Abbreviations Used in the Notes
(See also the lists at the beginning of the notes to individual translations.)
General Introduction and Historical Background of the Classics
1. The Confucius (551-479 B.C.) of the Analects demands courage and resoluteness in the practice of righteousness and requires that his disciples always do what is appropriate. He cultivated the six arts, which included chariot driving and archery, and in other texts refers to the terrible visage of the righteous man when he dons his armor. He also indicated that the chun-tzu, or perfected man, does not compete, which was taken by later Confucians as evidence that conflict and warfare are inappropriate for civi lized men. Other early Confucians, such as Mencius (371-289 B.C.) and Hsiin-tzu (a Confucian of the late Warring States period who wrote extensively on military affairs), were cognizant of the inescapable necessity of wars and armies. Only after several centuries, as the Confucians became further removed from the pristine spirit of their founder and the realities of the early context, did the tendency toward pacificism, or (perhaps more correctly) the civil, emerge and gain ascendancy. This is a complex topic that requires an extensive separate analytic work.
2. The dates assigned to the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods vary somewhat depending on the writer's predelictions. The Ch'un ch'iu, or Spring and Autumn Annals, which chronicles events from 722 to 481 B.C., was traditionally held to have been edited didactically by Confucius and was one of the essential Five Classics. (Confucius no doubt used the work for educational purposes and may have emended it to some extent, but he cannot be considered the compiler or editor in any real sense.) The Tso chuan, purportedly a commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals but in actuality a self-existent work that portrays the period in considerable detail, covers the years 722 to 468 B.C. (or 464 B.C.; opinion seems to vary). The Intrigues of the Warring States contains some material from the early fifth century B.C., but it basically records the people and events of the period 403-221 B.C., when the Ch'in officially assumed the mantle of imperial rule. Thus the Spring and Autumn period should refer to 722 to 481 B.C. and the Warring States era to 403-221 B.C., traditional dates that are adopted herein. However, there is also considerable logic to dating the Spring and Autumn period from the movement of the Western Chou capital to the east in 771 B.C. and extending the Warring States period to cover the interval between the end of the Tso chuan material and 403 B.C. This gives dates such as those Herrlee G. Creel (The Origins of Statecraft in China, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, p. 47) adopts: 770-464 and 463-222 B.C.
3. Lord Shang (died 338 B.c.), although much reviled by Confucian tradition, had great impact in reforming the laws and institutions of the state of Ch'in. Among his important contributions were imposing stringent laws; advocating and implementing a severe but certain system of rewards and punishments; restricting the conferring of rank to military achievements; organizing the entire populace as well as the military into groups of five and ten, thereby creating a dual-purpose, mutual guarantee system that facilitated immediate conscription; and eliminating the boundary paths between fields, making land a salable commodity. (Some of these reforms may have had antecedents, including those involving the military. For example, see Fu Shao-chieh, Wutzu chin-chu chin-i, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1976, p. 17.) The remnants of Lord Shang's book have been translated by J.J.L. Duyvendak as The Book of Lord Shang (Arthur Probsthain, London, 1928; reprint, University of Chicago Press, 1963).
4. Han Fei-tzu (died 233 B.C.), a famous Legalist and former disciple of Hsun-tzu (298-238 B.C.), left an extensive treatise, which has been translated in full by W. K. Liao (The Complete Works of Han Fei-tzu, 2 vols., A. Probsthain, London, 1959 [reprint of 1939 edition] ), and as selections by Burton Watson (Han Fei-tzu: Basic Writings, Columbia University Press, New York, 1964.)
