by Ruud Gullit
Another smart corner tactic is to have five players running in while a sixth runs back and turns up on the edge of the penalty area. The sixth player often has a free shot at goal from there, around sixteen meters out. You can use that trick once, as a surprise. Once the other team knows it’s part of your repertoire, it will post a defender between the penalty spot and the edge of the area as a precaution to stop it happening again.
A surprise corner involves five players running in while a sixth runs in the opposite direction to receive the ball on the edge of the penalty area.
Systems
Tactical formations
Everyone knows them, the diagrams of the team formations in the newspaper and on television before a game, and the endless discussions about which system the manager will choose: 4-4-2, 4-3-3, 5-3-2, 3-4-3, 4-3-2-1, 4-2-3-1, 4-2-2-1-1.
Note that if you add the numbers they always come to ten—keepers are never included when charting tactical formations. Yet today’s keepers have to be able to play soccer too, especially since the rule preventing keepers from picking up back passes was introduced in 1992. Most managers see the keeper as the first link in the buildup of an attack from the back.
After all, there are eleven players in a team, not ten. The keeper plays an integral part in the team’s tactics. But what are tactics? In short they are about exploiting the specific qualities of the player or players in your team who will be decisive in a game, and attacking the deficiencies of the opposing side. Tactics only work if they enable the individual to excel.
Tactics and systems are closely connected. For me, a system—whichever you choose—is a framework for defense and attack.
In defense, you use a system to organize and stick together so that the other side doesn’t get through when it has possession. The point is: what to do when you don’t have the ball? What to do to give the other side as little space as possible and limit its opportunity to attack?
When attacking, you stick to a system and a formation that will be able to create as much space as possible for your forwards to exploit their skills. At the same time, the task of the defenders is to identify where the danger lies should the forwards or midfielders lose the ball.
4-4-2 formation.
Within those parameters you have to make it click between the players, so that they can sense what the others are going to do. In other words: before it happens. However paradoxical it may seem, it’s not about what happens when you have the ball, but about what happens when you don’t.
As we have seen, systems and plans of attack depend to a large extent on the qualities of the individual players. If the central defender is slow, the defense shouldn’t be arrayed along the halfway line. With a fast yet technically limited striker, there’s not much point trying to focus play in the other side’s penalty area.
You need to start by drawing up an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of your team before you can choose which formation to use: 4-4-2, 4-3-3 or some other variation. Then you look at the weaknesses of the other side’s formation, or its individual players, such as someone who’s not playing in his usual position.
To win the game, you need to have possession of the ball. But you don’t need to have possession for long. You don’t necessarily need more possession than the other side. That is a common misconception. Moreover, when you get the ball you don’t need to keep possession: the main thing is to get as much advantage out of having the ball as you can.
4-4-2 game plan
A 4-4-2 formation is a system with a forward block of two central strikers. When in possession, the two strikers are the focus of the team’s attack. It is easier to score with two strikers than with one. With two strikers it is also easier to force the opposing four-player defense further back, and to confuse the other side’s buildup.
One of the strikers takes up position between the two left defenders and the other between the two on the right. That forces the keeper to bypass the back four in the buildup since the strikers can put them under immediate pressure. Many English clubs use this system with two strikers, as an attacking tactic as well as to confuse the other side’s buildup.
In England, teams make prolific use of the long ball from the back to the two strikers. The best combination is a big, tall, strong striker alongside a short, lithe, nimble one. The tall striker goes for the long ball and heads it on as the shorter player goes deep or dives behind, or if the short striker remains in position, the taller striker plays it to the other’s feet.
This maintains the pressure on the two central defenders, forcing them to play one-on-one at the back. It is especially difficult for central defenders because they prefer to have one defender dealing with the taller striker, while another takes up a free position behind to provide cover. With two strikers, the defense comes under pressure and the left or right back is forced to move toward the center to cover the back, as a result opening up the flank . . .
In a 4-4-2 formation, the left and right midfielders become wingers. When in possession, the team has four players up front. If the team loses the ball, the two outer midfielders drop back to a right and left back position to help cover the midfielders in the center. The two central midfielders take on a defensive role and seal up the defensive formation.
Once the team regains the ball it’s easy to switch back to an attacking mode since the two strikers are ready up front. The speed at which a team switches between gaining the ball and losing it (defense) and losing the ball and regaining possession (attack) often has a crucial impact on the ability to obtain a result.
In my days at AC Milan under Arrigo Sacchi, we used to play 4-4-2. No comparison with today’s 4-4-2, if only because keepers could pick up back passes. While we started with 4-3-3 our results were inconsistent, until an ankle injury sent Marco van Basten to the sidelines for a period. That was when we went over to 4-4-2. That involves giving the other side space and letting its players think they have room to attack. We forced the other side to advance along the flank; you can’t allow a team to build up in the center. If we had allowed forwards to do that, Sacchi would have given us a roasting. Because when you lose possession it leaves the midfielders having to choose between one side or the other, and if they make the wrong choice they are outplayed and the danger is suddenly a lot more serious.
