11. Such as dikes and irrigation ditches, both of which would have required extensive, onerous labor service and if damaged would have seriously impoverished the people.
12. They constrained the feudal lords with territorial boundaries (as well as by location), thereby limiting their resources and power.
13. Literally, "profits." The Legalists emphasized the motivational power of profits, whereas Confucians such as Mencius vociferously disdained them.
14. Fragment N. 24, SMF CS, pp. 122-123, also states that one mobilizes to attack the unrighteous-defining the latter as those who violate the proper order in laws, disregard the rites, and offend the hierarchy under Heaven.
15. The ruler should actively study the traces of the Former Sages with a view to employing them himself. This is the classical Confucian view subsequently denounced by the Legalists.
16. The cryptic text states that "state deportment did not enter the military; military deportment did not enter the state." In antiquity, as discussed in the general introduction, "states" consisted basically of walled cities that encompassed the ruler, his family members, other members of the feudal nobility, and the artisans. The fields were normally outside the walled city, and state affairs were administered from within the city. However, as several books and articles have pointed out, in the Shang and early Chou states, rulers-including the king and the local feudal lords-governed and participated in military and civil affairs equally. Accordingly, the reference to "within the state" should be taken as "within the court," within the administrative center. The military would be mobilized for campaigns outside the state (unless the city itself were un der siege). Thus the form, spirit, behavior, deportment, and so forth appropriate to one realm would not be found in the other. (This passage is repeated later in the chapter.)
17. Although the word translated as talents is ch'i, it is unlikely to refer to Confucius's famous dictum that "a gentleman is not a utensil (ch'i)."
18. Although several commentators understand this as referring to lawsuits, it hardly seems necessary to so restrict it-particularly in an age when there were very few "lawsuits" and they constituted only a minor element in state affairs. (Epigraphic materials indicate, however, that disputes were reasonably common.)
19. Rather than base decisions on adherence to some other virtue.
20. Execution could take many forms, some more painful and terrifying than others. In later ages execution came to involve the extermination of family members as well.
21. Because their objective was benevolent and their actions would be restrained to accord with the aim of simply punishing the evil, their behavior would be consistent with their teachings, and their teachings could again be taught after the victory without any inconsistency. (The major restraints are discussed in Chapter 1, in the paragraph containing note 11.)
22. Because they had no need to employ their weapons, the "five weapons" did not have to be deployed in effective fighting combinations.
23. As Liu Yin points out (SMF WCCS, 20B), this discussion focuses solely on the predominant strength of each dynasty. Obviously, the earlier dynasties were also forced to employ military strength to subjugate their enemies.
24. As Robin D.S. Yates has pointed out, the character wei cannot be construed to mean "attack" even though the passage seems to require it. The long weapons are described here as protecting the men wielding shorter ones and the shorter weapons as defending those wielding longer ones. However, in chariot warfare-the presumed basis of this text-charioteers attack with long weapons and rely on short weapons for defense only when engaged in close quarters.
25. The basis for these names, if in fact they are accurate, is lost in the mists of time. The commentators offer various obscure explanations, but none seems satisfactory. Our translation of the names is speculative. Specialists may consult the various commentators: SMF WCCS, 31A-32B; SMF CCCY, pp. 41-42; SMF CS, p. 51, and also the fragment on p. 102; SMF WCHC, 3:21-22.
26. The insignia were placed on flags and worn as emblems by the soldiers in addition to their other emblems of rank. Other discussions are found in the Six Secret Teachings and the Wei Liao-tzu. Fragment No. 4, SMF CS, p. 103, also discusses the choice of weapons, with their colors and significance.
27. The term means "army," or military in general, but may also mean an "army on the move," or campaign army, as throughout this passage.
28. This repeats and expands the second passage of the chapter (refer to note 16 above).
29. Acts of goodness should not go unnoticed; therefore, they sought to learn of them.
30. Kingdoms were extremely limited, so the king could personally observe those serving border duty during his tours of inspection. (Liu Yin understands the sentence as referring to the king rather than to superiors in general. Cf. SMF WCCS, 27B.)
