by Ian Kershaw
201. Max Domarus, Der Reichstag und die Macht, Würzburg, 1968, 101–2; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 45.
202. Mommsen, ‘Realisierung’, 387 and n.20.
203. IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frame 1081, Lösener testimony; ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 273; Domarus, Der Reichstag und die Macht, I02 n.21.
204. See Peter Reichel, Der schöne Schein des Dritten Reiches. Faszination und Gewalt des Faschismus, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, 116–38, esp. 126–31.
205. Domarus, 525.
206. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 45.
207. Domarus, 534.
208. IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frames 1081–2, Lösener testimony; ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 274; Schleunes, 124; Adam, 127.
209. IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frame 1082, Lösener testimony; ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 275.
210. The text of the law is published in Pätzold, Verfolgung, I14.
211. Adam, 128.
212. Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 431–2; Adam, 128 and n.74.
213. The text is published in Pätzold, Verfolgung, I13–14.
214. The incident took place on 26 July. Six dock workers involved were given mild sentences on 12 and 14 August, but five were ordered to be released on 7 September, when the magistrate, Louis Brodsky, delivered an attack on Nazism and described the Bremen as a ‘pirate ship’. The incident, widely reported in the German press, soured German-American relations. ‘The whole of Germany [is] enraged about the judgement in New York about the agitators who rioted around the “Bremen” and pulled down the swastika flag,’ noted Louise Solmitz in her diary on 7 September 1935 (Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, Hamburg, Louise Solmitz, Tagebuch, Bd.I, 1932–1937, Fol. 248). Hitler’s fury was said to have impulsively made him decide to proclaim the swastika banner as the new German Flag (Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 45; Domarus, 534 and n.201).
215. JK, 89–90.
216. In an interview at the end of November for the American United Press, Hitler repeated his assertion that ‘the necessity of combating Bolshevism is one of the main reasons for the Jewish legislation in Germany’. He claimed that the laws were there to protect the Jews, and that the decline in anti-Jewish agitation within Germany was proof of their success. The Reich government, he went on, had been led by the intention of ‘preventing through legal measures the self-help of the people, which could unburden itself among other things in dangerous explosions…’ (Domarus, 557–8)·
217. Domarus, 536–7.
218. Domarus, 537–8. Goebbels, a radical on ‘the Jewish Question’, found Göring’s speech ‘almost unbearable’. Whether by accident or design, the broadcast of the speech was turned off (TBJG, 1.2, 515 (17 September 1935)).
219. Domarus, 538.
220. Domarus, 538–9; and see Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 432; TBJG, I.2, 515 (17 September 1935), where Goebbels mistakenly has the entry under ‘Samstag’, not ‘Sonntag’. Hitler repeated his ban on all ‘excesses’ at a meeting of the Gauleiter on 17 September, though Goebbels was sceptical of its effect (TBJG, I.2, 516 (19 September 1935)).
221. A hint of Hitler’s own ambivalence, and determination not to be pinned down by legalities, could be seen in his refusal to allow Frick to publish any commentary on the ‘Jewish law’ (TBJG, I.2, 517 (21 September 1935)).
222. ZStA, Potsdam, RMdI, 27079/71, Fol. 52, LB of RP in Kassel, 4 March 1936.
223. The violence had already been in decline during the weeks preceding the Rally (Adam, 124).
224. Kulka, ‘Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze’, 622–3; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 76–80.
225. Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, 237.
226. Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 433–4; Adam, 134; ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 279–82; IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frames 1082–3, Lösener testimony. On the ‘Mischling question’, see especially Noakes, ‘The Development of Nazi Policy towards the German-Jewish “Mischlinge” 1933–1945’, 306–15.
227. Bankier, ‘Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question’, 14.
228. Adam, 132–5.
229. TBJG, II.2, 518 (25 September 1935). Lösener (‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 281) mentions being summoned to a meeting of the party leadership in the Town Hall at Munich on 29 September. His memory must have been faulty, since, as Goebbels’s diary entry makes clear, the meeting took place on 24 September.
230. ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 281. According to confidential information passed to press representatives, Hitler had tended at the meeting to favour the position of the ministry officials (Mommsen, ‘Realisierung’, 387–8, n.20).
