by Unknown
Fortunately, it dies hard and keeps cropping up in unexpected places, as will be seen later in this book.
The surrender of St. Valery was on June 12th. On June 17th, the day that Petain asked for an armistice, three days after the Germans entered Paris, the 7th Panzer Division was pushing up the Cotentin Peninsula to attack Cherbourg. One column moved along the coast through Coutance, another through St. Lo, a name which few could then have pin-pointed on the map but which to-day must be as familiar to many Americans as Detroit.
The division met with little opposition. With the exception of a Battalion ofFusiliers Marins , most of the French, having heard of the request for an armistice, not unnaturally stopped fighting: no man wants to be either the first or the last man killed in a war. A rearguard of “Jocks” of the British 52nd (Lowland) Division, strung across the 20-mile neck of the peninsula by General Marshall-Cornwall to cover the embarkment of 1st Armoured Division and 52nd Division from Cherbourg, compelled the Germans to side-step their positions. But by midnight on June 18th, 7th Infantry Regiment, under Colonel von Bismarck, with two panzer companies, had pushed into the suburbs of the city. During the night the divisional artillery was moved up to begin the bombardment of the forts next morning. It was unnecessary. At “first light” the fortress guns were silent. Only a few odd British guns, on the final covering positions, were still in action.
General Collins of the United States 7th Corps was nicknamed “Lightning Joe” for capturing Cherbourg within twenty days of the landing in Normandy. He had to fight for it, however. There was no fight in the senior French officers of both services who were in Cherbourg in June, 1940. It is charitable to suppose that they believed that an armistice was on the point of being accorded. Otherwise there would seem to be no excuse for the fact that they surrendered the fortress and 30,000 men to a single armoured division, barely twelve hours after it had come within range of the formidable fortress guns.
That was what happened. At 2 P.M. on June 19th French naval and military officers came out to offer unconditional surrender and the fighting stopped. At 5 P.M. the formal capitulation paper was signed. In the harbour was the undamaged transport of a British mechanised division.
The division was withdrawn before it could take over and count the arms in the forts. But in the operations from May 10th it had captured:
The Admiral of the French Navy (North) and:
4 other admirals.
1 Corps Commander,
4 Divisional Commanders with their staffs,
277 guns and 64 A.T. guns,
458 tanks and armoured cars,
4,000-5,000 trucks,
1,500-2,000 cars,
1,500-2,000 horse and mule wagons,
300-400 buses,
300-400 motor-cycles,
and the major part of the 97,468 prisoners credited to the Group to which it belonged. It had brought down 52 aircraft, captured 15 more on the ground and destroyed 12 more. There was much more booty which could not be counted because the division had moved too fast. Nor was there time to calculate, even approximately, the losses in killed and wounded which it had inflicted on the enemy. Its own casualties during the period were: 48 officers killed and 77 wounded; 108 sergeants and above killed and 317 wounded; 526 other ranks killed and 1,252 wounded; 3 officers, 34 sergeants and above and 229 other ranks missing. It had lost in tanks, Mark I, 3; Mark II, 5; Mark III, 26; and Mark IV, 8.
The figures of casualties and tank losses are small compared with what was accomplished. At the same time, when one remembers that Rommel was always properly parsimonious with men's lives, they are by no means negligible. They prove that the division had had hard fighting and had not merely chased a beaten enemy across France.
Desmond Young - Rommel, The Desert Fox
CHAPTER 5
“None So Blind...”
The good fairy who looks after the British had to work overtime in 1940. She never did them a better turn than when, despite her deputy, Mr. Churchill, she saw to it that the French did not continue the war in North Africa. Had they done so, Hitler must have followed them. Spain would have come in or been forced to allow the passage of German troops. Gibraltar would have fallen. The western end of the Mediterranean would have been closed. French colonial troops would never have stood against German armour.
Stiffened by a couple of German panzer divisions, even the chicken-hearted Graziani must have been dug out of his deep shelter and hustled into Cairo by Christmas. Britain's last base within striking distance of Europe would have gone. The loss of the Suez Canal would have closed the other end of the Mediterranean. The road to Syria, Iraq, Iran and, ultimately, the Caucasus would have been wide open. Turkey could have been pinched out or coerced into joining the Axis. Such are the contentions of better strategists than I. Had the half of it come off the Good Fairy would have had her hands full.
Only the German Naval Staff correctly appreciated these resplendent possibilities. With no taste for “Operation Sea Lion,” the invasion of Britain, Admiral Raeder suggested, on September 6th, 1940, that the best way to strike at her was to exclude her from the Mediterranean. On September 26th he was more explicit. “The British,” he said, “have always considered the Mediterranean the pivot of their world-empire.... Italy is fast becoming the main target of at- tack.... Britain always attempts to strangle the weaker. The Italians have not yet realised their danger when they refuse our help....For this reason the Mediterranean question must be cleared up during the winter months. Gibraltar must be taken.... The Suez Canal must be taken. It is doubtful whether the Italians can accomplish this alone; support by German troops will be needed. An advance from Suez through Palestine and Syria as far as Turkey is necessary. If we reach that point, Turkey will be in our power.The Russian problem will then appear in different light. Fundamentally, Russia is afraid of Germany. It is doubtful whether an advance against Russia from the north will be necessary.... The question of North-West Africa is also of decisive importance. All indications are that Britain, with the help of Gaullist France, and possibly also of the U.S.A., wants to make this region a centre of resistance and to set up air bases for an attack against Italy....In this way Italy would be defeated.” If Admiral Raeder is ever visited by the shades of Hitler, Keitel and Jodl he may well greet them with “Don't say I didn't tell you!”
