The first stage of their journey was to the Bergamo mountains, a quieter spot than Milan, which was to be their final destination. The radio equipment would travel separately for security reasons.
Unfortunately, despite the delays, which were due mainly to the arrests of Parri and other important members of the Italian resistance, the mission lacked adequate preparation, especially regarding their movements and false documents, both on account of the trust placed in the abilities of Don Giovanni Barbareschi, and the lack of involvement of the head of the SOE Lugano branch.
On the evening of 14 February 1945, Mallaby’s group, led by two smugglers, secretly crossed the border between Switzerland and Italy through the Val Cavargna, a popular route for contraband traffic, soldiers on the run and spies; they had no radio sets and codes with them because they were already in Italy. Theirs was not an easy passage, because in order to avoid suspicion, it was decided that no one would wear mountain boots, even though the area was covered in snow.
The four rested for a couple of hours in a small mountain shelter near Carlaccio after their hard night march, in which the only kind of comfort was a bit of wine and two beds that were much sought after.
At dawn on the 15th, they came within sight of Lake Como. After a couple of hours of further walking, the group crossed Lake Como, from Menaggio to Varenna, aboard a rented boat. And there the problems began.
The plan was that at this point the group would travel by car to Bergamo, having found a safe way to get hold of one. This was not possible, and so the four (separately, so as not to arouse suspicion) reached Lecco ‘laughing and joking with the other hitch hikers’ on board a big truck with a trailer.
Instead of pressing on towards the Bergamo mountains, Don Barbareschi persuaded Mallaby to head straight for Milan, where he had ‘many friends who could help us’. A car was found in Lecco, but as it would take a few hours to get it ready, the four went to a tavern to refresh themselves. It was a decision that proved fatal.
Mallaby prudently decided not to sit with the two priests. This appeared to be a good decision because, after a while, he noticed that another client and the owner appeared to be taking a particular interest in the imprudent conversation of the two men, who ‘rather forgot that they were still in danger and spoke too loudly and openly of matters which would have been better left unsaid’.
Following a tip-off by one of their travelling companions on the trucks, or by the client in the bar who had suddenly left the premises, a few minutes later two non-commissioned officers of the Brigate Nere (Black Brigade – more formally, the Corpo Ausiliario delle Squadre d’Azione di Camicie Nere) appeared. Although the documents of Mallaby, Barbareschi, Galassini and Zanin were in order, the somewhat agitated behaviour of the two priests led to personal searches.
Nothing compromising was found on Mallaby and Anselmo, but Giovanni Barbareschi was carrying a large amount of Swiss francs, while Don Zanin had Swiss cigarettes, powdered coffee and letters from Switzerland addressed to Italians, as well as a message from the former Senator Piero Puricelli in which he requested a significant sum of money for the priest to take abroad. This made the NCOs suspect that the four were smugglers, a positive result that appeared to offer them some hope.
The details of what happened next are recorded not only in Mallaby’s memoirs, but also in British reports and in the RSI documents acquired by the Allies at the end of the war.8
On 15 February 1945, Dick Mallaby was facing the double risk of being unmasked and recognized. Reflecting on the fact that Lake Como did not bring him much luck, the SOE agent hoped that no one recognized him as the paratrooper who, not even two years previously, had been in the same area, and in the same situation; or, that this did not emerge from the files.
However, things soon got worse. With some hesitation, especially from the two priests (only Barbareschi was in a cassock, adding further confusion and suspicion), the four stated that they had met on board the truck that had brought them to Lecco.
Immediately after this, a decisive and frightening detail was revealed: three of their false identity documents (prepared by an Italian collaborator at SOE’s Lugano branch) gave the same address in Milan (No. 1 Via Sant’Agnese) and, to boot, the building corresponding to this address had been destroyed by a bombing raid two years earlier.9
Things went downhill rapidly, and the four were arrested. After a short trip to the nearby police station, they were taken to the Brigate Nere barracks in Lecco and detained in separate cells.
Shortly thereafter, an Allied air raid took place and in the confusion that followed, Don Zanin managed to escape.10
Mallaby, who had previously tried to escape through an open window, managed to leave his cell and reach the courtyard without being seen, but was immediately caught by a member of the Black Brigade, who fortunately did not shoot him.
And at this point, the nearly 26-year-old Mallaby began to act decisively. His first goal was, again, to abide by the first commandment of a prisoner of war facing execution: gain time, and, given that the original mission had failed, he believed that the only hope was to invent a very basic bluff, embellishing it with mentions of key figures at the highest levels.
As he noted in his private memoirs, ‘I sat down on a bed and summoned the situation. I was after all the Senior person there and the welfare of the party depended on me. I thought over my previous experiences and decided that the only way of gaining time and, therefore, of being able to escape was for me to take the matter up to as high a level as possible’.
In all likelihood, this attempt grew out of the fertile bed of confidential information about the situation in northern Italy given to him before departure, in order to provide him with some context on the situation in the area and the enemy’s status quo.
