by Ruud Gullit
That basic instinct is indelible, everyone has it. And that goes for Leicester City’s players too. They have great qualities—after all, they’re playing in the Premier League. And they also have the stamina to achieve results. But you really start to make things tough for them when you let them take the initiative.
Balance in midfield
When you play with three midfielders, the ideal combination is one player who moves back and forth, taking up a position near the opposing goal, another who reads the game and dictates the buildup and pace of an attack, and a third who deals with the dynamic of the game, taking the ball from opponents and delivering it to the playmaker or strikers. He should also be able to judge the other team’s combinations.
This combination creates balance in midfield. That is essential since almost every game is decided in midfield, which is why many managers prefer to have four players here, or even five. Today, a 4-3-3 formation often transforms in defense to 4-5-1 as the wide men drop back to midfield. In England they call this 4-1-4-1. In the Netherlands the structure is based around a trio and most teams play with one player forward, namely 4-2-1-3, or one dropping back, 4-1-2-3.
For teams fielding four players in midfield, as in a 4-4-2 formation, the attacking mode transforms into 4-2-4. Often two midfielders shore up the attack, forcing the two remaining midfielders to stay in midfield in case the team loses possession.
If the midfield is diamond-shaped in a 4-4-2 formation, then one central midfielder is positioned just in front of the two central defenders and the other central midfielder is just behind the two central strikers: 4-1-2-1-2. The two outside midfielders play slightly less wide in this formation.
In any event, it is crucial that the midfielders are constantly thinking: what if? What if we lose the ball? Are we still in the right position? Know where your default position is, because soccer and analysis of opponents have become so sophisticated that a moment’s distraction from what is or may be about to happen can be catastrophic if the team loses possession.
Third midfielder behind
When you play with three midfielders in a 4-3-3 formation with the third player behind, effectively 4-1-2-3, the two midfielders should be dynamic, moving forward and back. If one starts a run, the other should remain behind and wide to cover any eventuality if, say, the attack breaks down. Right and left midfielders should be intelligent players: they can’t both join the attack. At least two players are needed to keep the width of the midfield covered. If only one remains the area is suddenly wide open: if the other side gains possession, its midfielders will sweep forward in a counterattack meeting virtually no resistance at all.
The right or left winger should always join the attack on goal, while his opposite number moves over to retrieve the ball if the cross is overhit or if the ball is cleared.
Third midfielder forward
Playing with three midfielders in a 4-3-3 formation with one player forward, effectively a 4-2-1-3, leaves just two midfielders to cover the entire central line, largely to maintain defensive control if a striker or the midfielder in the forward position, the so-called number 10, loses possession. In fact the number 10’s role is to play around the striker and create a nuisance, to chase and pressure the other team if it gains possession. He is also the link connecting the midfield to the attack.
These days a number 10’s role is harder than it was twenty years ago because far more tasks have been added and the available space is more limited, forcing the player to act fast. Juan Mata is someone who feels at home in this position . . . although he doesn’t score enough, for my liking.
Two Dutch players adopted this position to perfection: Dennis Bergkamp and Jari Litmanen at Ajax. They always emerged at the right place at the right time. Bergkamp’s goals were spectacular: superbly crafted and almost works of art. People still remember them, like that amazing goal following an incredible run for Arsenal against Newcastle.
Rooney’s position
Wayne Rooney is another player who knows how to play in the number 10 slot as a false striker. Rooney’s managers have vacillated between the number 10 position, the striker position and as a wide forward on the left. Ferguson often used him in the latter. Rooney was never able to focus on one role. His position was often determined by his fellow players or his opponents.
I understand his managers, but the effect has not always been positive for Rooney, if only because the constant changes led to an endless discussion about his ideal position. As long as Rooney plays at the highest level, the media will always be wondering: is he a striker or a number 10? A superficial debate, since the discussion revolves purely around his goals. If he fails to score for three weeks then he’s a number 10, and if he scores two goals as a number 10, then suddenly he belongs up there as a striker.
Probably Rooney will never be able to shake off this discussion during his playing career. All the messing about, with his position shifting from here to there, has prevented Rooney from developing into one of the world’s truly great players.
Someone like Lampard
At Chelsea, Frank Lampard had an enormous impact off the ball. From his position in midfield he served less as a link to the strikers than as the finisher in the penalty area. He didn’t think like a midfielder, more like a striker coming in from distance. He and the rest of the team had to be able to switch when they lost possession, so the team had to be well balanced. As a midfielder, a player like Lampard is always where the ball is. Which means that you need a midfielder to fill in the gap that he leaves. Without balance in midfield, you’ll lose the game. This is the problem I have highlighted before with regard to the England squad.