“The F�hrer agrees with the general line of thought,” add the minutes of the meeting. Why, then, did he not follow it out? First, he was not sea-minded. Second, he half believed, even in the late summer of 1940, that Britain would come to terms. Third, if she were obstinate, he hoped to “attract France into the orbit of the anti-British coalition,” as Ciano reported after the Brenner meeting on October 4th. Lastly, by the end of September, the Russian bee was already buzzing in his bonnet. Of these deterrents, the first was a disability he shared with Field-Marshal Keitel, Colonel-General Jodl and Colonel-General Halder, his military advisers. The second was a private illusion which Mr. Churchill had done his best publicly to dispel. The French coup he might very well have brought off, had he made a quick and generous peace. The majority of Frenchmen would almost certainly have settled down and, temporarily at least, accepted a German hegemony over Europe. There were no very hard feelings against the German Army. On the contrary, it was regarded with grudging admiration. To-day, even ex-members of the Resistance reserve their hatred for (a) Darnand'smilice and collaborators generally; (b) the Gestapo; (c) the S.S., in that order. The German Army comes a bad fourth. “On ne pent dire qu'ils n'etaient pas assez corrects, ces gens-la” is still commonly said in the part of France where I am writing.
As for the last fatal folly, there was no cure for that but the Russian winter and the Red Army.
Obsessed though he was with Russia, Hitler did not altogether forget North Africa. Heavy-handed efforts were made by Ribbentrop to bring Franco into the war. A plan (“Operation Felix”) was prepared for the capture of Gibraltar. Goering's pet scheme of a triple thrust into Morocco, Trip
olitania and the Balkans was strongly pressed by its author and at least considered. Moreover, though we did not know it at the time, General von Thoma, Chief of the German Mobile Forces at Army Headquarters, was sent in October to see General Graziani and discuss the dispatch of German troops to Libya. General von Thoma reported against the proposal, which was, he says, mainly political-to ensure that Mussolini did not change sides. His contention was that nothing less than a force of four panzer divisions would be of any use, that these could only be maintained with difficulty, if at all, in the face of British sea-power, and that they would have to be substituted for Italians. Graziani and Badoglio would object to any such substitution and, in fact, did not want German troops at all.
General von Thoma added that the African theatre was only suitable for the sort of war that General Lettow-Vorbeck had carried on in East Africa during World War I. He claims that Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch and Colonel-General Halder, his Chief of Staff, agreed with him and were also against sending German troops to Africa, which is very probable. They had both opposed von Manstein's plan of breaking into France through the Ardennes instead of through the low Countries, and Hitler had overruled them. Hitler lost his temper and von Thoma feels that the reason he was never sent to Africa in command until the war was already lost there (he arrived at El Alamein, where he was captured, on September 20th, 1942), was Hitler's spite.
It does not seem to have occurred to him even after the war that, whether Hitler's motives were political or military, he was right and von Brauchitsch, Halder and he, von Thoma, were wrong. Hitler should, no doubt, have overruled his military advisers, the more so as General von Thoma takes some pride in having pointed out to him, on the strength of his experience in Spain, that the Italian troops were useless, that “one British soldier was better than twelve Italians,” that “Italians are good workers but no fighters: they don't like the noise!” and so on. But who, except General von Thoma, could suppose that General Wavell would dare to attack so vastly superior a force or that Graziani's army would crumble as quickly and completely as it did?
When the first golden opportunity was already lost and Graziani defeated, Hitler took action. Having offered Mussolini German anti-tank units after the fall of Sidi-Barrani and suggested (a delicate matter for one dictator to another) placing Italian troops under German command, he woke up completely on the capture of Bardia and told his Chiefs of Staff that he was resolved to do everything in his power to prevent Italy from losing North Africa.... “The F�hrer is firmly determined to give the Italians support. German formations are to be transferred as soon as possible, equipped with anti-tank guns and mines, heavy tanks and light and heavy A.A. guns.... Material is to be shipped by sea, personnel by air.... Units cannot be transferred until the middle of February and will then take about five more weeks from the time of loading.”
