259. Ibid., 5.
260. Ruth Feldman et al., “Mother and Infant Coordinate Heart Rhythms Through Episodes of Interaction Synchrony,” Infant Behavior and Development 34 (2011): 574.
261. Breazeal, 234.
262. Wilson, Affect and Artificial Intelligence, 53.
263. Claudia Dreifus, “A Conversation with Cynthia Breazeal: A Passion to Build a Better Robot, One with Social Skills and a Smile,” The New York Times, June 10, 2003.
264. David Gelernter, “Dream Logic, the Internet and Artificial Thought,” Edge Foundation, June 22, 2010, https://edge.org/conversation/dream-logic-the-internet-and-artificial-thought.
265. Ibid.
266. Niels Bohr, quoted in Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond, trans. Arnold Pomerans (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 48.
267. John L. Heilbron, “The Mind That Created the Bohr Atom,” Seminaire Poincaré 17 (2013): 48.
268. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 11.
269. Ibid., 282.
270. Niels Bohr, quoted in Heilbron, 38.
271. Ibid.
272. Ibid., 49.
273. Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), 109.
274. Evelyn Fox Keller discusses Turing’s model and its legacy: “Turing’s foray into biology was of immense importance for the study of chemical systems, for the development of the mathematics of dynamical systems, even for many problems in physics. But not, it would seem, for developmental biology.” She goes on to say, however, that a rapprochement between mathematical and biological science would arrive later. See Evelyn Fox Keller, Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with Models, Metaphors, and Machines (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 90–108.
275. A. M. Turing, “The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences 237, no. 641 (1952): 37.
276. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, 58.
277. William W, Lytton, From Computer to Brain: Foundations of Computational Neuroscience (New York: Springer, 2002), 88.
278. For a clear explanation of how junk DNA is not junk, see Stephen S. Hall, “Hidden Treasures in Junk DNA,” Scientific American 307, iss. 4 (2012).
279. Jonathan Swift, The Poems of Jonathan Swift, vol. 2 (Chiswick: Press of C. Whittingham, 1822), 86–90.
280. Bernard de Fontenelle, quoted in Evelyn Fox Keller, “Secrets of God, Nature and Life,” in The Gender and Science Reader, ed. Muriel Lederman and Ingrid Bartsch (London: Routledge, 2001), 106.
281. R. Howard Block, “Medieval Misogyny,” in Misogyny, Misandry, and Misanthropy, ed. R. Howard Block and Frances Ferguson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 11.
282. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 6.
283. Ibid., 121.
284. Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near (New York: Penguin, 2006).
285. David Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 17, nos. 9–10 (2010): 9.
286. David Pearce, “The Hedonistic Imperative,” 1995, www.hedweb.com/hedab.htm.
287. Jeffrey L. Lacasse and Jonathan Leo, “Serotonin and Depression: A Disconnect Between Advertisements and the Scientific Literature,” PLoS, November 8, 2005, doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020392.
288. Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 1.
289. “Gelernter, Kurzweil Debate Machine Consciousness,” transcript by MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. December 6, 2006, www.kurzweilai.net.
290. Hans Moravec, “The Rise of the Robots: The Future of Artificial Intelligence,” Scientific American, March 23, 2009, 124.
291. Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005), 207.
292. Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century,” in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991), 149–81.
293. Steven Weinberg, “Sokal’s Hoax,” in Facing Up (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 150. In his essay “The Boundaries of Scientific Knowledge” in the same collection, Weinberg addresses the conundrums of consciousness but argues, “All these problems may eventually be solved without supposing that life or consciousness plays any role in the fundamental laws of nature or initial conditions,” p. 81. Another physicist takes a different view. See Richard Conn Henry, “The Mental Universe,” Nature 436, no. 7 (2005): 29.
294. René Descartes, Discourse on Method, in Essential Works of Descartes, trans. Lowell Bair (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), 12.
295. Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), 38.
296. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, book 1, part 4, section 5 (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1962), 289.
297. Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 188.
298. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 21.
299. Simone Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, trans. Hugh Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 31–32.
300. James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New York: Psychology Press, 2015), 119–36. Gibson also advocated the idea of “direct perception,” perception that is not aided by inference, memories, or representations but is essentially unmediated. It is not hard to understand why this is controversial. The debates on this subject are ongoing and often about degrees of immediacy. One need not accept direct perception, however, to be interested in the idea of affordance. See Harold S. Jenkins, “Gibson’s ‘Affordances’: Evolution of a Pivotal Concept,” Journal of Scientific Psychology (December 2008): 34–45.
301. Weil, Lectures, 32.
302. Vico, The New Science, 313.
303. Ibid., 129.
304. Ibid., 215.
305. Andreas K. Engel, Pascal Fries, and Wolf Singer, “Dynamic Predictions: Oscillations and Synchrony in Top-Down Processing,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2 (2001): 704–16.
306. Humberto Maturana, “Biology of Language: Epistemology of Reality,” in Psychology and Biology of Language and Thought: Essays in Honor of Eric Lenneberg, ed. George A. Miller and Elizabeth Lenneberg (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 61.
307. Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), 121.
308. Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and the Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 217.
309. Francisco Varela, quoted in David Rudrauf et al., “From Autopoiesis to Neurophenomenology: Francisco Varela’s Exploration of the Biophysics of Being,” Biological Research 36 (2003): 38.
310. Ibid., 39–40.
311. Gerald Edelman, Second Nature: Brain Science and Human Knowledge (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 87.
312. Ibid.
313. Francisco Varela and Jonathan Shear, “First Person Methodologies: What, Why, and How,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6, nos. 2–3 (1999): 1–14.
314. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 3.
315. Michael L. Slepian, Max Weisbuch, Nicholas O. Rule, and Nalini Ambady, “Tough and Tender: Embodied Categorization of Gender,” Psychological Science 22, no. 1 (2011): 26–28.
316. Michael Slepian, Nicholas O. Rule, and Nalini Ambady, “Proprioception and Person Perception: Politicians and Professors,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 38, no. 12 (2012): 1621–28.
317. Simon Lacey, Randall Stilla, and K. Sathian, “Metaphorically Feeling: Comprehending Textural Metaphors Activates Somatosensory Cortex,” Brain and Language 120, no. 3 (2012): 416–21.
318. Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science (London: Routledge, 2008), 49.
319. William James, “Reflex Action and Theism,” in The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2005), 92.
320. William James, Psychology: Briefer Course (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 11.
321. John Dewey, “The Problem of Logical Subject Matter,” from Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938), in The Essential Dewey: Ethics, Logic, Psychology, ed. Larry Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 166.
322. David Bohm, quoted in B. V. Sreekantan, “Reality and Consciousness: Is Quantum Biology the Future of Life Sciences?” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Consciousness and the Self, ed. Sangeetha Menon, Anindya Sinha, and B. V. Sreekantan (New Delhi: Springer, 2014), 276.
323. Andy Clark, “Embodiment: From Fish to Fantasy” (1999), www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/clark/pubs/TICSEmbodiment.pdf. See also Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Oxford University Press, 2008).
324. Andy Clark and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998): 7–19.
325. For various views, see Dorothea Olkowski and Gail Weiss, ed., Feminist Interpretations of Merleau-Ponty (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006).
326. John Dewey, Art as Experience (1934), in John Dewey: The Later Works 1925–53, vol. 10 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 271.
327. Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, in The Collected Works of Edith Stein, vol. 3, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1989), 56–89.
328. Karl Groos, The Play of Man, trans. Elizabeth L. Baldwin (New York: Appleton, 1898), 361–406.
329. Vernon Lee and C. Anstruther-Thomson, “Anthropomorphic Aesthetics,” in Beauty and Ugliness and Other Studies in Psychological Aesthetics (London: John Lane, 1912), 19.
330. Massimo Ammaniti and Vittorio Gallese, The Birth of Intersubjectivity: Psychodynamics, Neurobiology, and the Self (New York: Norton, 2014), 4.
331. Ibid., 24.
332. Ibid.
333. Gallese believes that some rudimentary mirror system is innate. See Vittorio Gallese et al., “Mirror Neuron Forum,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 6, no. 4 (2011): 369–407. For discussion on mirror systems as innate or learned and a view counter to Gallese’s, see Lindsay M. Overman and V. S. Ramachandran, “Reflections on the Mirror Neuron System: Their Evolutionary Functions Beyond Motor Representation,” in Mirror Neuron Systems: The Role of Mirroring in Social Cognition (New York: Springer, 2009), 39–62. See also Marco Iacoboni, “Imitation, Empathy, and Mirror Neurons,” Annual Psychological Review 60 (2009): 653–70.
334. J. Haueisen and T. R. Knösche, “Involuntary Motor Activity in Pianists Evoked by Music Perception,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 13 (2001): 786–91.
335. See Jaime A. Pineda, ed., The Role of Mirroring Processes in Social Cognition (San Diego, CA: Springer, 2009).
336. See Stephen Salloway and Paul Malloy, ed., The Neuropsychiatry of Limbic and Subcortical Disorders (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1997), 15.
337. Onno van der Hart, Annemieke van Dijke, Maarten van Son, and Kathy Steele, “Somatoform Dissociation in Traumatized World War I Combat Soldiers: A Neglected Heritage,” Journal of Trauma and Dissociation 1, no. 4 (2001): 33–66.
338. Paul Ekman, “Basic Emotions,” in Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, ed. T. Dalgleish and M. Power (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999), 45–60.
339. Rachel E. Jack, Olivier G .B. Garrod, and Philippe G. Schyns, “Dynamic Facial Expressions of Emotion Transmit an Evolving Hierarchy of Signals Over Time,” Current Biology 24, no. 2 (2014): 187–92.
340. For an argument against six basic emotions, see Prinz, Beyond Human Nature, 241–66.
341. Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 261–79.
342. Daniel N. Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 54.
343. Susanne Langer, Problems of Art: Ten Philosophical Lectures (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1957), 15.
344. Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915), Standard Edition, vol. 14, 118.
345. Antonio Damasio, “The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the Possible Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex,” Philosophical Transcript of the Royal Society London B 351 (1996): 1413–20.
346. Colwyn Trevarthen, “The Concept and Foundations of Infant Intersubjectivity,” in Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny, ed. Stein Bråten (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 15–46.
347. Philippe Rochat, “Early Objectification of the Self,” in The Self in Infancy: Theory and Research (Amsterdam: North-Holland-Elsevier Science Publishers, 1995), 66.
348. D. W. Winnicott, “Mirror Role of Mother and Family in Child Development,” in Playing and Reality (London: Routledge, 1989), 111.
349. George Herbert Mead, “The Social Self,” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (1913): 374.
350. Edward Tronick, “Commentary on a Paper by Frank M. Lachman,” Psychoanalytic Dialogues 11, no. 1 (2001): 193.
351. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 353–54.
352. Stein Bråten, “Infant Learning by Altercentric Participation: the Reverse of Egocentric Observation in Autism,” in Intersubjective Comunication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny, 105–26.
353. See Peter Carruthers, “Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2011 ed., http://plato.standford.edu/achives/fall2011/entries/consciousness-higher/.
354. John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
355. Mary Ainsworth, “Attachment: Retrospect and Prospect,” in The Place of Attachment in Human Behavior, ed. C. M. Parker and J. Stevenson (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 3–30.
356. Allan Schore, Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional Development (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994).
357. Claudia Lieberman and Zuoxin Wang, “The Social Environment and Neurogenesis in the Adult Mammalian Brain,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6 (2012): 118, doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00118.
358. Ruth Feldman, “Mother-Infant Synchrony and the Development of Moral Orientation in Childhood and Adolescence: Direct and Indirect Mechanisms of Developmental Continuity,” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 77 (2007): 582–97.
359. See Antonio Damasio’s discussion of his research with Hanna Damasio into the famous historical case of Phineas T. Gage, who suffered a prefrontal injury, and his own patient Eliot in Descartes’ Error, 3–82. For a neural correlate approach to the problem, see Michael Koenig, “The Role of Prefrontal Cortex in Psychopathy,” Reviews in Neuroscience 23, no. 3 (2012): 253–62. In his review Koenig writes, “In sum, across all of the aforementioned studies, psychopathy was associated with significant reductions in prefrontal grey matter.” How this occurs is unknown. Another study, however, found increased grey matter volume in youth with psychopathic traits. S.A. De Brito et al., “Size Matters: Increased Grey Matter in Boys with Conduct Problems and Callous Unemotional Traits,” Brain 132, no. 4 (2009): 843–52. For a paper that speculates that there is a genetic component to psychopathy but also understands it as a developmental disorder, see R. J. R. Blair, “The Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex: Functional Contributions and Dysfunction in Psychopathy,” Philosophical Transactions Royal Society London B 363, no. 1503 (2008): 2557–65. For an overv
iew, see Andrea L. Glenn and Adrian Raine, eds. Psychopathy: An Introduction to Biological Findings and Their Implications, (New York: New York University Press, 2014).
360. Bryan Kolb et al., “Experience and the Developing Prefrontal Cortex,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (2012), doi: 10.1073/pnas.11212511109.
361. Richard Kradin, “The Placebo Response: An Attachment Strategy that Counteracts the Effects of Stress Related Dysfunction,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 54, no. 4 (2011): 438. See also Richard Kradin, The Placebo Response and the Power of Unconscious Healing (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008).
362. Fabrizio Benedetti, Placebo Effects, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 45.
363. Ibid., 44.
364. Ibid., 91.
365. Ibid., 137.
366. For a brief overview, see “Towards a Neurobiology of Psychotherapy,” in Psychiatry, vol. 1, 4th ed., ed. Allan Tasman, Jerald Kay, Jeffrey A. Lieberman, Michael B. First, and Michelle B. Riba (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 1815–16.
367. See Linda A. W. Brakel, “The Placebo Effect: Psychoanalytic Theory Can Help Explain the Phenomenon,” American Imago 64 (2007): 273–81.
368. Cristina Alberini and Joseph LeDoux, “Memory Reconsolidation,” Current Biology 23, no. 17 (2013): 746–50.
369. For psychotherapeutic brain effects, see A.L. Brody et al., “Regional Brain Metabolic Changes in Patients with Major Depression Treated with Either Paroxetine or Interpersonal Therapy,” Archives of General Psychiatry 58 (2001): 631–40. For placebo changes, see H. Mayberg et al., “The Functional Neuroanatomy of the Placebo Effect,” American Journal of Psychiatry 159, no. 9 (2002): 728–37.
370. Freud, who attended Charcot’s lectures in Paris, recorded the comment “La théorie c’est bon; mais ça n’empêche pas d’exister.” “Extracts from Freud’s “Footnotes to His Translation of Charcot’s Tuesday Lectures” (1887–88), Standard Edition, vol. 1, 139.
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