Although the armistice was signed on 3 September, it was agreed to keep it secret until such a time as the Allied leadership was ready to implement it in line with their planned operations on the Italian peninsula. The original discussions had suggested that it would not be implemented until 12 September.
On 3 September, Marshal Badoglio met with Italy’s military leaders in Rome, but did not mention the signing of the armistice.
The Allies’ forthcoming plans for the peninsula envisaged that the Italian surrender would be announced simultaneously with a massive landing around Salerno and a parachute drop by the American 82nd Airborne Division north-west of Rome (Operation Giant II), something which had formed part of the agreement to support the Italian defence of Rome from the Germans.
The Allied invasion of the Italian mainland began on 3 September. The Allied XIII Corps crossed the Straits of Messina from Sicily to Reggio di Calabria, and gained a first foothold on the toe of Italy. The landings were lightly opposed, with German forces electing to withdraw northwards. The Italian forces in the area for the most part also offered little resistance.
On 5 September, in message No. 29, the Allies informed the Italian Supreme Command that Brigadier-General Maxwell Taylor would arrive in the early hours of the 8th to agree all the details of the planned Giant II airborne landings near Rome, with ‘full powers from the Supreme Allied Commander regarding the paratrooper operations’. The transcript of this message in the Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito contains the following postscript: ‘It is not clear if and when it was received.’54 In reality, the message had probably been ignored.
On 6 September, Algiers sent a message to Rome expressing some of General Castellano’s personal needs: ‘Please send me another pair of boots with my military aide, another bottle of “citross” from “NAI”, my glasses and the cigarettes in my office.’ This was clearly a coded message, given that the photos of Castellano in the act of signing the Italian surrender show him wearing a pair of glasses.
Messages Nos. 34, 35, 36 and 37 sent by Drizzle on 6 September bear witness to the rapidly and dramatically evolving situation, and make clear how everything that was happening at the time, in both Italy and the wider Mediterranean, revolved around the communications between Mallaby and the SOE base at Massingham. The four messages are transcribed as follows:
Please confirm receipt of the following message contained in this number (34) and number (35): please maintain constant vigilance every day for a very important message that will be sent between 9 and 10 GMT [Greenwich Mean Time], I repeat 9 and 10 GMT, on the 7th or after the 7th September, I repeat 7th September. Once you have received this important message, you will need to immediately respond that it has been received and understood.
Besides all the other agreements for the announcement of the great (G) day, the Italian radio broadcast by the BBC will present two brief news items on the Nazi German activity in Argentina between 1130 hours Greenwich time and 1245. I repeat between 1130 and 1245 Greenwich time.
This transmission will indicate the great (G) day.
Telegram No. 36. There will be no, I repeat, there will be no special music program as requested, please acknowledge receipt.
It is very important, I repeat very important, that you should be ready to receive my messages every three hours or less, I repeat every three hours or less, until otherwise notified.
This is No. 37. I will have numerous important messages for you during the next few days which must not, I repeat must not be delayed. I tried to send you three messages after 1900 hours the other night.55
The information communicated was unequivocal: the day of the announcement of the Italian armistice was very close and the agreed forms of communication were being renotified. The news came from the person who had predicted, and convinced all those who had to know, that these events were scheduled for 12 September: Brigadier-General Giuseppe Castellano.
Nevertheless, on 7 September, Italy’s political–military leaders were apparently taken by surprise when they officially learned that the announcement of the Italian surrender, the principal landing at Salerno and the Giant II landing near Rome would actually take place, in rapid succession, beginning on the 8th.
Those responsible for the catastrophe that engulfed Italy in September 1943 have always maintained in their defence that they assumed (basing their supposition on the conjecture reported by Castellano) that the surrender would be disclosed on 12 September, and, therefore, that they were taken by surprise to discover the actual date was the 8th.
But what could have changed in those four extra days, regarding the actual proposals and the existing political–military situation? The Germans, whether their armed forces were strong or weak, were nonetheless present in Rome, and only through a planned anticipation of the Salerno landings before the announcement could Field Marshal Albert Kesselring’s forces have been drawn from their Roman barracks and sucked towards Salerno. Secondly, would the Italian leadership, within the space of a couple of days or so, have discovered a lucidity and willingness to take firm action, instead of cunningly waiting for events to happen before trying to shape them to their advantage? Many factors lead us to doubt that this would have happened. Conversely, what clearly emerges too is the Allies’ strategic myopia in this period in their handling of events, and, above all, their inability to amend their planning, at least at the tactical level.
On the other side, the Germans’ behaviour was becoming more hostile by the day.
The pressure on the Italian leadership at this point was very intense.56
The Allied High Command was by now having doubts about the Italian desire to engage the Germans around Rome following the proclamation of the armistice, and so Brigadier-General Maxwell D. Taylor of the 82nd Airborne Division undertook the daring reconnaissance mission (announced on 5 September, in message No. 29) to assess the prospects of Giant II’s success. Accompanied by USAAF Colonel William T. Gardiner, Taylor arrived in the Italian capital late on 7 September, following a secret disembarkation at Gaeta in Lazio. After spending the night at Villa Badoglio, located between Via Bruxelles and Via di Villa Grazioli, in Rome, they learned from a recently awoken Marshal Badoglio that the Kingdom of Italy did not intend to proclaim the surrender duly signed, nor guarantee the security of the airports needed for Operation Giant II. Badoglio also requested a deferral of a few days for the armistice.
