Henry Sidgwick- Eye of the Universe

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by Bart Schultz


  even beyond the dreams of “the most sanguine socialist.” His point is

  simply to suggest how government might take steps toward the socialist

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  aim, and to insist that “it is only such mild and gentle steps towards the

  realisation of the socialistic ideal that I can regard as at all acceptable, in

  the present condition of our knowledge of man and society.” This is his

  updating of the Millian call for more socialistic experimentation, albeit

  in a very carefully phrased way, so that improving distribution is typi-

  cally tied to means that will also improve production. And, cautious as

  his statement may be, he makes it absolutely clear that he can “see no

  reason to regard unqualified laisser faire as tending to realise the most

  economical production any more than the best possible distribution of

  wealth: and it seems . . . quite possible that a considerable extension of

  the industrial functions of government might be on the whole advanta-

  geous, without any Utopian degree of moral or political improvement in

  human society.” Such improvements must be gradual, should begin in

  the areas where the market conspicuously fails (as in monopoly condi-

  tions), and should strive “to maintain as far as possible in the govern-

  mental organisation of industry an effective stimulus to individual ex-

  ertion, and to allow scope for invention and improvement of methods.”

  (PPE )

  He also suggests that “if we condemn ‘sweaters,’ slop-shop dealers,

  and other small traders who ‘grind the faces’ of the poor by taking full

  advantage of competition, it should be rather for want of benevolence

  than for want of justice; and the condemnation should be extended to

  other persons of wealth and leisure who are aware of this disease of the

  social organism and are making no efforts to remove it.” He admits that

  such efforts do need to be made, though “the exact form that they will

  take if most wisely directed must depend upon the particular conditions

  of the labourers in question.” (PPE )

  Having said this, Sidgwick is nonetheless about as close as he would

  ever come to proposing a substantive theory of distributive justice, as op-

  posed to his usual puzzling over the indeterminacy involved in notions

  of impartiality, the impossibility of giving each person his or her due,

  and so forth. On his view, the “only hope” of effecting anything resem-

  bling a distribution according to desert would involve “getting rid of all

  removable differences in remuneration that are due to causes other than

  the voluntary exertions of the labourers.” And this his scheme might

  do to a considerable extent, as long as “the means of training for the

  higher kinds of work were effectually brought within the reach of all

  classes, by a well organised system of free education, liberally supported by

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  exhibitions for the children of the poor.” After all, the inequalities resulting

  from

  the payment of interest to private capitalists as such, or of profit to employing

  capitalists, would, speaking broadly, have ceased to exist; and though it would

  be impossible, without intolerable constraint on the freedom of action of indi-

  viduals, to prevent the children of persons earning larger incomes or owning

  accumulated wealth from having a somewhat better start in life than the rest, still

  this advantage might be reduced to a minimum by such an educational system.

  (PPE )

  And Sidgwick even thinks that his creeping socialistic civilization will

  help with population growth and with such matters as sloth and fraud in

  public assistance:

  If we suppose a community in which the aggregate remuneration of labour is

  increased by most of the share that now forms interest on individuals’ capital,

  while the emoluments and dignities attached to the higher kinds of labour are

  brought within the hopes of all classes by a system of education which at the

  same time makes general such a degree of foresight and intelligence as is now

  possessed by the higher grade of artisans, – it seems quite possible that in such

  a community a minimum of wages might be guaranteed to all who were unable

  to find employment for themselves, without drawing an ever increasing crowd of

  applicants to claim the guaranteed minimum, and without a serious deficit arising

  from the inefficient work of such as did apply. (PPE )

  This was a subject very dear to Sidgwick’s heart, of course, and it

  is interesting not only that he found the question of population (and

  relatedly, sexuality) to be so closely allied to the problems of poor relief,

  but also that he had such faith in the possibilities of education for fostering

  intelligence and foresight throughout the population. These issues were

  also bound up with that of colonization, which provided another possible

  form of “poor relief,” though one also requiring considerable educational

  development.

