30. A terse, enigmatic text of approximately 360 characters associated with the legendary Yellow Emperor and also attributed to Feng Hou, his minister. A book with this title is preserved in several collections, generally with commentary by the Han scholar Kung-sun Hung. Although ascribed to the Yellow Emperor, it clearly postdates Suntzu, even employing some phrases from the Art of War and perhaps originates late in the Warring States period. Ma Lung, who is highly regarded by Li Ching and the T'aitsung and who appears on the first page of this chapter, is also noted as having written a commentary for it. (Note that there are some minor differences between the extant text and the portions quoted in Questions and Replies. Editions are found in the Pai- pu ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng from I-wen in Taipei and in a recent paperback from Shanghai ku-chi.)
31. The Chinese character for unorthodox-normally pronounced ch'i-has a less common second pronunciation-chi-when it refers to a "remainder" or "excess." This second meaning and associated pronunciation are the basis for Li Ching's explanation.
32. Chi (Karlgren, GSR 547C) is perhaps best understood as "motive force," "spring of change," "subtle change," "moment," or "impulse"-perhaps derived from the meaning of chi (GSR, 547A, the same character without the wood radical, glossed as "small, first signs") in Chuang-tzu. Although it is generally understood by the commentators as referring to "opportunity," this seems to be a derived meaning. Sun-tzu consistently speaks about change, both the changes that a commander should effect and those found in the evolving battlefield situation. The commander needs to grasp such changes as they develop, thereby converting them into "opportunities" that can be exploited. (Cf. LWK CC, pp. 12-13; LWK CCCY, pp. 87-91; LWK WCCS, 1: 16B- 17B; and TLWT WCHC, 4:15-16.)
33. "Remaining forces," yu chi, the second character being the character for "unorthodox" in the alternate pronunciation.
34. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 9, "Maneuvering the Army."
35. Essentially identical to a statement in Art of War, Chapter 1, "Initial Estimations."
36. Ibid., Chapter 8, "Nine Changes" (cf. note 114 to the Art of War translation). This dictum is not confined to Sun-tzu.
37. Literally, "grasps."
38. "Tui," translated as "platoon," a term the Classic of Grasping Subtle Change and Li Ching both use to designate a body of men. Although in most contexts it indicates a specific, small number, in some instances it stands as a more general reference to a "force" or "group." From the Warring States period on, it consisted of fifty (frequently specialized) infantrymen, which was also its strength as a fundamental organizational unit in the T'ang military system.
39. The overall orientation, which is both flexible and indeterminate, can be defined at will. Accordingly, "the front can be taken as the rear, the rear taken as the front." One commentator suggests that facing south would be the "normal" orientation, with the north then being the rear (TLWT WCHC, 4:17B).
40. Liu Yin states that any of the four unorthodox or four orthodox formations can be the head. Similarly, any of the nine formations (deployed throughout the matrix)including the general's in the center-can be the focus of an enemy attack, and the remaining eight will respond, thereby constituting the tails (LWK WCCS, 1:19). This differs from the orientation of the entire formation, which is normally determined by the direction of its forward movement, and pertains instead to conditions of engagement.
An alternative explanation identifies the "four heads" as being the outer positions on the horizontal and vertical axes (or roads) that are formed by the four lines (cf. TLWT WCHC, 4:17).
41. "Five" refers to the main horizontal and vertical directions or axes in the "well" configuration (front, rear, left, and right) supplemented by the "center." The forces de ployed in the outer boxes formed by the parallel lines defining the axes can be dispersed to fully occupy all eight outer positions. Thus formations occupying "five" positions can effectively cover all "eight" outer positions (Cf. LWK CC, pp. 8-12, 15; LWK CCCY, p. 92; TLWT WCHC, 4:17B-18A.) Note that the overall formation as well as contiguous positions react like the shuaijan in Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 11, "Nine Terrains,"
42. A legendary administrative system to organize the people and promote agriculture-one of several variants found in or attributed to antiquity. The Chinese character for "well" (ching) resembles a tic-tac-toe board, with a slight outward curve in the downward left leg. (For further discussion, for example, see Li Chia-shu, "Ts'ung Shihching k'an Hsi-Chou mo-nien i-ch'i Ch-un-ch'iu chung-yeh ch'i-chien-fen feng-chih, tsung-fa-chih, ching-t'ien-chih tung-yao," Chung-kuo wen-hua yen-chiu-so hsuehpao 19 [1988], pp. 191-216.)
