by Ian Kershaw
283. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I50, 152, 158.
284. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I54–5, 161.
285. Weinberg, i.164. See also Gerhard Meinck, Hitler und die deutsche Aufrüstung, Wiesbaden, 1959, 22–6, 35–51.
286. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I58, 166–8.
287. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I58–9.
288. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 447–8.
289. Brüning, ii.706–7.
290. Morsey, ‘Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei’, 388.
291. Brüning, ii.707.
292. Wilhelm Hoegner, Flucht vor Hitler, Munich, 1977, 203.
293. Domarus, 273.
294. Domarus, 278; for the text of the speech, 270–79.
295. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I61, 168, 169–70. Goebbels, visiting Geneva at the end of September, though full of contempt for what he saw, sounded like a peace-loving, amenable diplomat (Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923–45, Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas, Bonn, 1953, 283–6; TBJG, I.2, 465–6 (25 September 1933, 27 September 1933)). However, he appears to have favoured taking advantage of the impasse in negotiations to leave the talks (Weinberg, i.165 and refs. in n.28).
296. Weinberg, i.165 and n·29·
297. NCA, Supplement B, 1504; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i. 338.
298. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I71; Weinberg, i.165 (with different emphasis); Papen, 297–8.
299. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I72. Neurath, though strongly supportive of the move, was in fact only informed once the decision had been taken. He was told by Bülow on the evening of 4 October that Hitler and Blomberg now intended to leave the League (Günter Wollstein, Von Weimarer Revisionismus zu Hitler, Bonn/Bad Godesberg, 1973, 201 and n.39–40).
300. AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.903–7, here 904–5.
301. Weinberg, i.166. Formal notice of withdrawal from the League was only presented on 19 October (DGFP, C, II, 2 n.2).
302. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I73, 178–9; Jost Dülffer, ‘Zum “decision-making process” in der deutschen Außenpolitik 1933–1939’, in Manfred Funke (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte. Materialien zur Außenpolitik des Dritten Reichs, I86–204, here 188–90.
303. Domarus, 308–14.
304. Domarus, 323–30.
305. Hans Baur, Ich flog Mächtige der Erde, Kempten (Allgäu), 1956, 108–10; Domarus, 325 and n.293.
306. Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, 62.
307. Domarus, 331.
308. BAK, R18/5350, Fols. 95–104, 107–22, contains inquiries into complaints about irregularities in the election. See also AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.939 n.1; and Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.480–85.
309. If the point needed emphasis, the vote of 99.5 per cent in favour by the inmates of Dachau concentration camp underlined it (Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, I3 November 1933). In the circumstances, the levels of those refusing their support – greater in the election than the plebiscite – was sometimes remarkable (over 21 per cent in Hamburg and Berlin, over 15 per cent in Cologne-Aachen in the election) and corresponded broadly to the types of social structure and religious allegiance that had provided relative immunity to the Nazi breakthrough before 1933 (see Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.486–97).
310. AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.939 n.1.
311. AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.939–41.
CHAPTER 12: SECURING TOTAL POWER
1. The term was coined by Richard Bessel, Political Violence, I52.
2. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I65–76.
3. Diels, 254ff.
4. Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1235-VI-2, Fol.2–28, here 19–21.
5. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 166, I98.
6. The file of Meissner’s Präsidialkanzlei in Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1413-I-6, contains 460 folios relating to such cases between 1933 and 1935. The complicity of the judicial system, and of Gürtner personally, in the quashing of sentences against SA men convicted of acts of brutality is thoroughly explored by Gruchmann, Justiz, ch.4.
7. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I77–9.
8. Heinz Höhne, Mordsache Röhm. Hitlers Durchbruch zur Alleinherrschaft 1933–1934, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1934, 46, referring to remarks made by Hindenburg to Hitler on 29 June 1933. The comments were made in the context of the discord in the Protestant Church and did not mention the SA explicitly. Hindenburg’s view on the ‘excesses’ was, however, that Hitler ‘has the best will and is only working in with a pure heart in the interests of justice’, while ‘his subordinates unfortunately kick over the traces’ – something which would be sorted out in time (Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1235 – vI-2, Fol. 271, notes on a discussion of Hindenburg with Hugenberg, 17 May 1933).
9. Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, 4 (1933), 251–4, passages quoted, 253–4.
10. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I84. The figure was swollen by the paramilitary organizations incorporated in the SA, the most important of which was the Stahlhelm. Only around a third of the SA men were party members.
11. Domarus, 286.
12. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I82–3; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 46–9.
13. Shlomo Aronson, Reinhard Heydrich und die Frühgeschichte von Gestapo und SD, Stuttgart, 1971, 71, 92.
14. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I84–7.
15. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I43–8.
16. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I85, 188.
17. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, I27–8.
18. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I88–90. Unemployed workers had always, during the period of Nazism’s surge to power and continuing throughout 1933 and 1934, constituted a substantial proportion of the SA’s membership (Fischer, Stormtroopers, 45–8).
19. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 200–205; Hermann Mau, ‘Die “Zweite Revolution” – der 30. Juni 1934’, VfZ, I (1953), 119–37, here esp. 124–7; Otto Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer hat Sie zum Tode verurteilt…’. Hitlers ‘Röhm-Putsch’-Morde vor Gericht, Munich, 1993, 30, citing the testimony from 1953 of Paul Körner, formerly State Secretary in the Prussian Staatsministerium; Höhne, Mordsache Rohm, 218–19.
20. See Martin Loiperdinger and David Culbert, ‘Leni Riefenstahl, the SA, and the Nazi Party Rally Films, Nuremberg 1933–1934: “Sieg des Glaubens” and “Triumph des Willens”’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio, and Television, 8 (1988), 3–38, here esp. 12–13.
21. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 201.
22. Domarus, 338, for a glowing expression of Hitler’s thanks to Röhm on 31 December 1933 for his services to the Movement. Among the twelve such letters sent to Nazi leaders, only Röhm was addressed in the ‘Du’ form (Domarus, 338–42).
23. See Immo v. Fallois, Kalkül und Illusion. Der Machtkampf zwischen Reichswehr und SA während der Röhm-Krise 1934, Berlin, 1994, 101: the decision in principle for a Wehrmacht based on general conscription had already been taken. Hitler, in his speech on 30 January 1934, praised the party and the armed forces, seen as two pillars of the state (Domarus, 355–6; and see Müller, Heer, 95).
24. Fallois, 105–6, 117.
25. Fallois, 123 and n.560.
26. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Werner Jochmann (eds.), Ausgewählte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, 3 vols., Bielefeld, 1961, unpaginated, vol.I, C, 2 February 1934. Heß also gave a plain warning to the SA leadership around the same date in an article published in the Völkischer Beobachter and the Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte (Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 203).
27. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 200.
28. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I81.
29. Fallois, 105, 117.
30. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.336; Fallois, 106–8.
31. Fallois, 117–18.
32. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I83.
33. Fallois, 118–19, cit. Nachlaß Weichs, ΒΑ/MA, Freiburg, N19/12, S.12.
34. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.337; Mordsache Röhm, 2
05; Toland, 330 (based on Weich’s testimony).
35. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 206.
36. Fallois, 123, 131 and n.602, but claiming Hitler was waiting for the right psychological moment; Zitelmann, Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs, 77, interprets Hitler’s hesitancy to mean that he was incapable of coming to a decision in the conflict between the SA and the Reichswehr. Since he eventually did arrive at a decision – and one of the utmost ruthlessness – the former seems a more likely explanation.
37. Fallois, 125–6.
38. Diels, 379–82.
39. Fallois, 125, 131.
40. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 205, 209; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.343.
41. See Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 218, 223–4.
42. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 210; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 205; Fallois, 124. At the disarming of the SA following the Röhm crisis, the collection of arms found amounted to 177,000 rifles, 651 heavy and 1250 light machine-guns.
43. Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs. Facing the Dictators, London, 1962, 65.
44. See Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 221–2; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 213–14.
