Before the break of dawn, Lee also awoke, found another cracker box, and joined Jackson beside the fire. No one knows what conversation passed between the two, but the sight of them sitting alone in front of the fire in the early morning hours made a lasting impression on the mind of Lt. James Power Smith. An Ohio native and son of a Presbyterian minister, Smith was 25 years old when he began serving as an aide-de-camp to Jackson in 1862. Known as “Jimmy” to the rest of the staff, Smith was a divinity student who had received a degree from the Union Theological Seminary in Hampden Sydney, Virginia, prior to enlisting in the Confederate army. Jackson admired Smith’s religious background, calm demeanor, and attention to detail, and he quickly became one of the general’s most trusted officers.
Engraving depicting the cracker box council between Lee and Jackson.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War
* * *
Smith was sleeping nearby on a lower slope when the early morning chill awakened him. Turning over, he rubbed his eyes and caught a glimpse of Lee and Jackson sitting on cracker boxes, quietly warming their hands over the small fire. This “cracker box council” between two of the most famous generals of the war would be immortalized in words and pictures for years to come. In 1903, Smith would have a granite marker placed at the site commemorating the location of the Lee-Jackson bivouac.16
Around 3:30 a.m., Hotchkiss returned from his visit to Mr. Wellford’s house while the two generals were still seated beside the fire. Placing another cracker box between Lee and Jackson, he spread a map across the top and described a new road Wellford had recently cut southwest through the woods in order to haul cordwood and iron ore to Catharine Furnace. Hotchkiss described how the army could use this rough wagon trail to reach the Brock Road as it traveled north and entered the Plank Road west of the Federal position.
Having previously decided that a flanking march was the intended strategy, Lee and Jackson silently studied the route on the map. Finally, Lee spoke up. “General Jackson, what do you propose to do?”
“Go around here,” he replied, tracing his finger along the route drawn by Hotchkiss.
“What do you propose to make this movement with?” Lee asked.
“With my whole corps,” Jackson replied without hesitation.
Lee paused for a moment. “What will you leave me?”
“The divisions of Anderson and McLaws,” Jackson responded.
Lee paused again. Military tactics dictated that as a commander you should avoid dividing your army in the presence of the enemy, as it provides the adversary with the opportunity of opposing your fractions with his entire force. Lee had already divided his army once at Fredericksburg, and now Jackson was suggesting another large split in front of the enemy. The maneuver would leave Lee with roughly 14,000 men to oppose Hooker’s 70,000 while Jackson took his 28,000 men on a 12-mile march around the Union flank. It would be another risky move, with success depending on Hooker staying put around Chancellorsville, expecting Lee to attack from the front.
Lee had always been confident in his ability to read the intentions of the Union commanders, and Hooker was no exception. After a brief and thoughtful reflection, he looked at Jackson and said, “Well, go on.”
