Throughout his life, Revere sought new applications for his equipment and workforce. He had a remarkable ability to simultaneously perform older processes, perfect new ones, and research further opportunities. Revere’s facilities produced a diverse product line by 1808, but he still wanted more. By this point his reputation had spread throughout the New England merchant community, connecting him to a lucrative opportunity related to the newborn field of steamboat construction.
New York State merchants trading along the Hudson River showed an avid interest in steamboats for many years, and members of the legislature offered corporate charters and monopolistic privileges to encourage entrepreneurs to perfect steam engine technology and operate franchises. Inventor John Fitch received a fourteen-year corporate steamboat monopoly in 1787 but failed to complete a functional vessel by 1798. At this point the legislature revoked his grant and gave influential merchant Robert Livingston a twenty-year charter, provided that he could build a working boat within one year. He and his partner, inventor Robert Fulton, managed to maintain their charter privileges without the existence of a working vessel and finally launched a successful steamboat in 1807. Fulton and Livingston’s earliest attempts failed in part because they depended upon faulty steam engine equipment from Nicholas Roosevelt’s Soho plant in nearby New Jersey. They succeeded after ordering designs and parts from Britain, including a reliable Bolton and Watt steam engine. As usual, Americans had to take great pains to remove an advanced technology such as a steam engine from England. Fulton and Livingston required a cheaper source of parts for their later steamboats, particularly the giant copper sheets used in their boilers. Eventually they discovered Revere.39
On October 8, 1808, Robert Livingston’s brother John asked Revere for a price quote and size range for thick copper sheets weighing twelve pounds per square foot. Revere immediately responded that he previously had rolled only sheathing copper of fourteen-inch width but he could roll sheets as wide as his rollers, about three feet, and any length desired. He offered this copper at 55 cents per pound, and estimated he could roll a ton in approximately 10 or 15 days. Livingston soon accepted, and sent a draft diagram that carefully listed the dimensions of the different sheets he required.40
Boiler sheets differed from everything Revere had previously produced. Unlike copper sheathing, which merely had to remain on the outer hull of a ship, boilers withstood great pressure on a daily basis and required far more strength. All three boilerplate dimensions dwarfed naval sheathing, which only measured 14 inches wide by 4 feet long by 1/16 of an inch thick and weighed no more than 34 ounces per square foot. Boilerplate measured 3 feet wide by at least 5 feet long, and between 1/6 and 1/4 of an inch thick. In addition, several of the pieces required curved cuts along the sides to facilitate the construction of round portions of the boilers. Despite the novelty of this order, Revere completed more than 16,000 pounds of boilerplate early in 1809. Fulton placed a second order for 5 more tons of boilerplates in 1810, which Revere delivered in 1811. Fulton continued ordering more sheets from Revere well into 1814, after Joseph Warren had taken over the business. By this point the sheets sold for 70 cents a pound and were used in vessels intended to help the war effort.41
The steamboat contract had advantages and disadvantages. The boilerplate dimensions required altered production methods: bigger copper pigs, more men to lift and feed them through the rollers, and a different annealing process to compensate for the thicker sheets’ longer heating and cooling times. These challenges led to errors, and Fulton complained in 1811 about excessive delays as well as brittle plates that cracked frequently. In spite of these protests he continued placing orders with Revere, realizing he could not do any better. On the positive side, the Fulton contract provided Revere with sizeable copper orders requiring less processing per pound in comparison with thin naval sheathing: Revere’s workers had fewer sheets to process for an equal weight of copper. Because he charged by the pound, this contract promised major profits. Revere worked hard to encourage further sales, and by December 1810, he informed Robert Fulton that he had learned to make six-foot long sheets of any thickness, although he could not circumvent the three-foot width of his rollers.42
The Fulton contract prepared Revere for a host of creative new copper-sheeting applications that foreshadowed the business growth Joseph Warren experienced after he took over the company. Many of these new opportunities first appeared in 1809. Revere supplied local coppersmiths with heavy plate copper for stills, which also required sheets three feet wide by four or five feet long. The diligent efforts of Joseph Carson, his factor, turned up a long list of copper requests for still, sheet, “raised bottom,” and “flat crown” copper from Philadelphia braziers. And the proprietors of a Charlestown bridge asked Revere to comment on the possibility of sheathing gigantic piles in copper to prevent them from corroding and accumulating barnacles, a proposal he wholeheartedly endorsed.43
Revere’s business continued growing thanks to the new products and applications he and his son continued to locate. Each new process began in an experimental manner, characterized by trial and error as well as relatively large amounts of labor for each unit of output. But as he and his workers steadily gained expertise, Revere sought ways to standardize each new product, make it more profitable, and begin the cycle once more.
