by Ruud Gullit
This understanding can develop. Look at Real Madrid with Sergio Ramos and the Portuguese Pepe. Pepe’s qualities as a man-marker are well-known. When Ramos came from the right-back position to play in the center he had to get used to playing with Pepe, to the space, the coaching, the movement, everything in fact. As a right back, Ramos had gelled perfectly with Pepe as center back, but it turned out to be a totally different matter when Pepe moved into the sweeper position.
Ramos learned to play in the center, but at first he used to make mistakes. He was constantly having to fix situations and received a series of yellow and red cards as a result. “What if?” entered his head far too late. Today, the buildup on the ball is well prepared and now that he can anticipate better, and has experience in the role of sweeper, his confidence has risen and as a result he is rarely shown yellow or red cards any more. Having learned from experience, his tendency to commit fouls has almost disappeared. You can see him thinking: if we lose the ball here, then I should be there to prevent the counterattack.
As a central defender on the left in a 5-3-2 formation, Giorgio Chiellini is amazing in a three-player block. He plays at Juventus and for Italy, and he’s a wonderful player. He never lets the side down. Never. That’s not unusual in Italy, and yet he’s particularly admired for that quality. A player like that must have something special. Chiellini gives his teammates a sense that they can attack all they like, he’ll be there behind them—in fact not just as a central defender in a 5-3-2 setup: he plays the same role in a 4-4-2 or a 4-3-3 and even a 3-5-2 formation. You feel safe with him in the team; he avoids taking risks.
Risks are not part of the game for defenders. If you suspect that things are going wrong: get rid of the ball. Get rid of it! Then at least nothing has happened. I dislike players who take risks at the back. No players like that, and no managers. Maybe spectators do, but what’s the point if you lose games as a result? I need the back line to provide security, so I can play freely as a midfielder or a striker, going forward without worrying about what’s happening behind me. If a defender plays safe, then a forward can take risks. If Messi had to play with the handbrake on because Barcelona’s defense kept slipping up, then he would never play at his best.
Midfielders
A team that controls the midfield controls the game. Almost all managers follow this golden rule. Which is why many soccer systems are designed to get as many players as possible in midfield. Louis van Gaal’s great Ajax team of the 1990s achieved this by enabling the central defender Danny Blind to move up into midfield. FC Barcelona do something similar by allowing Messi to drop back from the front to midfield. It is crucial that the balance in midfield is maintained, filling in the positions according to the system (4-4-2 or 4-3-3).
With four in midfield you need players on the outside who can go deep; the two central positions are for the more defensive types. They shouldn’t be standing next to each other, but diagonally aligned. The one standing farther back should be concerned with organizing the team while the other should be more creative and moving the game forward, perhaps even turning up in front of goal occasionally. An example of a defensive midfielder was Carlo Ancelotti, while Frank Rijkaard epitomized an attacking midfielder.
For a 4-3-3 system you need three different types who are attuned to each other and complement each other’s qualities. Ideally there should be a defensive player, a creative midfielder and a player who will venture deep. Many teams get into trouble because they get this equation wrong or don’t have the right players under contract. Then the problems begin.
On the left
Glenn Hoddle of Tottenham Hotspur, AS Monaco, Swindon Town and Chelsea would have been perfect on the left in midfield in a 4-3-3 formation, but in a 4-4-2 system he was placed in the center. The problem for Hoddle was that he was actually born in the wrong country, or at the wrong time—which explains his lack of recognition. In the Netherlands everyone loved Hoddle, but in England they considered him too technical, he couldn’t run.
John Barnes, formerly of Liverpool, came into his own in a 4-4-2 system with his magical left foot, yet even more so in a 3-5-2 with the triangle pointing backward. He stood just in front of his defenders and from there he orchestrated the team’s buildup. He was a playmaker, a smart player who had a good overview of the game.
Two stars, in my opinion, were the Spaniard Rafael Gordillo of Real Madrid and Davie Cooper of Glasgow Rangers. Cooper, who tragically died of a brain hemorrhage in March 1995 at the age of thirty-nine, was technically perfect, with a wonderful grasp of the game, and a gift for scoring goals. Gordillo had tremendous stamina and patrolled the left flank tirelessly in a 4-4-2 system: his socks were always around his ankles.
I was a great fan of these two players, Cooper and Gordillo, as I was of the French midfielder José Touré, who played for Nantes and AS Monaco. I first saw him at a youth tournament in Austria and was totally enthralled. Later, he had problems in his personal life and he got into difficulties. Another player I enjoyed watching intensely was the Spanish-Belgian Juan Lozano.
Different players fit different systems, even if their positions seem similar. That is due to the other surrounding positions. For example, Edgar Davids was always on the left in the 4-3-3 formation at Ajax and Juventus, although he tended to move more into the center. Edgar was inexhaustible and never stopped running, tackling and winning balls. Moreover he had amazing skills on the ball, although he preferred passing to someone such as Zinedine Zidane, in the interests of the team. That too is a great quality: knowing when to give way.