Lee began writing orders for the movement while Jackson nodded in agreement, with what Hotchkiss described as “an eager smile upon his face.” After Lee finished, Jackson stood up, saluted the commanding general, and said, “My troops will move at once, sir.”17
* * *
After several delays, including a brief artillery duel, it was actually closer to 7:30 a.m. before the lead elements of Jackson’s army began marching down the Catharine Furnace Road. Warm sunshine and a cloudless sky had replaced the morning chill, and Lee stood at the side of the road silently watching the soldiers file past. Jackson, riding Little Sorrel, stopped alongside the commanding general and the two engaged in a brief conversation. Jackson’s face was reportedly flushed as he was seen pointing down the road in the direction of his troops. Lee nodded in agreement with something, and Jackson continued his ride west. It would be the last time the two Confederate generals ever saw each other.18
The narrow dirt roads winding through the Wilderness forest provided enough room for Jackson’s soldiers to march only four abreast, causing a thin column of 28,000 men, artillery, ammunition wagons, and ambulances to be stretched across an arc of ten miles once all the regiments were in motion. Jackson routinely expected his men to maintain a marching pace of two miles an hour, walking for fifty minutes and then resting for ten. On this march, however, the quality of the roads made that speed impossible to maintain. Colonel Porter Alexander described the difficulties of the movement in his memoir: “No one who has ever marched with a long column can form any conception how every little inequality of ground, and every mud hole, especially if the road be narrow, causes a column to string out and lose distance. So that, though the head may advance steadily, the rear has to alternately halt and start, and halt and start, in the most heartbreaking way, wearing out the men and consuming precious daylight.”19
Jackson spent the morning riding up and down the line prodding the men to stay in formation and continue moving. One officer vividly recalled the scene: “His face was pale, his eyes flashing. Out from his thin, compressed lips came the terse command: ‘Press forward, press forward.’ In his eagerness, as he rode, he leaned over on the neck of his horse as if in that way the march might be hurried. ‘See that the column is kept closed and that there is no straggling,’ he more than once ordered, and ‘Press on, press on,’ was repeated again and again.” Jackson was otherwise “grave and silent” during the march, with little conversation occurring between him and his staff.20
At one point, Old Jack did ride to the front of the column and engage in brief, low-level conversation with Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, whose division was leading the march, Brig. Gen. Raleigh E. Colston, and Col. Thomas Munford of the 2nd Virginia Cavalry, all graduates of the Virginia Military Institute. “I hear it said that General Hooker has more men than he can handle,” Jackson remarked. “I should like to have half as many more as I have today, and I should hurl him in the river! The trouble with us has always been to have a reserve to throw in at the critical moment to reap the benefit of advantages gained. We have always had to put in all of our troops and never had enough at the time most needed.”21
To help maintain secrecy, noise during the march was suppressed as much possible. The soldiers were prohibited from cheering and “strict silence was enforced, the men being allowed to speak only in whispers,” according to one North Carolina officer. The difficulty of the terrain combined with temperatures approaching 80 degrees made the going tough for many of the soldiers. “This march was a trying one to the men,” Col. C. T. Zachry of the 27th Georgia wrote in his official report. “The day was very warm; many fell out of the ranks exhausted, some fainting and having spasms; only a few had eaten anything since the morning before.”22
Despite his careful attempts at secrecy and concealment, Jackson’s flanking maneuver did not go unnoticed by the Union army. As the troops passed over the small knoll near Catharine Furnace, their march was observed by the Federal outposts on Hazel Grove. Hooker received word shortly after 9:00 a.m. that a large body of Rebel troops had been seen moving west. He was at first uncertain whether this movement represented an attempt to outflank him or the beginning of a Confederate retreat. To be safe, he sent an order to Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, whose XI Corps occupied the right flank, to guard against a possible attack from that direction. Unfortunately for Hooker and his army, the order went largely unheeded.
At noon, after the Confederate march was well underway, Hooker ordered Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles to “advance cautiously” and to “harass the movement as much as possible.” Sharp fighting near the furnace between Sickles’ men and a regiment of Georgia infantry left to guard the column’s flank began around 12:30 p.m. Nearer to the furnace, the Union troops could plainly see the Con
federate column turn south as it marched along a bend in the road. This limited observation reinforced the idea of a Confederate retreat—an idea Hooker was more than willing to accept. After Sickles’ attack failed to stop Jackson’s movement, Hooker issued an order at 2:30 p.m. to prepare for an early morning pursuit of the “retreating” Confederates.23
Jackson and the head of his corps reached the junction of the Brock and Orange Plank roads at 2:00 p.m., just as the tail of the column was passing Catharine Furnace. His original intention had been to turn east on the Plank Road and attack the end of the unsuspecting Federal line. But within moments of his arrival at the junction, Brig. Gen. Fitz Lee, whose cavalry force had led the flanking march, rode up with news of a recent discovery. “General,” he said excitedly, “if you will ride with me, halting your column here, out of sight, I will show you the enemy’s right, and you will perceive the great advantage of attacking down the Old Turnpike instead of the Plank Road, the enemy’s lines being taken in reverse.”24
Jackson and a single courier followed Lee through the woods to the top of a hill overlooking the Federal line. From there, Jackson could plainly see Union soldiers about a half mile away—completely oblivious to the threat before them. Their arms were stacked as they smoked, chatted, and played cards. To the left, Jackson could see the Talley farmhouse and the fork between the Old Turnpike and the Orange Plank Road in front of Wilderness Church. To the right, he saw Dowdall’s Tavern, the homestead of the son of the founder of Chancellorsville.
