Immediately after the landing, a brief German bombardment of Brindisi ensued, which was countered successfully by the guns of the ships at anchor. This took place just when Mallaby was setting up his equipment in a tower room in the Swabian castle in the city (which housed the Admiralty’s headquarters) to give his transmissions a better chance of success.
Mallaby transmitted another historical piece of news: the king of Italy was now under the protection of the Allies. In his secret diary he states that:
The Germans had by now left the town and there seemed to be little danger other than from the Italian ack ack which went into operation on the slightest excuse. Not that they had much ammunition left, for most of it had been shot away in the glorious firework display to celebrate the armistice. It was therefore something of a relief to operate under these conditions, but 24 hour watch was still mantained.
Mallaby’s private memoirs also reveal that he was asked, in case of contact with German forces, to respond that he was Radio Marshal Guazzini of the Italian Army Transmissions Section. The request jarred glaringly with the workman’s overalls that Mallaby had been wearing for almost a month. This small detail seems to further counter the hypothesis of an agreement between the Italian and German leaderships, while endorsing the considerable confusion surrounding, and lack of information available to, the Italian High Command at that point.
Meanwhile, Massingham sent anxious messages reiterating the urgent request for updates on the situation in all parts of the Italian peninsula and to do everything to guarantee complete control of the land, air and sea (including Sardinia). In the following hours, it also asked when the radio left in Rome would begin to transmit, demonstrating that the Italian catastrophe had not been fully understood by the Allies.82
On the morning of the 11th, Dick Mallaby continued his work; everybody desperately sought information on the situation in Rome and in other parts of Italy and Europe. Massingham sent an emphatic message from Castellano: ‘The Germans are suffering…Above all Italy will arise like one man and we will take every German by the throat.’
According to Mallaby’s memoirs, the first contact between the Allies and the core of Italian leaders now in Brindisi took place the same day with the arrival of a British submarine, but he could not meet the crew because ‘my duties did not allow my leaving of the set’.
SOE had dispatched to Apulia Captain Teddy De Haan, Captain Freddie White, and two radio operators: Sergeant Ken Royle and Edward Archibald Case (the latter remembered for his incredible speed on the telegraph key). The group, during the journey to Brindisi, always kept their radio, code plans and cyphers wrapped in straw, with matches to hand, in case of contact with enemy forces.
De Haan had witnessed Mallaby’s departure for Italy on 13 August and had been present at the historic signing of the Italian surrender at Cassibile on 3 September. He appears in some of the photos of the latter, demonstrating the critical role played by SOE in the armistice.
On 12 September, Dick Mallaby, having learned of his colleagues’ arrival, set off to find them at the Hotel Internazionale, which had been requisitioned. This, however, was made more difficult by the poor state of his clothing, which he had worn for over a month.
An Italian officer generously gave him 10,000 lire to buy something decent, but Mallaby, eager to meet his colleagues, headed straight into the hotel’s lobby, where he was immediately thrown out. Fortunately, he was recognized by Teddy de Haan, who, along with his other colleagues, besides reviving his spirits with some food and drink, also managed to sort him out with an urgently needed bath, his first in four weeks.
Thus De Haan, who was with Mallaby at the beginning of his mission, in fact marked the happy ending of it.
The British soldiers then found an almost complete officer’s uniform for Mallaby (although the lack of cap incurred the wrath of a zealous superior) and arranged a room for him in the hotel, where he took the wireless link.
In the course of some modest celebrations, Mallaby received official news of his promotion to second lieutenant (officially effective from 24 February 1944!). The following day Mallaby caused considerable amazement among the Italian soldiers he had been spending time with, when they saw the person they thought was an Italian sergeant-major dressed as a British officer.
A few days later, De Haan, together with an exhausted Dick Mallaby, Major Marchesi and Major Maurice Page, set up, at the Hotel Impero, the first Anglo–Italian special wireless telegraphic communications group. It focused on special operations, chiefly at that time making secret contact with the clandestine organizations that had risen in Rome and elsewhere against the German occupation. This was an additional heavy job, because the staff continued working on the secret transmissions to and from North Africa and London.
Mallaby’s diary reveals that there were heated discussions about just how far the cooperation with the Italians ‘could or was to go’, but also that after a few days’ instruction he realized ‘what excellent material’ the first trainees were (coming from the Italian Navy and Genio Trasmissioni).
Over the following days, Mallaby carried out further valuable work using Monkey, coordinating the movements of the Allies in the Italian peninsula and acting as a bridge between the embryonic structures of what would be called the Kingdom of the South and the Allies themselves. He also acted as the link to the various branches of the Italian armed forces scattered across Europe, which were subject to different destinies, of differing tragic proportions.83
The transmission traffic managed by Mallaby was even more intense than in the previous days. The problem that immediately presented itself was how to adapt the cryptography of the transmissions to the much higher number of messages, as well as increasing and diversifying the groups of cyphers available.