On the right
Frank Rijkaard and Carlo Ancelotti were the best to play in central midfield in 4-4-2 at Milan. They managed perfectly in those confined spaces, they were strong and knew how to win the ball. And their mind-set was always: “What if?” What if the striker gets in trouble, in midfield, to the right, to the left? How can we anticipate that? AC Milan had six players who always thought like that, so we were always covered if things went wrong up front or elsewhere.
Frank Rijkaard was a star. It took a lot of persuading on my part to convince the directors at Milan to bring him over from Real Zaragoza. They wanted to know everything about him, and they still weren’t sure. I told Sacchi and the board hundreds of times: “Get him!” At AC Milan we were already a good team, but with Frank in the squad all the pieces of the puzzle came together and for two years we won everything there was to win.
Frank had the energy and the power to keep going in midfield, forward or back. Yet he was far more than just strong. He could play fantastic soccer in those confined spaces and even snatched a few goals here and there with ease. Surprisingly many, for a defensive player. Frank actually scored in the final of the European Cup against Benfica, in Vienna.
He developed further at Milan, and as a Dutch international too, going on to play a second stint at Ajax, by then a player who could make sure that his team won, sometimes with a goal, although often more with his presence and his qualities as a player and even as a motivator—especially in the youthful, successful Ajax of the mid-1990s.
An amazing defensive midfielder was the Frenchman Claude Makélélé of Chelsea and Real Madrid. On the pitch, he too was always wondering: “What if?” He had a keen eye for danger. At first sight, Makélélé did little more than win the ball and pass it to someone who could do something with it. But with his soccer nous and the position he chose on the pitch he was often the one who took the sting out of the counterattack. Like Davids, Makélélé sacrificed himself even though he was an excellent player of the ball, and at the highest level.
An entirely different type of midfielder was Bryan Robson, a player with tremendous dynamism and a real leader of his side. If anyone could head an attack it was Robson. He gave his team that extra spark. He combined the knack of taking the ball from anyone with good skills and an ability to score.
A beautiful player to watch is Manchester City’s David Silva,
a playmaker who I don’t see as a pure midfielder, and equally not as a pure striker. He can do both and often also plays between the lines. He is difficult to defend against, yet he can also cause his own team defensive problems. So he is often posted out on the left, even though he plays best in the center.
Zinedine Zidane is the exception. A natural leader, with his presence rather than with eloquence: he was always about action rather than words. Every team he played in gave Zidane all the freedom he wanted. Many managers were even prepared to adjust their side just to enable Zidane to make the difference.
Zidane may not have said much on the pitch, but he saw everything. As he moved it seemed as if he was doing everything in third gear and yet he glided past opponents who were clearly operating in fifth. Like an elegant ballet dancer, and with a grandeur . . . watching Zidane was pure pleasure.
Another of Zidane’s strengths was the way he used opponents to move or turn and get away, like a catapult, although he normally avoided physical contact. Few could get an opponent off balance as effectively as Zidane by feigning a step forward, or dodging to the left or right only to pass on the other side. He moved with such ease that it seemed so simple, despite requiring meticulous timing. When Zidane was on the ball he always made the difference for Bordeaux, Juventus, Real Madrid and the French national side.
Since Zidane never pretended to specialize in defense, at Real Madrid they brought in Claude Makélélé. The two players were complementary: they were the supreme duo, a championship pairing.
Players like Zidane, Platini, Maradona, Cristiano Ronaldo and Messi think out of the box. These are players that we should nurture in soccer. Managers shouldn’t discuss tactics with players like these: they should trust them and give them freedom. And listen. If you asked them, I suspect they would fill your mind with all sorts of philosophical ideas. Cherish them, because they are the exceptions that make soccer so amazing.
Although Diego Maradona originally emerged as a midfielder, he played in his own style and could never be pinned down to any particular position. Whatever system his team played, Maradona was not really part of it; he had his own system: 9-1. Everyone played around him and he was always the player who made the difference, the ultimate example being the Argentinian side that beat West Germany in 1986 in Mexico City to win the World Cup.
I regularly played with and against Maradona. I took part in various friendly matches in which he appeared on my side, but on most of the occasions we met, I was in the opposing team. He was a leader in every way. He could explode in anger if teammates failed to do what he wanted. One time, someone in Maradona’s team was substituted—presumably on his orders—and he shouted abuse at him all the way to the bench. Maradona did everything to win. He was no less tough on himself. When he was injured, he just carried on, as in the 1990 World Cup in Italy, when he was kicked nonstop throughout the competition but succumbed only in the final against Germany. Players who were not prepared to risk a knock or two were bound to get into trouble with Maradona.
How good was he? AC Milan had the best defenders in the world, but no one could take the ball away from Maradona. Like Zidane, he used his opponent as a kind of catapult. If someone grabbed hold of him, he’d lean against them and use their strength to get away.
Physique and speed are more important now than they were twenty or thirty years ago. Yet Maradona would still have been a superstar today. In his day defenders could bring him down with impunity. He was constantly flying through the air after yet another dreadful tackle, although he also avoided just as many opponents by leaping high in the air. If Maradona had received the protection that referees give the likes of Messi today, we would have been able to enjoy a lot more of him.
