Operationally, despite the happy coincidence of Mallaby’s presence in Italy, there were significant security issues regarding the planned transmissions between Rome and Algiers.
Even if they were sure that their train would not be bombed (thanks to specific instructions given to the Anglo-American Air Forces), would Castellano and Montanari make it to Italy with their dramatic consignment without being intercepted by the Germans? Such fears were well founded and there were numerous complications involved. For example, the Daily Telegraph had published an article containing revelations about the arrival in Lisbon of an Italian mission to negotiate an armistice, thus putting the Germans in a state of maximum alert – one of the drawbacks of a free press.
The surrender documents were prudently entrusted to the unknowing Italian ambassador to Chile until the train reached Menton. The ambassador was travelling alongside Castellano and Montanari, who kept the radio and the cryptographic materials themselves.14
In this atmosphere of exaltation and tension, there was considerable trust in Dick Mallaby’s training and ‘highly retentive’ memory, but, given the importance of the mission and the need for complete confidentiality, it was decided that new codes would be subtly transmitted to him, using the old ones. In order to reassure Olaf that they were not fake, it was decided that the transmissions should contain multiple specific references to his personal life that only he would recognize. Thus Mallaby’s personal file was forensically analysed, and all those who knew him in Cairo and Massingham were interrogated without explanation, leading to the acquisition of highly personal information.
In this way, even if the transmission were intercepted, the transcript would only reveal that the new code’s keywords corresponded (among other things) to: his mother’s maiden name; his father’s name; his favourite beer and his first car; his favourite movie, and the actress with whom he would most like to spend a (sleepless) night (for the record, Metropolis and Jean Harlow, respectively); and his (rather early) age at the time of his first sexual relationship. Only Dick Mallaby would be able to understand all of these data.
The two radio stations were named Monkey (at Mallaby’s end) and Drizzle (at Massingham). The style to be adopted for the messages was to be ‘informal and not stereotypical’.15
The plan of action was summarised in a message dated 25 August, sent to Massingham by Roseberry, highlighting the following points:
(A)1400 is doing everything to delay a trial;
(B)if he senses the probability of failure through his major, he will try to carry out a rescue;
(C)General C [Castellano], as soon as he has crossed the border, will telephone Rome signalling that no action should be taken against Olaf until his arrival;
(D)General C will immediately request that Olaf be transferred into his custody, and will use him as an operator;
(E)we have provided General C with various messages that Olaf must recognize as coming only, repeat, only from us, so that he will have no hesitation in accepting them;
(F)one of these messages tells him to use Maraschino Orange.
General C has been told Olaf’s real name and rank as well as his links to Italy, but that his loyalty to us is beyond any doubt. He has expressed his admiration for Olaf’s courage and also considers that having available a fully reliable operator practising our procedures is the best solution.
From this message, and the others sent during this period, important historical details emerge, relating to the intentions and the evaluations of the two sides following the Lisbon meetings.
The Allies clarified that their operational plans would not be delayed as a result of the meetings in Lisbon. At the same time, the confident belief that the negotiations could continue in Rome was expressed.
According to Roseberry, ‘[The Italians] left with the fear that any delay on the path ahead or in the decision-making process could make it impossible for them to respond before our main attack was launched. The mission has formed a strong opinion that acceptance [of surrender] is inevitable.’16
Thus, Roseberry firstly sent a message hinting at the ‘possibility’ that transmissions using the Maraschino series codes could be sent the next day, and on 26 August informed Bern in message 3788 that:
1Steps have been taken for Vatican intervention for exchange of Olaf.
2Apart from this Olaf may be approached and asked to work a ‘B’ set. Contact will have with him certain messages which Olaf must recognize could only originate from us but he may despite this be suspicious that he is being asked to act treacherously.
3If any means can be found of getting a message to Olaf he should be told that this is a genuine approach arranged for him by his friends.
4We can demand that contact should say who authorized him (Olaf) to act. Contact may only be a cut-out and unable to reply and this should not make Olaf suspicious. If, however, reply is given the answer should be Mr. Roseberry (who fixed this up).17
But despite, or perhaps because of, his dramatic coup, Roseberry was the subject of criticism and complaints.
Massingham’s leaders protested over the lack and delay of reporting, and Roseberry sent a message from Lisbon dated 23 August, triumphantly declaring that he had managed to get the Olaf option accepted, having described himself to Castellano and Montanari as a friend of Italy. Three days later he signalled Massingham again that, ‘for your information, “C” [the British SIS] is furious that we got there before them and might try to sneak in’.18
Analysis of the plentiful British documents relating to this key moment reveals further relevant and unprecedented details of the event narrative as it unfolded contortedly in the closing days of August 1943. As a whole, the messages from this period allow us to understand the risks posed by the high level of secrecy, minimal operational coordination, and disjointed timings, the latter resulting from the technical impossibility of communicating in real time between the various offices involved.
Following the meetings with Castellano, it was decided to halt any plans to obtain Mallaby’s release, as it was feared that the efforts of SOE’s agents in Italy to free agent Olaf could interfere with what had been established in Lisbon.