Whenever Chelsea were the better side, it was relatively easy to solve that problem since they had sufficient players in midfield. But when playing against stronger teams, you have to be careful: if you can keep the balance intact then a player with individual qualities like Lampard can make all the difference. A manager who has a Lampard or someone like him in the team is constantly looking to put him in an ideal position. To achieve that, whatever the system the manager decides to use, you need the team—and if necessary players you bring in from outside—to support your Lampard and allow him to do his thing. It can make all the difference at that level.
Superior numbers in midfield
To achieve numerical superiority in midfield, you can move a defender up or drop a forward back. That creates space in the attack for players to come forward.
It is no surprise that Barça have the best midfield, which was even more the case when Xavi Hernández was still playing there and he formed a midfield trio with Andrés Iniesta and Sergio Busquets. A crucial aspect is the dynamic off the ball. How much work are they prepared to do for each other, to enable each other to play better? They have to keep moving all the time, and always be ready to take the ball.
Busquets was a defensive midfielder, Xavi the playmaker who passed balls left and right, and then there was Iniesta, the trio’s attacking midfielder. He preferred to play forward, passing the ball, and turning up near the striker and in front of goal.
Shifting position
At Ajax in 1995, they always had one player more in midfield by moving the free defender Danny Blind up or dropping stopper Frank Rijkaard back. At Barcelona, Messi used to occupy the same position before Luis Suárez came in as striker. Messi would often drop back into midfield to ensure the numerical advantage.
Central defenders rarely leave their post so, with Blind and Messi, Ajax and Barcelona always had more players in midfield. Which, as we have seen, is where you win games.
In that case, in a defensive role, you have to base your strategy on the team’s organization and keep the distances short, as Chelsea did in the Champions League semifinal in 2012. It is possible to compensate for having one less player in midfield as long as the team can anticipate where the ball is going from midfield into attack. It is crucial to keep a careful e
ye on who is advancing and to meet them, physically if necessary, by blocking them. You can’t afford to have ball watchers in midfield. Midfielders need to have a wider view, continually surveying the game as a whole.
Johan Cruijff was a striker and gradually dropped back as his career advanced to be able to direct attacking play from midfield and to feed passes. He continued along the same line as a manager developing this in his teams. Cruijff realized the great advantage of having a striker who could drop back. A midfielder, or a striker in a midfield position, could quickly move into gaps.
I remember a discussion with Cruijff about an AC Milan–Ajax game in the early 2000s. Cruijff argued that Ajax should have started without a striker. “Fine,” I said. “But it makes no difference for Milan. Milan won’t change their defensive organization. The defense and midfield block stands squarely in the middle of the pitch supported on the outside by the backs and the wide players. If Ajax shifts to the left, the block shifts too; to the right, the same.”
Double accordion
Leicester City’s organization in 2015/16 was similar to that of AC Milan when I played there: a tight defensive block capable of moving flexibly to the side where the ball was. That kept distances short. It requires concentration and discipline from the players to be able to move continually like an accordion. In fact it is not just about moving from left to right and vice versa, but also forward or backward. For the other side, it’s almost impossible to get through. You can’t split that block up as long as they concentrate on remaining in position with respect to each other, always maintaining the same distance. The result is that the gaps are so small, it’s almost always possible to deal with any situation.
For me, that defensive organization at Leicester City has a familiar ring to it. The manager, Claudio Ranieri, an Italian, has molded Leicester into a modern copy of AC Milan. From that perspective, we were twenty years ahead of our time at Milan.
Leicester City’s attack starts in defense. Not all the defenders are equally fast. A player like Robert Huth is not particularly flexible either. He has the physique to stay on his feet for ninety minutes in the Premier League. But you can’t play someone like Huth on the halfway line or with too much distance between himself and the keeper. So what to do? You place a block around your own penalty area. In addition you have two fast players in midfield able to take up defensive positions, three (or two) superquick, goal-hungry players in attacking positions in midfield and one (or two) quick strikers to surprise the other side with counterattacks.
Scylla and Charybdis
Years ago at Arsenal they played with a strong defensive lineup of four: Tony Adams, Martin Keown, Patrick Vieira and Emmanuel Petit. Behind them stood David Seaman, the keeper. Up front were the striker, Ian Wright, quick wingers such as Marc Overmars and Fredrik Ljungberg, and, of course, the stylists Dennis Bergkamp and Thierry Henry. Since Henry needed space to be able to rush forward, it was imperative that the defensive block didn’t move forward too quickly. Arsenal’s players might otherwise clog up their own position. As they got used to each other and learned to play as a team, they also began to play better in the other side’s half. In the end they developed the ideal combination of two systems: playing in the opponents’ half and counterattacking. The combination proved perfect and in 1998 it began to reap dividends: league titles, FA Cups and a place in the 2006 Champions League final against FC Barcelona in Paris.