Maradona was in my opinion the best soccer player ever. He was the whole deal, the player who understood everything about tactics, technique, insight, the lot. Sometimes he was such a genius that you thought: What is this . . . what’s happening here? I experienced this playing against Maradona, and when I played with him too. I played in a benefit for him along with Gianfranco Zola, Gustavo Poyet and many other former stars; yet every ball went to Maradona. Naturally, almost. From respect. And because, after all, Maradona is Maradona.
Whenever we got together off the pitch we always had great fun. He’s a fantastic guy and just wanted everyone to like him. That made him an easy target. People managed to manipulate him, to get him to do what they wanted and to use him. He fell for it time and again. But as a player Maradona was brilliant, the best player I ever saw.
When it comes to Pelé, I can’t judge. I never saw him play live. There are astonishing images in film clips, but whether he was better than Maradona, I couldn’t say. I believe all the superlatives about him, I know his trophy cabinet is full to bursting, including three World Cup titles with Brazil. But, unfortunately, I never saw him in action and so I can’t really give an objective opinion.
So for the moment I’ll stick to Maradona. Who knows, maybe in a couple of years I’ll change my mind when Messi retires and I’ll concede that he was actually better than his compatriot. Although I’ll always maintain that in the age in which he played, Maradona faced far tougher opposition. He never had the protection that Messi enjoys today. It was open season all year round. If Maradona had played in today’s environment he wouldn’t have suffered such long and serious injuries as he did when he met the butcher of Bilbao, Andoni Goikoetxea.
In the center
While Michel Platini did not have a fixed place in midfield, he mainly played in the center. An amazing player and a prolific goal-scorer who rarely had to help in defense, he could always rely on players like Alain Giresse, Jean Tigana and Luis Fernández. This central trio maintained the team’s sense of balance. They were all excellent players in their own right and knew exactly how to deal with any danger that threatened when Platini went forward. It was a question of pure soccer nous and self-sacrifice.
That’s why some managers put players like Platini along the flank, where they can do the least damage if they lose the ball. The same happened to Platini’s successor, Zinedine Zidane, toward the end of his career. Yet in Platini’s heyday it had hardly been necessary since the speed at which teams switched to regain possession was far slower.
To exploit Platini’s qualities to the fullest, the French coach, Michel Hidalgo, just looked at what he needed: which players to play alongside him, which tactics and which style of play suited Platini best? In the end, Hidalgo came up with le carré magique—the magic square: Giresse, Tigana and Bernard Genghini (1982 World Cup) and later Luis Fernández (1984 European Championship). In the 1984 European Championship in France, Platini scored nine goals in five games, a record that still stands, although these days more countries play more matches—for the 2016 European Championship, the number of countries was raised from sixteen to twenty-four.
There is hardly any place for an old-fashioned playmaker like Platini in top soccer today. It is increasingly difficult to maintain a place at the top of the international game with only that quality. The last to have succeeded, in my view, was Andrea Pirlo.
Now it’s all about stamina, physical strength and quick adjustment on the pitch. While it may not be difficult to find these qualities gathered together, players like Platini and Pirlo would be able to thrive only in extremely technical teams. You can’t afford to lose the ball today, otherwise even the best players can be overwhelmed. Which is why these playmaker types tend to find themselves on the wings, where losing the ball is less dangerous.
Dilemmas in midfield (1)
Steven Gerrard and Frank Lampard both played as attacking midfielders. They appeared together in the English national side and each successive coach faced the same question: how to ensure that these two superb midfielders could play together in such a way that they exploited their respective qualities to the fullest. That this never materialized is perhaps one of the biggest disappointments in contemporary En
glish soccer.
Lampard has no fixed position, whatever the system, because he runs everywhere. In fact you have to create a position for him without wandering too far from your system or your tactics. So who do you place next to him and behind?
One way or another, Lampard and Gerrard failed to complement each other, even though they were both fantastic players. According to the English system, one should be on the outside in midfield and the other in the center. So one of them had to sacrifice his position. Both think forward, but if you play 4-4-1-1 you get a problem in the center if the ball is lost up front. At one time Lampard was even placed behind the striker, but his strength is to come up through midfield. That’s why Chelsea’s 4-3-3 was perfect for Lampard.
Unfortunately, England’s coaches never really experimented with a 4-3-3 system with the triangle pointing backward in midfield. A solid midfielder like Paul Scholes would have been ideal in that combination. But even he was exiled to the sidelines, after which he announced his retirement from the national side, far too early in my opinion.
Gerrard was given a more defensive position in midfield at Liverpool. There he was more of a passer of the ball. Naturally he could do that easily enough, but it isn’t the quality that people appreciated about him the most. Gerrard is too good a player to spend the match patrolling in front of defense. He should play farther forward, that’s where his strength lies. Eventually, however, he agreed to take on the defensive role.
A number of England coaches found the Lampard–Gerrard question too hot to handle. In fact it was a relief when one of the two was injured, because no England coach ever had sufficient authority to be able to ride the storm that choosing either one over the other would have entailed—the English fans and press simply wouldn’t have accepted it.