69. Following LWK CCCY, p. 124.
70. Chapter 10, "Configurations of Terrain." In the Art of War the sentence begins "If the general is weak and not strict, unenlightened in his instructions and leadership. " Li Ching dropped the first phrase and changed "leadership" to "training."
71. Ibid., Chapter 3, "Planning Offensives." The Three Strategies ("Superior Strategy") also incorporates this belief.
72. Here the text matches the original, having the character for "leadership" rather than "training."
73. From Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 5, "Strategic Military Power." The original has "excels at warfare" rather than "excels in employing the army."
74. The section in brackets, to the end of Li Ching's comment, does not appear in the Ming edition but is preserved in the Sung version.
75. Two statements from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance."
76. The tradition of employing barbarians against barbarians, especially partially sinicized or submissive ones against more brutal hordes, was consciously attempted throughout Chinese history. Even the Shang had used the "barbarian" Chou as a military buffer against more aggressive peoples to the west. (For a discussion of the "barbarian against barbarian" policy, see Yu Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967, pp. 14ff.)
77. A concept advanced in Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance."
78. The calculation of gain and loss is derived from Sun-tzu's first chapter, "Initial Estimations."
79. Ibid., Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance."
80. "How can he bring it about?" This is understood as referring to manipulating the enemy, bringing them into a position from which victory can be effected (cf. Liu Yin's comments, LWK WCCS, II:2B).
81. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance." Sun-tzu states, "Thus one who excels at warfare compels men and is not compelled by other men." (For further discussion of the phrase "compels men and is not compelled by men," see Tzu Yu-ch'iu, ed., Mou-li eh k'u, Lan-t'ien ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990, p. 171.)
82. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 7, "Military Combat."
83. Although the six do not comprise an actual quotation from Sun-tzu, most express his thoughts and principles-especially employing enticements to draw the en emy forth (cf. LWK CCCY, pp. 140-141). "Heavy" and "light" can refer to "substance" as contrasted with the "light" or insubstantial or to the types of troops.
84. The term "chun-chiao" is variously understood as a rank of officer or the units of organization (as taken in the translation). Cf. LWK CC, p. 33; LWK CCCY, pp. 143-144; TLWT WCHC, chuan 4,11:6-7.
85. Units are integrated hierarchically by tens (rather than fives). Thus ten squads of five compose a platoon and ten platoons a battalion or regiment. The basic idea is to effect training from the fundamental unit up the scale of organization. (This is different, however, from the idea of one man teaching five and five men then teaching five more, thereby spreading the skills through horizontal training-as found in WuCh'i's "Controlling the Army" [Wu-tzu, Chapter 3].) Thus higher-level instruction is directed to the officers, possibly such as the chun-chiao (if the term is understood as an officer) and subordinate generals.
86. From the fifth year of Duke Huan (Cf. Legge, The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen, pp. 44,46). The chariots provided the front, the infantrymen filled in the gaps. 87. See note 50 above.
88. Chapter 16 in the extant Wei Liao-tzu.
89. In antiquity, until the development of paper in the late Han, and its growing use thereafter, wooden slips were employed for all recording purposes-including recording commands and the achievements and offenses of the squad of five, which is probably the intended reference here. A squad's insignia symbolized its inescapable participation in a mutually bonded unit, with severe consequences for failing to preserve unit integrity. (Cf. LWK CC, p. 34; LWK CCCY, pp. 145-146; LWK WCCS, 11:7.)
90. In terms of functional organization, twenty-five infantrymen composed a Jiang (platoon), and eight cavalrymen similarly constituted a platoon. Thus the organization for cavalry-although identical in principle-was significantly different and lacked the squad level.
91. Following Liu Yin. Many commentators take this as a quotation from the Ssuma Fa, Chapter 3, "Determining Rank." There the text goes on to discuss the five types of weapons and their appropriate, integrated use. However, this would seem to misread the Questions and Replies (even though the Ssu-ma Fa emphasizes the use of "five" throughout) because there is no justification for introducing any discussion of weapons.