At 2.55am on 8 September 1943, the two American officers took advantage of Monkey’s availability and attempted to officially communicate news of the Italian volte-face via the following urgent message:
To the Commander-in-Chief of 15th Army Group. Given Marshal Badoglio’s statement about the impossibility of proclaiming the armistice and of guaranteeing the airports, Giant II is impossible. Reasons given for change are irredeemable lack of fuel and ammunition and new German measures. Badoglio asks Taylor to come back to report government opinions. Taylor and Gardiner await instructions. Acknowledge receipt. Taylor.
Unfortunately, this very message was unable to be deciphered in its first transmission and was only correctly transcribed more than three hours later, at the dawn of 8 September, X-Day.57
The following messages (15 and 16) from Italy’s leaders, transmitted by Dick Mallaby early on 8 September, left no doubt about Italian intentions in the hours leading up to the expected proclamation of Italian surrender. The first read:
Given changes and precipitous situation and presence of German armed forces in the vicinity of Rome, it is no longer possible to accept the immediate armistice since this will lead to the capital being occupied and the Government overthrown by the Germans. Operation Giant II is no longer possible given the lack of sufficient forces to secure the airports.
The second message stated:
General Taylor is ready to return to Sicily to report the government’s views and awaits orders. Badoglio.
In a growing atmosphere of dismay and tension, Brigadier-General
Taylor, having received the shock news and fearing a disaster, focused on cancelling his men’s departure for the Rome mission, take-off for which was scheduled for 6.30pm.
As the disturbing news reported through Mallaby reached Allied Forces HQ in Algiers on the morning of the 8th, the members of Eisenhower’s entourage were thrown into consternation (Eisenhower being in Bizerte at the time). After formally communicating, on their own initiative, the cancellation of Giant II, they asked the General Staff whether the Italian surrender should be announced anyway.
Further confusion on this key day was caused by an absence of immediate replies to the Italian messages from Allied HQ, as well as the failure to transmit by radio in English at the pre-established time the agreed coded announcement indicating the date of the surrender proclamation. It is not clear why this happened. However, the air raid that took place on Frascati (a small town south of Rome, which housed the German General Headquarters for the Mediterranean) – which was a further, pre-agreed event that announced X-Day to the Italians on 8 September – put paid to any doubts about Allied intentions regarding the proclamation.
At this precise point, Reuters, even before Eisenhower could manage to do so, announced the Italian surrender to the world, following a peremptory and unequivocal telegram sent to Allied Force HQ from Washington DC, which stated:
It is the opinion of the President and of the Prime Minister that, the agreement having been signed, you should give public announcement considering that this would facilitate your military operations … For the personal attention of Eisenhower and Smith. You should have no consideration, I repeat no consideration for the difficulties that this could cause for the Italian government.58
A hopeless and embarrassed Castellano was subjected to the direct outbursts of the Allied leaders in Sicily. The Italian negotiator had learned of the imminent proclamation of surrender even after his colleagues in the Supreme Command. In his report sent to General Ambrosio on 15 September 1943, he stated that ‘at about 12 p.m.’ General Eisenhower had informed him that ‘he had already telegraphed the Italian government’. Eisenhower showed him the telegram, ‘which was actually very extreme. In turn, I sent a telegram to the head of the government highlighting the gravity of the situation.’ However, according to the declarations of Luigi Marchesi, during his questioning on 17 December 1944 at the Commission of Inquiry for the failure to defend Rome, ‘Around 5 p.m. on the 8th, through the secret radio we learned that the armistice would be announced in the evening.’59
At the Palazzo Reale del Quirinale in Rome, at 5.30pm, an emergency meeting known as the Council of the Crown (Consiglio della Corona) was held. This involved almost all of Italy’s military leaders (excluding General Roatta, who was meeting with the Germans), the relevant government ministers and, of course, the king and Marshal Badoglio as head of government.
Simultaneously, Eisenhower and his staff, fearing that the whole negotiation instigated by Castellano could prove to be an elaborate trap and also, consequently, that the Salerno landings would be a scene of dreadful carnage, contacted Dodds-Parker to check if the Monkey–Drizzle transmissions were secure. Massingham’s commander answered that they were secure, in so far as the Germans had not managed to crack the Monkey–Drizzle codes (their only direct knowledge of what was happening came from interceptions of the transoceanic phone calls between Roosevelt and Churchill).
As the Italian Council of the Crown was fiercely debating a proposal to issue an official statement of denial and refusal of surrender, Major Marchesi, the lowest ranking among those present, intervened. He read out the third part of the lengthy Drizzle message No. 45, which had just been phoned through to him by Lieutenant-Colonel De Francesco.
The message contained Eisenhower’s furious reply to the Italian vacillation. Its content was hard-hitting, direct and unequivocal:
From the Allied Commander-in-Chief to Marshal Badoglio.