31. Such as the "Ta K'ai" mentioned in the first chapter.
32. The Spirit Terrace was supposedly first erected by King Wen of the Chou dynasty. Beneath it he greeted the triumphant army and welcomed those returning from border and other service. Thus it was associated with welcoming men back from labors, military or otherwise. (Another tradition holds that the tower allowed the king to look out over the four quarters and observe the conditions of the people. Cf. Liu Yin's notes, SMF WCCS, 27B; and SMF CCCY, p. 56.)
In general, terraces were an anathema to the people in antiquity, enslaving their labor without providing them with any visible benefit or enjoyment. They therefore symbolized the ruler's conspicuous consumption and generally became focal objects for hatred. For example, in his famous interview with King Hui of Liang, Mencius develops his theme of sharing wealth with the people around a reference to King Wen's ponds and terraces (IA2).
33. Some commentators take these as mendicant persuaders, whose ideas and talents could also be drawn on to develop policies and strategies (cf. SMF WCCS, 28B). However, persuaders or sophists did not really appear until the rise of social mobility toward the end of the Spring and Autumn period. The Spring and Autumn conflicts disenfranchised many members of the nobility, creating a class of stateless wanderers with a wide array of talents-martial, technical, and administrative.
34. The ruler should enquire about the people's hatreds to ensure they are directed toward the enemy, not toward annoying policies in government.
35. A phrase or two appears to be missing from the text. One other possible translation is: "If advancing and withdrawing are without doubt, [it is because plans have been settled]. If [the commander] sees the enemy and lacks plans, then listen to his case and punish him" (following Liu Yin, SMF WCCS, 38A). Another possibility would be: "When advancing and withdrawing are without doubt, one can make plans when the enemy is seen." However, because creating false impressions is a cornerstone of Chinese military thought, we prefer the translation given in the text.
36. Liu Yin understands this as referring to the enemy, preventing them from advancing, which seems doubtful (SMF WCCS, 38B).
37. This appears to be a disconnected fragment discussing techniques similar to those found in the Six Secret Teachings.
38. It is unclear who should not forget it-the ruler, superiors, people in general, or the person who performed the action.
39. Some commentators take this as referring to policies rather than individuals.
40. The chapter takes its title from the first line; however, the main theme is controlling the spirit (ch'i) of the men.
41. Liu Yin understands this as "establish officers for the companies and squads" (SMF WCCS, 43A).
42. This appears to mean the number of paces between each man in both the rows and files, such as four paces horizontally and five vertically. However, it may also be understood as establishing the direction of their movement (cf. SMF WCCS, 43A; SMF CS, p. 78; SMF CCCY, p. 98).
43. The translation of this and several subsequent sentences is extremely tentative due to the apparently corrupt state of the text. In the context of what follows, some commentators suggest this line de
scribes the performance of military courtesies, even though the Ssu-ma Fa generally emphasizes the inappropriateness of such behavior in the military realm (cf. SMF WCHC, p. 148). However, in our opinion it describes the postures or methods of advancing for the two different types of fighting formations. Crouching down and advancing by crawling would minimize exposure to projectiles (cf. Ping-fa, p. 52). The remainder of the passage would then describe additional drills to be implemented under conditions of fear and terror.
44. When the enemy first appears, the men are distant and appear insignificant. Plans to contain and defeat them are formulated; accordingly, the soldiers are not afraid. When the enemy is engaged the men should focus on fighting, on their roles and duty, not on looking at the enemy's army (cf. SMF WCHC, p. 149).
45. The translation generally follows the suggestions of Liu Chung-p'ing, SMF CCCY, pp. 99-100. However, it could also be translated as "the squad leaders deploy the men to the left and right; all below the commander wearing armor sit; the oath is sworn; and then the army is slowly advanced." (Cf. Liu Yin's comments, SMF WCCS, 43B-44A; and SMF CS, p. 78.)