And so, with the air of someone who finally wishes to unburden themselves, Mallaby confidentially asked to speak with the station commander. He declared himself to be Captain Richard Tucker (creating a fictitious identity with a changed surname once again, to simplify things, and cleverly raising his military rank), on a special mission from Field Marshal Harold Alexander, tasked with passing on a highly confidential message for the exclusive attention of Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, Minister of War of the RSI.
The choice of Graziani was probably because he had been captured by the Italians.
Mallaby also had the foresight to specify immediately that his special mission did not involve spying, but was aimed exclusively at the direct transmission of a personal message to Graziani, and, given its highly secret nature, it could not be conveyed through the usual diplomatic channels.
Mallaby’s statements left the Brigate Nere officers in a puzzled and incredulous state, especially in view of the fact that Mallaby had been arrested in the company of two priests. He clarified that their presence was necessary, as the best means of contacting Graziani was considered to be via the Archbishop of Milan, Cardinal Alfredo Ildefonso Schuster: the two priests were to take Mallaby to the cardinal.
At this point the Brigate Nere officer decided to check this by cross-examining Don Giovanni Barbareschi. Unfortunately, according to Mallaby, the young priest continued to be of little help because – although certainly in good faith – he denied this version, accusing Mallaby of being an impostor, clearly fearful of having been betrayed by him.
Mallaby, with great skill and adapting his tactics to the circumstances, pointed out that the two priests were simply tasked with taking him to Schuster, and therefore did not know the details of his mission.
Thus, on the afternoon of the 15th, Mallaby was taken to the commander of the Como Brigate Nere, who immediately asked him for details of the message he had been instructed to deliver to Graziani.
Surprisingly, when he refused, Mallaby was not returned to a cell, but taken to the officers’ mess for the night, having solemnly promised that he would not attempt to escape. The atmosphere had suddenly become cordial, and Mallaby was told he had assumed the status of a pris
oner of war. Representatives of the RSI appeared interested in listening to the proposals brought by the so-called special messenger from the Allied leadership.
The next morning Mallaby was taken to Milan, where he met with Brigadier-General Edoardo Facdouelle, Chief of Staff of the Brigate Nere. Facdouelle welcomed him cordially, and expressed his conviction that Mallaby’s ‘special mission’ would be carried out successfully. After a brief discussion, Mallaby had lunch with Facdouelle, the head of the Fascist Women’s Auxiliary Forces and Facdouelle’s equally cordial daughter. During the lunch, Mallaby was led to believe that he would without doubt be returned to central-southern Italy, and was even asked to send greetings to Facdouelle’s brother, who lived in San Miniato in Tuscany.
On the morning of the 17th they left Milan, heading for Graziani’s headquarters. Mallaby was left alone while Facdouelle went to meet Graziani. Despite his insistence, Mallaby did not manage to meet the Marshal of Italy: he was informed that Graziani did not consider it opportune to speak with him because of the danger that the Germans would find out about it.
Mallaby was then taken to Volta Mantovana to the headquarters of the Italian counterespionage organization to be interrogated by the head of SID, Colonel of the Carabinieri Candeloro De Leo, who had been summoned from Milan, and personally given this ‘important mission’ by Graziani.
Dick Mallaby was surprised at the fact that, despite the often pre-dawn timings and it being winter, all his transfers, even the longest, took place in open-topped cars. It did not take him long to realize, when an intense Allied air raid began, and without any need for further explanation, that travelling in an open-topped car made jumping into the nearest ditch a lot easier. He also realized that even the cars of the highest institutional offices of the RSI were open-topped.11
After being once again impeccably hosted – even enjoying a real coffee, his first in a long while – the first meeting between Mallaby and De Leo took place on the 18th.12
De Leo, who informed Mallaby that Graziani could not meet him ‘for obvious reasons’ and had delegated him to do so, turned out to be a skilful and observant inquisitor. He employed a verification strategy that consisted of asking Mallaby to sign the minutes of his statements and then making him repeat them several times, with new statements and signatures, allowing for comparison between the various minutes.
Since his insistence on a personal interview with Graziani had borne no fruit, Mallaby began to reveal the details of his phantom mission, which with the passing of the hours he had been able to improve and refine, to an ever less inquisitorial and ever more interested De Leo. The latter confessed – sincerely or for some ulterior motive – to Mallaby his concerns about what could happen in northern Italy after the cessation of hostilities, saying that the RSI’s leadership strongly feared partisan reprisals, communist attempts to seize power through violence, and the resulting chaos. Mallaby enjoyed reassuring him, ‘revealing’ that the Allies had foreseen such a scenario, and had made specific plans to be able to oppose such reactions. With the consent of the RSI’s leadership, even the resistance forces could be exploited to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and damage to the assets and productive resources of northern Italy. Finally, Mallaby reiterated that he had been instructed only to report Graziani’s response to his superiors, having no power to negotiate.13
Mallaby pointed out that the Allies wanted to verify the possibility of agreeing a modus operandi with Mussolini’s republic, in order to avoid destruction in northern Italy by the increasingly brutal retreating German forces following Hitler’s scorched earth orders, together with the removal of industrial machinery and works of art.14
In order to avoid all this, a proposal was made to establish preliminary contact with the leaders of the RSI, with a view to setting up a permanent line of communication to make plans for the moment when the Germans began their foreseen retreat.
