The T'ai-tsung said: "During the Spring and Autumn period, when Hsun Wu attacked the Ti, he abandoned his chariots to make infantry lines.64 Were they also orthodox troops? Or unorthodox troops?"
Li Ching said: "Hsun Wu used strategy for chariot warfare, that is all! Although he abandoned the chariots, his strategy is still found therein. One force acted as the left flank, one force acted as the right flank, and one resisted the enemy in the front. Dividing them into three units, this is one tactic for chariot warfare. Whether one thousand or ten thousand chariots, it would be the same. I observe that in Duke Ts'ao's Hsin shu it states: `Attack chariots [are accompanied by] seventy-five men. To the fore, to oppose the enemy, is one unit; to the left and right corners are two more units. The defense chariots65 have an additional unit. It consists of ten men to prepare the food, five to repair and maintain the equipment, five to care for the horses, and five to gather firewood and fetch water-altogether twenty-five men. For a pair of attack and defense chariots, altogether there are one hundred men.' If you mobilize one hundred thousand men, you would employ one thousand each of the light [attack] and heavy [defense] chariots. This is the general outline of Hsun Wu's old methods.
"Moreover, I observe that in the period from Han to Wei, army regulations had five chariots compose a platoon [tui], with a supervisor [to command them]. Ten chariots formed a regiment [shih],66 under a chief commandant. For one thousand chariots there were two men, a general and lieutenant general. If more chariots, the organization followed this pattern. If I examine it in comparison with our present methods, then our probing force is the [old] cavalry; our frontal assault troops are the [old] infantry and cavalry, half and half; and our holding force goes forth with combined chariot tactics.
"When I went to the west to rectify and punish the T'u-chueh, we crossed several thousand li of treacherous terrain. I never dared change this system, for the constraints and regulations of the ancients can truly be trusted."
The T'ai-tsung honored Ling-chou with an imperial visit. After he returned he summoned Li Ching and invited him to be seated. He said: "I ordered Tao-tsung, A-shih-na She-erh, and others to mount a campaign of rectification and punishment against Hsueh-Yen-t'o. Several groups among the T'ieh-le peoples requested the establishment of Han bureaucratic administration, and I acceded to all their requests. The Yen-t'o fled to the west, but I was afraid they would become a source of trouble to us, so I dispatched Li Chi to attack them. At present the northern regions are all at peace, but the various groups of barbarians and Han Chinese dwell intermingled with one another. What long-term method can we employ to settle and preserve them both?"
Li Ching said: "Your Majesty has ordered the establishment of sixty-six relay stations from the T'u-chueh to the Hui-ho [Uighers] to connect the forward observation posts. This step already implements the necessary measures. However, I foolishly believe it is appropriate for the Han [defensive] forces to have one method of training and the barbarians another. Since their instruction and training are separate, do not allow them to be intermixed and treated the same. If we encounter the incursion of some other group, then at that moment you can secretly order the generals to change their insignia and exchange their uniforms, and employ unorthodox methods to attack them."
The T'ai-tsung said: "For what reason?"
Li Ching said: "This is the technique referred to as `manifesting many methods to cause misperception.'67 If you have the barbarians appear as Han Chinese, and Han Chinese masquerade as barbarians, the [enemy] will not know the distinction between barbarians and Chinese. Then no one will be able to fathom our plans for attack and defense. One who excels at employing an army first strives not to be fathomable,68 for then the enemy will be confused wherever he goes."
The T'ai-tsung said: "This truly accords with my thoughts. You may go and secretly instruct our border generals that only through this difference between Han and barbarians can we manifest the methods of unorthodox and orthodox warfare."
Li Ching bowed twice and said: "Your thoughts are those of a Sage, they flow from Heaven! You hear one and you know ten. How can I fully explain it all!"
The T'ai-tsung said: "Chu-ko Liang said: `A well-organized army, [even] if commanded by an incompetent general, cannot be defeated. An army that lacks good order, [even if it] has a capable general, cannot be victorious.' I suspect that his discussion is not expressive of the highest principles."
Li Ching said: "This was something Marquis Wu [Chu-ko Liang] said to stimulate69 the troops. I observe that Sun-tzu said: `If the instructions and training are not enlightened, the officers and troops lack constant duties, and their deployment into formation is askew, it is termed chaotic.70 From antiquity the number of cases in which a chaotic army brought victory [to the enemy] can never be fully recorded!i71 As to `the instructions and leader- ship72 not being enlightened,' he was speaking about their instruction and inspection lacking the ancient methods. With regard to `the officers and troops lacking constant duties,' he was speaking about the generals and their subor dinates entrusted with authority [ch'uan] not having held their positions very long. When he refers to `a chaotic army inviting victory,' he was speaking about self-destruction and defeat, not about an enemy conquering them. For this reason Marquis Wu said that if the army is well organized and trained, even an ordinary general will not be defeated. If the troops themselves are in chaos, then even though the general is sagacious, they will be endangered. What doubt can there be?"
The T'ai-tsung said: "The instruction and training of the army truly cannot be slighted!"