Revere and the Environment: Raw Material Shortages and Procurement Strategies
As a manufacturer, Revere realized that the success of his business depended upon his ability to procure the necessary quantities of fuel, metal, and water-power at reasonable prices. But neither Revere nor any other citizen of early nineteenth-century America connected raw material usage to the diminishment of nature, in part because the modern conception of the natural environment did not even exist at that time. While Americans and members of all nations valued nature, its bounty appeared infinite and unthreatened by humanity’s ability to exploit it. Revere expressed resource constraints strictly in economic terms and focused upon the pricing habits of merchants, suppliers, and the government. Instead of connecting the rising price of wood with regional deforestation, for example, he looked for different suppliers or for ways to cut transportation costs. The market economy—far more tangible for him than abstract conceptions of the environment—mediated between nature and his industrial operations.
Of course, Revere and his fellow manufacturers did affect their environment in many ways. Beginning in his silverworking years, Revere played a small and indirect role in the larger American demand for metal and fuel resources. As the urban and manufacturing populations grew, the impact of their consumption increased. Revere needed more natural resources during his copper-rolling years although his fuel use remained small enough to be handled by the local market. However, his facility required so much copper by this time that he could no longer rely upon casual interactions with merchants, and instead had to increase his reliance on recycled metal while working with the government to secure a more dependable long-term supply. Revere’s relationship with his natural environment became far more direct when he realized the finite nature of his water supply, provided by the Neponset River. In this case Revere’s mill had a major impact upon upstream and downstream river users and the resulting conflicts foreshadowed major legal disputes of the later nineteenth century.
Ever since his earliest bell-rolling days in the 1790s, Revere knew all too well that copper was much scarcer in America than iron, and posed a far more dangerous limitation than labor shortages. The situation only worsened as his shop demanded more copper. Without a domestic supply he either reused “old” copper or relied upon overseas copper shipments, a choice between two untrustworthy options. “Old” copper often contained pieces of iron or other metals that ruined the finished product. In a 1796 letter to Nathaniel Gorham, Revere complained that “I was obliged to purchase it [copper] in small parcels which were utensils that had been burned in the West Indies and their was frequently among it Iron that I could not found.” Imp
orted copper usually had a higher quality but its quantity and price depended on ever-changing international trade conditions. The U.S. Navy purchased refined copper from many places, including copper plates from Sweden and Turkey, pigs from South America, and bars from Russia, but Britain remained the most consistent source of high-quality copper. Britain’s restriction on all copper exports in 1798 deprived the United States of its primary supply and made the young country’s precarious position impossible to ignore.44
Given the essential role copper played in his operations, Revere felt the need to secure a more dependable source and he asked the government to help him, since his manufactory sold much of its output to the navy. Revere summarized his copper procurement problems in a June 10, 1803 letter to Naval Secretary Robert Smith: “We find it extremely difficult to procure Stock, either old Sheeting or other Copper, sufficient for our small Manufactory, the merchants not being in the habits of importing it.” He then offered two insightful suggestions. First, he asked Smith to reserve old copper sheathing stripped from government ships for the re-coppering process. This request extended his use of recycled copper, with the key advantage that