S. "Virtue," although encompassing the basic meaning of moral virtue, was the object of much complex thought in ancient China and came to have numerous nuances and technical meanings, including "power" and "potency." Some of these are discussed briefly in the footnotes to the translations. In general, "Virtue" (capitalized) is used to translate the term to whenever the transcendent dimensions are critical-when the cultivation of to (virtue) leads to Virtue, which is synonymous with moral achievement and the inner power that accompanies it. Within the context of Taoist texts and to a certain extent military writings influenced by them, the term to indicates inner potency or power-generally as contrasted with and distinguished from the moral and ethical realm because the artificial constraints of rites, morals, and ethics were anathema to most Taoist-oriented thinkers (neo-Taoism and eclectic works excepted). A specialized body of literature has developed in recent years, due partly to the discovery of previously unknown manuscripts; these writings offer various conceptualizations and systematizations under the rubric of "Huang-Lao" thought, although there is by no means universal accord that these trends constitute a school or an affiliation. Specialists are no doubt aware of them, but the general reader may find Arthur Waley's classic comments on the term to in his introduction to The Way and Its Power (Grove Press, New York, 1958), or D. C. Lau's thoughts in his translation of the Tao Te Ching (The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1982) of interest. (Also see the notes to the translator's introduction to the Art of War translation in the present volume, especially number 24, for further discussion and sources, and Aar Vervoorn's article "Taoism, Legalism, and the Quest for Order in Warring States China," JCP, Vol. 8, No. 3 [September 1981], pp. 303-324.)
Throughout we translate to as "virtue" when it refers to morals and ethics and as "Virtue" when it connotes the attainment of a special status-with inherent powerthrough the cultivation of virtue, which is not unlike the original meaning of virtus. The questions of its transcendent dimensions, relationship to potency, and metaphysical realization in warfare command must be left to another book and the studies of experts.
6. Every "civilized" dynasty, including the Shang, appears to have exploited "bar- barian"-defined by reference to the dynasty's own self-perceived level of civilization-peoples against other, similar peoples. In many cases they were even settled in the frontier regions, just within state borders, and shouldered the burden of dynastic defense. However, this first appeared as an articulated policy in the Han era and was symptomatic of the steppe-sedentary conflict. Discussions may be found in Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (Beacon Press, Boston, 1962); Yu Ying- shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967); and Sechin Jagchid and Van Jay Symons, Peace, War, and Trade Along the Great Wall (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1989).
7. This discussion of the Shang is based on standard Western texts and monographs, such as Kwang-chih Chang's Shang Civilization (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980) and Cheng Te-k'un's Shang China (Heffer, Cambridge, 1960), supplemented by the normal range of articles from specialist journals, such as Early China and Wen wu. They are listed in the bibliography under the sections for historical materials.
8. A major point of contention is whether slaves were used solely for domestic work and perhaps occasional agricultural activities or whether the entire Shang edifice was based on the systematic use and exploitation of a slave class of agricultural workers. Depending on whether a Marxist or another synthetic framework is employed, the evidence is defined and interpreted differently. However, it appears that enslaved prisoners and their descendants were found largely in domestic work rather than agriculture.
9. In the Shang and Chou dynasties, the presence of the lineage's ancestral temple virtually constituted the defining feature of a capital city. Naturally, various deities, spirits, and animistic forces were also worshipped, depending on the period, state, and beliefs of the time. The ruler's ancestral temple always played a critical role in prewar discussions and in prebattle ceremonies, as is evident in the Seven Military Classics.
10. In the past decade a number of lengthy, minut