Jackson stared intently through his binoculars for five minutes without uttering a word, even though his lips were silently moving the entire time. Fitz Lee was convinced the devout Jackson was speaking to the “Great God of Battles.”
The young cavalry officer’s analysis of the tactical situation was correct. The Union line stretched farther west than anticipated, so attacking down the Plank Road would put Jackson’s forces in front of the Union army instead of on its flank. The Confederates would need to swing left an additional mile and a half and strike the Yankee right from along the turnpike. Turning suddenly to the courier, Jackson ordered, “Tell General Rodes to move across the Plank Road and halt when he gets to the Old Turnpike. I will join him there.”25
Jackson took one final look at the Federal position and, without acknowledging or thanking Lee, turned his horse and galloped down the hill back to the Brock Road.
“When he came back from the view,” Porter Alexander noted, “there was a perceptible eagerness in his air and he hurried the head of the column over to a cross road we had to follow from there.” Jackson then dismounted, sat on a stump by the side of the road, and wrote his last dispatch:
Near 3 P.M.
May 2d, 1863
General,
The enemy has made a stand at Chancellor’s which is about two miles from Chancellorsville. I hope as soon as practicable to attack.
I trust that an ever kind Providence will bless us with great success.
Respectfully,
T. J. JACKSON
Lt. Genl.
Genl. R. E. Lee
The leading division is up & the next two appear to be well closed.
T. J. J.26
Jack Haydon, a local resident who had acted as one of the guides through the countryside, had completed his task once the army arrived at the crossroads. After Jackson dismissed him, Haydon asked the general if he would do him a favor.
“What is it, sir?” Jackson curtly responded.
“Take care of yourself,” Haydon replied.27
Upon reaching the Old Turnpike, the column turned right and marched east for nearly a mile before stopping along a low ridge just beyond the farm of John R. Luckett. Jackson deployed the men three divisions deep across a line that stretched for three-quarters of a mile on each side of the turnpike. Except for those in the cleared area around the Luckett farm, most of the men were concealed in the thick Wilderness. Another two hours of daylight would pass before the entire Second Corps was fully in line and ready to attack.
As the divisions were falling into line, a former student of Jackson’s at VMI, Capt. Marcellus N. Moorman, commanding a battery of artillery attached to the cavalry, approached Jackson to clarify whether his men were to remain with the infantry or withdraw with the cavalry. “Captain,” Jackson answered his old pupil, “I will give you the honor of going in on my front line.” Shortly thereafter, heavy artillery firing could be heard far to the east, and Moorman asked Jackson whom he thought it could be. “How far do you suppose it is?” he asked the captain.
“Five or six miles,” Moorman replied.
“I suppose it is General Lee,” Jackson said. “Time we are moving.” According to plan, Lee was making demonstrations in the Union front to occupy Hooker’s attention and prevent him from sending troops to the right flank.28
Jackson’s directions for the attack were clear. The entire line was to push forward to the Talley farm, using the turnpike as a guide. After taking the heights at Talley’s, the force was to proceed toward the second objective, Dowdall’s Tavern; under no circumstances was there to be any pause in the advance.29
Jackson sat on his horse near the Luckett farmhouse and glanced up and down the line of Confederate gray. Inspired by the sight of the many VMI graduates he noticed among his staff, he proudly announced to those around: “The Institute will be heard from today.”30
The atmosphere around the farm was much like the calm before an approaching storm. When told the final preparations were complete, Jackson looked at his watch. It was 5:15 p.m. With the evening sun setting at his back, Jackson calmly asked his division commander, “Are you ready, General Rodes?”
“Yes, sir,” Rodes answered emphatically.
