by Ian Kershaw
78. Das letzte halbe Jahr, pp. 218 (22.1.45), 236 (7.2.45).
79. BfZ, Sammlung Sterz, Gisela K., 3.2.45.
80. BfZ, Sammlung Sterz, Luise G., 3.2.45.
81. Heinrich Breloer (ed.), Mein Tagebuch: Geschichten vom Überleben 1939–1947, Cologne, 1984, p. 228 (27.1.45).
82. For a good description in one region, see Jill Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front: Württemberg under the Nazis, London, 2006, pp. 304–12.
83. BfZ, Sammlung Sterz, Gefr. Heinrich R., 23.1.45.
84. BfZ, Sammlung Sterz, Sold. Willy F., 30.1.45.
85. BfZ, Sammlung Sterz, Fw. Hugo B., 2.2.45.
86. BfZ, Sammlung Sterz, Lt. Thomas S., 23.1.45.
87. BfZ, Sammlung Sterz, Hptm. Emerich P., 20.1.45.
88. BfZ, Sammlung Sterz, Uffz. Hans ——, 24.1.45.
89. BfZ, Sammlung Sterz, O’Gefr. Otto L., 24.1.45.
90. BfZ, Sammlung Sterz, Gren. Kurt M., 30.1.45.
91. Quoted Andreas Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage: Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945, Munich, 2007, p. 243, and see also, for racial stereotypes, pp. 269–70.
92. BA/MA, MSg2/2697, fo. 88, diary of Lieutenant Julius Dufner, 25.1.45.
93. NAL, WO219/1587, fo. 860, SHAEF, Directorate of Army Psychiatry Research Memorandum 45/03/12, January 1945.
94. Kunz, pp. 299–300.
95. BA/MA, N245/3, NL Reinhardt, ‘Kalenderblätter 1945’, fo. 81 (14.1.45); N245/2, Briefe, fo. 41 (15.1.45); N245/15, Generalleutnant Otto Heidkämper (former Chief of Staff of Army Group Centre), ‘Die Schlacht um Ostpreußen’ (1953), fo. 32; Guderian, pp. 382–3; DRZW, 10/1 (Lakowski), pp. 536–7.
96. BA/MA, N245/3, NL Reinhardt, ‘Kalenderblätter 1945’, fo. 82 (16–17.1.45); N245/15, Heidkämper, fos. 40–43.
97. BA/MA, N245/2, NL Reinhardt, Briefe, fo. 41 (19.1.45).
98. BA/MA, N245/2, NL Reinhardt, Briefe, fo. 41 (20.1.45).
99. BA/MA, N245/2, NL Reinhardt, Briefe, fo. 41v (21.1.45); N245/3, NL Reinhardt, ‘Kalenderblätter 1945’, fos. 82–3 (20–21.1.45); N245/15, Heidkämper, fos. 53–7.
100. The above account relies, except where otherwise stated, on BA/MA, N245/3, NL Reinhardt, ‘Kalenderblätter 1945’, fos. 83–4 (22–7.1.45); N245/2, NL Reinhardt, Briefe, fos. 41–2 (22.1.45, 26.1.45); N245/15, Heidkämper, fos. 68–72, 76–87; N24/39, ‘Erinnerungen von General d.I. a.D. Friedrich Hoßbach’, typescript (May 1945), pp. 45–6, 68. See also Friedrich Hoßbach, Die Schlacht um Ostpreußen, Überlingen, 1951, pp. 51–73; Guderian, pp. 400–401; Dieckert and Grossmann, pp. 94–5, 110-18; DZW, 6, p. 511.
101. e.g. BA/MA, RH21/3/730, fos. 3–6, ‘Auskünfte Gen.Major Mueller-Hillebrand (Chef des Stabes) über den Einsatz der 3. Pz. Armee in Ostpreußen, Sept. 1944–Feb. 1945’ (1955); ‘Auszug aus einem Bericht von Oberst i.G. Mendrzyk O.Qu. bei der 3. Panzer-Armee’.
