And yet, there are risks in being too innovative. The Germans wasted a considerable amount of their limited resources in trying to develop wonder weapons (and even naval units they couldn’t really use, like battleships and carriers.) The history of military development is littered with boondoggles that absorbed money and returned little. One doesn’t need to look further than Arthur C. Clarke's Superiority to realise that a technologically-advanced military could be defeated by a primitive, but more numerous force (as happened to Custer at Little Big Horn). The trick, as always, is to remain on the cutting edge without sacrificing the keystones of survival and eventual victory.
***
In 2000, the Bush Administration believed the only major threat to the United States - and the global order it had created - was China, a rising power. The reforms to the American military proposed by Donald Rumsfeld, amongst others, were designed to fight and win a war that was assumed to be something akin to the Falklands War, although on a much larger scale. The war would be limited. The Americans would either safeguard Taiwan and put the Chinese back in their box or lose control over the waters surrounding China, in which case China would dominate Taiwan and the surrounding nations. There was no concept the war would turn general, with engagements being fought all over the world, or nuclear.
This was not an unreasonable assumption, at the time. However, it didn’t account for terrorists who could - and did - turn airliners into makeshift cruise missiles. (Not unlike submarines and aircraft, the threat was first discussed in fiction and largely ignored by the militaries.) The United States and its allies found themselves grappling with a new kind of war, facing challenges they were not mentally prepared to handle. They had to deploy forces to Afghanistan and later Iraq, becoming embroiled in complex issues that were either unprecedented or, in the past, had been handled in ways that were now politically unacceptable. Worse, the terrorists and insurgents who survived their first encounters with American and allied firepower learnt from their experiences. They found ways to minimise American advantages, they found ways to circumvent or outsmart American technology and they found ways to create legal and ethical problems for their American opponents. Worst of all, the terrorists were ever-present. When the allied forces pulled out, the terrorists moved back and undid all their good works.
The problem exists on a much bigger scale. China, Russia and Iran - and other enemy states -have a very good motive to find ways to circumvent American advantages and bring the United States to heel. The Chinese investment in antiship missiles, for example, can only be explained as a bid to deter American carriers from approaching the South China Sea or preparation to sink one if she did. The Russians have been working on building up their deployable technology, claiming that it can match American technology (and, just incidentally, selling it without strings attached). The assumption the United States - and the West in general - will retain its technological edge for the foreseeable future is nothing more than wishful thinking.
Technology is not the only issue. Saudi Arabia, for example, has spent vast sums of money on buying everything from modern tanks to aircraft. It has one of the largest defence budgets in the world. And yet, the Saudis are quite unable to protect themselves against a peer power. The Saudis have spent so much time coup-proofing their military and setting up rival units that their actual fighting power is quite low. Even basic maintenance is a non-issue. It is true the Saudis did better than their critics expected, during the Gulf War, but the bar was not set very high. Modern militaries require more than giving a man a rifle and pointing him at the front. They need training in how to handle and maintain their weapons, then training that draws directly from real-life experiences. It is all too easy, when there is no sense of urgency, to allow standards to fall by the wayside.
The belief that the West will maintain its superiority tends to breed complacency. The planners of Operation Iraqi Freedom overlooked a number of factors that made the invasion and occupation a great deal harder than it could have been. Their mindset refused to allow them to grasp the nettle and admit that they would have to make hard decisions and yes, there would be casualties. In a sense, the complacency continues to pervade American and Western military thinking. Our governments are often more interested in looking good than actually making hard decisions and sticking to them, because they believe - deep inside - that total defeat is simply not a possibility. This is, unfortunately, untrue.
There are three basic possibilities that must be acknowledged, considered and prepared for:
First, we may face another paradigm shift in wartime. Instead of a major invasion, we may see insurgencies and uprisings within major cities, particularly in districts dominated by ethnic and religious groups hostile to the government. This would present us with a legal and ethical quandary, as we would start by treating the matter as a police issue rather than calling on the military. The insurgents, in such a scenario, would try to play on this as much as possible, alternatively claiming to be a rival government or demanding the protection of the law depending on the exact situation. This would rapidly lead to hardening attitudes, particularly if the government refused to commit itself to defending the country until it was too late. If this happened, our values as a society would be effectively dead.
Second, we might face an enemy force that outnumbers us so badly the tech advantage is effectively meaningless. China, for example, might throw hundreds of primitive cruise missiles at a carrier battle group and count it a victory; Russia might launch a massive invasion of Europe, accepting the loss of ten Russian tanks for every European tank and coming out ahead. If this happened, the world order would be completely reshaped.
Third, we might face a different paradigm shift. The Russians or the Chinese might manage to gain effective control of space, allowing them to bombard the United States from orbit until the United States surrendered. This would not require (much) additional technological development, merely the will to invest money and resources and the determination to overlook early failures. If this happened, the world order would be shattered beyond repair.
***
In these books, the Terrain Marine Corps met - for the first time in centuries - an opponent that matched them in technology and came close to them, although not completely, in training. The marines had problems handling the challenge because they assumed, even though they should have known better, that they were the best. They were too used to enemies who were unable or unwilling to match them in a straight fight.
In the real world, the results might not be so kind. The world is not a safe place. The current global order has its problems, some of which are easy to see, but it is far better than the alternative. There is no reason to believe - and quite a few reasons to disbelieve - that a world dominated by Russia, China, Iran or Islamic State’s successors would be any better. We must ready ourselves for battle, for being ready to fight is the only way to prevent a war.
And now you’ve read the book, I have a favour to ask.
It’s getting harder to earn a living through indie writing these days, for a number of reasons (my health is one of them, unfortunately). If you liked this book, please post a review wherever you bought it; the more reviews a book gets, the more promotion.
Christopher G. Nuttall
Edinburgh, 2020
The Halls of Montezuma Page 39