by Bart Schultz
and it is of the first importance.
What is rather more puzzling, as noted in the previous section, is how
Sidgwick could have been so dramatic in his early statement of the dualism,
while in fact giving a rather weak account of the egoistic alternative. Shaver,
for example, in a careful analysis, allows that Sidgwick’s axioms do at least
serve to locate the debate between the rational egoist and the utilitarian:
“The issue turns on the rationality of taking up the point of view of the
universe.” But he claims that “Sidgwick’s considered view is that rational
egoism is neither self-evident nor of the highest certainty” but is “as
credible as utilitarianism.” And this considered view is problematic
because the credibility of egoism is scarcely made out.
The qualified wording here is important, since, on an ungenerous read-
ing, Sidgwick’s dualism would appear to involve a flagrant contradiction
between the claim that both egoism and utilitarianism are self-evident,
on the one side, and the use of the consistency criterion as a test of self-
evidence, on the other. After all, how could two inconsistent propositions
both be self-evident? Such supposed incoherence has been taken by some,
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such as Brink, as a reason for reading Sidgwick’s account, in externalist
fashion, as yielding a self-evident theory of rationality, in the shape of
rational egoism, and a self-evident theory of morality, in the shape of util-
itarianism – thus avoiding the incoherence by departmentalizing what it is
rational to do separately from what it is moral to do. Brink admits that
this is a philosophical reconstruction, however, and that it does not seem
to fit most of what Sidgwick actually says about rationality and moral-
ity, which he treats as a unity. Still, Sidgwick was not entirely consistent,
especially in his earlier work.
Shaver’s reading makes better overall sense. On this account, one possi-
bility would be that the “consistency test is a test for the highest certainty,
not for self-evidence,” since self-evidence is the concern of the first crite-
rion and the ultimate concern is the highest certainty (from eliminating
sources of error) to be had by meeting all the criteria. Thus, it could be the
case that egoism and utilitarianism are both self-evident and inconsistent
and therefore not of the highest certainty. But there is a still better in-
terpretation. Sidgwick’s “considered view,” according to Shaver, has him
agreeing that
rational egoism and utilitarianism do not possess the highest certainty. But when
he distinguishes between rational egoism and utilitarianism, on the one hand, and
the “self-evident element” expressed by the axioms on the other, he suggests that
neither rational egoism nor utilitarianism is self-evident. This is also the result one would expect from the “careful reflection” that yields self-evidence: Reflection
on the inconsistency of rational egoism with other beliefs of the same certainty
should (though need not) lead one to doubt its self-evidence. Sidgwick suggests
exactly this when he writes that from the inconsistency “it would seem to follow
that the apparently intuitive operation of the Practical Reason, manifested in these
contradictory judgements, is after all illusory.” (ME ). In this way the puzzle
raised by the critics is doubly dissolved. Sidgwick is left saying, plausibly, that
rational egoism and utilitarianism really are inconsistent.
This would seem to be the most sensible way to interpret Sidgwick’s
tendency to speak of “apparently self-evident” intuitions, and to be in
keeping with Sidgwick’s broadly fallibilistic attitude, though it must be
allowed that Sidgwick often did put his case in simplified form, and that
he at times seems to fit Shaver’s other interpretive strategy. Often enough,
he simply seems to be expressing his consternation that these two views,
epistemologically forceful when considered on their own terms, can yield
conflicting prescriptions when taken together and practically applied.
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At any rate, these points are important not only in their own right, but
also as preliminaries to addressing the question put earlier – namely, why
is Sidgwick so persuaded of the rationality of egoism? This, it seems fair
to say, is one of the most important and puzzling problems arising out
of over a century of commentary on the Methods. All the more so given
that it is manifest, as previous chapters have shown, that the problem of
self-sacrifice dominated Sidgwick’s life and in fact led him to produce the
Methods. Was the life of self-sacrifice, be it Christian or Comtean, really
the happiest one?