Li Ching said: "When the training accords with method, then the officers take pleasure in being employed. When instructions do not accord with method, even though one supervises and upbraids them from morning to night, it is of no advantage. The reason I thoroughly investigated the ancient regulations and collated them with all diagrams was to realize as nearly as possible a well-regulated army."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Please select the ancient methods for formations on my behalf and diagram them all for me."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Barbarian armies only rely on their strong horses to rush forth to attack. Are they unorthodox forces? Han armies only rely on their strong crossbowmen to hamstring the enemy. Are they orthodox forces?"
Li Ching said: "According to Sun-tzu: `Those that excel in employing the army seek [victory] through the strategic configuration of power [shih], not through relying upon men. Therefore they are able to select men for positions and employ strategic power. 13 What is referred to as `selecting men' means engaging in battle in accord with the respective strengths of the barbarians and the Han. The barbarians are strong in the use of horses. Horses are an advantage in fast-moving fighting. Han troops are strong in the use of crossbows. Crossbows are an advantage in a slow-paced battle. In this each of them naturally relies upon their strategic power [ship], but they are not to be distinguished as unorthodox and orthodox. Previously, I discussed how the barbarians and Han units ought to change their insignia and exchange their uniforms, a technique in which the unorthodox and orthodox mutually give rise to each other. Horses also have orthodox tactics, crossbows also unorthodox employment. What constancy is there?"
The T'ai-tsung said: "My lord, discuss the technique again in detail."
Li Ching said: "First manifest a form and cause the enemy to follow it. This is the technique."
[T'ai-tsung:74 "I understand it now. Sun-tzu said: `For the army, the pinnacle of military deployment approaches the formless.' And `In accord with the enemy's disposition we impose measures upon the masses that produce victory, but the masses are unable to fathom them.i75 This is what is meant!"
Li Ching bowed twice. "Perfect indeed! Your Majesty's sagacious thoughts have already penetrated more than half of it!"]
The T'ai-tsung said: "Recently, the remnants of the Ch'i-tan [Khitan] and Hsi peoples have all submitted. I have determined that the two [tribal] commanders in chief of the Sung Mo and Jao Le regions will be united under
the An-pei Protectorate. I would like to employ Hsueh Wan-ch'e [as governor]. What do you think?"
Li Ching said: "Wan-ch'e is not as suitable as A-shih-na She-erh, Chih-shih Ssu-li, or Ch'i-pi Ho-li. They are all barbarian subjects who thoroughly understand military affairs. I once spoke with them about the mountains, rivers, and roads of the Sung Mo and Jao Le regions, as well as the submissive and rebellious barbarians as far out as the western regions where there are tens of peoples. In every detail they can be trusted. I taught them methods of deployment, and in all cases they nodded their heads and accepted my instructions. I hope you will entrust them with the responsibility without having any doubt. [Men] like Wan-ch'e are courageous but lack planning and would find it difficult to bear the responsibility alone."
The T'ai-tsung smiled and said: "These barbarians have all been well employed by you. The ancients said: `Using the Man and Ti to attack the Man and Ti is China's strategic power.'76 My lord has attained it."
The T'ai-tsung said: "I have looked through all the military books, but none surpasses Sun-tzu. In Sun-tzu's thirteen chapters there is nothing that surpasses the `vacuous' and `substantial."Now when employing the army, if one recognizes the strategic power [shih] of the vacuous and substantial, then he will always be victorious. Our contemporary generals are only able to talk about avoiding the substantial and attacking the vacuous. When they approach the enemy, few recognize the vacuous and substantial, probably because they are unable to compel the enemy [to come] to them, but on the contrary are compelled by the enemy. How can this be? My lord, please discuss the essentials of all these in detail with our generals."
Li Ching said: "Instructing them first about the techniques for changing the unorthodox [ch'i] and orthodox [cheng] into each other and afterward telling them about the form [hsing] of the vacuous and substantial would be possible. Many of the generals do not know how to take the unorthodox to be the orthodox, and the orthodox to be the unorthodox, so how can they recognize when the vacuous is substantial, and the substantial vacuous?"
The T'ai-tsung said: "[According to Sun-tzu:] `Make plans against them to know the likelihood for gain and loss.78 Stimulate them to know their patterns of movement and stopping. Determine their disposition [hsing] to know what terrain is tenable, what deadly. Probe them to know where they have an excess, where an insufficiency.'79 Accordingly, do the unorthodox and orthodox lie with me, while the vacuous and substantial lie with the enemy.>"
Li Ching said: "The unorthodox and orthodox are the means by which to bring about the vacuous and substantial in the enemy. If the enemy is substantial, then I must use the orthodox. If the enemy is vacuous, then I must use the unorthodox. If a general does not know the unorthodox and ortho dox, then even though he knows whether the enemy is vacuous or substantial, how can he bring it about?80 I respectfully accept your mandate but will [first] instruct all the generals in the unorthodox and orthodox, and afterward they will realize the vacuous and substantial by themselves."