By now, the Monkey–Drizzle system had its days numbered, but its swan song comprised a series of further important and historical communications. In message No. 38 dated 11 September 1943, Badoglio issued a sterile, incoherent attempt at a motivational message to the scattered and confused Italian armed forces.
Other messages that day had greater relevance and more precision. For example, Massingham pointed out the dangerous behaviour of some Italian aircraft in the combat zone, which, despite making friendly signals, were flying too close to those of the Allies, and risked being shot down.
On 12 September, Brigadier-General Castellano sent a message from Algiers to Brindisi for the attention of the Italian Foreign Minister (who was actually still in Rome). It stated that Allied intelligence had requested all Italian diplomatic representatives in neutral countries (in particular, the consul in Lourenço Marques, modern Maputo, in Mozambique) to forward to them any information of military interest in their possession, even information previously acquired by the German intelligence services.
The following day, Castellano, while requesting news and updates from the Italian Supreme Command, complained that he did not even know its new location, and asked where the departing Allied mission should head for, something which indicated the enduring chaos of the situation. The same problem was reported to Mallaby. And when Massingham’s leaders had reported with friendly sarcasm that they had fallen asleep awaiting wireless telegraphic contact to resume, Mallaby checked the message, revealing that he was in Brindisi, adding, with equal sarcasm, ‘therefore Italy’.
On the same day the Allied mission arrived in Apulia, preceded by an imperious message from Algiers to Badoglio forbidding any publicity about this. The mission was led by the British Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Mason-MacFarlane and the diplomats Robert D. Murphy (for the United States) and Harold Macmillan (for the United Kingdom) and its first act was the eviction of Italian Chief of Staff of the Army from the Hotel Internazionale.
An urgent message from Algiers asked that it be pointed out to the Italian population (which when subjected to nearby shellfire, as many often were, would wave white flags) that the Allies had no choice but to target the German lines of communication i
n order to hinder their movements.84
At this point, Mallaby’s work mainly comprised the reception of messages, decoding the multiple requests from Italian commanders (fighting the Germans from Sardinia to the Aegean Sea) and messages from the Allied mission personnel arriving in Apulia (who needed information on the availability of airports, transport and infrastructure).
Confusion was endemic in this period, and the Monkey–Drizzle transmissions once again constituted the only form of communication between the Italian nucleus in Brindisi and the Allies. They also served as a link between the scattered groups of Italian soldiers who were attempting to control the overwhelming situation as best they could. On 13 September, for example, Algiers requested an update about General Giacomo Carboni, who was in charge of the defence of Rome, asking if he was in Brindisi. The following day, General Ambrosio ordered Brigadier-General Castellano to try to establish communications with the diplomatic missions ‘since it is impossible for us to do so’.
Mallaby was tasked with receiving and transcribing another famous message from the Allies in this phase, the content of which was not particularly pleasant for Badoglio. In this message, the head of the Italian government was bluntly invited to take action to liberate Italy from German control.
Pietro Badoglio, with typical nonchalance and the detachment from reality that characterized his efforts in this period, communicated via Mallaby his great happiness at the arrival of the Allied mission in Brindisi and proposed a summit meeting to discuss ‘further actions in the Italian theatre, which, naturally, we are experts in’. The debate will continue as to whether this message resulted from an unconscious detachment from reality, or was a deliberate attempt to evade his duties.
From Algiers, however, on the same day, 13 September, Castellano sent the following message in code: ‘We are sorry that the cigarettes are so bad.’ This confirms that coded sentences had been previously agreed between the Italians, in order to exchange information without being understood by the Allies. Probably, considering the aforementioned message on 6 September, cigarettes meant the ‘situation of the Italian Supreme Command’.
The message sent by Monkey to Massingham on 14 September provides clear evidence of a further major strategic error on the part of the Allies, regarding their evaluation and management of events in the wake of the Italian capitulation. In this, the Italian leadership in Brindisi asked Brigadier-General Castellano to point out to the Allies that, ‘as we are unable to operate at sea, due to the armistice, vital strategic positions have already fallen and are likely to fall into German hands. These are the Ionian Islands, Valona, Corsica, Elba. There is an urgent need for naval forces, including Italian ones, to monitor the situation and hinder landings.’85
There was no response to this request and what had been predicted by the Italians actually happened.
From 18 September, London’s SOE leadership finally started sharing some details of Dick Mallaby’s daring adventure with Bern, stating for the future that: ‘we consider that the spiritual side of resistance is of paramount importance if we are to forestall the risk of apathy in the German occupied region. We are therefore infiltrating leading members of the Giustizia e Libertà movement and wish you to support all the elements likely to keep the people keep fighting; funds particularly for support of workless become important’ and conceding that ‘our knowledge of resistance movements and figures deriving from your work in recent months has proved to be of great value’. A few weeks later, this assessment would be blatantly contradicted, when the true nature of the Italian resistance movement was revealed to SOE’s astonished leaders in Apulia by the Italians.
On the 20th, Roseberry sent a conciliatory note to McCaffery explaining that at the outset of the matter, there was little certainty over the good faith of the Italians. He also stressed that distubring the discussions while events were ongoing would have had fatal consequences, given the extreme secrecy surrounding them.
