by Rex Warner
I myself am well informed about this colony, since many of my friends were among the colonists. Some were very distinguished men. There was, for instance, Hippodamos of Miletus, the town planner, who in consultation with Pericles had been responsible for all the new building in Piraeus. He was one of the first to recognize the obvious advantages, from the point of view of traffic control, of broad straight thoroughfares intersecting each other at right angles. As a result of his work you can travel in Piraeus twice the distance that you could cover in the same time in Athens. Then there was another Ionian, Herodotus of Halicarnassus, one of the wittiest and most learned men I have ever met and a great traveler. He was already a friend of Pericles, and Sophocles had written a poem in his honor; and this was before the time when his great history was completed. Pericles had been much impressed by those portions of the history which he had seen and later was responsible for awarding to Herodotus the greatest literary prize in terms of money that has ever been given to a Greek. And this was not because Herodotus was his friend or even because in his history he rightly emphasizes the great part played by Athens in the Persian wars. It was because his work was excellent, original and, insofar as this is possible in history, true. Pericles believed that it was the duty and privilege of Athens to support and encourage everything that is excellent.
Another of the colonists was Protagoras of Abdera, also a man of very great learning, though I should hardly call him philosopher. He, like most of the others who are called “sophists,” was more interested in acquiring and using knowledge for practical political purposes than in investigating the fundamental nature of the universe. Indeed, many of these sophists will declare that the discovery of truth is impossible or that, if it were possible, the knowledge of it could never be communicated to others. You will still find many people who quote the statement of Protagoras that “man is the measure” as a justification for their own selfishness, lethargy, lack of curiosity and ignorance. In fact this statement, about which we hear so much, can only be interpreted as meaning something that is perfectly obvious or something that is obviously untrue. But Protagoras is a good man whose views on all practical matters are well worth attention. He was given the responsibility for drawing up the constitution of the new colony, and I am told that he did this work admirably, though to the distaste of the original Sybarites, who expected, for no good reason, to occupy a position of particular privilege.
In fact there were, as often happens, many difficulties and disagreements before the city finally took shape at Thouria, near the site of ancient Sybaris. Thucydides himself was involved in one of these quarrels, and when he returned to Athens he was prosecuted by one of the two Athenian founders. There was also trouble with some of the neighboring Italian cities, and the people of Thouria were lucky in being able to secure the services of the exiled Spartan Kleandridas, who was a fine soldier, though, as Pericles had discovered, easy to bribe. Today Thouria is a rich and prosperous city. Herodotus, after another stay in Athens, has returned to live there and is honored as one of its leading citizens. It is one of those places which bears the mark of Athens without being an Athenian dependency, and this is what Pericles wanted it to be.
It so happened (and this was, of course, pure accident) that the venture of Thouria turned out very much to Pericles’s own political advantage. Thucydides, after his prosecution for events connected with the expedition, became, rightly or wrongly, extremely unpopular. In the recent past he had attempted to discredit Pericles by attacking his friends and, most unsuccessfully, to get rid of Pericles himself by means of ostracism. He now suffered what he had planned for others. A vote by ostracism was held and Thucydides was forced to go into exile for ten years. For the rest of Pericles’s life there was no resolute or important opposition to his leadership.
13
The War with Samos
A striking example of the complete ascendancy which Pericles had now won over the Athenian people can be found in the war with Samos, which broke out soon after the ostracism of Thucydides. In this war the Athenians lost many lives and were, for a short time, in great danger. The war was violently opposed by the remnants of Thucydides’s party, who asserted that Athens was acting with a complete disregard for justice and her own safety. They were supported by several of the comic poets, who did their best to deride Pericles by harping on his supposed meanness and his infatuation for Aspasia. The people laughed at the jokes, but continued to support Pericles enthusiastically in everything that he suggested to them.
At the time when this war broke out Samos was by far the most powerful of the allies. Her long naval tradition went back to the times of the tyrant Polycrates, who is said to have designed the first modern warships and who made the city of Samos, before the Persian conquest, into one of the richest and most brilliant in the world. The Samians claim with some reason that in those days they were preeminent not only in shipbuilding but in architecture, engineering and poetry. Among their philosophers they could name Pythagoras, about whom I have already declared my opinion. Samos still possessed a powerful fleet and, with the other large islands of Chios and Lesbos, still provided ships rather than money as her contribution to the Athenian alliance. As a result she was used to considering herself independent. The Athenians had made no attempt to shape or control her government as they had done in the case of the great mainland city of Miletus.