Launching the greatest attack of his military career, Stonewall Jackson quietly replied, “You can go forward, then.”31
1 Hotchkiss, Make Me a Map of the Valley, 137; Fitzhugh Lee, “Chancellorsville,” 562; Edward P. Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill, NC, 1989), 196.
2 OR 25, pt. 1, 862.
3 Bigelow, Chancellorsville, 478.
4 John D. Imboden, “Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah,” in B&L, vol. 2, pt. 1, 297; “Field Notes at Chancellorsville from Stuart and Jackson,” in SHSP (1883), vol. 11, 138.
5 OR 25, pt. 1, 764.
6 Joseph G. Morrison, “Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville,” in CV (May 1905), 231; Marcellus N. Moorman, “Narrative of Events and Observations Connected with the Wounding of General T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson,” in SHSP (1902), vol. 30, 110.
7 Bigelow, Chancellorsville, 262; T. M. R. Talcott, “General Lee’s Strategy at the Battle of Chancellorsville,” in SHSP (1906), vol. 34, 17; Samuel P. Bates, “Hooker’s Comments on Chancellorsville,” in B& L, vol. 3, pt. 1, 218.
8 Lee, “Chancellorsville,” 567.
9 Talcott, “Lee’s Strategy at Chancellorsville,” 16.
10 Daily Dispatch (Richmond, VA), October 26, 1875; Talcott, “Lee’s Strategy at Chancellorsville,” 16.
11 Douglas, I Rode With Stonewall, 313.
12 Armistead L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee (Secaucus, NJ, 1983), 258; Arthur Rogers, in Dabney-Jackson Collection, box 2, LVA; Peter W. Houck, Confederate Surgeon: The Personal Recollections of E. A. Craighill (Lynchburg, VA, 1989), 54; The Sentinel (Richmond, VA), May 16, 1863; Douglas, I Rode With Stonewall, 220. Douglas states that staff officer James P. Smith was the recipient of the covering, but other accounts relate Jackson placing the cape over its sleeping owner.
13 Lacy, “Narrative.”
14 Ibid.
15 Long, Memoirs of Lee, 258.
16 James P. Smith, “Stonewall Jackson’s Last Battle,” in B&L, vol. 3, pt. 1, 203-214. Smith directed the placement of ten stone markers throughout the area to commemorate various events primarily associated with Lee and Jackson.
17 Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, 43
1-432. Henderson quoted a letter sent to him by Hotchkiss detailing the exchange between Lee and Jackson.
18 Lee, “Chancellorsville,” 569-570; Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, 433.
19 Gallagher, Fighting for the Confederacy, 201.
20 Hunter H. McGuire, “Career and Character of General T. J. Jackson,” in SHSP (1897), vol. 25, 110; Gallagher, Fighting for the Confederacy, 201-202.
21 Robertson, Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend, 718.
22 V. E. Turner and H. C. Hall, “Twenty-third Regiment,” in Walter Clark, ed., Histories of Regiments from North Carolina, 5 vols. (Raleigh, NC, 1901 ), vol. 2, 228; OR 25, pt. 2, 981.
23 OR 25, pt. 1, 386; Bigelow, Chancellorsville, 289.
24 Lee, “Chancellorsville,” 572.
25 Ibid.
26 Gallagher, Fighting for the Confederacy, 202; Smith, “Stonewall Jackson’s Last Battle,” 206. The original copy of the last dispatch is in the Library of Virginia in Richmond.
27 Murray F. Taylor, letter to CV magazine, Jan. 13, 1904, Thomas J. Jackson Collection, Museum of the Confederacy (MOC), 3. An edited version of the letter appears in CV (October 1904), 492-494.
28 Marcellus N. Moorman, “Narrative of Events,” in SHSP (1902), vol. 30, 111; Marcellus Moorman to Hunter H. McGuire, April 8, 1898, Hotchkiss Papers, reel 15, Library of Congress (LC).
29 OR 25, pt. 1, 940-941.
Calamity at Chancellorsville Page 5