43. Entire volumes have been written about this and similar formations, with extensive disagreement about their use (cf. Chung-kuo chun-shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, pp. 67-78, for some examples). However, in this case it appears the four corners were left open, with the army's forces filling the middle positions horizontally and vertically as well as the middle. However, the middle is not counted as being "filled" (as discussed in the text immediately following) because these are "excess" or "unorthodox" forces under the personal direction of the commanding general himself (cf. Liu Yin's comments, LWK WCCS, I:21).
44. This echoes a similar statement in Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 5, "Strategic Military Power."
45. As distinguished from the "well-field" system described by Mencius (III:A3) and the "village-well" system attributed to the Yellow Emperor just above. (Cf. Tu Cheng-sheng, "Chou-tai feng-chien chieh-t'i-hou to chun-cheng hsin-chih-hso," BIHP, Vol. 55, No. 1 [1984], pp. 96-109.)
46. Most historical sources state the number as three thousand rather than three hundred, as do some editions. (For a discussion of the T'ai Kung and the efforts of the Chou to construct the weapons of war, including the three hundred chariots, refer to the translator's introduction. Also note Yeh Shih's vehement criticism of Li Ching's ascription of monumental achievements to the T'ai Kung, LWK CC, p. 87.)
47. Quoted from the "Chou Annals" in the Shib chi and also found in the Shu ching. The concept of measured constraint, associated with the Chou scope of battle, is prominently preserved in the Ssu-ma Fa.
48. Translating from the Ming edition. Others have "incited the army." Historically, the Annals record the T'ai Kung as leading this elite band of one hundred in the initial, sudden assault against the Shang army.
49. The Kuan-tzu, recently translated by W. Allyn Rickett (Guanzi, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985) is an eclectic work associated with his name.
50. No longer extant in the present Ssu-ma Fa, only in fragments dispersed in other works. However, multiples of five were basic throughout the Chou. (For a brief discussion, see Appendix E; and, for example, Tu Cheng-sheng, "Chou-tai feng-chien chieht'i-hou to chun-cheng hsin-chih-hsu," pp. 73-113, and especially 79-81; and LWK CCCY, pp. 102-103. There is an entire category of books on military organization, many noted in the recent work by Hsu Pao-lin, Chung-kuo ping-shu t'ung-chien, Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990, pp. 217-280. Foremost among them is the modern Li-tai ping-chip ch'ien-shuo (ed. Wang Shao-wei and Liu Chao-hsiang), an extensive analysis and revision of the Li-tai ping-chih, Chieh-fang-chiin ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1986.)
51. For a discussion of these categories, see note 20 to the translator's introduction to the Wei Liao-tzu. Li Ching is basically following Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history of the Ssuma Fa as found in Ssu-ma Jang-chu's Shih chi biography. (The biography appears in full in the translator's introduction to the Ssu-ma Fa translation.)
52. These three works are now lost. For a discussion of the extant text and its relationship to them, see the translator's introduction to the translation.
53. Surprisingly, this appears to be erroneous. The extant Ssu-ma Fa discusses the "spring and fall hunts" near the beginning, not the "spring and winter" hunts. Although winter was considered the season of death, the Ssu-ma Fa decries winter mobilization because of the extreme hardship the soldiers would suffer from the cold. Of course, the text reflects an early age of limited
battles. (The Chou ii, chuan 7, "Summer Offices, Ssu-ma," discusses hunts for all four seasons. However, in analyzing these regulations, Lao Kan also notes that according to the Kuo-yu, military activities should be conducted in winter. See "Chou-tai ping-chih ch'u-lun," Chung-kuo-ship yen-chiu 1985, No. 4, p. 10.)
54. The term used, "respectfully performed the affairs of," usually refers to a subject respectfully accepting and executing his ruler's commands. However, in reality, the feudal lords had simply usurped power and sought to legitimize their actions through such claims.