recycled copper sheathing did not contain any iron and therefore had a higher quality. Second, Revere suggested that all naval ships returning from the Mediterranean sea should purchase cheap, quality copper at the port of Smyrna (now called Izmir, in modern-day Turkey) to use as ballast for the trip home. Revere added that Britain imported much of its copper from Smyrna, and voiced the Stoddert-like sentiment that “Should any difference arise between that government & ours would it not be difficult to procure a sufficient quantity from any other power for publick purposes?” Once again, Revere seemed remarkably well informed about international politics, and anticipated the War of 1812 about nine years in advance. Revere reiterated this advice in March 1805 to Naval Officer Jacob Crowninshield, hoping he might alter Smith’s policy. Revere had conducted even more extensive research by this point, and determined that copper in Smyrna could be purchased for as little as 20 cents a pound, while it cost 27 cents in Leghorn, the next cheapest source. This information partially resulted from Joseph Warren’s fact-finding mission in Europe.45
In addition to his attempts to alter naval policy, Revere did whatever he could to arrange a steady copper supply. He told Robert Smith, “We are endeavoring to git in the way of importing it but that will take time” as early as 1803, but lacked the contacts and capital to deal directly with overseas suppliers. He had better results from many small partnerships with different factors, or purchasing agents such as Joseph Carson, and with larger importers such as New York City merchant and copper importer Harmon Hendricks, as described above. In October 1809 Revere tried to arrange a partnership with a New Jersey mine that could have solved many of his problems, but the plan fell through. Since he couldn’t do without copper he had no choice but to alter his work cycle and adjust his prices to respond to the changing international supply. Although he occasionally complained to friends or clients about temporary copper shortages, his records suggest that his output was never impacted for long.46
Revere had a much easier time procuring wood and charcoal. Although the land around Boston grew steadily deforested throughout the colonial and post-Revolutionary periods, numerous vendors sold fuel at reasonable prices. Throughout the year he repeatedly purchased two to three cords of wood at a time. He preferred buying oak and chestnut, long-burning hardwoods, for $10 to $16 a cord, and he purchased pine for under $7 a cord as a last resort.
He listed his suppliers in his records under their individual names, which indicates that he probably had personal relationships with woodlot owners rather than merchants. These transactions, combined with the availability of wood around Boston, kept prices fairly low and stable. He had to pay transportation as well as raw material costs but they represented a small fraction of his operating expenses. Factory-wide fuel costs were approximately $987 in 1806, and transportation costs for fuel and copper shipments were around $900. In contrast, Revere paid more than $18,000 for copper.47
Cheap fuel did not continue forever. In his 1810 report on Manufactures, Tench Coxe already noted the increasing number and severity of regional fuel shortages across the nation. He did not develop a comprehensive or long-term solution other than to recommend that industries such as wire drawing, cannon boring, and cutting establish themselves in low-fuel (coastal) regions, while the more fuel-intensive industries should relocate to forested regions.48 Most existing manufacturers, including Revere, did not have the luxury of relocating. The most successful manufacturers found ways to build robust networks of potential suppliers and make accurate estimates of resource needs to allow enough time to meet all shop needs. Revere kept accurate records and amassed long lists of contacts since his earliest silverworking days and did not suffer from any major copper or fuel shortages. Waterpower, the most recent addition to his manufacturing system, proved more challenging.
