Craveri 1980 emphasizes (p. 76) that even after 1943: ‘SOE peppered northern Italy with missions led by brave British officers, even in Garibaldine formations, who knows? Perhaps more to control them than to genuinely help them.’
An important, neglected truth.
10 TNA: HS 6/871.
11 TNA: HS 6/869.
12 TNA: HS 6/871.
13 Ibid. The simple ‘double message’ method was used for correspondence that contained place or personal names. The first message would give single letters (or less commonly numbers) in place of names; subsequent messages would provide keys to the meaning of these. The first message, for example, might read: ‘X has volunteered to go in Kelly’s place’. A second message transmitted shortly after would specify that X was ‘an Englishman named Mallaby’, adding that ‘we will refer to him as Y’, while a third message specified that ‘Y is agent Olaf’.
14 Ibid.
15 According to Howarth 1980 (p. 189), Mallaby had become one of the best radio-telegraphy instructors, and among his students was Christine Granville (codename of the famous and celebrated Polish SOE agent Krystyna Skarbek, who conducted missions in Eastern Europe and France during the war).
Howarth describes Mallaby as a man ‘with kind, almost whimsical ways’, while according to McCaffery, Mallaby ‘possessed the kind of courage known as the cold, two o’clock in the morning type. But his appearance prompted a Swiss friend who met him later to say that one of the great strengths of England lay in its being full of fresh-faced pleasant youngsters like Dick, who were capable of going out and doing the man-sized jobs that he did’. John McCaffery, ‘No Pipes or Drums’ (unpublished memories: Imperial War Museum, London).
16 ACS: ACC microfilm, Public Safety, item: Cecil D. Mallaby, reel 166 C.
17 According to Pawley 1999 (p. 36), FANY Dorothy Temple had also developed a code plan, called Muscat (continuing the alcohol theme), for the Italian agents whom Mallaby was tasked with contacting.
18 Stafford 2011, p. 100. Bailey 2014, passim. When Giacomino Sarfatti learned that SIM had controlled his nine-month stint in Milan, he had to admitt that, despite Klein’s strange behavior, he didn’t rumble that Klein was in effect an enemy agent either, inferring that he was ‘handicapped by two things: (a) [by] my age (22 at the time) and my very little experience of life and men generally; [and] (b) by the fact that I had been repeatedly told both in London and Bern that I could trust [Klein] and rely completely on him. I was actually told he was [a] wonderful man and that I was going to be quite safe as long as he was looking after me’ (Bailey 2014, p. 327 and TNA: HS 9/1313).
19 TNA: HS 6/872.
20 Ibid.
21 TNA: HS 6/870.
22 Ibid.
23 Stafford 2011, p. 12; Dodds-Parker 1984, pp. 118–19.
24 The Most Secret report dated 28 September 1943 (entitled ‘The Olaf Story’) stated that Mallaby was sent to Massingham in part to avoid the risk (which appeared to be real) of him backing out due to the repeated postponements: ‘Once his morale was restored, plans were made to drop him “blind” over one of the northern Italian lakes and let him find a way to settle in one or other of the safe addresses provided to him’ (TNA: HS 6/775). This kind of statement, a rarity in the services, helps us understand the level of tension that constantly filled the lives of SOE agents.
25 Moore and Fedorowich 2002, pp. 107 and 258 (note). Attempts to recruit Italian prisoners captured in Africa and those resident abroad had very poor results, both quantitatively and qualitatively; on this point, see Bailey 2014, passim. The recruitment of prisoners for military purposes was obviously prohibited by international convention.
26 TNA: HS 6/870. This detailed memorandum specified that the toiletry bag, and above all the money, were the property of the administrative powers and were to be returned, subject to the issue of a specific receipt, if not used within the scheduled time frame for the operation. A request for this does not appear to have been issued.
27 TNA: HS 6/870-872.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 As John Le Carré recalls in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, even the best undercover agents were often betrayed by their footwear, it being difficult to change them, especially in winter. One of the most common mistakes by those involved in clandestine missions was providing agents working together or in the same area with identical clothing, as if they were school pupils or part of a sports team.
The clothing items for Mallaby’s mission were provided by an SOE-based workshop, the so-called G Topo unit, commanded by Malcom Munthe.