The T'ai-tsung said: "If we take the unorthodox as the orthodox and the enemy realizes it is the unorthodox, then I will use the orthodox to attack him. If we take the orthodox as the unorthodox and the enemy thinks it is the orthodox, then I will use the unorthodox to attack him. I will cause the enemy's strategic power [shih] to constantly be vacuous, and my strategic power to always be substantial. If you teach the generals these methods, it should be easy to make them understand."
Li Ching said: "One thousand essays, ten thousand sections do not go beyond `compel others, do not be compelled by them.'S1 I ought to use this to teach all the generals."
The T'ai-tsung said: "I have established the Yao-ch'ih Supervisor in Chief subordinate to the An-hsi Protector-general. How shall we manage and deploy the Han [Chinese] and barbarian peoples in this area?"
Li Ching said: "When Heaven gave birth to men, originally there was no distinction of `barbarian' and `Han.' But their territory is distant, wild, and desert-like, and they must rely on archery and hunting to live. Thus they are constantly practicing fighting and warfare. If we are generous to them, show good faith, pacify them, and fully supply them with clothes and food, then they will all be men of the Han. As your Majesty has established this Protector-general, I request you gather in all the Han border troops and settle them in the interior. This will greatly reduce the provisions necessary to feed them, which is what military strategists refer to as the `method for governing strength.' But you should select Han officials who are thoroughly familiar with barbarian affairs, and you should disperse defensive fortifications [throughout the region]. This will be sufficient to manage the region for a long time. If we should encounter some emergency, Han troops can then go out there."
The T'ai-tsung said: "What did Sun-tzu say about governing strength?"
Li Ching said: "'With the near await the distant; with the rested await the fatigued; with the sated await the hungry.'"' This covers the main points. One who excels at employing the army extends these three into six: `With enticements await their coming. In quiescence await the impetuous. With the heavy await the light. With the strictly [disciplined] await the inattentive. With order await the turbulent. With defense await attacks.'S3 When conditions are contrary to these, your strength will be insufficient. Without techniques to govern [the expenditure of force], how can one direct the army?"
The T'ai-tsung said: "People who study Sun-tzu today only recite the empty words. Few grasp and extend his meaning. Methods for governing the expenditure of strength should be thoroughly expounded to all the generals."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Our old generals and aging troops are exhausted and nearly all dead. Our armies are newly deployed, so they have no experience in assuming formations against the enemy. If we want to instruct them, what should be most essential?"
Li Ching said: "I would instruct the soldiers by dividing their activities into three steps. [The men] must first be organized into squads according to the Method of Five. After this organization into squads of five is complete, provide them with [military organization] into armies and brigades.84 This is one step.
"The method for military organization into armies and brigades is to build from one to ten, from ten to one hundred .8' This is one step.
"Entrust them to the command of subordinate generals. The subordinate generals will unite all the platoons of a brigade. Assemble and instruct them with the diagrams for the dispositions. This is one step.
"The commanding general examines the instructions in each of these three steps and thereupon conducts maneuvers to test and evaluate their deployment into formation and their overall organization. He divides them into unorthodox [ch'i] and orthodox [cheng], binds the masses with an oath, and implements punishments. Your Majesty should observe them from on high, and all measures should be possible."
The T'ai-tsung said: "There are several schools of thought on the Method of Five. Whose is the most important?"
Li Ching said: "According to Master Tso's Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals: `First the battalion [of chariots], afterward the squads of five [in the gaps].,86 Moreover, the Ssu-ma Fa states: `Five men make up the squad of five.'S7 The Wei Liao-t'zu has [a section entitled] `Orders for Binding the Squads of Five.'88 Han military organization had the one-foot [wooden strip] for records and insignia [for the squads].89 In later ages the records and insignia were done on paper, whereupon they lost the organization.
"I have studied and contemplated their methods. From the squad of five men they changed to twenty-five. From twenty-five men they change to seventy-five, composed of seventy-two infantrymen and three armored officers. When they set aside chariots and employed cavalry, then twenty-five [infantry] men were equivalent to eight cavalrymen.90 This then was the organization of `five soldiers matching five.'91 Thus among the military methods of the various strategists, only the Method of Five is important. In the minimal arrangement there are five men, in the largest twenty-five. If the latter are tripled, they become seventy-five. Multiplied by
another level of five, one obtains three hundred and seventy-five. Three hundred men are orthodox forces, sixty are unorthodox [with the remaining fifteen being the armored shih]. In this case they can be further divided into two, forming two orthodox [companies] of one hundred and fifty men each, and two [unorthodox] platoons of thirty men, one for each flank. This is what the Ssu-ma Fa means by `five men composing the unit of five, with ten squads of five being a platoon,' which is relied upon until today. This is its essence."
The T'ai-tsung said: "I have discussed military strategy with Li Chi. For the most part he agrees with what you say, but Li Chi does not thoroughly understand its origin. From what techniques did the methods by which you established the `Six Flowers Formation' originate?"
Li Ching said: "I based them on Chu-ko Liang's Eight Formations. Large formations contain small formations; large encampments contain small en- campments.92 All the corners are interlocked, the curves and broken points correlated. The ancient system was like this, so I made the diagram in accord with it. Thus the outside is drawn to be square, but the inside environment is circular. They then become the `Six Flowers,' as commonly termed."
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 41