92. As with the formations from the Classic of Grasping Subtle Change, the main deployment consists of formations suborganized into smaller copies. Thus each brigade, for example, is able to execute changes that mirror the overall deployment in responding to attacks in the area of responsibility.
93. The Ming edition of the Seven Military Classics, which is the basis for our translation, has the character pu-"pace" or "step"-and is followed by some later editions. The Sung edition has the character cheng-"orthodox" or "upright"-and is followed by such modern editions as LWK CC. If the text is emended to cheng, it would then read "The square is given birth from the orthodox; the circle is given birth from the unorthodox [ch'i]." Cf. LWK CC, p. 34; LWK CCCY, pp. 148-149; LWK WCCS, 11: 1 OB- 11A; TLWT WCHC, chuan 4, II:9A.
94. Wu-tzu, Chapter 3, "Controlling the Army." The original is somewhat different: "Even if broken off from the main order they preserve their formations, even if scattered they will reform lines."
95. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 4, "Military Disposition."
96. For chieh, "constraints," see the notes to Art of War, Chapter 5, "Strategic Military Power." Chieh is used in two rather distinct senses in the ensuing discussion: first, in the sense found in Sun-tzu, which has the essential meaning of an "impulse" or "decisiveness" (Giles)-that which occurs in a brief, finite moment-and second, in the normal sense of "measure," of imposing fixed measure on actions-whether spatial or temporal.
97. A quotation from Art of War, Chapter 5, "Strategic Miitary Power."
98. Chieh.
99. The commentators generally take this to mean one beating of the drum for each shout; however, it has also been suggested that it means a thrust at the enemy for each shout.
100. Although this seems to refer to spatial dimensions, as front and rear, it could also refer to temporal order, as first and later.
101. A rather curious statement because such automatic responses could easily be exploited by enemy strategists.
102. This sentence paraphrases one from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 11, "Nine Terrains": "He commands them as if racing a herd of sheep-they are driven away, driven back, but no one knows where they are going."
103. The concept of "constraints" reappears here, more properly rendered as "measure" or perhaps "rhythm" in accord with its use in music and dance.
104. In accord with "five phase" concepts, each of the directions was correlated with one of the five phases, and a whole array of aspects was further grouped around each phase. (Cf. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. II, History of Scientific Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1962, pp. 232-265.) Liu Yin notes them as follows: east-green; south-red; west-white; north-black; center-yellow (LWK WCCS, 11: 15B).
105. Cf. TLWT WCHC, p. 190.
106. "San fu," translated as "three covering forces," refers to the division into three operational units that apparently have responsibility for "covering" or "protecting" each other (understanding fu in the sense of "overspread," "cover." Cf. Karlgren, GSR, entry 1034m). Whether they represent units available for executing flexible-including unorthodox-tactics or three ambushing forces is the subject of disagreement (cf. LWK CC, p. 39).
107. Through their own misunderstanding of the Hsin shu, not because of Duke Ts'ao's ignorance of military tactics.
108. See note 64 to the text of Questions and Replies.
&nbs
p; 109. Following the Sung edition of the Seven Military Classics, which has fan rather than jen-the latter clearly a copyist's error.
110. A partial quotation from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 4, "Military Disposition." The original reads: "One who excels at defense buries himself away below the lowest depths of Earth. One who excels at offense moves from above the greatest heights of Heaven." "Lowest depths" is literally "nine layers of Earth," "greatest heights" is "nine layers of Heaven."
111. Although the Six Secret Teachings discusses the selection and training of men, this passage does not appear in the extant writings.
112. Emending the text to read "hundred" instead of "twenty." (See Appendix E for a diagram.)
113. "Three thousand" is definitely an error. "One hundred" would yield the historically appropriate force strength. (However, the discussion is even more complex. Cf. Liu Yin's notes, LWK WCCS, II:20-21A.) The "Tiger Guards" are discussed in the translator's introduction to the Six Secret Teachings; their role was apparently that of an elite force rather than officers in a command structure.