Arsenal lost that final. That was when Arsène Wenger decided to develop his team and his style of play further. He seems to have taken Barcelona as his ideal. With Alexis Sánchez in the side, Arsenal do manage to emulate the Catalan style to some extent, and Wenger would clearly like to have someone like Sergio Agüero at the club too.
Each season you think and hope: this time Arsenal are finally going to do it, they’ll get their trophy. You want them to succeed. Wenger has such an amazingly positive style of play and philosophy. Unfortunately, all he has managed to garner in the last ten years is the FA Cup and Community Shield, perhaps because Arsenal are caught between two options, steering a course between Barça and the old Arsenal—not a pure counterattacking side and not a pure attacking one either.
Finally
Tactics are a weapon in your game plan. But you need a system that suits your players and feels like second nature to them, one tailored to their specific qualities. Your tactics should also take into account the qualities that the other side brings to the game. To ignore that is to overestimate your own abilities and to underestimate the other team (unless you happen to be as good as Barça).
Nothing is sacred, no single system: it is the players who make the difference. Should I play on the halfway line with my defense if I don’t have the pace at the back? No, of course not. Should I play two strikers even though I only have the one? No, then I have to ensure that the team combines to get the best out of the lone striker. And sometimes it may be crucial for the striker to give space to the winger, if the wide player is the one making the difference. Nothing is sacred.
Kickoff
The kickoff may seem insignificant, with the tap forward to a teammate, who then ninety-nine times out of a hundred plays it back to the team’s own half. Yet I always watch with interest. Often the side that kicks off uses the moment to signal its intentions: whether it’s about to go for the jugular, or start by watching what the other team does; whether it plans to play a combination game, or intends to fight.
Sometimes you’ll see three or four players ready to rush the defense after the back pass is sent flying into the other half. They want to put the other side under pressure from the start, so when the ball comes down, the defender has two or three players to deal with and the battle is on straight away. That is a clear signal: we’re not afraid.
Some teams tap the ball around in their own half for a while, waiting to see how the other side will respond: what answer do its players have to us passing to each other like this? Are they going to put pressure on the ball, or are they going to wait and see too?
There are some teams that kick off by passing the ball back to the keeper, who holds on to the ball or kicks it all the way upfield. That leads immediately to tussles. If that is where your team’s strength lies then that’s the way to get started.
Patterns of play
When you start playing soccer as a kid you do what you feel like. Gradually you learn different patterns of play in training. These are incorporated into practice sessions, repeated time and again, over and over, and they become so ingrained that you never forget them, ever. These are the basic building blocks of the game. For me, learning the game as a youngster in the Netherlands, it was all about patterns of play in a 4-3-3 formation.
Pattern 1. Player 1 plays to player 2, who passes back; player 1 then passes to player 3, going deep. Player 3 passes to the striker.
Pattern 2. Player 1 plays to player 2 and moves up. Player 2 passes to the approaching player 3, who passes deep to player 1 moving forward. Player 1 crosses to the striker.
Moving trios
The trio, the best-known and simplest pattern, is the basic ingredient of every combination in soccer: one player has the ball, a second is ready to receive a pass and the third is looking for space. These three elements encapsulate everything. The exercise consists of the following: pass and move, knock on and move, pass to third player and move. A variation is: pass and move, knock on and move, cross and finish.
These are patterns that you see at the highest level and with any number of variations. A key aspect of them is that players are continually moving, because that’s always difficult to defend against, even in the zone. Against two players it is possible, but a third moving player, brought in to make the difference, is harder to defend against, especially since the third player isn’t moving toward the second player passing the ball, but is always moving away, into free space.
A long ball from the back to the striker deep in the op
posite half. The entire team moves forward and traps the other side in their own half.
You have to keep creating these patterns of moving trios, and two or three trios one after the other. In a good team with good players this comes naturally since regular training in their early years has made it second nature, and it is coupled with experience and quality.
These patterns work perfectly in a 4-4-2 or 5-3-2 formation. It is crucial that the two strikers always move in different directions. Number one passes to number two and number three runs off. That ball can be passed low, along the grass, or high, overhead, preferably chipped to allow the striker to chest it down and control it. Otherwise the risk of losing the ball is much greater. There should always be someone lying deep available for a pass, and preferably moving too.
If the two strikers remain standing together, it may look like a trio, but it’s a static trio, while the trio should actually be moving around to break through the defense. It forces defenders to make a choice, which implies that they may choose wrongly. Nothing is easier for a defender than a forward who stands still, simply asking to be tackled or dealt a less than delicate tap.
Defenders in effect mirror the movements of the opposing attackers. If a ball reaches a striker, the two central defenders can’t be standing still. One of them has to challenge the striker while the other covers in case the player breaks through. Where two central defenders face two strikers, one challenges the player with the ball while the other lets the second striker go and provides cover for the first defender.