by Ian Kershaw
Hitler could afford, finally, to stand back no longer. He was compelled to intervene. At extraordinarily short notice – only one day – he summoned for 3 January 1935 a uniquely entitled meeting of the ‘German Leadership’ (Deutsche Führerschaft) in Berlin’s State Opera House. Rudolf Heß took the chair. The Party Reichsleiter and Gauleiter were present. So were the top leaders of the armed forces. Hitler spoke for one and a half hours with the overriding object of restoring the faith of the military in the National Socialist leadership. He stressed his will to make Germany a great power again, its defences secured through a strong Wehrmacht. This could only be attained through total unity. He referred again to the two pillars of the Wehrmacht and the Party on which the National Socialist state rested. He demanded restoration of the mutual trust between the two. He assured the army that he was on their side. He would disbelieve any comments and tear up any reports from those in the Party claiming that army leaders were criticizing or opposing him, ‘for my faith in the Wehrmacht is unshakable,’ he declared. Weeping, he beseeched party leaders to see that only absolute loyalty and devotion to him in a united community would enable him to rebuild Germany. As in the Strasser crisis of 1932, the high-point of the theatricals was his threat to commit suicide if this unity were not forthcoming. The contrived drama of the speech did the trick. The applause was tumultuous. The army leaders were won over, impressed by what they saw as Hitler’s moving declaration of loyalty to the armed forces. Göring ended the meeting, representing the unity of party, state and military leadership in his own person, with a vote of thanks to Hitler.60 Once more, Hitler had succeeded in presenting himself as the indispensable unifier, reconciling through his ‘mission’ the conflicting interests of the differing sections of the ‘power-cartel’.61
In the meantime, a rich propaganda gift was about to fall into Hitler’s lap with the return of the Saar territory to Germany through the plebiscite of 13 January 1935. The Versailles Treaty had removed the Saarland from Germany, placing it under League of Nations control for fifteen years, and affording France the right to its resources. After fifteen years it was foreseen that the Saar inhabitants – roughly half a million voters – should decide whether they would prefer to return to Germany, become part of France, or retain the status quo. It was always likely that the majority of the largely German-speaking population, where resentment at the treatment meted out in 1919 still smouldered fiercely, would want to return to Germany. A good deal of work by the German government prepared the ground, and as the plebiscite day approached Goebbels unleashed a massive barrage of propaganda directed at the Saar inhabitants and raising consciousness of the issue at home.62 Berlin could feel confident that the plebiscite would result in a vote to return the Saar to Germany. According to the French ambassador André François-Poncet, however, Hitler would not have been surprised if the French had attempted to forestall a German triumph by taking possession of the territory or by adjourning the date of the plebiscite.63 Moreover, the Saar territory was overwhelmingly Catholic, with a large industrial working-class segment of the population – the two social groups which had proved least enthusiastic about Nazism within Germany itself.64
In the light of the ferocious repression of the Left and the threatening, if still largely sporadic, persecution of the Catholic Church that had followed the Nazi takeover in Germany, opponents of the Hitler regime in the Saar could still harbour illusions of a substantial anti-Nazi vote.65 But the Catholic authorities put their weight behind a return to Germany. And many Saar Catholics already looked to Hitler as the leader who would rescue them from Bolshevism.66 On the Left, the massive erosion of party loyalties had set in long before the plebiscite. For all their propaganda efforts, the message of the dwindling number of Social Democrat and Communist functionaries fell largely on stony ground. Nazi propaganda had little difficulty in trumpeting the alternative to a return to Germany: continued massive unemployment, economic exploitation by France, and lack of any political voice.67 Some concerted intimidation, as in the Reich itself during the ‘time of struggle’, did the rest. For the vast majority – workers and Catholics, middle-class and better-off alike – there seemed no choice to speak of. The future lay with Hitler’s Germany. Nationalist emotion and material self-interest went hand in hand.
When the votes were counted, just under 91 per cent of the Saar’s electorate had freely chosen dictatorship.68 At least two-thirds of the former supporters of both left-wing parties had supported the return to Germany.69 Any lingering doubts about whether Hitler had the genuine backing of the German people were dispelled.
Hitler milked his triumph for all that it was worth. At the same time, he was careful to make dove-like noises for public consumption. ‘Following the completion of your return,’ he told the Saar people, the German Reich ‘had no further territorial demands to make of France’.70 And in an interview with the Daily Mail journalist Ward Price four days after the plebiscite, he intoned: ‘Germany will of its own accord (von sich aus) never break the peace.’71 On 1 March, the day of the formal incorporation of the Saar territory in the Reich, Hitler spoke in Saarbrücken. He was ‘supremely happy’ (überglücklich), he declared, to be able to take part ‘in this day of happiness for the entire nation’ and ‘for the whole of Europe’. He hoped that as a consequence of the settlement of the Saar issue, ‘relations between Germany and France had improved once and for all. Just as we want peace, so we must hope that our great neighbouring people is also willing and ready to seek this peace with us.’72
Hitler’s true thoughts were different. The Saar triumph had strengthened his hand. He had to exploit the advantage. Western diplomats awaited his next move. They would not wait long.