114. There are five changes rather than four because the fifth change is to reassume the initial formation.
115. A famous dictum from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 1, "Initial Estimations." "Deceit" alone is inadequate; the phrase should perhaps be translated "The essence of warfare is deception and artifice."
116. The five phases were systematically correlated into a number of relationships, principal among them the production and conquest cycles. For example, wood gives birth to fire, whereas fire conquers (i.e., smelts) metal. (For further discussion, see Needham, History of Scientific Thought, pp. 253-265.) Once the formations are assigned phase names, they naturally fall into these patterns of relationships, suggesting various dynamics.
117. An analogy from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance": "Water configures its flow in accord with the terrain, the army controls [its measures] for victory in accord with the enemy."
118. Fan Li was a thinker and political adviser in the Spring and Autumn period who evolved military theories based on the unending cycle of yin and yang. His writings-if any-have been lost, although fragments have been preserved in other works from the period.
119. "Last" and "first" could also be understood spatially, as "in front" and "behind," or "to the rear."
120. As discussed in note 104 above, the five phases had many aspects correlated with them, including musical notes.
121. This echoes the Ssu-ma Fa and early Legalist thinkers.
122. Emperor Kuang Wu succeeded in conquering all the dissident forces as well as Wang Mang to restore the Han dynasty, thereafter known as the Eastern or Later Han.
123. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 9, "Maneuvering the Army."
124. "The Punitive Expedition of Yin," in the "Book of the Hsia," the Shang Shu (Book of Documents). Cf. James Legge, tr., The Shoo King, in the Chinese Classics, Oxford University Press, undated Hong Kong reprint, p. 163.
125. This incident is recorded in his biography.
126. The "Red Eyebrows," who derived their name from their custom of painting their eyebrows red to conspicuously distinguish themselves in battle, were among the groups that arose in opposition to the usurper Wang Mang (who held power from A.D. 8-23).
127. Yang Kan and Chung Chia were two minor figures in the Spring and Autumn period, preserved in the historical records for their offenses against military regulations. The former was spared although his driver was executed, but the latter was beheaded (LWK CC, p. 47).
128. Sun-tzu advanced the concept of the "expendable spy" in the Art of War, Chapter 13, "Employing Spies." There he defines them as agents "employed to spread disinformation outside the state." Literally, the term is "dead spy" because they are likely to be killed once the true situation is known. (Li Ching's biography presumably records his decision and actions in the case of T'ang Chien.)
129. A quote from ibid.
130. The Duke of Chou, who is discussed in the general introduction, was compelled by his great righteousness to command armies against his own brothers when they revolted against the enthronement of King Wu's son. (There were other contributing factors as well, including the revolutionaries' apparent belief that the Duke of Chou was using the pretext of acting as regent for the underage king to seize power for himself.)
131. A "host" generally fights on his own terrain, usually on his own terms, whereas an invader is generally termed a "guest." However, these terms are simplistic and often nominal, as Li Ching's discussion shows.
132. This is one of Sun-tzu's main themes, found especially in the Art of War, Chapter 2, "Waging War."
133. A concept central to all the strategists in the Seven Military Classics as well as the Tao Te Ching.
134. Art of War, Chapter 2, "Waging War."
135. Ibid. "One who excels in employing the army does not conscript the people twice nor transport provisions a third time."
136. These policies were hallmarks of Sun-tzu's approach and were markedly different from those of later theorists (although no doubt common practice).
137. A quote from Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance." The order of the phrases has been reversed from the original: "If the enemy is rested you can tire him; if he is sated you can make him hungry."
138. Again the concept of "constraint" or "measure" appears.
139. An incident from the Sixteen Kingdoms period.
140. A quotation from Chapter 60 of the Six Secret Teachings, "The Infantry in Battle." The original differs slightly, reading "mounds" rather than "funeral mounds."