  Evidently, then, and as unlikely as it may seem, Sidgwick’s Principles

  ends up admittedly straining the bounds of political economy in its ef-

  fort to come to terms with culture and education, the sources of gradual

  semisocialism. Here was a vision of the educating society, one involving

  concrete suggestions for both educational institutions narrowly conceived

  and the broader advance of culture. As in the Methods, Sidgwick had buried

  a subversive account of moral (or social) development within an extensive

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  and seemingly respectful treatment of the received wisdom that had no

  utopian intentions.

  Ironically, it may well be that these more lyrical moments in Sidgwick’s

  work were composed in Rome, during the Italian tour when he was busily

  studying art with the help of Symonds’s Renaissance volume on the sub-

  ject. He had meant to finish the work before departing England, but, as

  he wrote to Symonds, “fate ordained” that he would have to continue

  working on it while visiting the Eternal City and its monuments (CWC).

  However, the Eternal City also made him quite ill, and his digestive disor-

  ders made it impossible for him to continue on to Greece as he had hoped

  to do.

  To be sure, Sidgwick’s claims reflect the socialist legacy of Mill and

  Maurice rather than of Marx and Morris, and they do not even approx-

  imate the “ideal” utilitarian society sometimes invoked
in the Methods.

  Experimental and gradualist, anti- and perhaps even counterrevolution-

  ary, and ever celebratory of individual and elite efforts at high-minded

  social improving, this was the type of movement that Marx himself had

  attacked as hopelessly bourgeois. Indeed, on this score, Marx had fa-

  mously attacked not only Mill but also Mill’s chief Cambridge disciple,

  Henry Fawcett, the blind political economist who had done much to tutor

  Sidgwick in Mill, but who had had the temerity to criticize the principles

  of the First International. In this respect, Sidgwick remained altogether

  Millian.

  Indeed, as Sidgwick heads toward the conclusion of his volume, he re-

  turns again to the question of the relation of economics to morality, posing

  the question of whether “the whole individualistic organisation of indus-

  try, whatever its material advantages may be, is not open to condemnation

  as radically demoralising.” Although there is nothing in Sidgwick’s writ-

  ings that quite reaches the lyricism of Mill’s laments about the possible

  stagnation and loss of solitude in the future, he is nonetheless also keenly

  sensitive to the attractions of an alternative ethos, one in which life in

  society promises fellowship. He recognizes that the divergences between

  private and common interest, and the antisocial temper of individualism,

  have led many “thoughtful persons” to sympathize with socialism, and

  that even many who are not socialists “yet feel the moral need of some

  means of developing in the members of a modern industrial community

  a fuller consciousness of their industrial work as a social function, only

  rightly performed when done with a cordial regard to the welfare of the

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  whole society, – or at least of that part of it to which the work is immediately

  useful.” It is of course from this point of view that so much importance

  attaches to attempts at increasing the role of cooperatives in economic

  activity. But what is more, since “it is always open to any individual who

  dislikes the selfish habits of feeling and action naturally engendered by the

  individualistic organisation of society, to counteract them in his private

  sphere by practising and commending a voluntary redistribution of wealth

  for the benefit of others,” the subject of poor relief again comes to the fore.

  (PPE –)

  Now, it is important not to overestimate the subversiveness of

  Sidgwick’s gradualist arguments, particularly on matters such as imme-

  diate aid to the poor. Again, the subject of poor relief was a particularly

  fraught one for him, given how much time and energy he had invested in it,

  and how it was bound up with the other matters of justice and the potential

  for socialism. Despite his keen awareness of the long Christian tradition

  of almsgiving, Sidgwick finds it impossible to think well of it when the

  activity proceeds in ignorance of political economy, and he often expresses

  his disgust with “sentimental” politics. Political economy has, on the one

  side, tended “to impress powerfully on the mind the great waste of the

  material means of happiness that is involved in the customary expendi-

  ture even of the most respectable rich persons.” But it has also, on the

  other,

  tended to make the common view of these dangers [of almsgiving] more clear,

  definite, and systematic. It has impressed forcibly on instructed minds the gen-

  eral rule that if a man’s wants are supplied by gift when he might have sup-

  plied them himself by harder work and greater thrift, his motives to industry

  and thrift tend to be so far diminished; and not only his motives, but the mo-

  tives of all persons in like circumstances who are thereby led to expect like gifts

  themselves.