Anxious to do nothing to jeopardize the Saar campaign, especial caution had been deployed in rearmament, either on Hitler’s orders or those of the Foreign Office. It could, therefore, be expected that the demands of the armed forces leadership for accelerated rearmament, in which political and military considerations went hand in hand, would gain new impetus following the Saar triumph. The Saar was indirectly connected with the rearmament question in another way. The disarmament talks in Geneva – since Germany’s withdrawal deprived of their substance – had been adjourned in November 1934 to await the outcome of the Saar plebiscite before attempting once more to propose internationally agreed limits on rearmament. This was of no interest to Hitler, concerned only with bilateral agreements.73 But the prospect led to a memorandum from General Beck, written on 6 March, which gives clear insight into the army’s views at the time.
The memorandum revolved around the notion of guaranteeing the ‘security of our living-space’ – a phrase indicating the widespread but varied usage of the term ‘Lebensraum’. Beck envisaged the possibility of attack from the Reich’s neighbours – France, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Belgium – though he saw little danger of Soviet intervention. The likelihood in his view was of a limited central European war in which Britain would be merely a bystander. Germany’s defence strength had to be measured in the context of the worst possible scenario. Beck looked to full equality for Germany in all questions of rearmament, and the removal of all restrictions – including those on the western borders of the Reich. The ending of the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland was a minimal demand. The army leadership had planned since December 1933, as a memorandum from Beck’s office made clear, for a peacetime army of twenty-one divisions.74 Beck now contemplated expansion in peacetime to twenty-three divisions, which could be rapidly increased to sixty-three divisions by 1939 – almost the size of the 1914 army – in the event of war. In an exchange of memoranda with army chief (Chef der Heeresleitung) Fritsch a few days later, it was plain that Beck saw the twenty-three divisions as a temporary arrangement for three or four years before further expansion to a peacetime army of thirty-six divisions. Fritsch, more anxious about the prospect of a preventive attack on Germany, argued that twenty-three divisions was too small a basis for the intended sixty-three-division war
army, and advocated moving more swiftly to a thirty-six-division army. Fritsch too, however, was concerned that over-hasty expansion could produce foreign-policy tension, and perhaps even military danger – a view shared by Defence Minister Blomberg.75
Army leaders were thus divided about the tempo of expansion, but not about its necessity or the aim of an eventual thirty-six-division peacetime army, the size eventually determined by Hitler in March 1935. General conscription had already been foreseen in the programme of December 1933, put forward by Beck. It was an essential component of military planning, intended for introduction on 1 October 1934.76 This date proved illusory. But military leaders still reckoned with the necessity of moving to a conscript army by summer 1935. Only the timing remained to be determined – on the basis of the foreign-policy situation.77
This had become strained again in early 1935. A joint British-French communiqué on 3 February had condemned unilateral rearmament, and advanced proposals for general restrictions of arms levels and an international defence-pact against aggression from the air.78 After some delay, the German response on 15 February expressed the wish for clarificatory talks with the British government.79 The British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon and Lord Privy Seal Anthony Eden were accordingly invited for talks in Berlin on 7 March.80 Three days before the planned visit, the publication of a British Government White Book, announcing increases in military expenditure as a result of the growing insecurity in Europe caused by German rearmament and the bellicose atmosphere being cultivated in the Reich, led to a furious outcry in the German press.81 Hitler promptly developed a ‘diplomatic’ cold and sore throat, allegedly picked up during his trip to a rainy Saarbrücken at the start of the month, and postponed Simon’s visit.82 Rosenberg found him ‘on the day of the outbreak of his hoarseness’ in excellent mood, cheered by the cancellation. ‘Again some time had been won,’ Hitler commented. ‘Those ruling England must get used to dealing with us only on an equal footing.’ He would ‘recover Germany’s position centimetre for centimetre,’ he added. ‘After a year, nobody will dare any longer to attack us! These few years must do it. If we had begun rearmament only in 1936 it would have been too late.’83
Three days after the visit should have taken place, on 10 March, Göring announced the existence of a German air-force – an outright breach of the Versailles Treaty.84 For effect, in comments to diplomats, he almost doubled the numbers of aircraft actually at Germany’s disposal at the time.85 Just prior to this, the French had renewed their military treaty of 1921 with Belgium.86 And on 15 March the French National Assembly approved the lengthening of the period of military service from one to two years.87 The moves of the arch-enemy, France, prompted Hitler’s reaction. They provided the pretext.88 Alert as ever to both the political and the propaganda advantages to be gained from the actions of his opponents, he decided to take the step now which in any case would soon have been forthcoming.