55. The Chou Ii (chuan 7, "Summer Offices, Ssu-ma") lists the nine reasons the ruler would rectify a subject state, such as harming the people or killing their own lord. This list is identical to the "nine prohibitions" the king should publicize before the assembled feudal lords, found at the end of the first chapter of the Ssu-ma Fa.
56. "Armor and weapons," the arts of warfare. At the same time, they would order and rectify the affairs of the submissive states, curtailing any impulse toward defiance or independence.
57. The practice of training in the intervals between the seasons is not found in the present Ssu-ma Fa. However, the concept of spring and fall hunting exercises providing such training, and thus the means by which "not to forget warfare," is prominent in the first chapter. Constant preparation and training are of course underlying themes in most military writings.
58. One of the five hegemons. The term translated here as "battalion" is kuang. Generally, lu-normally a unit of five hundred men-is translated as "battalion" throughout this book. However, "battalion" is the lowest-strength Western military unit that is functionally equivalent to kuang.
The paragraphs that follow are somewhat confusing because of the introduction of different organizational terms and the relative lack of English equivalent units. They are further complicated by Li Ching's sweeping overview of military history and his tendency to redefine terms. There is great disagreement among commentators on the original Tso chuan text as well, and therefore in some parts the translation is somewhat tentative. For convenience in following the details of the argument, the Chinese unit term is indicated after the English translation.
59. Quoted from Shih Hui's appraisal of Ch'u (Chin's enemy) and Sun-shu Ao's selection of classic regulations to organize Ch'u's government and army. (Tso chuan, twelfth year of Duke Hsuan. For a complete translation, see the sixth month: James Legge, The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen, Oxford University Press, 1872 [reprint Chin-hsueh shu-chu, Taipei, 1968], p. 312, tr. p. 317; Burton Watson, The Tso chuan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989, p. 87.) Although the meaning of the second half of the sentence is clear (the military should always be prepared without having specific instructions or orders), the first part-"on the symbolization of things"has elicited divergent comments. Essentially, each officer should act in accord with his designated responsibility, as symbolized and thus defined and directed by his pennant. (Apparently, the pennants had animals and objects depicted on them, with associated duties and responsibilities within the hierarchy of military command. Of course, insignia could also function in this manner, and there is no evidence to preclude this meaning as well-particularly because the narrative also discusses them.) Thus, whether in action or not, the officers knew their duties and would act accordingly. However, the commentators advance other views as well, including one that interprets the phrase as referring to commands conveyed by flags with appropriate objects on them. (Thus Watson translates as "the various officers move in accord with the objects displayed on the flags," essentially the same translation as that of Legge. [See Watson, The Tso chuan, p. 87, including his note 10.] This follows Chang Ping-lin's understanding of the sentence as referring to the wielding of central command, which Wu and Wang also accept [LWK CC, p. 21].) Cf. Yang Po-chun, Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan chu, Chung-hua shu-chu, Peking, 1990 (rev. ed.), Vol. 2, p. 724.
60. The commentators offer several interpretations for these sentences in an attempt to make sense of the numbers implied. The translation reflects Li Ching's apparent understanding, which may not be the original meaning. Thus the term for company, tsu, is taken as referring to the number of men accompanying each chariot rather than to a full battalion of chariots, and the problematic phrase "tsu plan chih Jiang" is understood as emplacing an additional company to the flanks. (This might have originally meant a company of twenty-five, so two companies for the two flanks would yield fifty for a total of one hundred fifty men per chariot, as Li Ching asserts. However, his definition of Jiang requires that it be fifty men, so one Jiang is obviously split between the two flanks of each chariot.)
Other views, derived solely from the Tso chuan, range from one hundred men per chariot to one hundred fifty men per kuang or battalion, which is variously accounted as thirty or fifteen chariots. Attempts are made to force these numbers to conform to figures derived from the Ssu-ma Fa (portions no longer extant), but Yang Po-chUn believes they should all be thrown out because the discussion simply refers to chariots and the definition of a chariot battalion and has nothing to do with infantrymen. (See Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan chu, pp. 731-732; Li Tzung-t'ung, Tso-chuan chu-shu chi pucheng, Shih-chieh shu-chu, Taipei, 1971, Vol. 1, 23:13B-14A; and Chung-kuo chiin- shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, pp. 13-15.)