102. Quoted Schwendemann, ‘Das Kriegsende in Ostpreußen’, p. 98.
103. Schwendemann, ‘Tod zwischen den Fronten’, p. 43. I am most grateful to Dr Schwendemann for the reference to the source for these comments, BA/MA, RH20/4/617, unfoliated, Notizen über Ferngespräche 14–25.1.45, Gesprächsnotizen vom 24.1.45 (Hoßbach addressing leading officers at 16.00 hours that day, and speaking to Reinhardt that evening at 22.15 hours), and to Dr Jürgen Förster for obtaining for me a copy of the document.
104. BA/MA, N712/15, NL Pollex, Auszüge aus Briefen, fo. 12, 22.1.45.
105. N24/39, NL Hoßbach, ‘Erinnerungen’, pp. 46–7; Hoßbach, p. 70. That Rendulic´ had a less than complete comprehension of the situation in East Prussia when he arrived there seems clear. He had as recently as 17 January been appointed by Hitler as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Courland, and had been in Courland no more than twelve hours when, on 26 January, he was suddenly informed that he had to take over the command of Army Group North, besieged in East Prussia. – Lothar Rendulic´, Gekämpft, Gesiegt, Geschlagen, Wels, 1952, pp. 331–2, 336.
106. Guderian, pp. 400–401. Rendulic´, pp. 337–55, provides a description of his period, a little over six weeks, in command in East Prussia, until 12 March, though it contains only a few inconsequential lines on Hoßbach’s dismissal on p. 343.
107. Guderian, p. 394.
108. Hastings, p. 283; Roland Kaltenegger, Schörner: Feldmarschall der letzten Stunde, Munich and Berlin, 1994, pp. 265–6; Siebel-Achenbach, pp. 59, 71–2. Hitler had initially intended Field-Marshal Model to take over the command. It was decided, however, that he was urgently needed in the west, so the command was given to Schörner. – TBJG, II/15, pp. 135 (16.1.45), 138 (17.1.45).
109. Quoted DRZW, 10/2 (Kunz), p. 39.
110. BA/MA, N60/74, NL Schörner, ‘Tragödie Schlesien, März 1945’, fo. 2 (1958).
111. BAB, NS6/353, fos. 157–8, Bormann, Bekanntgabe 28/45, Ungehorsam und falsche Meldungen, containing Keitel’s order in appendix; also IfZ, Fa-91/4, fo. 1069.
112. Himmler’s command had, it seems, already been agreed some days earlier, in the main, according to Goebbels, because ‘a firm hand’ was needed to turn troops ‘flooding back’ from the path of the Soviets into new fighting units. Goebbels even suggested making Himmler Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to relieve Hitler of this duty, but Hitler was unwilling to go so far and stated that Himmler first had to prove he could master operational command. – TBJG, II/15, pp. 165 (20.1.45), 181 (22.1.45), 195 (23.1.45).
113. DZW, 6, p. 513.
114. IWM, FO645/155, interrogations of Karl Dönitz, 30.9.45, p. 5; 2.10.45, p. 2 (in English).
115. IfZ, ZS 1810, Bd. II, fo. 54, Dönitz interview with Barry Pree, 18.11.74.
116. Quoted Schwendemann, ‘Endkampf’, p. 20; also Schwendemann, ‘Tod zwischen den Fronten’, p. 45.
117. Goebbels thought Göring, when he spoke with him on 27 January, ‘almost defeatist’ and depressed, hoping even now that Hitler would try to find a political solution. – TBJG, 15/II, p. 250 (28.1.45)
118. DZW, 6, p. 572.
119. DRZW, 9/1 (Heinemann), p. 884.
120. DRZW, 9/1 (Heinemann), p. 882.
121. DRZW, 10/1 (Lakowski), p. 559.
122. DZW, 6, pp. 575, 591.
123. David K. Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944–1945, Lawrence, Kan., 2002, p. 131.
124. Quoted DZW, 6, p. 513.
125. DZW, 6, pp. 513–14.
CHAPTER 6. TERROR COMES HOME
1. See in general, for a similar interpretation, Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, Oxford, 2001.
2. For the malevolent depiction of Jews, which showed no diminution as Jews were deported from Germany, see Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust, Cambridge, Mass., 2006, and Herf’s contribution, ‘ “Der Krieg und die Juden”: Nationalsozialistische Propaganda im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in DRZW, 9/2, pp. 159ff.