Waterpower did not represent a revolutionary technology in the nineteenth century. The ancient Greeks made liberal use of waterpower, gear trains, and pumps, and civilizations since then used waterwheels to power grist mills, saw mills, and numerous other devices that processed raw materials. Until the 1790s, American manufacturing typically relied upon hand tools and hand power, and the first large-scale manufacturing attempts collected many workers in one location so they could produce items with traditional tools and methods. Waterpower entered the manufacturing world at the end of the eighteenth century, greatly expanding the potential for production and machine use while introducing a host of unanticipated managerial and control problems.49
The need for waterpower prompted Revere’s purchase of the Canton property and never left his thoughts. Most machines require three types of components: a power source; transmission mechanisms such as gears, shafts, cams, and pulleys; and a tool to be manipulated by the machine. Revere’s rolling mill consisted of a waterwheel driven by the river, gears and shafts turned by the wheel, and two large rollers turned by the shafts. The waterwheel and transmission components of this process involved technology that he had never encountered before, and he benefited greatly from preexisting equipment. The Canton property contained several buildings from an earlier ironworks whose waterwheels used the Neponset River’s power to cut iron bars into small strips. Early waterpower almost exclusively relied on vertical waterwheels, usually undershot, with wooden crown and lantern gearing helping to direct the power in the proper direction. Revere modified this equipment to enable it to roll copper into sheets, thereby saving the major expense of building his own rolling mill or importing equipment from Britain. Revere used two waterwheels to drive his two rollers and another to power a triphammer via powered cams. Waterwheels probably drove the large bellows in his foundry and turned the boring device for cannon as well.50
Manufacturers had to select mill sites based on available waterpower, but this decision carried serious risks. A small river or stream, such as Canton’s Neponset, seriously limited maximum output. However, a large river demanded far higher capital outlays to fully realize its potential. Assuming that basic hydrological conditions remained roughly the same between 1800 and 1909, an early twentieth-century study provides an estimate of Revere’s available waterpower. In 1909 the Revere Copper Company offered its Canton land, buildings, and waterpower privileges for sale at public auction. The property description in the auction booklet describes this water privilege as an “average daily water power of 100 h.p. 12 hours a day.” Waterpower depends upon the quantity of water in the watershed as well as the velocity of that water, which relates to the average distance it drops. The Neponset River drained over a 27.5-square-mile region (most of which was not owned by Revere’s company), having a net fall of 16 feet. The 1909 property included a small millpond as well as the right to tap some or all of the water in the Kinsley, Massapoag, and Reservoir ponds upstream. The engineer observed that these additional water sources allowed twelve hours of flow even during the d
ry months. Table 8.1 presents his findings of the waterpower throughout the year according to two scenarios: open the dam and allow water to flow naturally over a twenty-four-hour period, or use the dam to store and release water over a more concentrated twelve-hour period.51
Revere’s values probably fell between these columns: he often used his dam to store water and release it during daylight hours when his workers manned the shop, but he did not have access to all the storage capacity utilized by the company in 1909. The river flow pattern described in Table 8.1 reveals a dramatic seasonal cycle, with powerful flows in March and April, low flows from July to October, and intermediate flows in other months. This cycle explains the frequency of entries in his wastebook as well as his labor-hiring practices, since each year’s major activity began in November and ended in June. This contrasts with Revere’s work patterns when he operated from Boston, because he then adjusted his schedule to correspond to the buying patterns of merchants or his customers, as opposed to the rhythms of nature.
Table 8.1. Neponset River Flow in 1909
Waterpower increased the need for managerial control over manufacturing operations because shop operations and the deployment of water flow had to be coordinated and marshaled. Many early entrepreneurs had major difficulties efficiently using and adapting to the tempo of water flow, and often found it easier to shift to steam power later in the nineteenth century.52 The Neponset River’s flow left much to be desired. Although it usually met Revere’s needs in spring and late autumn, the river froze for some of the winter, and summer dry spells forced him to cease all copper-rolling operations for weeks at a time. New York City merchant Harmon Hendricks mentioned this water shortage in an 1807 letter to Congressman Gordon Mumford. Hendricks told Mumford that Revere could not roll enough copper for all of America’s needs, arguing, “I do not hesitate to say it is out of his power to supply Boston market solely. His miniature manufactory & works have not one third of the year the advantage of water, I have been at Canton where are established those works and I write from my own observations.”53 One possible solution to Revere’s water shortage would have been to produce and stockpile large quantities of copper sheets when the river cooperated, and perform other tasks when it dried or froze. Although he did try to build a copper reserve, he often had to set aside his scarce supplies of copper for specific jobs. In general, demand for copper products remained fickle throughout Revere’s tenure and stockpiling invited risk. In future years, when Revere and other manufacturers sufficiently standardized their output to minimize the uniqueness of different orders, companies had more confidence in sales estimates and practiced continual production. Revere held on to some aspects of his artisan mentality and preferred to receive an order before making a product.
Midnight Ride, Industrial Dawn Page 41