ely detailed articles based on historical records, recently recovered bronze inscriptions, calendrical reconstructions, and celestial phenomena have discussed the probable date for Chou's conquest of the Shang. The traditionally held date of 1122 B.C. proposed by the Han dynasty scholar Liu Hsin has been invalidated emphatically by David Pankenier's proof that the rare five-planet conjunction recorded in the Bamboo Annals actually occurred on May 28, 1059 B.C. (See David W. Pankenier, "Astronomical Dates in Shang and Western Zhou," EC 7 [1981-1982], pp. 2-5.) Various other dates previously proposed-such as 1111, 1075 (T'ang Lan), 1027, 1025, and 1023 (Bernhard Karlgren)-have also been discarded. Current arguments, based on essentially the same evidence-including the critical five-planet conjunction-variously supplemented or interpreted, produce three theories: Pankenier's January 20, 1046 B.C. (Pankenier, "Astronomical Dates," p. 2-37, in particular p. 16); David S. Nivison's January 15, 1045 B.C. (originally proposed in his article "The Dates of Western Chou," HJAS, Vol. 43, No. 2 [December 1983], pp. 481-580), and 1040 (according to his note revising the JAS article published almost simultaneously in Early China [EC 8 (1982-1983), pp. 76-78]); and Edward Shaughnessy, who supports Nivison's first date of January 15, 1045 (see "'New' Evidence on the Zhou Conquest," EC 6 [1980-1981], pp. 57-79, and "The `Current' Bamboo Annals and the Date of the Zhou Conquest of Shang," EC 11-12 [1985-1987], pp. 33-60, especially p. 45). Chou Fa-kao also supports the 1045 date in a Chinese review article ("Wu Wang k'e Shang to nien-tai wen-t'i," in Li-shih Yu-yen Yen-chiu-so chi-k'an [BIHP], Vol. 56, No. 1 [1985], Taipei, pp. 5-41). Because 1045 B.C. appears well-founded, it is adopted herein. However, for further discussions, see Chang, Shang Civilization, pp. 15-19; Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, pp. 487-491, who suggests accepting the traditional date of 1122 B.C. even though acknowledging it may be inaccurate; Tung Tso-pin, "Hsi-Chou nien-li-p'u," BIHP 23 (1951), pp. 681-760; Ch'u Wan-li, "Hsi-Chou shih-shih kai-shu," BIHP 42 (1971), pp. 775-802; Jung Men-yuan, "Shih-t'an Hsi-Chou chi-nien," Chung-hua wen-shih lun-ts'ung 1 (1980), pp. 16-20; Ho Yu-ch'i, "Chou Wu-wang fa-Chou to nien-tai went'i," Chung-shan Ta-hsueh hsueh-pao 1 (1981), pp. 64-70; and Edward L. Shaughnessy, "On the Authenticity of the Bamboo Annals," HJAS, Vol. 46, No. 1 (June 1986), pp. 149-180.
11. The casting of massive ritual cauldrons, some weighing several hundred pounds, and the production of bronze weapons required hundreds of skilled artisans engaged in coordinated activity.
12. It is well-known that in the plains area of central China-the locus of the Shang dynasty-the soft yellowish earth can easily be dug with a sharpened wooden stick or other nonmetallic object. Naturally, agricultural efficiency improves with metal plows and hoes, but they were not essential and were rarely, if ever, used in the Shang era. (See Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 223; Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, pp. 75 and 353; and T. R. Treger, A Geography of China, Aldine, Chicago, 1965, pp. 5051.) A contrary view is taken by the traditionalist Ch'en Liang-tso in a lengthy, detailed review of the archaeological evidence. He concludes that the Shang already had bronze agricultural implements, which were used concurrently with those made of inexpensive materials such as stone and bone. Moreover, in his view, these implements were employed extensively throughout the Chou period until they were finally displaced by iron in the Warring States era. (See Ch'en Liang-tso, "Wo-kuo ku-tai to ch'ing-t'ung nung-chii," Han-hsueh yen-chin, Vol. 2, No. 1 [June 1984], pp. 135-166, and Vol. 2, No. 2 [December 1984], pp. 363-402.)
13. Rice, which requires wet cultivation, originated in the south and was little grown in Shang central areas. (For general discussions of agriculture in China, see Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 6, Part 2, Agriculture [by Francesca Bray], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984; Kwang-chih Chang, eds., Food in Chinese Culture, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977; and E. N. Anderson, The Food of China, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988.)
14. The enormous numbers of animals used in the almost continuous sacrifices, which went to feed the priestly caste and the nobility, is cited as evidence that cattle and other animals must have been raised. Cf. Chang, Shang Civilization, pp. 142-145, 230.
15. See ibid., pp. 195-196. The king's wives are also recorded as having commanded troops and as having personal forces.
16. Cf. Cheng Te-k'un, Shang China, pp. 208-212; Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 249. The total number in the army during wartime is sometimes estimated at thirty thousand (Cheng, Shang China, p. 210), which would be many measures smaller than the number of troops reported as having engaged in the battle of Mu-yeh. This suggests that the more limited figures apply only to the early to middle Shang era-perhaps with significant expansion later-as well as overstatement.
17. See Fan Yuzhou, "Military Campaign Inscriptions from YH 127," BSOAS, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1989) pp. 533-548; and David N. Keightley, who cites the extensive nature of the king's travels in "The Late Shang State," in The Origins of Chinese Civilization, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983, pp. 552-555.