At a conference between Hitler, Mussolini and their staffs on January 19th and 20th, the Italians reported that they were bringing their three divisions in Tripoli up to full strength and transferring one armoured division and one motorised division from Italy, the move to be completed about February 20th. They “very warmly welcome the dispatch of the German 5th Light (Motorised) Division.” Its move was to be made between February 15th and 20th but equipment could be shipped earlier. At another, domestic, conference on February 3rd, Hitler told his Army Staff that “the loss of North Africa could be withstood in the military sense but must have a strong psychological effect on Italy. Britain could hold a pistol at Italy's head.... The British forces in the Mediterranean would not be tied down. The British would have the free use of a dozen divisions and could employ them most dangerously in Syria. We must make every effort to prevent this.... We must render effective assistance in North Africa.” The Luftwaffe, which had already been ordered to assist the Italians, must intervene still more actively with Stukas and fighters and must strike a blow against the British troops in Cyrenaica, using the heaviest bombs. It must work in co-operation with the Italian Air Force to protect the transports, to disrupt British supplies by land and sea and to combat the British fleet. But first of all attempts must be made to subdue the air base of Malta.
Even if this intervention were enough to bring the British advance to a standstill, the “blocking unit,” the 5th Light Division, was still insufficient, said Hitler, and must be reinforced by a strong armoured unit. The dispatch of German troops must be speeded up and air transport used if necessary. All this was well enough. It will be seen, however, that the thinking was purely defensive. Hitler said as much in a letter to Mussolini on February 28th. “If we are patient for another five days,” he wrote, “I am sure that any new British attempt to push on towards Tripoli is bound to fail. I am very grateful to you, Duce, for the fact that you have placed your motorised units at the disposal of General Rommel. He will not let you down and I am convinced that in the near future he will have won the loyalty and, I hope, the affection of your troops. I believe that the mere arrival of the first Panzer Regiment will represent an exceptional reinforcement of your position.” The last part of this prediction, at least, was soon to be proved correct.
Hitler thus realised the importance of not losing North Africa. Neither he nor his staff seem to have seen the possibility of conquering it and the far-reaching results that would flow from a successful offensive against Egypt. Halder, for example, never took the North African campaign seriously from the start and never regarded it as more than a political move to keep the Italians in the war. For this the outlay of three or four divisions might not prove too costly. “Of course, if the opportunity for offensive action presented itself we would take it but on the whole we regarded the matter as a fight for time,” he said in his interrogation. “I last talked to Rommel about this subject in the spring of 1942. At that time he told me that he would conquer Egypt and the Suez Canal and then he spoke of East Africa. I could not restrain a somewhat impolite smile and asked him what he would need for the purpose. He thought he would want another two armoured corps. I asked him: 'Even if we had them, how would you supply and feed them?' To this question his reply was 'That's quite immaterial to me; that's your problem!' As events in Africa grew worse, Rommel kept demanding more and more aid. Where it was to come from didn't worry him. Then the Italians began to complain because they were losing their shipping in the process. If history succeeds in unravelling the threads of what went on in Africa, it will have achieved a miracle, for Rommel managed to get things into such an unholy muddle that I doubt whether any one will ever be able to make head or tail of it.”
Rommel is dead but the unravelling is not so difficult as Colonel-General Halder imagines. Nor is the verdict of history likely to be as favourable to himself as he supposes. History does not rate very highly men in key positions who allow their judgment to be influenced by their personal likes and dislikes. That Halder disliked Rommel is obvious from the tone of his own statement and from the adroit substitution of “two armoured corps” for the two armoured divisions for which Rommel actually asked. It is obvious from the omissions. Halder speaks of a conversation in “the spring of 1942.” He refrains from mentioning that it was on July 27th, 1941, that Rommel first sought permission to launch an offensive, with the Suez Canal as its objective and February, 1942, as its target date. Whatever he may have asked for hi the spring of 1942, he then asked only for three German divisions, with mixed units amounting to another, and three extra Italian divisions. The Army Command jibbed at providing the extra German units and Halder or one of his staff wrote rude comments on the margin of the plan. Yet if Rommel had had four extra German divisions (two hundred were being employed on the Russian front and the Germans sent three to Tunis in three weeks after the Allied landings in North Africa in November, 1942), it is long odds that he would have reached Cairo and the Canal at the beginning of 1942.
As for supply, Halder again fails to mention what Rommel all along saw, what the German and Italian General Staffs were strangely blind in not seeing
until too late, that the key to all supply problems and, indeed, to the control of the Mediterranean, was the capture of Malta.
Lastly, Halder, perhaps naturally, omits to mention Rommel once called him a bloody fool, or the German equivalent, and asked him what he had ever done in war except sit on his backside in an office chair. It is not to be supposed, however, that he has forgotten it.
The story of the war in North Africa is the story of unending battle between Rommel, who saw-and proved-the possibility of a major success there and a High Command which refused to take the North African campaign seriously. In that battle Rommel had all the odds against him. He was far away in the desert and “les absents ont toujours tort.” He was not a General Staff officer and was, therefore, decried by the professionals. On the rare occasions when he saw Hitler, he could seldom see him alone. When he did, he founc him, understandably, engrossed in Russia. He was patted on the back and promised support but he felt that any impression he might make would be rubbed out as soon as he left by Hitler's entourage. Above all, Keitel, Jodl and Halder were jealous of his popularity with Hitler and the German public, of his war record and, no doubt, of his good luck in having an independent command beyond the reach of the F�hrer. The easiest way to “smear” him was to make out that, while he might be a good leader in the field, he was not a man whose views on the larger issues of war could be taken seriously.