In a 4-3-3 buildup the outside backs move forward and the central defenders go wide. They form a triangular combination with the keeper to avoid the oncoming striker. One of the central defenders is then free to move into midfield, giving numerical superiority.
4-3-3 (central buildup)
It is always surprising how easily teams forget the basic rules when trying to prevent a 4-3-3 attack. Too often you see teams being allowed to build up along the central axis of the pitch.
When the team has possession the wing backs come all the way forward, taking the other side’s wingers with them. The two central defenders go wide, standing slightly farther away from each other, forming a triangle with the keeper. The remaining striker has to contend with a three-against-one combination. One of the two central defenders can then dribble the ball down the middle of the pitch into the midfield area. If the team in possession succeeds, then it has an extra player along each line. A fantastic buildup and the foundation to build from behind in a 4-3-3 formation.
But if you lose the ball wide, then the area behind the central defender who moved up is completely open, leaving the defenders to face the opposing forwards one-on-one and vulnerable to a possible counterattack. Then a striker’s individual quality can easily make the difference.
So it is always up to the strikers to disrupt the buildup of a new attack when the other side gains possession and to force the ball to the flank, ensuring the midfielder does not get into the position of having to defend against two opponents.
At AC Milan we often built up by sending a long high ball from the back to the striker, whose job
was to keep the ball and pass it to the approaching midfielders as they escaped their markers.
Chipping as an attacking tactic
Managers at other clubs weren’t just sitting idly by; they were studying our 4-4-2 at AC Milan and they would often try to force us to build our attacks along the wing. If we found ourselves without space, the wing backs Paolo Maldini and Mauro Tassotti would pass to Franco Baresi or Alessandro “Billy” Costacurta, the central defenders. They would chip the ball over the midfield to the strikers, Marco van Basten or me. Then either we kept the ball or we passed it back to the midfielders Frank Rijkaard or Carlo Ancelotti as they came forward, from which the attack developed. On either side we had sprinters: Roberto Donadoni and Angelo Colombo.
Whenever Van Basten or I lost the ball the other players would give us hell because the whole team would be surging forward at that moment, open and exposed to a potential counterattack. We often trained for this unorthodox kind of buildup.
Those chips were the hardest kind of passes since they had to be extremely accurate. The Italian defenders were breathing down our necks: they left Van Basten and me no space. We had to arrive exactly as the chip landed. Franco and “Billy” knew roughly where we would end up at the end of a run and scooped the ball precisely to where we would be. Truly amazing. It looked so easy, yet the level of skill was exceptional.
It was also vital that the combination between Van Basten and me worked. We could anticipate each other and never went for the ball, or ran deep, or left or right simultaneously. Our complementary movements were almost instinctive. We hammered in the timing at AC Milan’s Milanello training ground over and over again. Having been raised with the Dutch preference for 4-3-3, both of us had to learn the 4-4-2 system.
3-4-3 formation.
Ajax against Milan
In the early 1990s Ajax were a leading force in international soccer. On paper, Van Gaal’s team played 4-3-3, but when it gained possession, effectively it changed into a 3-4-3 system thanks to the key role played by Danny Blind, now the Dutch national coach. He moved up to join the three players in midfield, which created a four-against-three situation from which the farthest forward, Jari Litmanen, was able to move up to a position just behind the striker.
Four strikers up front resulted in one-on-ones everywhere on the pitch. If Marc Overmars or Patrick Kluivert got the better of their direct opponent, they would immediately find themselves in a two-against-one situation in the penalty area or even eye-to-eye with the keeper.
The basic premise is always to have more players in midfield. These need to be technically proficient players, since they have limited space to maneuver. Although Ajax always had a high percentage of possession, the team would also lose the ball occasionally. Since Blind often moved out of his defensive position, Frank Rijkaard would provide a kind of residual defense. Rijkaard was in the latter stages of his career, an experienced player who coached the team from the back. It was due to him that Ajax played such attacking soccer.
Whereas wing backs tend to play in attacking positions these days, Frank de Boer and Michael Reiziger used to move toward the center when Blind went forward. That enabled Ajax to keep the distances short for the opponents in the attack. Meanwhile, Edgar Davids provided balance in midfield: he was constantly checking how many players were in front of the ball, and if there were more than four he would call one back.
AC Milan had a tough time playing their 4-4-2 system against Ajax in the 1994/95 season. They lost three times that year, the last occasion being the final of the 1995 Champions League in Vienna, to a Patrick Kluivert goal.
4-3-3 formation.
Ajax’s wing backs had AC Milan’s outside midfielders marked. The two remaining Italian central midfielders therefore faced three Ajax players, sometimes four if Danny Blind moved into midfield. As a result the Italians never had a chance to get the ball and found themselves completely outplayed. Milan’s wing backs didn’t dare come to their aid either since they were kept in place by Ajax’s outside right and left.