18. A later term, the Three Armies (san chun), was used constantly to refer to a campaign army. Whether it originates with these three divisions (san shih) or was simply an organizational creation (such as for upper, middle, and lower) is not clear. (Cf. Chin Hsiang-heng, "Ts'ung chia-ku pu-ts'u yen-chiu Yin Shang chun-lu-chung chih wangtsu san-hsing san-shih," Chung-kuo wen-tzu 52 [1974], pp. 1-26; and the material on military organization in Appendix E.)
19. A basic distinction in the Shang and Early Chou was made between the people who dwelled within the kuo, the "state," and those who lived outside it. At this time a state was essentially a city fortified by surrounding walls, with the privileged class residing within its protective confines. The city dwellers furnished the warriors, whereas those outside the walls were not required to serve or were merely conscripted as menial support (if they were not alien peoples under the control of the kuo). This distinction declined as the scope of warfare eventually expanded in the Spring and Autumn period. (See, for example, Hsu Hsi-ch'en, "Chou-tai ping-chih ch'u-lun," Chung-kuoshih yen-chiu 4 [1985], pp. 4-5.)
20. On warfare objectives, see Yang Hung, Chung-kuo ku-ping-ch'i lun-ts'ung, Ming-wen shu-chu, Taipei, 1983, p. 8. Although agriculturally based and accordingly prosperous, the Shang ruling house required vast riches to distribute to the nobility, whether directly or indirectly (through allowing them to retain the plunders of war). Because the Shang domain was extensive and the nobility counted in the ten of thousands of families, it was rather voracious. For example, in one battle the Shang reportedly took thirty thousand prisoners (see Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 194).
21. Among the peoples particularly chosen for sacrifice were the Ch'iang, from whose Chiang clan many of the principal wives of the Chou royalty came. The T'ai Kung, adviser to Kings Wen and Wu of the Chou, was also of Ch'iang origin. It seems possible that the Shang's enmity toward the Ch'iang drove them to an alliance with the Chou, although this is not known. See E. G. Pulleyblank, "The Chinese and Their Neighbors in Prehistoric and Early Historic Times," in The Origins of Chinese Civilization, pp. 420-421; Chang, Shang Civilization, p. 249.
22. In the Shang and probably the Early Chou, weapons were generally stored in government armories and were distributed only when required for military campaigns. (See Yen I-p'ing, "Yin Shang ping-chih," Chung-kuo wen-tzu, NS 7 [1983], p. 39.) This reflected the considerable cost of weapons and diffused any threat of an armed political revolt against the ruling family. Furthermore, because of the cost factor, some researchers believe conscripted infantrymen were generally not furnished with serious weapons until the infantry grew in significance and less expensive iron weapons became available. (For example, see Chung-kuo chun-shih-shih Pien-hsieh- tsu, Chung-kuo chun-ship-ship, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1988, p. 2.)
23. The dagger-ax derives its name from the dagger-like blade horizontally affixed near the top of a long wooden shaft, but it is primarily a hooking weapon. Wounds are inflicted by swinging down and pulling forward, with the
curved knife-like blade cutting in and hooking the enemy (rather than delivering a crushing, chopping blow directly into the soldier as an ax blade would. The ancients also had axes, but their role seems to have been limited and perhaps largely ceremonial.) See Chou Wei, Chungkuo ping-ch'i shih-kao, Ming-wen shu-chu, Taipei, 1980, pp. 64-88; Hayashi Minao, Chugoku In-shu jidai no buki, Kyoto Daigaku Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyusho, Kyoto, 1972, pp. 3-96; Lao Kan, "Chan-kuo shih-tai to chan-cheng fang-fa," BIHP 37 (1967), pp. 53-57; and Shih Chang-ju, "Hsiao-t'un Yin-tai to ch'eng-t'ao ping-ch'i," BIHP 22 (1950), pp. 59-65. A number of specialized articles have discussed this indigenous weapon, including Ma Heng, "Ko chi chih yen-chiu," Yenching hsueh-pao, No. 5 (1929), pp. 745-753; Kuo Pao-chun, "Ko chi yQ-lun," BIHP, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1935), pp. 313-326; and Li Chi, "Yu-pei ch'u-t'u ch'ing-t'ung kou-ping fen-lei t'u-chieh," BIHP 22 (1950), pp. 1-31.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 46