45. Kurt Gossweiler, Die Röhm-Affäre. Hintergründe, Zusammenhänge, Aus-wirkungen, Cologne, 1983, 76, cit. the headline of the Evening Standard (London), of ii June 1934, that Hitler was on the verge of catastrophe, with the implication that the Reichswehr would step in should he fail.
46. AdR, Reg. Hitler, I197–1200 (quoted words 1197); Norbert Frei, Der Führerstaat. Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft 1933 bis 1945, Munich, 1987, 13.
47. See Frei, Führerstaat, I4–15; Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich. Bavaria, 1933–1945, Oxford, 1983, 46–7, 76, 120–21; Timothy W. Mason, Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich. Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft, Opladen, 1977, 192; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 207.
48. DBS, i. 172 (26 June 1934).
49. Cit. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 232. Jung’s fundamental resistance to Hitler from late 1933 onwards is emphasized in the memoirs of a former close acquaintance and sympathizer, Edmund Forschbach, Edgar J. Jung. Ein konservativer Revolutionär, 30. Juni 1934, Pfullingen, 1984. Fallois, 114 n. 522, suggests, however, that Jung wanted only to modify, not replace, the regime. Even after Jung’s arrest – ordered by Hitler (Hans-Günther Seraphim (ed.), Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs 1934/35 und 1939/40, Munich, 1964, 42–3) – following Papen’s Marburg speech, the plan worked out by Bose and Tschirschky for Papen to put to Hindenburg still foresaw, as a continuation of the ‘taming concept’, the membership of Hitler and Göring in a Directory also including Fritsch, Papen, Brüning, and Goerdeler (Karl Martin Graß, Edgar Jung, Ρ apenkreis und Röhmkrise 1933–34, Diss., Heidelberg, 1966, 264–6).
50. See Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 233–4; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 208. The Gestapo was well informed of their activities; and Blomberg and Reichenau in the Reichswehr leadership were aware of the advantages to the army that Hitler, removed from the clutches of the SA, would bring (Frei, Führerstaat, 23–5). See also the pessimistic evaluation of Fallois, 112–16, about the chances of an alternative to Hitler’s regime, especially given the opportunities it provided for the rearmament plans of the army.
51. Heinrich Brüning, in a letter written after the war, said he had heard in April 1934 that Hindenburg was unlikely to live until August, and that three weeks afterwards he learnt of Hitler’s plans to ensure that he would become head of state on the Reich President’s death. Brüning received, too, he stated, information about a ‘proscription list’ containing the names of Schleicher, Strasser and others who were subsequently murdered, together with that of Papen (Heinrich Brüning, Briefe und Gespräche 1934–1945, ed. Claire Nix, Stuttgart, 1974, 26–7). Hindenburg’s doctor, Ferdinand Sauerbruch, Das war mein Lehen, Bad Wörishofen, 1951, 511, remarks simply that Hindenburg became ill in spring 1934. Meissner, Staatssekretär, 375, comments that the President became ill in spring with a bladder complaint. (See also Andreas Dorpalen, Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic, Princeton, 1964, 478.)
52. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, 311–13, without giving any source, refers to a communiqué on Hindenburg’s health on 27 April, over two weeks after Hitler and Blomberg had been informed that the President would not live much longer.
53. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 228–9; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 207–8; Longerich Die braunen Bataillone, I20.
54. Graß, 227 and n.570; Forschbach, 115–16.
55. Jacobsen and Jochmann, Ausgewählte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, unpaginated, vol.1, CJ, 17 June 1934; Papen, 309.
56. Papen, 310–11.
57. Brüning commented, in a letter he wrote on 9 July to the former British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold, that to hold the speech without agreeing any subsequent action with the Reichswehr and Reich President was ‘a huge mistake’ (ein riesiger Fehler). Brüning added that he had heard from a reliable source that Papen had read the speech for the first time only two hours before speaking in Marburg. (See, on this point, Forschbach, 115–16.) After the war Brüning said he had himself received a copy of Edgar Jung’s text in April or May, and strongly advised against putting it into Papen’s hands (Brüning, Briefe und Gespräche, 25, 27)·
58. Domarus, 390–91.
59. Fallois, 132.
60. Papen, 310–11.
61. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 237.
62. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, 319–20.
63. Meissner, Staatssekretär, 363.
64. Cit. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 212.
65. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 239; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 211.
66. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 215.
67. Fallois, 126–30, 135–6, 138–9; Müller, Heer, I13–18.
68. Graß, 260–61; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 239–42.
69. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 242.
70. Domarus, 394, 399.
71. Graß, 264–8; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 247–51, 256.
72. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 256.
73. Graß, 263 and n.728; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 257.
74. Graß, 269; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 216; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 256–7.
75. TBJG, I.2, 472–3 (29 June 1934). For Hitler’s visit to the Labour Service camps, see Hartmut Heyck, ‘The Reich Labour Service in Peace and War: A Survey of the Reichsarbeitsdienst and its Predecessors’, unpublished M.A. thesis, Carleton University, Ontario, 1997, 69.
76. Tb Reuth, ii.843 (1 July 1934); and see Reuth, Goebbels, 314.
77. Tb Reuth, ii.843 (1 July 1934)·
78. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 265.
79. Domarus, 394–5; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 216.
80. Domarus, 399; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 260–66 (quoted words, 266).
81. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 266–7; Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, I8.
82. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 267–8; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 214; Domarus, 396, 399–400; Library of Congress: Adolf Hitler Collection, C-89, 9376–88A-B, Erich Kempka interview, 15 October 1971. Röhm was the only one of those arrested to be taken away in a car; the rest went in the chartered bus.
83. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 271, cit. Schreiben von Karl Schreyer an das Polizeipräsidium München, 27 May 1949, Prozeßakten Landgericht München I. See also IfZ, Fa 108, SA/OSAF, 1928–45, Bl.39, for the official report of the meeting by the Reichspressestelle der NSDAP.
84. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 273.
85. Domarus, 397; Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 21–8. Evidently in a calmer mood, Hitler went on to dictate a number of press communiqués and Lutze’s letter of appointment as new SA Chief of Staff (Domarus, 397–402).
86. Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 24, 26.
87. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 274.
88. Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs, 46, (7 July 1934).
89. Domarus, 396; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 270–71.
&nbs
p; 90. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 218.
91. For the above, see Papen, 315–18; Hans Bernd Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 2 vols., Zürich, 1946, i.225–81; Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 36–44, 135 (relating to Edgar Jung); Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 219; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 271, 281–2, 284–9. Klausener’s name (along with those of Schleicher, Bredow, and Bose) had appeared on lists privately compiled – without any conspiratorial plans – by Edgar Jung of those who might belong to a future government (Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 251–2).
92. Hans Bernd Gisevius, Adolf Hitler. Versuch einer Deutung, Munich, 1963, 291; Frei, Führerstaat, 32.
93. Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 30.
94. Papen, 320.
95. Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 32, based on Körner’s testimony in 1953.
96. Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 32–6.
97. Domarus, 404.
98. Domarus, 405.
99. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, i.270.
100. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 296, 319–21; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 219.
101. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.359. Mau, ‘Die “Zweite Revolution”’, 134, guesses that the number of victims was at least twice, and perhaps three times, as many as the official figure given of seventy-seven. It was later officially announced that, on Göring’s orders alone, as many as 1, 124 persons had been taken into custody in connection with the ‘Röhm revolt’ (Domarus, 409).
102. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 220–24.
103. On the reactions of the foreign press, see AdR, Reg. Hitler, I376 n.3, citing Goebbels’s radio comments on 10 July 1934, as reported in the VB the following day.
104. Domarus, 405.
105. Domarus, 405.
106. Papen, 320.
107. Domarus, 406. Gürtner’s retrospective legalization of the murderous actions reflected the hopeless strategy followed by jurists in the Third Reich: seeking, so they imagined, to protect the principles of law against arbitrary and illegal force by declaring such force legal. See Gruchmann, Justiz, 448–55, for the mentality of Gürtner which lay behind his framing of the law, and 433–84 for the reactions of the legal administration to the murders perpetrated in the ‘Röhm affair’.