32 TNA: HS 6/870.
33 Ibid.; TNA: HS 6/872.
34 Ibid.
35 TNA: HS 6/870.
36 TNA: HS 6/872.
37 For security reasons, as already indicated, it was established that Mallaby and his technical equipment should travel separately. At Cairo station, concealment work was carried out so well that on 15 July Massingham was forced to enquire by means of a special message where the photographic films with the cryptographic codes had been hidden (TNA: ibid.).
38 Ibid.
39 For a description of the strains that agents were under on operations, see Foot 1984, p. 235 and Pawley 1999, p. 59. As noted by Foot 1984 (p. 235): ‘Besides the agent who is said to have died of fright, there were several more who were more or less violently disturbed by the strains they had to undergo: the strain of being one person while seeming to be another; the strain of keeping silent while everyone round them gossiped; the strain of not correcting the under-informed; the strain of being important but being thought a nobody; the strain of remembering strings of addresses too secret to be written down and too important to be forgotten; the unforgettable threats of arrest and torture if discovered; the lack of time, the lack of any chance entirely to relax; the perpetual uncertainty; the perpetual lack of sleep. The first thought of an important agent, pulled in at a shop control but not yet identified by the enemy, when he had been out there receiving arms for eleven nights in two weeks and other agents parachuted in, was not for his safety, nor for those for whom he was responsible – it was, “Finally I can sleep”.’
Pawley 1999 (p. 59) recalls the case of a wireless operator working in Yugoslavia who became convinced he was St Paul.
40 TNA: HS 6/870.
41 TNA: HS 6/872.
42 Ibid.
43 TNA: HS 6/870-872.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 In a communication dated 11 August from Bern, the city names were omitted from the addresses, so that initially, at Massingham, it was believed that the Via Calvi safe house was in Como. A further exchange of messages was needed to clear things up. The building in Via Calvi was destroyed a few days later by bombing, at the same time as the beginning of Operation Neck.
48 TNA: HS 6/870. According to the final reports, Mallaby would have arrived in Italy with a total of 210,000 lire – a truly remarkable sum.
49 Ibid.
50 TNA: HS 6/775.
51 TNA: HS 6/872. Other reports provided slightly different coordinates. However, what matters (and what is certain) is the actual place where Mallaby was brought back to land: Carate Urio.
52 On the night of 12/13 August 1943, Milan suffered perhaps the most violent of its many wartime raids. According to Christopher Woods in ‘A Tale of Two Armistices’, in K. G. Robertson, War, Resistance and Intelligence: Collected Essays in Honour of M.R.D. Foot, Leo Cooper: Barnsley, 1999, p. 3, due to the bombing the owner of the Milanese safe house known to Mallaby would have fled the city, and in panic would have destroyed the radio apparatus intended for agent Olaf. This lacks credibility, given that the apartment and the apparatus were managed by SIM, and I have found no documentary evidence to support this.
53 My interview with Mrs Anna Maria Rusconi.
54 Carate Urio is in the area where, on 28 April 1945, Benito Mussolini and Clara Petacci were shot, and where, after the war, Winston Ch
urchill holidayed with his artist’s brushes.
55 My interview with Mrs Anna Maria Rusconi and local newspaper La Provincia, 29 September 2016.
56 Malcolm Tudor, SOE in Italy: The Real Story, Emilia Publishing: Newtown, 2011, p. 17.
57 Around this time, on 18 August 1943, the leadership of SIM passed from General Cesare Amè to General Giacomo Carboni.
58 Daniele Lembo, in I servizi segreti di Salò (Grafica Ma.Ro srl Editrice: Copiano, 2001, passim) states that in 1942, SIM, despite having discovered a radio base in Milan and identified its operator, did not arrest the agent in question, but instead aided his activities, since the information he transmitted was not only carefully monitored, but was in fact provided by the British network in northern Italy that was being manipulated by SIM itself. Each transmission was monitored by an Italian listening station, which had its own cypher. Evidently, this station was the one managed by agent Galea (Sarfatti), under the full control of SIM, and was the one that agent Olaf – equipped with ad hoc ciphers for his mission – intended to use.