46. This may also be understood as everyone, from those holding rank down through the infantrymen, wears armor. However, a distinction was just made in the previous sentence between those wearing armor who are ordered to sit and apparently those who are not. The latter may be confined to support personnel, but presumably they would not be involved in the actual combat. The question revolves on to what period the passage refers-Early Chou, when armies were small and consisted of nobility, or later in the Spring and Autumn or Warring States periods, when infantry had become the major component and the troops all wore armor.
47. One commentary in the SMF WCHC suggests that the severity of military law requires these actions, but then the commander can relax the discipline, putting the men at ease. This would allow him to manipulate their spirit prior to battle, when they were struck with terror. By performing these exercises, these rites, the commander could wrest control of their emotions (cf. SMF WCHC, p. 149 [3:57A] ).
48. Understanding "tu'i" as push back, withdraw, after performing the li (cf. SMF WCHC, p. 149 [3:57]).
49. Personal leadership was thought to be the key to commanding the troops.
50. Presumably, this would include not only family and state but also the remission of their offenses-such as attempted desertion-if they performed valiantly in battle.
51. Or "soldiers become stalwart through the weight of their armor."
52. As the commentators note, this passage appears to be missing characters. The first two lines of the paragraph, however, become an extremely well-known axiom in the martial arts.
Some of the commentators assert that this principle of the fearful mind refers to the soldiers' fear of their commander. In the Seven Military Classics the thought is frequently expressed that if the troops fear their commander more than they fear the enemy, they will advance into battle. Therefore, the commander's duty is to ensure that this fearful mind is exploited so that the advantage of so preying on it-fighting the enemy-will be the same as the advantage of seeing only victory.
53. Literally, "if with the light one advances light." The understanding of territory as light or heavy appears to have been common to the period, and Sun-tzu devotes considerable space to such tactical considerations. However, an alternative is to simply read the passage as a comparison of force (cf. Ping-fa, p. 52): "If you advance with a light force against a light enemy, you will be endangered. If you advance with a heavy force against a heavy enemy, you will accomplish nothing. If you advance with a light force against a heavy enemy, you will be defeated. If you advance with a heavy force against a light enemy, you will be successful. Thus in warfare the light and heavy are mutually related." It is also possible to consider the passage as discussing methods for employing the forces, such as the light in a light fashion, but this seems less likely.
54. That is, maintain vigilance; do not simply cast aside weapons and armor while resting.
55. Following Liu Yin, SMF WCCS, 47B. However, the text simply says "the light will be heavy," perhaps referring to the army's power.
56. A dictum that several commentators note is rather impractical. The commander would have to manipulate the men into developing the spirit for victory and discern ways to take advantage of the conditions of season and weather.
57. In an earlier passage, the same wording indicated confinement as a measure of discipline. This raises questions about the meaning of both paragraphs.
58. The foundation would be benevolence, civil measures; the ends would be the exercise of righteousness, the martial, force.
59. Liu Yin, writing during the Ming dynasty, understands the horses as referring to cavalry. However, this is unlikely if the text was composed prior to 300 B.c. and is describing earlier conditions of warfare (cf. SMF WCCS, 49B).
60. Drums for the head apparently referred to drums that direct the attention of the troops (and therefore their movements) in one direction or another.
61. Drums for the feet would no doubt have indicated the beat or speed of advancing.
62. The various editions record a critical difference in one character, which changes the understanding of the entire passage. The translation follows the reading of chi, "already" victorious, rather than juo, "whether" victorious. The import of the second reading would carry throughout, translating as "if one may be victorious or not; if one cannot speak about the sharpness of the weapons; cannot speak about the sturdiness of the armor; cannot speak about the sturdiness of the chariots; nor speak about the quality of the horses; nor can the masses take themselves to be many, then the Tao has not yet been attained." (Cf. SMF WCHC, p. 154 [3:67]; SMF WCCS, 50B [where Liu Yin's commentary indicates the character was originally "already"]; SMF CCCY, pp. 117118.)
63. Here the Tao refers to the ultimate objective of pacifying the realm, gaining final victory. Understanding as in note 62, the Tao would then refer to the Tao of Warfare, the realization of a victorious army.