It was because of a dispute with Miletus, which had long been a rival of Samos and could boast of an equally distinguished past (much more distinguished, so far as philosophy is concerned), that the war broke out, although, in my opinion, the occasions for war can seldom be regarded as their true causes. In Samos there was a strong antidemocratic party which felt itself threatened by the increasing prestige of the democracies, which of course were, as a rule, supported by Athens. But nationalism can be at least as powerful a force as democracy, and it seemed possible to bring even their political opponents into a common effort to secure complete independence which, if won, would secure the anti-democrats in power. In such a situation war was, in any case, likely if not inevitable. The same thing may be said of the present war, the outbreak of which did not depend on any particular dispute, but simply on the fact that the Spartans realized that as Athens grew stronger, their own position must inevitably grow weaker.
So, with regard to this war with Samos, the events which immediately led up to it are of only incidental importance. Nor would it be wholly accurate to say that the real cause of the war was in the conflicting interests of democracy and a system by which power went, as a matter of course, to the rich and noble families. This explanation is indeed nearer the truth, but the issue was confused by the fact that the Athenian democracy, the model for all democracies, was also, and of necessity, an imperialism. It was possible, and almost reasonable, for a Samian democrat to regard any Athenian intervention in his affairs as an attack upon his liberty. Pericles, of course, was aware of this attitude and could sympathize with it. But his greatness lies in the fact that he was a realist as well as a theoretician. What is vital must be defended at all costs, and in his view Athens herself, the leader and example of all liberty and of every brilliant hope, depended for her existence and survival on the maintenance of her empire. Freedom, to him, was more than a word or a sensation of irresponsibility. He imagined it rather as the outcome of security, initiative and an integration of both delicacy and strength. He could be ruthless, but he could not be inhuman, sentimental or hypocritical. Unlike other statesmen, he realized the full implications of any decision that he made, but he was not for that reason any the less quick in coming to a decision.
He knew that intervention in Samos might mean war and was ready for war when it came. The representatives of Miletus who came to Athens to ask for Athenian help in their border dispute with Samos were accompanied by a number of Samian democrats who stated that the government of their island was planning to secede from the alliance and urged Pericles to replace the government with a democracy, a
measure which would require the use of force. The Athenians, on the motion of Pericles, supported the claim of Miletus and sent forty ships to Samos. The move was too sudden to be resisted. The Athenians took a hundred hostages, mostly boys and young men of the leading families, and deposited them under guard on the island of Lemnos. In Samos they set up a democratic government and, leaving behind them an Athenian commissioner with a small garrison, sailed away.
However, they had miscalculated the strength and resolution of the anti-democratic party. Many of these had escaped to the mainland as soon as the Athenian fleet was sighted, had made their way inland to the Persian governor Pisuthnes, and had found that he was willing to help them. Since Persia and Athens were at peace, he could scarcely come out openly on their side, but the help he did give was effective: he put about seven hundred mercenary troops at their disposal. With this force they returned to Samos by night and, after overwhelming the Athenian garrison, killed or arrested most of their political opponents and then, acting with great speed, landed at Lemnos and took away the hostages. They handed over their Athenian prisoners to the Persians, having first branded them on the forehead with the Athenian emblem of the owl. This act of savagery led, as such acts usually do, to a retaliation that was equally savage, since in the subsequent fighting the Athenians branded their Samian prisoners with the mark of the samaena, a kind of warship which is supposed to have been designed by Polycrates and which used to be used in Samian coinage as the owl is in Athens. The fact that the Samians acted in such a way seems to indicate that they now considered themselves too strong to be attacked. They expected too that other members of the Athenian alliance would take the opportunity to revolt, so that if Athens did decide to act she would have to disperse her forces too widely to be effective anywhere. And in fact the important city of Byzantium, no doubt in collusion with the Samians, closed her harbor to Athenian ships and refused to make her contribution to the Athenian treasury.
The feeling in Athens was one of anger rather than alarm, though there was indeed reason for alarm. Before this time people had enjoyed jokes to the effect that Pericles’s only motive in championing the cause of Miletus had been his infatuation for Aspasia, who was of course a native of this city. They believed that since the crushing of the revolt in Euboea everything was secure, and, finding themselves disappointed, reacted with their usual violence. They were willing to give Pericles everything that he asked, and Pericles asked for nothing else than the employment of the whole force of the state. He saw more clearly than the rest the real danger of the situation and knew that with every day that passed without action the danger would increase. Neither Persia nor Sparta could be counted upon to keep the peace. Pisuthnes was already supporting the rebels and a deputation from them was on its way to Sparta. Particular anxiety was felt about the loyalty of Chios and Lesbos, since if their fleets were united with Samos and were supported by the Phoenician fleet under Persian control, Athens would be outnumbered on her own element, the sea.