59 TNA: HS 6/872. Quite surprisingly SIM even knew Mallaby’s SOE codename for the mission (i.e. Olaf): NARA RG 226.
60 TNA: HS 6/776-780-872.
61 TNA: HS 6/872.
62 The Italian secret reports relating to Mallaby’s capture recorded that, according to confidential information, two additional parachute drops had taken place in the Lake Como area. Furthermore, according to other unconfirmed reports, two individuals wearing life jackets had been spotted in the Bellagio area in the early hours of the morning, and between Torriggia and Careno lights had been seen and aircraft engines heard. This had led to multi-agency search operations.
Following careful searches, all that was found was a rowing boat near Villa Frigerio at Nesso (TNA: ibid.)
63 Ibid. According to the accompanying note, this dossier was drawn up on the basis of the ‘Italian documents requisitioned’ and obtained by ‘C.I.’ (possibly referring to an agent from SIS’s Italian branch), through his contacts in Rome.
64 Ibid. Article 35 of the Instrument of Surrender signed at Malta on 29 September 1943 stated: ‘The Italian Government will supply all information and provide all documents required by the United Nations [i.e. the Allies]. There shall be no destruction or concealment of archives, records, plans or any other documents or information.’
65 Ibid. The concluding comment of the SOE report reveals an unsurprising detail. Mallaby’s false identity documents were ‘furnished by Cairo under general authority, but without express authority from “C” [i.e. SIS]’. Thus, it was recommended: ‘the least said the better’.
66 Ibid.
67 TNA: HS 6/870. In October 1943, as mentioned above, the levels of accumulated stress resulted in McCaffery suffering a nervous breakdown that required a four-week convalescence.
68 TNA: HS 6/872. This message also noted the embarrassing situation of having to wait until the Friday following Mallaby’s drop (i.e. six whole days) before attempting any contact.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. The codename Partito possibly referred to a member or a group of members of the Partito d’Azione (which had close ties with the British and SOE). This hypothesis is reinforced by an urgent message dated 23 August sent by London that indicated that some initiatives being considered to secure Mallaby’s release might expose the links between this party and SOE. This is another proof of the misplaced confidence gained by the group managed by SIM, just reflecting that even if the Fascism was gone in that moment in Italy, political parties were not legitimized.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 TNA: HS 6/870. The RAF’s operating procedures for dropping matériel and people were often criticized by SOE agents, as they considered them crude and dangerous, both for those on the ground in reception committees, and for those who had to jump (see Stafford 2011, p. 286).
76 TNA: HS 6/872.
CHAPTER 4: FROM DISASTER TO TRIUMPH
1 In a confidential memorandum dated 28 September 1943, SOE’s Department J recorded that a member of the Italian mission to Allied HQ in Africa had complained that the disinterest of British officials in considering the first Italian attempts to negotiate surrender had delayed the fall of Fascism by several months (TNA: HS 6/775).
2 For further details on Montanari, see Peter Tompkins, Italy Betrayed, Simon and Schuster: New York, 1966; Craveri 1980, p. 123.
3 Elena Aga Rossi, L’inganno reciproco - L’armistizio tra l’Italia e gli Angloamericani del settembre 1943, Roma – Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali – Ufficio Centrale per i Beni Archivistici – 1993, passim. Una nazione allo sbando. L’armistizio italiano del settembre 1943 e le sue conseguenze, Il Mulino: Bologna, 1993, passim. A Nation Collapses: The Italian Surrender of September 1943, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2000, passim.
4 Giuseppe Castellano, Come firmai l’armistizio di Cassibile, Mondadori: Milan, 1945, passim; La Guerra continua, Rizzoli: Milan, 1963, passim; Roma Kaputt, Gherardo Casini Editore: Rome, 1967, passim.
5 Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top, Doubleday & Company: New York, 1969, p. 147; Castellano 1945, p. 152 (note); Ruggero Zangrandi, 1943: 25 Luglio-8 Settembre, Feltrinelli: Milan, 1964, passim.
Regarding Castellano’s behaviour and beliefs, the following psychoanalytic explanation by Allied Force HQ on 10 September 1943 appears to be spot on, as Castellano’s bluffing became more evident: ‘Why had Castellano brought the negotiations to a head? Probably, AFHQ speculated, it was “chiefly due to his treatment by the Germans who apparently ignored the Italians militarily and told them nothing about operations”’ (Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Center of Military History, United States Army: Washington DC, 1993, p. 541 and note 4).