The original statement in the Tso chuan is perhaps translated as follows: "The ruler's personal guard is divided into two battalions. For each battalion there is a company [tsu] and a platoon [Jiang] to the flanks of the company." It is otherwise recorded in the Tso chuan that a battalion consisted of thirty chariots, although both Watson and Legge translate as if the entire guard corps was only thirty chariots, or one kuang (Legge: "Its ruler's own chariots are divided into two bodies of fifteen each. To each of them are attached 100 men, and an additional complement of 25 men" [Legge, The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen, p. 318]). Arguments advanced that the speaker was defining the nature of the tsu in the second part of the sentence seem inappropriate to an extemporaneous battlefield analysis of an enemy's military preparedness and organization.
The original sentence continues by describing how the right wing stands on alert from early morning and the left wing thereafter, thereby illustrating that their forces are constantly prepared. Li Ching has apparently extrapolated this laconic statement to describe Ch'u forces in general, although the commentators all agree that it refers to the king's personal guards or chariots.
61. Another quotation from slightly earlier in the narrative, the twelfth year of Duke Hsuan. Again, the original and its meaning in Li Ching's analysis are open to at least two possible interpretations. First, as translated in the text, it indicates that the contingent of infantrymen assigned to the right are deployed close to the shafts, whereas (in the original) those assigned to the left are dispatched to "search for fodder." (This "searching for fodder" seems highly unlikely because it commits half the ruler's personal troops to a menial, although important, activity. [It has been suggested that this might be a phrase from some other dialect, with a rather different-but unknown-meaning.] They might have been sent forth to scour the environment for enemy troops in concealment and to otherwise provide security functions.) Second, yu yuan might refer to the Army of the Right taking its direction from the commanding general's chariot, as symbolized by the "shaft." (Cf. Yang Po-chun, Ch'un-ch'iu Tsochuan chu, p. 723; Legge, The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen, p. 317; Watson, The Tso chuan, p. 87; LWK CC, p. 22; and LWK CCCY, pp. 113-114.) A third possibility is that the infantrymen deployed to the right of each chariot simply follow the direction of the general's shaft during an advance, without any redeployment to protect both flanks. (Left flank coverage for each chariot would presumably be provided by the chariot company positioned to the left in all cases but one.) Li Ching exploits both senses in his statements that immediately follow.
62. Li Ching thus apparently concludes that the regulations stipulate that the formation's orientation is determined by the direction of the chariots' advance, which (perhaps because of the vulner
ability of the chariots, as discussed in the general introduction and Appendix A) required the soldiers attached to the chariot battalion to remain close to the flanks during combat. Examples of reorienting the general's chariot shafts and thus the army's direction occur in the Tso chuan's narrative of this battle and its preliminary actions.
63. Tui, platoons with a strength of fifty men (see note 38 above). A tui was equal to two Jiang.
64. Recorded in the Tso chuan, the first year of Duke Chao. As discussed in the general introduction, this pivotal battle is generally regarded as marking the inception of a shift from chariot warfare to infantry warfare. (Unfortunately, the battle is not included in Burton Watson's translation of the Tso chuan but can be found in Legge [The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen, text p. 572, translation p. 579]. For further analysis, see LWK CCCY, pp. 113-115; LWK CC, p. 22; Tu Cheng-sheng, "Chou-tai," p. 88; and especially Chung-kuo chun-shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, pp. 24-26.)
65. These are generally regarded by the commentators as supply vehicles. (Also see Chung-kuo chun-ship-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, p. 14.)
66. Shih is the ancient term for army, later more equivalent to "regiment." Here company or battalion would more appropriately suggest its strength.
67. Wu Tzu-hsu's statement recorded in the Tso chuan, thirtieth year of Duke Chao, is cited as the source for this quotation (LWK CC, p. 25; Legge, The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen, p. 733, translation p. 735). However, it obviously summarizes Sun-tzu's approach to warfare and the thought of most traditional strategists thereafter.
68. Such as by employing deception, being formless, and preserving secrecy. (Note that the idea of Han Chinese pretending to be barbarians contravenes the most fundamental beliefs of many orthodox officials and therefore fell beyond the realm of possibility. See, for example, Yeh Shih's vehement denouncement of this tactic, LWK CC, p. 88.)
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 67