportunistic actions to capitalize on the chaos. At the time of the establishment of the dynasty, only a limited area in the north had actually been brought under central government control; the next ten years were spent consolidating its power, extending the imperial domain in all directions-including to the agriculturally critical eastern areas-and creating a heritage of tranquility for succeeding generations.
The T'ang established itself through the talents of its skilled generals, the adoption of Sui institutions, the populist appeal of its positions, and a benevolent pacification policy-especially in the south. Three generals particularly distinguished themselves: Li Ching, the strategist to whom this seventh military classic is attributed; Li Shih-chi; and Li Shih-min, the second son of Li Yuan who became T'ang T'ai-tsung upon his usurping the throne in A.D. 627. All three were active in the founding and integration of the empire, with T'ang T'ai-tsung being depicted as heroically leading his elite troops into many pitched conflicts.
T'ang T'ai-tsung, who asks the questions and offers short observations in this military classic, apparently received a Confucian education; he therefore had thorough knowledge of the classics and histories as well as being extremely skilled in the martial arts. He reportedly commanded troops by age fifteen and after contributing to the establishment of the T'ang as both a strategist and a commander, was instrumental in subduing numerous challenges to the new state-including those mounted by segments of the Western Turks. He finally became emperor by displacing his father, although only after murdering his older brother, the designated heir. Stories of his prowess and famous horses abound in popular Chinese history.3
As emperor he consciously cultivated the image of a proper ruler, one responsive to the needs of the people and willing to accept criticism and advice. The country was truly unified, both politically and culturally. Measures were enacted to reduce the plight of the people and stimulate the economy. Government expenditures were reduced, and effective administration was imposed throughout the nation. With the passage of time and perhaps distance from the uncertainties of the initial period, he eventually became more independent, intolerant, and extravagant. However, the formative years of the T'ang saw the rebirth of thought and culture, the resurgence of a civilization that would dazzle Asia for three centuries.
Li Ching-who lived from A.D. 571 to 649-began his career under the Sul, serving in the northwest in a military capacity. He eventually joined the T'ang forces just after the fall of the capital, Ch'ang-an, and became one of T'ang T'ai-tsung's earliest associates and supporters. Thereafter, he commanded T'ang troops in the suppression of both internal and external challenges, the great conquest of the Western Turks (for which he became famous), and the pacification of the south. Thus if the Questions and Replies actually preserves his conversations with T'ang T'ai-tsung, or even a large part of them, the strategies they discuss were not only theoretical concepts but had been personally tested and employed by them in critical battles.
The book differs markedly from the earlier classics, being more of a survey of earlier works, combined with a wide-ranging discussion and appreciation of their theories and contradictions. Illustrated by historical examples from their own campaign experiences, these discussions apparently reveal the predominant strategies and tactics of their era. Although most historians consider the book to be a forgery from either the late T'ang or Northern Sung, arguments have also been advanced that-as with other compendiums summarizing the thought and actions of the period-it is at least based on an actual protowork or recorded notes.'
Li Ching's biography from the Hsin T'ang-shu not only depicts the turbulent career of a successful T'ang politician and commander but also portrays the man and his strategies in action:5
Li Ching, whose personal name was Yao-shih, was a native of San-yuan in the Metropolitan prefecture. Tall and elegant in appearance, he was thoroughly versed in the classics and histories. He once said to those close to him: "In this life a man wants to attain wealth and rank through accomplishments. Why must one compose passages like the Confucians?" Whenever his uncle Han Ch'in-hu discussed military affairs with him, he would sigh in amazement and say: "If one cannot discuss Sun-tzu and Wu-tzu with this man, who can one discuss them with?" When Li Ching served the Sui dynasty as Chief of the Palace Attendants, Niu Hung-Minister for the Ministry of Personnel-saw him and remarked: "This is a talent to assist a king!" The Left Vice Director [for State Affairs], Yang Su, placing his hand on his great seat, said to him: "My lord, in the end you should sit here!"
At the end of the Ta-yeh period he served as Vice Magistrate of Ma-i District. When T'ang Kao-tsu attacked the Turks, Li Ching observed that Kao-tsu was marked by extraordinary ambition. He had himself arrested [for being disloyal to Kao-tsu] in order to urgently report Kao-tsu's revolutionary intentions and sent to Chiang-tu. When he reached Ch'ang-an the road was blocked. Kao-tsu then conquered the capital [and captured Li Ching]. He was about to have him beheaded when Ching cried out: "My lord raised troops to eliminate perversity and chaos on behalf of All under Heaven. If you want to achieve the great affair [of becoming emperor], how can you slay a righteous man because of personal enmity?" The king of Ch'in [Li Shih-minj also interceded on his behalf, and he was released, being brought into the government as a member of the Three Capital Guards. He accompanied [Li Shih-min] on the campaign to pacify Wang Shih-ch'ung and for his achievements was appointed a commander.