6 The message document features a prominent handwritten addition, including the words ‘My God!’, a clear indication of the reader’s surprise at some positive or unnerving aspect as reported. The anonymous amender of this message also underlined the part in which it was asked whether the proposed ideas on how to free Mallaby should be referred to ‘J.Q.’ (i.e. McCaffery).
7 A summary of the military and other discussions between Brigadier-General Castellano and General Eisenhower’s General Staff in Lisbon on 19 August 1943 can be found in Castellano 1945, pp. 217–18; Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Documenti diplomatici italiani, Nona serie: 1939–1943, vol. X (7 febbraio – 8 settembre 1943), Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato: Rome, 1990, pp. 851–57; and Aga Rossi, L’inganno reciproco, 1993, pp. 288–89.
8 Strong 1969, pp. 151–52.
9 TNA: HS 7/58 and TNA: 6/776. In his secret diary, written years after the events, Dick Mallaby wrote that the set and the signal plans were handed over to Montanari by ‘the Colonel in charge of the Italian section SOE in London’. Even if his recollections were private, Mallaby still felt the need not to reveal details about SOE organization.
10 Castellano 1945, pp. 116–17, 122–23 and 172. Tompkins’ version of events (Tompkins 1962, p. 110) matches this in most details – unsurprisingly, given the post-war contacts between the two authors.
During his interrogation before the Commission of Inquiry into the failure to defend Rome on 17 December 1944, Brigadier-General Castellano noted the following on this point: ‘After having made the arrangements about my trip and having been equipped with a radio and cypher, I rapidly headed for Rome’. He fails to mention (as normal in his official statements) the role of Dick Mallaby (Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’ Esercito – henceforth AUSSME – Diari Storici 2 G.M., ‘Mancata difesa di Roma’, b. 3000).
11 The British–American versions of the events during this period are mildly contradictory and partially conflicting. See Marks 1998, p. 359; Dodds-Parker 1984, p.137; Bailey 2014, pp. 310–11; Melton C. Davis, Chi difende Roma? I quarantacinque
giorni: 25 luglio–8 settembre 1943, Rizzoli Editore: Milan, 1973. p. 283.
12 Castellano 1945, p. 123. A. Wagg and D. Brown, No Spaghetti for Breakfast, Nicholson and Watson: London, 1943, p. 126. Ivan Palermo, Storia di un Armistizio, Mondadori: Milan, 1967, pp. 156–57.
13 Marks 1998, p. 359.
14 The secrecy of the Castellano mission and the lack of coordination with the Italian structures in Portugal had a positive consequence, as Ambassador Prunas had no need to lie when his German counterpart asked him for an information on intelligence about an Italian mission in Lisbon charged with surrender negiotiations.
15 Marks 1998, p. 359. TNA: HS 6/779.
16 TNA: HS 6/779. A message from a few days before (22 August) reported the unfounded opinion of Castellano that his leisurely return to Italy did not matter, as an Allied landing on mainland Italy was not considered imminent. It was the beginning of a catastrophic misunderstanding.
17 TNA: HS 6/872.
18 Ibid. As for American reactions, see Max Corvo, The O.S.S. in Italy 1942–1945: A Personal Memoir, Praeger: New York, 1990, p. 131; later (p. 167).
19 TNA: HS 6/872.
20 Ibid.
21 TNA: HS 6/775.
22 TNA: HS 6/872 In 1943, SIM had managed to install one of its agents as Osborne’s butler. He was able to remove and photograph the cypher used by the British diplomat, but this was discovered by the British, who began using this unorthodox channel to spread false information to the Italians.
23 TNA: HS 6/775-779-780-870-871-872.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 TNA: HS 6/775.
28 TNA: HS 6/872.
29 Castellano 1945 states (p. 123): ‘I did not encounter difficulties, as soon as I arrived in Rome, in tracking down the officer, who was immediately freed.’ This clearly shows he was led to believe that Mallaby was an officer (a fictitious promotion) and that the Italian leadership had no qualms about using a British agent.
30 TNA: HS 6/775.
31 Mallaby’s private memoirs confirm the controversial existence of this letter and the writer’s identity: ‘I was handed a letter from my Colonel, which from its contents left me in no doubt’.
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