All of the ten Athenian generals were required to serve on this campaign. Pericles himself set out at once with the sixty ships that were immediately available, once again taking a deliberate risk, since the Samians had a fleet of at least seventy ships and it would be necessary for Pericles to detach some of his own vessels to make sure that Chios and Lesbos would send their contingents and to keep a lookout for any possible move of the Phoenicians. The Athenians, however, believe themselves, with reason, to be the best sailors in the world and in all naval battles have shown themselves indifferent to odds. This was one of many occasions in Athens when men were called up and ships made ready for sea in a fever of hurry, impatience and enthusiasm. Many of those who served on this expedition were friends of mine. Sophocles was one of the generals. My old pupil Archelaus was in the infantry, as also was young Socrates.
There is no doubt that the Samians were surprised by the speed and daring of Pericles’s action. They had imagined that Athens would either do nothing or would take some time to muster her forces and had decided to use what they thought would be an interval to settle their account with Miletus. But they were recalled from Miletus by fire signals announcing the approach of an Athenian fleet.
Pericles had already dispatched some ships to Chios and Lesbos, so that by the time he made contact with the enemy fleet of some seventy triremes his own strength was only forty-four. He engaged them without delay, defeated them and drove them into harbor. However, he still lacked sufficient naval and military strength to impose a regular blockade. A few Samian ships succeeded in slipping out of harbor and sailed southward to make contact with Pisuthnes and urge him to bring up the Phoenician fleet to their aid. This was a danger which Pericles took seriously. The Phoenician fleet would not move without the authority of the Great King, but Pisuthnes had already broken the peace with Athens and there were no means of knowing with certainty whether the Great King would approve or disapprove of his action.
Indeed, on this occasion the mere possibility of Persian aid did almost as much good to the Samians as the aid itself might have done had it been forthcoming. Pericles was soon reinforced by twenty-five ships from Chios and Lesbos and another sixty, with a strong army, from Athens. He was now able to land troops in sufficient numbers to be effective and proceeded to build fortifications to blockade the city of Samos itself. But before the fortifications were completed, reports came in to the effect that the Phoenician fleet had left Tyre and was sailing north. Pericles, with sixty ships, sailed to meet them. He had left sixty-five ships behind him, a force strong enough to contain the Samian fleet, and the fortifications seemed already capable of resisting any attack. His calculations were justified by everything except the event, though it is difficult to see how he could have acted otherwise. If a large Phoenician fleet were permitted to make contact with the Samians, Athenian difficulties would be enormously increased.
However, an opportunity for action, though a slight one, had been offered to the Samians, and they took advantage of it with skill and daring. They made their preparations quietly, manned their ships with remarkable speed, and suddenly attacked in full force the few Athenian ships which were watching the harbor, sinking some of them and putting the rest to flight. The rest of the Athenian fleet came into action hurriedly and was defeated, though with no considerable loss. An attack was also made on the Athenian camp and many prisoners were taken. The main fortifications held, but now the Athenians were on the defensive and for a fortnight the Samians had command of the sea. They used this period to bring in provisions and war supplies and to send to Sparta another deputation, which exaggerated their victory and urged the Spartans to act before it was too late.
The whole operation had been brilliantly conceived and carried out. It is interesting to observe that most of the credit for this goes to a philosopher. This was Melissos, who commanded the Samian forces throughout the siege and for whose military abilities Pericles professed a high regard. Indeed, as a general Melissos deserves great praise. As a philosopher he is interesting, but in my view unsound. He develops with great subtlety the doctrine of Parmenides that the whole is one. It is a doctrine which seeks to show, among other things, that all motion, all change, all becoming and passing away, all diversity is illusory, and it has always seemed to me remarkable that a general so noted for his rapidity of action should be one who believed motion to be impossible.
After a fortnight Pericles, with the main body of the Fleet, returned. No trace of the Phoenician fleet had been discovered and he had heard nothing of the successful action of Melissos. Sophocles has told me that this was the only occasion in his experience when he had found Pericles impatient and almost resentful. He blamed himself for his long absence, though in fact it is hard to know how he could have avoided it; and he blamed the other generals for lack of forethought and energy. Characteristically, he never blamed the troops or the crews of the ships, since it was his belief that men under his command would always fight well if they were given adequate l
eadership. He even reprimanded Sophocles himself, who in an attempt to amuse him told him the story of how, at a banquet, he had been fascinated by the appearance of a beautiful boy who was pouring out the wine and, in a dexterous exchange of conversation, had induced the boy to put down his face to be kissed, “And after that,” Sophocles had concluded, “you claim that I am no strategist.” But Pericles was far from being amused. “In war,” he had replied, “a general must keep not only his hands but his eyes clean.”