Hsiao Hsien occupied Chiang-ling, so [Kao-tsu] issued an imperial edict to Ching to pacify the area. Accompanied by a few light cavalrymen he crossed to Chin-chou to confront several tens of thousands of Man [barbarian] Teng Shihluo bandits encamped in the mountain valleys of the region. King Yuan of Luchiang had not been victorious, so Ching planned the attack for him, forcing the enemy to withdraw. They proceeded to Hsia-chou, where they were blocked by Hsien's army and could not advance. The emperor assumed he was procrastinating and issued an imperial edict to the Supervisor in Chief Hsu Shao to behead Ching. Shao entered a plea on Ching's behalf, and he was spared.
The Man peoples in K'ai-chou under Jan Chao-tse then invaded K'uei-chou. Hsiao-kung, king of Chao Commandery, engaged them in battle but without gaining any advantage. Ching led eight hundred men to destroy their encampment and strategic defiles, establishing an ambush which resulted in the beheading of Chao-tse and the capture of five thousand prisoners. The emperor exclaimed to his attendants: "Employing men of achievement is not as good as using those who have erred. This is certainly true in Li Ching's case." Thereupon he personally drafted his citation, saying: "You are blameless for what is already past. I have long forgotten previous events." Li Ching subsequently planned the strategy for ten campaigns against Hsien.
By imperial edict Ching was appointed Commander in Chief of the Campaign Army, concurrently serving as Aide to Hsiao-kung's Campaign Army, with both armies' administrative matters all being entrusted to him. In August of the fourth year of the Martial Virtue reign period [A.D. 621], he reviewed the troops in K'uei-chou. It was the time of the autumn floods, with heavy waves on the vile, overflowing waters [of the Ch'ang-chiang River].6 Hsien believed Ching would not be able to descend, so he did not establish any defenses. Ching's generals also requested they await the calming of the river before advancing. Ching said: "For the army the most critical affair is for its speed to be spiritual. Now the men have just assembled and Hsien does not yet know it, so if we take advantage of the water to attack his fortifications, it will be like being unable to cover one's ears at a thunderclap. Even if he is able to suddenly summon his troops, he will lack the means to oppose us, and we will certainly capture him." Hsiao-kung followed his plan, and in the ninth month the navy attacked I-ling. Hsien's general Wen Shih-hung encamped at Ch'ing-chiang with several tens of thousands of troops. Hsiao-kung wanted to attack him, but Ching said: "You cannot! Shih-hung is a stalwart general, while those below him are all coura
geous men. Now when they have newly lost Ching-men, they will all be full of ardor to oppose us. This is an army which can rescue the defeated and cannot be opposed. It would be better to go to the southern river bank and wait for their ch'i [spirit] to abate, and then take them." Hsiao-kung did not listen but instead left Ching behind to guard the encampment and personally went forth to engage them in battle. After being soundly defeated, he returned. The bandits then employed boats to disperse and plunder the countryside. Ching saw their disarray and let his army loose to destroy them. They seized more than four hundred vessels, while ten thousand of the enemy drowned.
Thereupon, leading a vanguard of five thousand light cavalry, he raced to Chiang-ling. They besieged the city and encamped, [subsequently] destroying generals Yang Chun-mao and Cheng Wen-hsiu and taking four thousand armored soldiers prisoner. Hsiao-kung continued the advance, and Hsien was terrified. He summoned the troops of the Chiang-nan region, but when they did not arrive, surrendered the next day. Ching entered their capital. His orders were quiet but strict, and the army did not loot [the city].
Some [of his generals] requested that Ching confiscate the family wealth of Hsien's generals who had opposed them in order to reward the army. Ching said: "The army of a True King has sympathy for the people and seizes the guilty. They were coerced into coming, so if we confiscate their wealth because the army opposed us-what they fundamentally did not wish to do-we make no allowance for the real rebels. Now that we have just settled Ching and Ying, we should display generosity and magnanimity in order to pacify their hearts. If they surrender and we confiscate their wealth, I am afraid that from Ching south, they will strengthen their walls and increase their emplacements. Forcing them into a desperate defense is not excellence in planning." He stopped their actions and did not confiscate their wealth. Because of this the line of cities between the Chiang and Han rivers competed with each other to submit.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 38