3. BAB, NS19/2454, fos. 1–3v: SS-Kriegsberichter-Abteilung, SS-Standarte ‘Kurt Eggers’, 26–30.1.45.
4. 1945: Das Jahr der endgültigen Niederlage der faschistischen Wehrmacht. Dokumente, ed. Gerhard Förster and Richard Lakowski, Berlin, 1975, p. 144 (5.2.45).
5. NAL, WO219/4713, SHAEF reports, 15.2.45, 20.2.45. The threat of ‘family liability’ (Sippenhaft) against soldiers judged to be failing in their duty had been issued on numerous occasions by Wehrmacht commanders as a deterrent. It was indeed carried out in some cases, though these were exceptions rather than the rule. See Robert Loeffel, ‘Soldiers and Terror: Re-evaluating the Complicity of the Wehrmacht in Nazi Germany’, German History, 27 (2009), pp. 514–30.
6. Account (in English) of a prisoner of war, captured in the west, who had returned from the eastern front: LHC, Dempsey Papers, no. 273, pt. II, p. 7 (3.3.45).
7. BAB, NS6/135, fos. 44, 118–21, Gauleitung Mageburg-Anhalt, report of 16.2.45; report of Landratsamt in Mähr.-Schönberg, 17.2.45.
8. BAB, NS6/135, fo. 11, Auszug aus einem Bericht des Pg. Waldmann, Inspekti
on-Mitte, 7.3.45 (referring to impressions gathered in early February).
9. BAB, NS19/3705, fos. 6–13, ‘Beobachtungen im Heimatkriegsgebiet’, 22.2.45 and covering letter of Bormann to Himmler, 1.3.45.
10. BAB, NS19/2068, fos. 6–6v, 20–20v, ‘Meldungen aus dem Ostraum’, Müllrose, 16.2.45, Mark Brandenburg, 21.2.45. Reports of widespread looting in the Oder area as an indication of demoralization also in DZW, 6, p. 514. According to Goebbels’ aide, Wilfred von Oven, writing in mid-February, ‘the morale of the German soldiers on the eastern front is becoming worse by the day’. – Wilfred von Oven, Finale Furioso: Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, Tübingen, 1974, p. 578 (11.2.45).
11. BAB, R55/601, fo. 284, Tätigkeitsbericht der RPÄ, 21.2.45.
12. Das letzte halbe Jahr: Stimmungsberichte der Wehrmachtpropaganda 1944/45, ed. Wolfram Wette, Ricarda Bremer and Detlef Vogel, Essen, 2001, pp. 236–7 (7.2.45).
13. Das letzte halbe Jahr, p. 251 (23.2.45).
14. BHStA, MA 106695, report of RPvOB, 9.2.45. And see further examples in Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands, Munich, 1995, pp. 819–20, and Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen, Düsseldorf and Vienna, 1970, pp. 546ff.
15. BAB, R55/620, fos. 129–131v, SD report to State Secretary Dr Naumann, Propaganda Ministry, ‘Situation in Wien’, 1.3.45. The popular mood in Vienna had been especially poor, according to a report the previous September, when it was claimed that there was widespread defeatism, making the population open to Communist agitation. – BAB, NS6/166, fos. 23–7, Kaltenbrunner to Bormann, 14.9.44. And see Ludwig Jedlicka, ‘Ein unbekannter Bericht Kaltenbrunners über die Lage in Österreich im September 1944’, in Ludwig Jedlicka, Der 20. Juli 1944, Vienna, 1985, pp. 82–6; and Timothy Kirk, Nazism and the Working Class in Austria, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 130–32.
16. StAM, LRA 29656, fo. 573, SD-Außenstelle Berchtesgaden, 7.3.45.
17. NAL, WO219/1587, SHAEF summary of intelligence reports from informants, 20–25.2.45.
18. Goebbels noted that ‘the fiasco of the East Prussian treks is mainly put down to the Party, and the Party leadership in East Prussia is thoroughly lambasted’. – TBJG, II/15, p. 374 (13.2.45).