The danger that the agreements between Castellano and the Allies might be affected was anything but hypothetical, even considering that in reality SOE’s so-called network of collaborators in Italy had hidden objectives quite at odds with those of the British, something which was unknown – at least initially – even to Castellano and the Supreme Command.
On 28 August, Bern announced that: a ‘trusted Como friend of 1400’ named Luciano (agent 1401) had managed to meet Mallaby inside San Donnino Prison, bringing him ‘greetings from Pietro’, which left agent Olaf ‘much impressed’; the escape of the prisoner (disguised as a soldier) could be planned for the following week, and Mallaby would be hidden in the countryside, to await further instructions.
Roseberry’s answer, labelled ‘most immediate to be marked personal’, was lightning fast and skillful: ‘Splendid work. Lay everything on but do not carry into effect until Thursday September 2nd…. For explanation refer to our telegram 3788 para 2’ (my emphasis; the telegram referred to is shown here).
The message for Bern was unequivocal: the operation to free Mallaby had to be postponed, since his liberty might be achieved in another way.
Roseberry informed Massingham the following day, tactically altering the details slightly, reporting that:
11400 has visited Olaf who is in prison at Como and says he can arrange in a few days to rescue him disquised in uniform and keep him hidden.
21400 has been instructed to lay everything on but not to put into effect until Thursday 2nd September.
3This may jeopardize Olaf’s chances but we must take this risk rather than deprive General. C of his services if he decides to use him.
4Important that we should know without delay any developments so that we can instruct 1400 either to go ahead without waiting or to lay off altogether.19
SOE’s chiefs found themselves in the tricky position of weighing up opposing risks and benefits in an operational context that further complicated their assessments, leaving aside the fact that they ignored the significant infiltration suffered.
SOE’s Italian ‘collaborators’, SIM and other Italian investigative bodies, Massingham and Bern stations, the Allied leadership and Castellano were all acting at the time not only in different locations, but also with differing, imperfect knowledge and understanding of the events in progress. Moreover, all of them were united (for different reasons) by restrictions in communications. Castellano moreover did not have the slightest idea of SIM infiltration in SOE, and SIM was unaware of Castellano’s mission.
If the option set up in Lisbon had concluded within the agreed terms, agent Olaf would be safe and sound and SOE would have notched up a notable success. On the other hand, if, for some reason, this did not happen (should Castellano fail to keep his word, or be ordered to renege), what Roseberry had revealed would have nailed Mallaby to the cross once and for all. The feelings of remorse would have been overwhelming, given that his release seemed to be well underway. Not forgetting the top-secret information revealed to the Italians, who also had a precious radio and cryptographic codes in their hands.
The dilemma was quickly set aside and the riskier, but potentially more profitable, option was chosen. This involved putting Mallaby’s neck on the line for the potential of a successful outcome of negotiations for the Italian surrender.
As emphasized by Roseberry’s above-cited message of 26 August, SOE was in fierce competition with other British and American intelligence services and secret bodies, both for prestige and the allocation of funds and resources. SOE’s leadership, seizing the opportunity presented, was thus forced to choose between saving its agent’s life or the exclusive management of an unexpected mission that was potentially both pivotal and of historic importance. And so it was, even if various discrepancies threatened to upset the apple cart.
In message number 460, dated 29 August, Massingham communicated the instructions through which Mallaby should be given reassurance that he was ‘doing the right thing’. The Maraschino and Monkey group codes should be interweaved with messages that were ‘entirely personal and featuring unequivocal elements of authenticity’. The instructions for the new codes were transmitted to the head of the radio-telegraphic department at Massingham, Bill Corbett, with orders to: decode the messages personally; keep everything in a safe; not allow more than two operators to know the codes; deliver incoming messages only to Dodds-Parker himself; and keep the outgoing messages himself, without further disclosure.20
SOE Bern dispatched a coded message on the evening of 30 August that regretted, with reference to the order to halt the plan to liberate Mallaby, that it had not been possible to stop Luciano, the trusted friend of agent 1400.
That same day, in a message sent at 11.59pm from London, Bern was informed that Olaf had been released – and not through Luciano’s intervention.21 Despite this fact, there were still no concerns at SOE about the credibility of Luciano and the other Italian collaborators.
Agent Olaf had avoided the firing squad and was about to begin his new role. He was helped by the particular phase of war, in which the new Italian executive, whilst clearly hesitant in its decision making, had more to gain by keeping such a unique, important prisoner at its disposal, as opposed to dispatching him. Furthermore, the area where his capture took place was far from the war’s front line in southern Italy.
Mallaby’s capture had already generated significant controversial diplomatic activity between Italy and Great Britain and this had greatly reduced the risks to him. Agent Olaf had become a key pawn for the two opposing sides, and the importance of those involved in the diplomatic discussions suggested that the prisoner was more than a mere paratrooper.
Previously, in a Most Secret message dated 26 August 1943, the Foreign Office had informed the Holy See that an Englishman with an ID card in the name of Aldo Guazzini, who had parachuted in civilian clothes into the area around Como on the night of 13/14 August, had been captured by the Italian authorities. The message sought confirmation that he had not been shot immediately.