The detail of the proposal formulated by Mallaby to Graziani was as follows:
1In the event of a German withdrawal from northern Italy, the Italian troops under Graziani’s command should do everything possible to preserve Italian industrial installations and public services from destruction by the Germans;
2In such circumstances they should also do what they could to maintain law and order in the face of any attempt at disturbance from whatever quarter;
3Partisan formations, who would carry out similar tasks in the areas controlled by them, would be directed by Allied missions sent in at the appropriate time;
4These measures were aimed at avoiding unnecessary bloodshed alike between Allied and Italian Republican forces and between the latter and Partisan formations;
5In the event of Italian Republican forces being unable to keep order in difficult local situations, Alexander would send in adequate airborne forces for police duties.15
Dick Mallaby had laid out these five points on the basis of the information at his disposal and the concerns expressed to him by De Leo. Graziani, should he be willing to engage, could travel to Allied Force Headquarters on an RSI aircraft, or even an Allied one.
Finally Mallaby informed De Leo that because of his capture the plans were miscarried, so it would be necessary for him to collect the wireless equipment in Switzerland.
In his secret diary Mallaby reflected as follows: ‘I was very lucky that I managed to tell a story that proved to be entirely watertight and was not broken down in later cross-examination’.
De Leo concluded the meeting by assuring Mallaby that he would report the contents to Graziani, expressing a curious regret over the fact that the operation had lost some of its secrecy.
De Leo kept his word and on 19 February sent Graziani the declaration signed by Captain Richard Tucker containing the proposed conditions.
But in the Italian camp, the matter caused some embarrassment, partly because, just regarding the loss of secrecy, some of the Brigate Nere had already informed Benito Mussolini in person as early as 16 February. But the turning point was close and would still have been surprising, even if seasoned by moments of panic.
Mallaby could not know that, due to loyalty and transparency – or rather, due to the impossibility of doing otherwise – the RSI’s leadership did not intend to hide the matter from the Germans – and perhaps this was the subject of De Leo’s aforementioned regret.
In any event, the Italians did precisely this, and Mallaby, after the confidential conversation with De Leo, firstly remained confined and then was interrogated again.
Afterwards, Mallaby was told to pack his things. In the hall of the beautiful villa there was an SS captain, who, after introducing himself, kindly asked the British agent to follow him.
Mallaby felt the same sequence of emotions in the moments that followed as those he had experienced in August 1943 in Rome, when he had been escorted from prison. The most logical assessment seemed to be that he had fallen out of a (not particularly hot) frying pan and into the fire.
In his words, ‘My uneasiness increased further as looking over the shoulder of the officer who sat in the front seat, I noticed that he was reading a signed copy of my statement to Graziani. However, there was little to be done except carry on the bluff, for a slip at this stage would have meant the end of everything both for me and my friends in Como’.
Mallaby was shepherded into a German vehicle and driven to the headquarters of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD – the SS intelligence agency), at the Palazzo delle Assicurazioni, in Corso Vittorio Emanuele (now Corso Porta Nuova) in Verona.
Dick Mallaby would have felt reassured if he had known of the awareness that was spreading through part of the German military leadership regarding the inevitability of their defeat, and the consequent determination of most of them to achieve a viable exit from the war, avoiding as many of the foreseeable post-war consequences as possible.
Mallaby underwent a typical German interrogation: he began with the story of his life, from childhood to his capture. Everything was meticulously minuted and every
answer gave rise to further questions. There was no chance to relax, given that the interrogators switched over after brief summarizing consultations.
What his interrogators did not know was that Dick Mallaby understood German, so that he was able to follow the content of the conversations that took place in his presence and process his responses with greater efficiency and with more time to think. Moreover, in order not to fall into contradictions, Mallaby, as usual, recounted and confirmed, as far as was possible and prudent, personal details about himself that were true. Tuscany was by now under Allied control, and, as far as his family and their safety was concerned, there was now no possibility of it feeding back, nor of retaliation. Naturally, Mallaby was less sincere with the Germans about the details of his activities and, in particular, about his first Italian mission in August 1943 and everything that flowed from it.
The problems came when his interrogators asked him what his credentials were for this special mission. Mallaby replied that, for obvious reasons, he did not have any documents with him, but, once again improvising on the spot, he went out on a limb, saying that Archbishop Schuster would have received information about his mission directly from the British headquarters.
When asked how he was supposed to contact his command, Mallaby repeated that a radio was available in Switzerland. It was a shrewd but credible answer.
The Germans, however, did not see it as such, and it was interpreted as a clever attempt to evade German custody, and not come back. As the situation began to become more problematic, Mallaby felt like an unprepared schoolboy saved by the bell, as the umpteenth Allied air raid sent everyone rushing to the shelters.
An Englishman Abroad Page 17