19. BAB, NS19/3833, fo. 1, Gottlob Berger to SS-Standartenführer Rudolf Brandt, 18.2.45.
20. BAB, NS6/135, fo. 44, report from Gauleitung Magdeburg-Anhalt, 16.2.45.
21. StAM, NSDAP 35, unfoliated, Gauorganisationsleiter München-Oberbayern to Kreisleiter, etc., 21.2.45. At the beginning of January, the Gauleiter had sharply criticized the wearing of ‘fantasy uniforms’ and ‘costuming’ as Party officials created their own colour or cut of uniform. – StAM, NSDAP 52, unfoliated, Gauorganisationsleiter München-Oberbayern to Gauamtsleiter and Kreisleiter, 3.1.45.
22. See Henke, p. 829.
23. Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe, London, 2008, pp. 528–9. Frank was eventually arrested by American troops on 4 May, tried at Nuremberg, and hanged for his part in war crimes and crimes against humanity.
24. IfZ, NO-3501, report of SS-Staf. Hübner, 16.3.45; National Archives, Washington, NND 871063, arrest and interrogation reports on Greiser, 17.5.45, 1.6.45; Jürgen Thorwald, Es begann an der Weichsel: Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten, pb. edn., Munich, 1995 (1st edn., 1949), pp. 69–79; Catherine Epstein, Model Nazi: Arthur Greiser and the Occupation of Western Poland, Oxford, 2010, pp. 298–304.
25. TBJG, II/15, pp. 223 (25.1.45), 231–2 (26.1.45), 357 (11.2.45); von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 551 (23.1.45)
26. BAB, R55/622, fos. 181–2, survey of letters sent to the RPÄ. And see BAB, NS6/135, fos. 30–32, report of 20.2.45 from Lieutenant Klein, NS-Führungsstab OKH Potsdam, on negative impressions of Party members, notably an SS-Obersturmführer, during treks from the Wartheland between 19 and 25 January. Remarkably, as late as 20 February, a month after he had fled, Greiser submitted a final report, from the security of Karlsbad, to Himmler and Bormann on the setting up and deployment of the Volkssturm in the Warthegau. – BAB, R43II/692b, fos. 109–24 (20–21.2.45).
27. BAB, NS6/353, fo. 30–30v, PK Rundschreiben 65/45, 12.2.45. Only a few days later the Party Chancellery received another dismal report of the failings of the authorities in the Warthegau in January. – BAB, NS6/135, fos. 30–32, report by Lieutenant Horst Klein, NS-Führungsstab OKH Potsdam, with an attached recommendation for Pg. Willi Ruder for the Party, in order to restore confidence in it, to take drastic action against all leading Party members seen to have failed in their duties.
28. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 572 (7.2.45).
29. IfZ, Fa 91/4, fos. 1075–8, GBV an die Obersten Reichsbehörden, 1.2.45; 1945: Das Jahr der endgültigen Niederlage der faschistischen Wehrmacht, p. 152.
30. 1945: Das Jahr der endgültigen Niederlage der faschistischen Wehrmacht, pp. 152–4.
31. e.g. BAB, NS6/353, fo. 15, PK Rundschreiben 43/45, 30.1.45; fo. 49, PK Rundschreiben 86/45, 17.2.45; fo. 106, Anordnung 23/45, 21.1.45.
32. BAB, NS6/354, fo. 134, PK Anordnung 48/45g, 1.2.45.
33. BAB, NS6/353, fos. 121–2, PK Anordnung 98/45, 23.2.45.
34. BAB, NS6/353, fos. 65–66v, PK Rundschreiben 113/45, ‘25. Jahrestag der Verkündung des Parteiprogramms’, 24.2.45.
35. BAB, NS6/353, fos. 157–8, PK Bekanntgabe 28/45, 26.1.45 and Anlage.
36. One of these, Feldjägerkommando II, based behind the lines of Army Group Centre, reported picking up 136,000 soldiers in February, leading to almost 200 facing trial and 46 death sentences. It regarded the ratio of those arrested to the number of troops fighting as unexceptional, given the military situation. – DRZW, 9/1 (Förster), p. 638.
