by Unknown
Our problem in this retreat was the non-motorised force of Italians. The slowest formation, assuming that one does not want to abandon it, always determines the speed of retreat of the whole army. This is a disastrous disadvantage in the face of a fully motorised and superior attacker. It was necessary, for these reasons, to move the Italian divisions to the west into new positions, before the beginning of the British attack, to keep the motorised troops at Mersa-el-Brega so as to tie down the British, to mine the roads and to take advantage of every opportunity of inflicting damage on the enemy advanced guard. The British Commander had revealed himself as over-cautious. He risked nothing which was the least doubtful and any bold action was completely foreign to him. It was, therefore, the task of our motorised forces to give an impression of constant activity so as to make the British even more cautious and slow down their speed. It was clear to me that Montgomery would never take the risk of striking boldly after us and overrunning us, as he could have done perfectly safely. Indeed, looking at the operations as a whole, such a course would have cost him far smaller casualties than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action, at the sacrifice of speed.
In any case the retreat to Tunisia was to be carried out in several stages, the British to be forced into deploying as often as possible. This was a gamble on the caution of the British Commander which proved to be very well justified. The Buerat line was earmarked as the first position, the line Tarhuna-Homs as the second. Even there we did not intend to accept battle; instead the infantry was to move off beforehand, while the mechanised formations lightly engaged the enemy and delayed their advance. At Gabes, which, like El Alamein, could not be outflanked from the south, the stand was finally to be made.
(b) In the Gabes position the infantry could bear the main weight of the battle. The position did not lend itself to an attack by motorised forces and could only be broken through by the concentration of a tremendous quantity of material. Montgomery would take no risk and would need several months to bring up enough material from Libya so as to be able to attack the Wadi Akarit with good prospects of success. In the meantime the motorised forces were to be reinforced and refitted with the equipment which would be brought into Tunis while the retreat was going on. The 5th Panzer Army would have landed and we should have a chance of building up another striking force.
The great danger for us was the wide-open front in the west of Tunisia which offered the British and Americans in that area good opportunities of launching an offensive. We must, therefore, first strike there, stage a surprise attack with the whole of our motorised forces, destroy a part of the Anglo-American formations and drive the rest back into Algeria. Meanwhile Montgomery could not hope to do anything against the Gabes position until he had built up large stocks of ammunition for his artillery.
After the British and Americans had been beaten in western Tunisia and deprived of the power of staging an offensive, the quickest possible reorganisation would have to be made for an attack on Montgomery, to throw him back to the east and delay his deployment. Such an operation would obviously be one of considerable difficulty owing to the unfavourable nature of the ground.
(c) In the long run neither Libya nor Tunisia could have been held, for the African war was decided by the battle of the Atlantic. From the moment that the overwhelming industrial ca- pacity of the United States could make itself felt in any theatre of war, there was no chance of ultimate victory. Even if we had overrun the whole of Africa and the Americans had been left with a suitable bridgehead through which they could transport their material, we must eventually have lost the continent.*
[* This is only superficially a contradiction of Rommel's previous views and a confirmation of those of General Halder. Rommel remained convinced that, given support, he could have overrun the Middle East in the spring or summer of 1942 but he came to realise that American production must eventually prove decisive everywhere.]
Tactical skill at this stage could only postpone the collapse; it could not avert it in the long run. In Tunisia the aim must be to gain time, so as to bring as many as possible of the battle-tried veterans in safety to Europe. Because our experience had shown that there was no hope of maintaining a large army in Tunisia, our endeavour must be to reduce the fighting troops there to fewer but better-equipped formations. If the Allies tried to force a decision, we must constantly shorten the front and evacuate more and more troops by means of transport aircraft, barges and warships. The first stand must be in the hilly country extending round Tunis from Enfidaville, the second in the Cap Bon peninsula. When the Allies finally took Tunis they must find nothing there, or at most a few prisoners, and would thus be robbed of the fruits of their victory, as we were robbed at Dunkirk.
(d) From the troops scheduled for evacuation to Italy, a striking force would be formed. These troops were the best both in training and in battle experience that we could put against the British and Americans. Moreover, I was on such terms with them that their value under my command was not to be measured only by their actual numbers.
The End