A key passage in the Methods points to the fundamental significance of
the differences between persons. Explaining that the egoist may avoid the
“proof” of utilitarianism offered in Chapter of Book IV by declining to
affirm that “his own greatest happiness is not merely the rational ultimate
end for himself, but a part of Universal Good,” Sidgwick continues:
It would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction between
any one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and that consequently
“I” am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a sense,
fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the
existence of other individuals: and this being so, I do not see how it can be proved
that this distinction is not to be taken as fundamental in determining the ulti-
mate end of rational action for an individual. And it may be observed that most
Utilitarians, however anxious they have been to convince men of the reasonable-
ness of aiming at happiness generally, have not commonly sought to attain this
result by any logical transition from the Egoistic to the Universalistic principle.
They have relied almost entirely on the Sanctions of Utilitarian rules; that is,
on the pleasures gained or pains avoided by the individual conforming to them.
Indeed, if an Egoist remains impervious to what we have called Proof, the only
way of rationally inducing him to aim at the happiness of all, is to show him that
his own greatest happiness can be best attained by so doing. And further, even if
a man admits the self-evidence of the principle of Rational Benevolence, he may
still hold that his own happiness is an end which it is irrational for him to sacrifice to any other; and that therefore a harmony between the maxim of Prudence and
the maxim of Rational Benevolence must be somehow demonstrated, if morality
is to be made completely rationa
l. This latter view, indeed . . . appears to me, on the whole, the view of Common Sense: and it is that which I myself hold. It thus
becomes needful to examine how far and in what way the required demonstration
can be effected. (ME )
Again, Sidgwick’s own view is that both individual and universal hap-
piness must be served, must be treated as that unity of which Mill spoke
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so eloquently, “to bid self-love and social be the same.” His purpose is not
the “suppression of egoism,” but rather the assimilation of it to form a
unified view free of irresolvable practical dilemmas – something akin to
the harmony that had been claimed by earlier, theological utilitarianism.
And again, egoism bears two aspects: interested and disinterested.
But as Shaver shows, following Schneewind, this passage “was added
to the fourth edition of the Methods,” having first appeared in “Some
Fundamental Ethical Controversies” ( Mind , ), and before this,
Sidgwick admitted that he “had made no attempt to show the irrationality
of the sacrifice of self-interest to duty.” The point had been forcefully put
by Georg von Gizycki, who, in a series of reviews, tried to get Sidgwick
to provide some defense of rational egoism. His defense is weakest in
the first edition, and after that he tends to link the axiom of temporal
neutrality to rational egoism, as emerging out of it in a way suggesting
that such egoism has a certain priority. Still, according to Shaver, he
did not appear to think that rational egoism was established by the axiom
of temporal irrelevance, or that there were other absolutely compelling
grounds for it arising from, say, general agreement. Thus, much rests on
the so-called distinction passage, as the ultimate revelation, in the Methods, of how Sidgwick conceived the conflict on the egoistic side, beyond the
bare assertion of self-evidence.
Yet for Shaver, the argument presented in the distinction passage
scarcely seems able to support the weight Sidgwick puts on it. If it is
supposed to involve a non-normative argument about personal identity,
to the effect that challenges to self-interest stemming from a “reduction-
ist” view of the self as a fiction falter because they rely on a false view
of personal identity, then it would seem rather rudimentary and at any
rate trained on only one line of objection. Parfit, in Reasons and Persons,
has famously maintained just this line, defending the reductionist view
of personal identity and suggesting that it remains a mystery just why
Sidgwick clung to the “further fact” view of identity. Parfit also argues
that rational egoism is an “unstable hybrid” view. After all, how can one
go along with Sidgwick in thinking that one should rationally be more
concerned about one’s own future than the future states of others, simply
because it is one’s own future, if there is need of a further argument to show
why one should not be more concerned about one’s present rather than fu-
ture aims, as the so-called Present-Aim theory of rationality would urge?