On 13 March, Lieutenant-Colonel Hoßbach, Hitler’s Wehrmacht adjutant, was ordered to present himself the next morning in the Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten in Munich. When he arrived, Hitler was still in bed. Only shortly before midday was the military adjutant summoned to be told that the Führer had decided to reintroduce conscription in the immediate future – a move which would in the eyes of the entire world graphically demonstrate Germany’s newly regained autonomy and cast aside the military restrictions of Versailles.89 Hitler expounded his reasons for two hours. The advantageous foreign-policy situation, in which other European states were adjusting their military strength, and especially the measures being taken in France, were decisive. Hoßbach was then asked what size the new army should be. Astonishingly, Hitler did not consider directly consulting Fritsch or Beck on this vital topic. It was expected that Hoßbach would be familiar with the thinking of the military leadership. Subject to approval from War Minister Blomberg and Commander-in-Chief of the Army Fritsch, Hoßbach stipulated thirty-six divisions. This matched the final size of the peacetime army that the military leadership had envisaged as a future goal. 90 It implied an army of 550,000 men, five and a half times the size of the post-Versailles army, and a third larger than that envisaged by Beck in his memorandum written only nine days earlier. Hitler accepted Hoßbach’s figures without demur. What had been meant by the army chiefs as a level to be attained only gradually was now determined as the immediate size.
The more spectacular the better, was always Hitler’s maxim in a propaganda coup. Secrecy both to achieve the greatest surprise and avoid damaging leaks that could provoke dangerous repercussions was another. Hitler had taken his decision without consulting either his military leaders or relevant ministers.91 It was the first time this had happened in a serious matter of foreign policy, and the first time that Hitler encountered opposition from the heads of the armed forces.92 Only Hoßbach’s pleading on 14 March had persuaded Hitler to inform Blomberg, Fritsch, and selected cabinet ministers of what he had in store two days later. He had initially been unwilling to disclose to them what he intended on the grounds that there might then be a risk to secrecy.93 The War Minister and armed forces leadership were astonished and appalled that Hitler was prepared to take the step at such a sensitive juncture in foreign policy. It was not that they disagreed with the expansion of the armed forces, or its scale; merely that the timing and way it was done struck them as irresponsible and unnecessarily risky.94 The Foreign Ministry was more sanguine about the risks involved, reckoning the danger of military intervention to be slight.95 Britain’s reaction would be decisive. And various indicators reaching Berlin pointed to the fact that the British were increasingly inclined to accept German rearmament.96 While the military leadership recoiled, therefore, civilian members of the cabinet welcomed Hitler’s move.97
The relative calm of the other members of the cabinet evidently helped to soothe Blomberg’s nerves. Alongside the worries of foreign-policy repercussions had also to be weighed the advantages and opportunities that the move would afford the army. By the following day, the very day of the announcement, he had overcome his initial disapproval.98 At the lunchtime cabinet meeting, the last before the announcement, he praised the Führer’s ‘great deed’, led the other ministers in a three-fold ‘Heil’ to Hitler, and pledged his further loyalty.99 Fritsch, too, had come round to giving his approval. His objections – remembered by Hitler years later – were by now confined to technical problems arising from the planned speed of rearmament.100
Later that afternoon, Saturday, 16 March, Hitler, with Neurath at his side, informed foreign ambassadors of his imminent action.101 According to Hitler, the Italian ambassador, Vittorio Cerruti (replaced in the summer, at Hitler’s request), went white with anger; the French, André François-Poncet, delivered an immediate verbal protest; the British ambassador, Sir Eric Phipps, merely inquired whether Germany’s offers to Britain on relative sizes of air-forces and fleets still stood.102 Then the dramatic news was announced. Hitler proclaimed the new Wehrmacht of thirty-six divisions, and the introduction of general military service. He justified the move through the steps taken by other states to rearm, spurning German offers for disarmament on an equal basis, and asserted that the government wished for nothing more than ‘the power, for the Reich and thereby also for the whole of Europe, to be able to uphold peace’.103
Special editions of newspapers were rushed out, eulogizing ‘the first great measure to liquidate Versailles’, the erasing of the shame of defeat, and the restoration of Germany’s military standing. Delirious crowds gathered outside the Reich Chancellery cheering Hitler.104 ‘Today’s creation of a conscript army in open defiance of Versailles will greatly enhance his domestic position,’ commented the American journalist William Shirer, who witnessed the scenes in Berlin, ‘for there are few Germans, regardless of how much they hate the Nazis, who will not support it wholeheartedly. The great majority will like the way he has thumbed his nose at Versailles, which they all resented.’105
The following day, from now on renamed ‘H
eroes’ Memorial Day’, amid a sea of military uniforms and flags in the State Opera House in Berlin, the huge stage-curtain hung with an enormous silver and black iron cross, the sombre chords of Beethoven’s ‘Funeral March’ (the second movement of the great Eroica symphony) sounding out, General Blomberg gave the address. ‘The world has been made to realize that Germany did not die of its defeat in the World War,’ he intoned. ‘Germany will again take the place she deserves among the nations. We pledge ourselves to a Germany which will never surrender and never again sign a treaty which cannot be fulfilled.’ Hitler looked on approvingly from the royal box.106 A grandiose military display followed, the restored tradition of the German army as its centrepiece.107 Hitler stood flanked on his right by a symbol of the old army, the aged Field Marshal August von Mackensen, who had commanded the German troops in Rumania during the First World War, with Blomberg, representing the new army, on his left.108