  In sum, “there is reason to hope that, in minds of nobler stamp, the

  full perception of the difficulties and risks attending the voluntary re-

  distribution of wealth will only act as a spur to the sustained intellec-

  tual activity required for the successful accomplishment of this duty.”

  (PPE )

  The point is that private almsgiving was often seen as a necessary supple-

  ment to the work of the English Poor Law – with its infamous workhouses –

  but it was “largely impulsive, unenlightened, and unorganised,” so that

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  it gave serious encouragement to “unthrift, and even to imposture.”

  Conceivably then, the “government might with advantage undertake the

  organisation of eleemosynary relief, in order to make its distribution as

  economical, effective, and judicious as possible,” although the provision

  of the funds for such relief “might be left mainly to voluntary gifts

  and bequests, with a certain amount of assistance from government, if

  experience shews it to be necessary, but without any legal right to re-

  lief.” (PPE ) This would be the model of the French system, which

  Sidgwick thinks does work in certain respects, though on the whole he

  actually favors the English system, the very object of so much Dickensian

  satire.

  Thus, like Mill, Sidgwick took a fairly sour view of what the exist-

  ing poorer members of society were capable of, by way of advancing the

  semisocialistic future. Still, again like Mill, that future also held out the

  possibility of a general improvement in education and culture that would

  pervade all levels of society – indeed, would help to reduce if not eliminate

  the gap between the better-off and the worse-off. And this was, as Maurice

  had also urged, quite possibly essential to social harmony.

  Fuller discussion of this sensitive topic – on which many would say

  Sidgwick sounds more like Mr. Gradgrind than Whitman – must await

  the treatment of his magnum opus in politics (which subject, it should

  be plain, was constantly on his mind as he was working through his more

  purely economic views). But before proceeding to that, it should perhaps

  be underscored yet again just how different Sidgwick’s political economy

  was from that of the orthodox Benthamites or even the Millians. For

  Sidgwick strikes at the very heart of economic analysis. He does not merely

  invoke the familiar forms of irrationality due to custom and habit. Rather,

  he wonders about the condition even of “a community where the members

  generally were as enlightened and alert in the pursuit of their interests as

  we can ever expect human beings to become,” in which it still might be

  the case that “the defects of private enterprise” needed to be overcome by

  “the action of the community in its collective capacity” (PPE ). In a


  more abstract consideration of the conditions under which “even where

  we do not regard the intervention of government as at present desirable,

  we may yet look forward to it, and perhaps prepare the way for it,” he

  finds it possible to doubt that social progress “is carrying us towards a

  condition in which the assumption, that the consumer is a better judge

  than government of the commodities that he requires and of the source

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  from which they may be best obtained, will be sufficiently true for all

  practical purposes.” Indeed,

  [I]n some important respects the tendencies of social development seem to be

  rather in an opposite direction. As the appliances of life become more elaborate and

  complicated through the progress of invention, it is only according to the general

  law of division of labour to suppose that an average man’s ability to judge of the

  adaptation of means to ends, even as regards the satisfaction of his everyday needs,

  is likely to become continually less. No doubt an ideally intelligent person would

  under these circumstances be always duly aware of his own ignorance, and would

  take the advice of experts. But it seems not unlikely that the need of such advice,

  and the difficulty of finding the right advisers, may increase more markedly than

  the average consciousness of such need and difficulty, at any rate where the benefits to be obtained or the evils to be warded off are somewhat remote and uncertain;

  especially when we consider that the self-interest of producers will in many cases

  lead them to offer commodities that seem rather than are useful, if the difference between seeming and reality is likely to escape notice. (PPE –)

  Skepticism about these fundamental comforts of orthodox political

  economy would seem, potentially, to throw a rather heavy burden of re-

  sponsibility on the “expert” or enlightened guidance that Sidgwick looks

  to as the way out, though he admits that how “far government can usefully

  attempt to remedy these shortcomings of self-help is a question that does

  not admit of a confident general answer.” The “nature and extent of such

  collective action” as would correct for such failings is hard to capture in any

 

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