With their 4-3-3 and 3-4-3 formation, Ajax created a situation on the pitch in which they always had an extra player. Because they were constantly having to decide who to attack, and would often get it wrong, AC Milan became confused and began to doubt themselves.
How did AC Milan respond? The team could have tried mirroring the Ajax formation. But when you have achieved such formidable results with your own 4-4-2-formula, it’s difficult to change tack. Fabio Capello held rigidly to his Italian method and lost each time, including in the final of the Champions League.
4-3-3 game plan
The great advantage of a 4-3-3 formation is that you can play in groups of three all over the pitch, and you can link up from one trio to the next as you move forward. Working in trios makes it easy for the player with the ball because when it’s done right there are always two options to pass forward. This leaves defenders in a difficult situation since they have to make choices and are constantly having to anticipate which direction the attack is heading in and where the trio are moving. The key to the combination is to pass the ball with the right pace and to the correct foot.
When I was playing in the Netherlands almost all the clubs relied on a 4-3-3 system and most games were won or lost in midfield. In a 4-3-3 formation the winger’s job was to keep the field as wide as possible. The right and left wingers would stay close to the touchline, since that forced the other side’s right and left backs to go equally wide, creating open spaces in the center.
Midfielders used the opportunity to dive into the space between the two backs and the two central defenders. To prevent this the two wing backs would regularly move to a more central position, which then opened up space along the flanks for the wingers to go forward along the touchline to deliver a cross.
The midfield in a 4-3-3 formation
There are three options for the midfield area in this system:
A flat midfield with three players lined abreast: which rarely happens since a pass between any of these players makes the midfield redundant.
A midfield in which the central midfielder is at the apex of a triangle pointing backward, so he is in front of the defense, playing as a number 6.
A midfield in which the central midfielder is at the apex of a triangle pointing forward, in an attacking position near the striker, so he is then said to be playing as a number 10.
Among Dutch players, who refer to these midfield trios as triangles, the concept is a familiar one and well understood. In England, however, you don’t talk about the apex of a triangle, pointing forward or back. In England you simply describe the team formation: 4-3-3 with the apex of a triangle toward the back is described as a 4-1-2-3 system; 4-3-3 with the apex pointing forward is a 4-2-1-3 system. So with the latter you have one attacking midfielder, and with the former two.
After Chelsea sent José Mourinho packing, Guus Hiddink tried organizing his midfield in a 4-1-2-3 system. To create an ideal midfield combination you need three different kinds of player: a controller, a sprinter and a creative forward who can score goals.
Hiddink had precisely the right combination with John Obi Mikel, Nemanja Matić and Cesc Fàbregas. Yet there was something wrong. Three excellent players, each with his own specific qualities, would surely fit into a 4-3-3 system? Not always. Obi Mikel plays defensively but lacks tackling skills, he doesn’t take the ball away, and when the team gain or lose the ball, he doesn’t switch roles quickly enough in depth. Matić is a sprinter, but often wide, with the ball at his feet, and doesn’t play deep fast enough. Fàbregas is fantastic when it comes to attacking soccer, but in a defensive role he often makes mistakes.
When you’re looking to buy a midfield, there’s a lot that can go wrong. Combining the required qualities there is a delicate business: it may look right on paper, but that’s no guarantee. You have to wait and see what happens in practice. Often these combinations
gel together with one or two coincidental successes.
Take another example: Manchester United in the late 1990s. Sir Alex Ferguson had a well-oiled machine in midfield and his combination with one or two strikers worked with the precision of a Swiss watch. These talented and versatile players were also able to switch from a 4-4-2 formation to 4-3-3, with either one or two attacking midfielders. It worked because United’s midfielders could play in different systems and in different situations.
Man Utd had fantastic strikers: Andy Cole, Dwight Yorke, Teddy Sheringham, Ole-Gunnar Solskjaer and Ruud van Nistelrooy. Along the axis there were Roy Keane, Paul Scholes, Nicky Butt, and later Michael Carrick and Darren Fletcher. On the wing were players such as Ryan Giggs, David Beckham and later Ronaldo. Their qualities could give United something extra whenever the game required it.
Sir Alex’s teams always had an extra trick up their sleeve. I thought they were especially good when they played in Europe in the Champions League. They could switch their system effortlessly to a single striker with a supporting forward. It seemed like Sir Alex could send any eleven players onto the pitch and it would work out fine.
Which proves that in the end individual qualities are the decisive factor.
Rigid game
As a manager at Chelsea, Newcastle United and Feyenoord I always focused on the qualities of my players when working out a system. None of these clubs dictated a particular style of play. I think Ajax is the only club in the world that demands their manager employ a 4-3-3 formation. Every team at the club plays with that system, from the six-year-old youngsters to the first team. There is something to be said for giving the manager a guideline, but I have never known it so rigidly adhered to as at Ajax.