But this message contains further important information, highlighting, while at the same time noting that it should not be repeated, another careless statement by Castellano. According to him, the inability to make rapid decisions after the overthrow of Mussolini, which resulted in the influx of large numbers of German troops, was the fault of the king and Badoglio, whom he described as ‘older than their years’.86
On 21 September Roseberry sent another message to McCaffery, which is essential for any study of the events of the period. It read:
The armistice is a purely military instrument and only military consideration with the Italian military considerations have any weight at present.
Our view is that we must take full advantage of collaboration with the Italian military staff whilst independently supporting the liberal elements…. Our chief preoccupation has been and still is firstly to ensure complete withdrawal of Italian military resistance to allies and accordingly fullest possible measure of military collaboration. This could only be done with the de facto government.
Badoglio and company regard a military government as the only form which will work at present and this cannot be disputed as regards the area on our side of the line.
Badoglio undoubtedly expected to be able to hold Rome and south of Rome and present military situation was not envisaged in his plans.
But the most striking statement, one that is characteriscally ramshackle and groundless in nature, appears at the message’s end:
For your strictly private guidance. General Castellano gave J (Roseberry: e.n.). the inside story of the original coup and it is evident that they and Ambrosio merely regard Badoglio as a useful instrument to be discarded when no longer needed. Ambrosio is the real power at present.87
Ambrosio may have been the real power in that moment, but on 18 November 1943 he was replaced by Giovanni Messe: a decision endorsed and authorized by the Allies given their absolute domination of the weak government of King Vittorio Emanuele and Badoglio.
Castellano evidently thought he had carried out his mission in an irreproachable manner, and had no remorse for the armistice catastrophe. Being unable to contain himself, he did not even understand that such statements, regardless of their validity, always leave a bad impression, notably among the British. In their wake, and because of the way he behaved, he never managed to appear as if acting in good faith during the negotiations.88
Meanwhile, it was only on the 22 September that the Foreign Office was informed that the mediation of the Vatican was no longer required to save agent Olaf. This was further proof that the unexpected developments in Operation Neck had been kept secret. On the same day, Dick Mallaby, who clearly had not been allowed to do so up to that point, sent a message to Cairo for the attention of Christine Granville, informing her that he was safe and sound.
Over the following days, SOE’s leadership in Massingham and London were forced to explain why they had enjoyed full exclusivity in managing the Italian capitulation. The need for these clarifications partly stemmed from the intense, unrestrained frustration felt by some members in competing offices, which had led them to speculate, in the absence of better suggestions, that the occupation of Rome by the Germans had been a consequence of this exclusivity.
On 28 September 1943, with ill-concealed pride after ‘so many requests’, Cecil Roseberry in his capacity as head of Department J of SOE circulated among the few authorized to know the previously mentioned memorandum relating to Dick Mallaby’s first mission, entitled ‘The Olaf Story’.89
The enormous importance of what Mallaby had accomplished was recorded and freely recognized by those in the know. But amnesia at all levels, in Britain and in Italy, followed.
Over three densely packed pages, Roseberry summarized the details of Mallaby’s involvement in the negotiations for the Italian capitulation and his journey to Brindisi. He also revealed that the British agent was training Italian wireless telegraphists at that time, but was itching to begin a new mission in enemy or occupied territory.90
The reason
for the underestimation and ignorance of Mallaby’s achievements, which have endured for decades, is highlighted by Massingham’s commander, Dodds-Parker. He remembers how, at the time, few were party to the contents of the Monkey–Drizzle messages, and above all, that Eisenhower in person had ordered that knowledge of the part SOE played in the Italian surrender ‘should be kept to a minimum’.
In his 1984 memoirs, Dodds-Parker complained that even he had not had the slightest opportunity to check the details of the events that he was about to recount, because, despite the recommendation of a former prime minister, he had not been allowed to access the relevant documentation. Up until the extensive declassification of documents in the 1990s and later, complaints of this kind were routine among British academics. Even Michael R. D. Foot pointed out that, thanks to the documentation left by SOE in Denmark, academics there had been able to draw on an abundance of sources that were unavailable to those in Great Britain.
Eisenhower, on the other hand, recognized that the events in which Mallaby was a key player had changed the course of World War II, completing a series of ‘negotiations, secret communications, clandestine journeys of secret agents and frequent meetings in hidden places’, where ‘plots of various kinds were hatched, only to be abandoned because of changing circumstances’ that ‘if encountered in the fictional world, would have been scorned as incredible melodrama’.91
According to Leo Marks, the unpredictable developments leading on from Operation Neck guaranteed SOE, for the first time, the express appreciation of Churchill and the British General Staff, an event that would be repeated only once again, when SOE agents in Denmark managed to pass on valuable information about the German missile site at Peenemünde. They also brought further pleasure to the Baker Street Irregulars, who had handled the matter in splendid isolation without interference from their rivals in SIS.
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