On 26 August, in order to address the issue, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Holy See Sir D’Arcy Godolphin Osborne, 12th Duke of Leeds,22 was asked to check with due urgency whether Mallaby had already been shot, and, if not, to intervene – unofficially, it was recommended – to prevent his execution in the following manner: ‘Unless there are strong objections, by any means that is useful, making it clear that we are considering the offer of suitable Italian prisoners in exchange.’23
The author of the message expressed his conviction that any sort of approach would save Mallaby’s life at this stage of the war. The message ended with an appeal to act with the utmost urgency.24
As a demonstration of the extreme secrecy and general disorder surrounding the affair, an urgent and confidential message was sent from London at 8.30am on 24 August 1943 (i.e. when the turning point for Mallaby had already been decided, but not actioned). It stated that all possibilities of obtaining the release of agent Olaf should be explored, without the need to seek constant authorization, and even avoiding the involvement of Massingham.25
This message also noted that Vatican channels would probably be opened up and hinted that the treatment of a British officer might have been different to that previously reserved for captured Italian traitors (more or less immediate execution).
Mallaby was not an officer, but, with strategic timing, on 24 August 1943 he was unofficially promoted to second lieutenant. This would help Mallaby in his prison questioning by the Italians, increase his standing in the eyes of those with whom he would be dealing and raise concern over his status as a prisoner. The appointment was communicated to those who needed to know by order of Allied Forces HQ.26
So, following complaints from other departments about the resources allocated to saving Mallaby, SOE’s leadership clarified on 28 August that the agent it was trying to safeguard was a British Army officer and full English national, effortlessly making use of his promotion to increase his chances of survival.27
At this stage, Dick Mallaby’s fate remained the same. Despite the fact that he had become a key figure in the new scenario established in Portugal, nobody in Rome or Italy knew about it on account of Castellano’s lack of communications, and it was thought that his execution was still a possibility.
SOE’s leadership, in the meantime, had not been knocked back by the initial failure of Operation Neck, but it finally began to have some doubts about the Italian structure managed by McCaffery.
A series of messages over the following days reveals the high level at which negotiations were being conducted, including the direct involvement of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raffaele Guariglia, as requested by the Secretary of State for the Vatican, Cardinal Luigi Maglione. This produced the first tangible results: news was received that Mallaby was alive and well and would probably be transferred to Rome soon.
On 27 August, it was revealed to Massingham that in addition to diplomatic efforts via the Vatican, the Castellano option also existed as a means of securing Mallaby’s freedom, though surely it was impossible that Massingham did not already know about this!
These communications as a whole reveal the secretive nature of SOE. On occasion, this led to strange malfunctions and operational wastefulness.
On 30 August, Roseberry informed Massingham that agent Olaf would by now have arrived in Rome, and that this ruled out the possibility of any escape attempt that would jeopardize both his exchange and his employment by Castellano. On the same day, as already mentioned, Bern regretted having been unable to stop Luciano in time.28
Obviously unaware of the developments, on 20 September Massingham was asked by the Foreign Office if agent Olaf was safe, to cancel the request to the Vatican; on the 22nd, Massingham confirmed that there was no
longer any need.
By this date Mallaby was working almost officially alongside and for (some of) the Italians.29
SOE’s gamble had paid off.
Castellano had left Lisbon on 23 August with a copy of the Short Armistice, and finally arrived in Rome on the 27th, where he relayed the Allied conditions to Marshal Badoglio and the Italian Foreign Minister Raffaele Guariglia. First of all he issued urgent orders to have Mallaby brought to the Supreme Command and taken into his personal custody. Prior to this, as soon as he crossed the border into Italy, he had ordered that the English prisoner should not be executed, as promised to Roseberry.
And so it was that Mallaby was rapidly transferred from San Donnino Prison in Como to Regina Coeli Prison in Rome, where he arrived on 29 August.
He did not stay there long, as what was agreed in Lisbon quickly began to take shape. Having left Regina Coeli Prison, the young Englishman, while being driven by car through the centre of Rome and unaware of the positive outcomes that had been achieved in his favour, was afraid that his brief journey, through streets and past monuments and palaces, was only taking him to a firing squad. The comfortable method of transport used, however, allowed for a glimmer of hope.30
At the end of his short journey, the British agent was astonished. He had been driven to a majestic old building with obvious military importance – in fact the most militarily and strategically important location in Italy: Palazzo Vidoni, home to the Supreme Command of the Italian Army. It was the last place where an enemy soldier should have been.
Mallaby was brought before Brigadier-General Giuseppe Castellano and Franco Montanari, neither of whom he had ever met before. Castellano informed Mallaby, in a rather peremptory manner, that he was in possession of a British radio transmitter with which the agent was to immediately contact Allied Force HQ in Algiers.
Mallaby, speaking in Italian, objected that, as a British soldier, he could not obey Castellano’s orders. He was then shown the letter from Roseberry.31
An Englishman Abroad Page 11