64. Liu Yin indicates that this refers to the upper ranks, but it need not be so restricted (cf. SMF WCCS, 52A).
65. Some of the modern Chinese translators believe this sentence refers to assuming a defensive position. However, the context does not so delimit it, and in fact the text just below discusses harassing the enemy with a small force (cf. SMF CS, p. 92).
66. "Unorthodox" tactics (ch'i) are not specifically mentioned in the Ssu-ma Fa, although there are references to using craft and subterfuge in the fragments (cf. No. 31, SMF CS, p. 127) and a few brief discussions of unusual tactics applicable to special circumstances. The concept of the orthodox/unorthodox received its greatest theoretical expression in Sun-tzu's Art of War and was refined and expanded thereafter.
67. See fragment No. 30, which is similar (SMF CS, pp. 126-127).
68. To avoid forcing them onto desperate ground, another concept common to Sun-tzu. Note fragment No. 49, SMF CS, pp. 134-135, which advises not pursuing or pressing an enemy too severely.
69. This may also mean "attack their confusion" or "add to their confusion."
70. The Ming commentator Liu Yin believes the character "avoid"should be understood as "prepare." However, there is no need nor justification for this view. The enemy fails to recognize danger or miscalculates its own strength and thus does not avoid fatal situations (cf. SMF WCHC, p. 158).
71. Some editions have the character pu-"not"-instead of yu-"at" or "on." Consequently, their commentators read the sentence as "If the enemy stops or deviates from the road, be wary!" (Cf. SMF CCCY, pp. 132-133.)
Sun-tzu's Art of War
Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Books
Notes to the Translator's Introduction
1. For a basic history of the text, including its influence in Japan, see the introduction and appendixes to Samuel B. Griffith's translation (cited in note 3, below). Over the centuries there have been numerous Japanese translations of varying quality, in cluding both s
cholarly renditions and extremely simplified popular editions-even comic book versions-in this century. Although several have been consulted for our translation, they will be noted only where they differ significantly from the traditional Chinese texts.
2. Lionel Giles, tr.,Sun-tzu on the Art of War, Luzac and Co., London, 1910.
3. Samuel B. Griffith, The Art of War, Oxford University Press, London, 1963. Griffith also supplements the translated text with selected materials from the most important commentaries.
4. For example, Thomas Cleary's The Art of War, Shambhala Publications, Inc., Boston, 1988. The introduction contains a discussion of the Art of War as a Taoist book, and the translation incorporates extensive quotations from the commentaries.
S. For example, see Ch'i Ssu-ho, in Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, 3 vols., (Cheng Liangshu, ed.), Hsiieh-sheng shu-chu, Taipei, 1984, pp. 1599, 1602-1603. Subsequent historical events and later concepts are both noted within the Art of War. The former include references to Su Ch'in, and the development of the five phase theory (as now explicated by the Lin-1 text entitled "The Yellow Emperor Conquers the Red Emperor")-which is necessary to understand one passage-should be counted among the latter. (See Li Ling in Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1606-1607. Also see Ch'u Wan-li, Hsien-Ch'in wen-ship tzu-liao k'ao-pien, Lien-ching, Taipei, 1983, pp. 433-435; and Chang Hsin-ch'eng, ed., Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, 2 vols., Shang-wu yin-shu- kuan, Taipei, 1970 [reprint of 1939 edition], Vol. 2, pp. 797-801.) Other examples are cited in the notes to the translation.
6. For example, see Li Ling in Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1614-1617; Ch'i Ssu-ho in Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1598-1599; and Chang Hsin-ch'eng, Wei-shu t'ungk'ao, Vol. 2, pp. 797-800. The absence of Sun Wu's name and accomplishments from the Tso chuan, which is well noted for portraying Wu's events in comparative detail, is considered fatal to any claim of historicity. However, a few scholars argue that many persons and events pivotal to the history of various minor states went unrecorded, so the absence of Sun-tzu's name should not be considered remarkable.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 53