Sidgwick himself had suggested how such arguments might be made:
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I do not see why the Egoistic principle should pass unchallenged any more than
the Universalistic. I do not see why the axiom of Prudence should not be ques-
tioned, when it conflicts with present inclination, on a ground similar to that
on which the Egoists refuse to admit the axiom of Rational Benevolence. If the
Utilitarian has to answer the question, ‘Why should I sacrifice my own happiness
for the greater happiness of another?’ it must surely be admissible to ask the Egoist,
‘Why should I sacrifice a present pleasure for a greater one in the future? Why
should I concern myself about my own future feelings any more than about the
feelings of other persons? It undoubtedly seems to Common Sense paradoxical
to ask for a reason why one should seek one’s own happiness on the whole; but I
do not see how the demand can be repudiated as absurd by those who adopt the
views of the extreme empirical school of psychologists, although those views are
commonly supposed to have a close affinity with Egoistic Hedonism. Grant that
the Ego is merely a system of coherent phenomena, that the permanent identi-
cal ‘I’ is not a fact but a fiction, as Hume and his followers maintain; why, then,
should one part of the series of feelings into which the Ego is resolved be con-
cerned with another part of the same series, any more than with any other series?
(ME –)
Of course, Sidgwick did have reasons for rejecting such a view, reasons
stemming from his metaphysics and his work in psychical research, which
will be the subject of the following chapters. This side of his research is, to
my mind, absolutely crucial for understanding his conviction that egoism
is credible. But even if Sidgwick’s nonreductionism is viable, there are
other objections to rational egoism, objections that bear heavily on more
purely normative readings of the distinction passage.
Thus, as Shaver maintains, if that passage is meant to suggest that there
are two and only two normative “points of view,” that of the universe (the
whole) and that of the individual (the part), then it is also too rudimentary
for the purpose. Broad’s well-known objection was that as far as common
sense is concerned, self-referential altruism – the point of view of family,
friends, perhaps country – seems to be the favored view, or at any rate is
no more or less arbitrary than the point of view of the individual or of
the universe. Perhaps, then, there is a continuum of positions here, so
that it needs to be shown why, whichever end one starts with, the same
arguments would not lead one all the way to the other end or just as well
stop at any point in between. Thus, the assertion “I am a Dane” seems
no more arbitrary than the assertion “I am a separate individual,” as an
ontologically grounded counter to the demand that one take the point of
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view of the universe. And as previous sections have amply demonstrated,
Sidgwick himself often points up the arbitrariness of the individual point
of view; indeed, Shaver draws attention to some of the important passages
in which Sidgwick seems to press the case in just this imp
artialist or neu-
tralist way. In “The Establishment of Ethical First Principles,” Sidgwick
explains that if I hold that “it is reasonable for me to take my own greatest
happiness as the ultimate end of my conduct,” I need to show why the
fact that it is mine makes a difference, and why I should not concede that
“the happiness of any other individual, equally capable and deserving of
happiness, must be no less worth aiming at than my own.” He applies
a similar argument to support concern for the happiness of animals – as
Shaver notes, explicitly correcting “on utilitarian grounds, what some take
to be common sense.”
Finally, if, following Parfit, the distinction passage is read as an early
version of Rawls’s “separateness of persons” objection to utilitarianism,
bringing out the disanalogy between the rationality of (i) making a sacrifice
for the sake of a greater benefit to oneself later on and (ii) making a sacrifice
for the sake of greater benefits to others, then it is, according to Shaver,
simply a bad reading. Sidgwick obviously admits the rationality of both
forms of sacrifice, but he does not support the second on the basis of the
first. When he discusses the part/whole analogy, Sidgwick, according to
Shaver, “is simply noting a similarity. He is not claiming that the argument
for (ii) stands on the truth of (i) and the similarity of the cases. (Indeed,
in the first edition, he argues for (ii) without mentioning (i).)” And
besides,
Sidgwick endorses no alternative moral theory, other than rational egoism, by
which utilitarianism stands condemned. He has argued that common-sense moral-
ity, which might condemn utilitarianism, collapses into utilitarianism. In rational egoism, Sidgwick does have a rival normative theory that condemns utilitarianism. And the distinction passage could be taken to express condemnation from
the point of view of this theory. But then the distinction passage has not yielded
any defence of rational egoism. It simply tells us what rational egoism says about
utilitarianism. Just as the separateness of persons charge depends on, rather than
establishes, the superiority of a non-utilitarian theory of justice, so the distinction passage would depend on, rather than establish, rational egoism.
Thus, Shaver’s conclusion is that “however it is read, the distinction pas-