I intend to transmit via the radio the acceptance of the armistice at the time already agreed. If you or any part of your armed forces fail to cooperate as previously agreed, I will have the details of this deal published throughout the world. Today is X-Day and I expect you to do your part.
I do not accept your message of this morning postponing the armistice. Your accredited representative has signed an agreement with me and Italy’s only hope is linked to your adherence to this agreement. According to your urgent request, the airborne operations are temporarily suspended.
You have enough troops around Rome to ensure the momentary security of the city, but I request exhaustive information on the basis of which arrange as soon as possible for the airborne operation.
Immediately send General Taylor to Bizerte informing in advance of his arrival and the route of the airplane.
The plans have been made in the belief that you are acting in good faith and we have been prepared to carry out future military operations on this basis. Any failure now on your part to fulfill all the obligations of the signed agreement will have the most serious consequences for your country. No future action of yours could do more to give us back some confidence in your good faith, and [if refused] the dissolution of your government and your nation would consequently follow.
General Eisenhower.60
Drizzle message No. 49, sent by Castellano, doubled the dose:
Failure to announce the armistice by radio at 1830hrs this afternoon would be considered by the [Allied] commander-in-chief a failure to fulfill the solemn commitment already signed. If there is no announcement of the armistice at the appointed time, all the agreements will be null and void and the Allied commander-in-chief affirms that the non-announcement would prove disastrous for the future of Italy. Respond immediately.
The message that followed stated: ‘Essential that the proclamation of the Chief of the General Staff contains explicit orders to the armed forces to collaborate with the Allies.’61
Thus, Italy’s political and military leaders realized, having also listened to the king’s decisive words on the matter, that their unrealistic demands had been emphatically bulldozed over. The decision was taken to announce the armistice immediately.
The Italian surrender was officially announced first by General Eisenhower in a broadcast on Radio Algiers at 6.30pm Rome time, 8 September. Shortly after this, Marshal Pietro Badoglio made his way to the studios of EIAR (Ente Italiano per le Audizioni Radiofoniche – the Italian public service broadcaster) in Via Asiago, Rome, where he then broadcast the following message to the nation at 7.42pm that evening:
The Italian government, recognizing the impossibility of continuing the unequal struggle against the overwhelming enemy power, in order to spare the nation from further and more serious disasters, has requested an armistice from General Eisenhower, commander in chief of the Anglo-American allied forces.
The request was accepted.
Consequently, every act of hostility against the Anglo-American forces must cease by Italian forces everywhere.
However, they will react to any attacks from any other source.
The final part of the proclamation was highly ambiguous, and doubt persisted as to what exactly had been agreed in the armistice among the Italian population and its forces. This was one of the main points of blame put on the Italian government.
But one of the Monkey–Drizzle messages, sent just prior to the announcement of the armistice while confirming what would be announced by Eisenhower and Badoglio, provides a vital piece of information regarding the origins of this costly ambiguity. Message No. 10 sent by Drizzle on 8 September stated:
The [Allied] Commander-in-Chief, in order to prevent any possibility of misunderstanding by our troops who have not, I repeat, have not been informed of the facts, requests that the final paragraph of the Proclamation be changed to ‘Consequently, all acts of hostility towards the Anglo-American forces must cease on the part of Italian forces in every location. However, they will react to any attacks from any other source.’62
This key
message No. 10 attests that the decisive and controversial and ambiguous part of the proclamation was the work of the Allied leadership.
According to the prior agreements, the radio announcements made by Badoglio and Eisenhower should have been simultaneous. The Monkey message transmitted by Mallaby around the same time gave the Italian reply to Eisenhower’s earlier ultimatum, and explained the lack of synchronicity. The message did not come from Marshal Badoglio, however, but from the Italian Supreme Command. The Italian Supreme Command justified themselves in the following terms:
The failure to receive radio signal agreed and delayed arrival your No. 45 has not permitted diffusion agreed. Proclamation taken place as requested also without your message. It is sufficient for us engagements taken. Excessive hurry – found our preparations incomplete and has caused delay sailing fleet.
Finally, one way or another, the Italian surrender was officially public knowledge.
In his memoirs, Mallaby recalls that immediately after the announcement, like in a miracle he was embraced by the Italian soldiers. Wine was brought out to celebrate the common triumph over the Germans.63
‘After all we were no longer enemies’ pondered Mallaby in his secret diary.
Despite having first-hand knowledge of the whole situation, Dick Mallaby was unaware of the Italians’ unprepared state. But, only a few hours after the announcement of the surrender and the celebratory refreshments, Mallaby realized that the situation was deteriorating.
As time passed, he understood that he was once again facing a dangerous, out of control situation, while at the same time still burdened with managing the incoming and outgoing messages, which were flowing frenetically during those dramatic hours.
In the early hours of the following day, 9 September, the main Allied invasion force landed near Salerno on Italy’s western coast, in Operation Avalanche. It was led by General Mark W. Clark’s US Fifth Army, which contained the British X Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division in reserve. Avalanche was supported by Royal Navy battleships and fleet carriers.
An Englishman Abroad Page 13