37. Ursula von Kardorff, Berliner Aufzeichnungen 1942–1945, pb. edn., Munich, 1981, p. 228 (25.1.45).
38. IfZ, Fa-91/5, fo. 1239, Aufruf Himmlers, 31.1.45; BAB, R55/610, fos. 161ff., RPÄ Danzig to State Secretary Dr Naumann, Propaganda Ministry, 31.1.45, attaching Himmler’s proclamation.
39. BAB, NS6/354, fos. 60–61v, PK Rundschreiben 59/45g, ‘Erfassung von versprengten Wehrmachtangehörigen’, 6.2.45, and attached Anlage reproducing OKW order of 2.2.45. A month later, on 5 March, Field-Marshal Keitel passed on Hitler’s order that all financial support for the families of prisoners entering captivity without being wounded or having demonstrably fought to the last was to be halted. – Printed in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär, Kriegsende 1945: Die Zerstörung des Deutschen Reiches, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, p. 163.
40. Andreas Kunz, ‘Die Wehrmacht in der Agonie der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944/45: Eine Gedankenskizze’, in Jörg Hillmann and John Zimmermann (eds.), Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland, Munich, 2002, p. 103 n. 26.
41. BAB, NS19/3705, fos. 1–5, Bormann to Himmler, ‘Vorbereitungen für die bevorstehende Feindoffensive im Westen’, and attached Rundschreiben to the western Gauleiter, 8.2.45.
42. BAB, NS6/354, fos. 135–6, PK Anordnung 67/45g, 13.2.45.
43. BAB, NS6/354, fos. 81–4, PK Rundschreiben 92/45g, Rs., 20.2.45.
44. StAM, NSDAP 35, Gauleitung München-Oberbayern, Rundschreiben Nr. 5, 22.2.45.
45. BAB, NS19/2721, fo. 4–4v, Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe Weichsel, 12.2.45.
46. TBJG, II/15, p. 459 (9.3.45). Bodies of uniformed German soldiers hanging from a bridge across the Oder near Frankurt in mid-February were said to have led to thousands of ‘stragglers’ reporting for further frontline service. – Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, vol. 2, Buenos Aires, 1950, p. 246 (16.2.45).
47. BAB, NS6/756, fos. 2–6, Bormann, ‘Verstärkung der kämpfenden Truppe’, 28.2.45.
48. Norbert Haase, ‘Justizterror in der Wehrmacht’, in Cord Arendes, Edgar Wolfrum and Jörg Zedler (eds.), Terror nach Innen: Verbrechen am Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Göttingen, 2006, pp. 84–5, reckons that half a million German soldiers might have been sentenced by military courts over the duration of the war, implying, therefore, that the numbers down to the end of 1944 doubled in the last four months. There were
eighteen times as many death sentences as in the period from June 1941 to November 1944. Fritz Wullner, NS-Militärjustiz und das Elend der Geschichtsschreibung, Baden-Baden, 1991, p. 461, estimates a figure of around 300,000 deserters down to the end of 1944. For the organization of the terror apparatus within the Wehrmacht, including the extended use of the Geheime Feldpolizei, see John Zimmermann, Pflicht zum Untergang: Die deutsche Kriegführung im Westen des Reiches 1944/45, Paderborn, 2009, pp. 139–65.
49. Benjamin Ziemann, ‘Fluchten aus dem Konsens zum Durchhalten: Ergebnisse, Probleme und Perspektiven der Erforschung soldatischer Verweigerungsformen in der Wehrmacht 1939–1945’, in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (eds.), Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität, Munich, 1999, pp. 594–6, 599; Otto Hennicke, ‘Auszüge aus der Wehrmachtkriminalstatistik’, Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte, 5 (1966), pp. 442–50; Manfred Messerschmidt and Fritz Wullner, Die Wehrmachtjustiz, Baden-Baden, 1987, p. 91; Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: From War to Peace, London, 2009, p. 63. The figure of 35,000 underestimates the scale of desertion. One estimate places the figure at more than 100,000. – Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘Deserteure im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in Wolfram Wette (ed.), Deserteure der Wehrmacht, Essen, 1995, p. 62. A further 35,000 were sentenced for other contraventions of military law (Ziemann, p. 604). On the procedures for carrying out the death penalty in the Wehrmacht, see Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmachtjustiz 1933–1945, Paderborn, 2005, pp. 393–400.