141. This sentence does not appear in the extant Art o f War. However, Sun-tzu does discuss several classifications of terrain and their inherent dangers in various chapters. Tseng Chen has pointed out the wisdom of such seemingly obscure policies: Deserted places of former habitation as well as funeral grounds were more likely to harbor disease vectors and environmental poisons (LWK CCCY, pp. 190-191).
142. Many commentators understand ping as referring to "weapons" rather than "army," but because all weapons are inherently "implements of violence" and the passage continues with a discussion about mobilizing the army, "army" seems more appropriate here.
143. The reference to t'ien-kuan is somewhat problematic, with some commentators understanding it as the title of a lost traditional text (Heavenly Offices) and others thinking it refers to the astrological interpretation of heavenly phenomena. (See the notes to Chapter 1 of the Wei Liao-tzu, "Heavenly Offices," and also LWK CCCY, p. 193; and LWK CC, p. 52.) Accordingly, the phrase t'ien kuan shih jih is translated throughout as "astrologically auspicious seasons and days," thereby emphasizing the intentional structuring of actions to accord with auspicious times and avoid baleful moments.
144. This continues the discussion found in Book II of using animal names and such other designations as the five notes to obscure the actuality of military formations.
145. Previously discussed in Book I; see note 28.
146. Kung-sun Shu, a commandery governor under Wang Mang's reign, had proclaimed himself emperor in the chaotic period prior to the establishment of the Later Han. When Emperor Kuang-wu deputed Wu Han to dislodge Kung-sun Shu from his power base and vanquish him, he admonished him to avoid an immediate, direct confrontation (see LWK CCCY, p. 194).
147. Not found in the extant Six Secret Teachings. The term "entangling the army" also appears in Chapter 3 of the Art of War, "Strategies for Attack."
148. Wang Meng was a reclusive expert on military affairs who was accidentally discovered and eventually employed by Fu Chien. Just prior to his own death he advised Fu Chien against undertaking the doomed campaign against Chin, but his warning was obstinately disregarded. Fu Chien was subsequently defeated at Fei River.
149. Essentially a summation of Sun-tzu's approach to warfare.
150. From Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance."
151. This
is a quotation from the traditionally transmitted text of the Art of War, Chapter 4, "Military Disposition."
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid., Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance." The T'ai-tsung has expanded Suntzu's basic principles regarding relative force and manipulating the enemy to create new tactical principles.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid., Chapter 3, "Planning Offensives."
156. Ssu-ma Fa, Book I, "Benevolence the Foundation."
157. Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 4, "Military Disposition."
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid., Chapter 7, "Military Combat."
161. Wu-tzu, Chapter 4, "The Tao of the General." (See note 32 to the text of Questions and Replies fora discussion of the concept of "vital points.")
162. Li Chi, who had a distinguished military career, began as the leader of a small band of rebels and eventually threw his allegiance to the T'ang (whereupon he changed his original surname, Hsu, to Li. He was compelled to drop his middle character, "shih," because it was identical to that in Li Shih-min's name and thus was proscribed by imperial taboo. Accordingly, he became known as Li Chi instead of Li Shih-chi.) A highly successful military strategist and general, he commanded troops during the consolidation of the empire, undertook desert campaigns, and later supported the invasion of Koguryo-which he frequently directed in person. He also held a number of high civil positions when not deputed on military duties.
163. Although there may not be "any harm" in it, later commentators-such as Liu Yin-find it rather unbelievable, for a variety of reasons (see LWK WCCS, III:11-12).
164. Chang-sun Wu-chi was T'ang T'ai-tsung's brother-in-law, adviser, and confidant from childhood. Distinguished for his military achievements, he also furthered the T'ai-tsung's usurpation of the throne and was appointed to the highest civil offices. Although instrumental in establishing Kao-tsung (Li Chih's) claim to the throne and entrusted with exercising the greatest power, he was eventually banished for "plotting against" the emperor through the machinations of Empress Wu.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 68