231. TBJG, I.2, 520 (1 October 1935).
232. Adam, 139–40.
233. ΤΒJG, I.2, 537 (7 November 1935).
234. Adam, 140–41; Schleunes, 129; Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, I48–51 and (for consequences of the racial definition in a number of personal cases) 155–62; above all, Noakes, ‘The Development of Nazi Policy towards the German-Jewish “Mischlinge” 1933–1945’, 310–15, and Jeremy Noakes,‘Wohin gehören die “Judenmischlinge”? Die Entstehung der ersten Durchführungsverordnungen zu den Nürnberger Gesetzen’, in Ursula Büttner (ed.), Das Unrechtsregime. Verfolgung, Exil, Belasteter Neubeginn, Hamburg, 1986, 69–90. Those not counting as Jews under this definition, but descended from one or two ‘non-Aryan’ grandparents, were labelled ‘Mischlinge’. In practice, ‘Mischlinge Grade Γ (of two ‘non-Aryan’ grandparents) came under the ‘Blood Law’ to be associated with ‘full Jews’ (see Adam, 143–4)·
235. TBJG, I.2, 540 (15 November 1935).
236. Adam, 142–3 and 142 n.130.
237. Until Gustloff’s death, the Auslandsorganisation (AO) of the NSDAP in Switzerland had a Landesgruppenleiter and constituency groups (Ortsgruppen) in various cities. Following the assassination of Gustloff, the Swiss government did not allow the filling of his post, but the duties of the Landesgruppenleiter were in practice taken over by the German embassy in Bern (Benz, Graml and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 724).
238. Bayern, ii.297.
239. Domarus, 573–5.
240. Hildegard von Kotze and Helmut Krausnick (eds.), ‘Es spricht der Führer’. 7 exemplarische Hitler-Reden, Gütersloh, 1966, 148.
241. For some cases of intervention by Hitler in 1936–7, see Bankier, ‘Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question’, 15.
242. DBS, iii.27.
243. Der Parteitag der Freiheit vom 10.–16. September 1935. Offizieller Bericht über den Verlauf des Reichsparteitages mit sämtlichen Kongreßreden, Munich, 1935, 287; also in: Parteitag der Freiheit. Reden des Führers und ausgewählte Kongreßreden am Reichsparteitag der NSDAP, 1935, Munich, 1935, 134–5.
244. Ε. C. Helmreich, ‘The Arrest and Freeing of the Protestant Bishops of Württemberg and Bavaria, September–October 1934’, Central European History, 2 (1969), 159–69; Paul Sauer, Württemberg in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, Ulm, 1975, 185–9; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, I64–79.
245. Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, I70, 172, 178.
246. Cited in Conway, 76–7.
247. See Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, I19.
248. Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, 205ff.
249. TBJG, I.2, 504 (19 August 1935). See also 505 (21 August 1935): ‘Rosenberg, Himmler, and Darré must stop their cultist nonsense’ (‘Rosenberg, Himmler und Darré müssen ihren kultischen Unfug abstellen’).
250. TBJG, I.2, 511 (6 September 1935): ‘In the question of Catholicism, the Führer sees things as very serious.’
251. For the impact of the ‘Church Struggle’ on the attitudes of the Catholic population in Bavaria, see Kershaw, Popular Opi
nion and Political Dissent, ch.5.
252. For the ‘1918 syndrome’ of Hitler and the Nazi leadership, see Mason, Sozialpolitik, ch. I.
253. TBJG, I.2, 504 (19 August 1935): ‘Führer gibt Überblick politische Lage. Sieht Verfall:
254. BAK, R43II/318, Fols.205–13, 28, 61–2 (and also Fols.195–203, 214–15); R43ll/318a, Fols.45–53. See also Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 72 and n.102.
255. DRZW, i.254–9. The extent to which Germany was successful in economically exploiting the Balkan countries has been disputed by Alan S. Milward, ‘The Reichsmark Bloc and the International Economy’, in Hirschfeld and Kettenacker, 377–413, drawing a rejoinder from Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, ‘Südosteuropa in der nationalsozialistischen Großraumwirtschaft’ in the same volume, 414–28.
256. John E. Farquharson, The Plough and the Swastika. The NSDAP and Agriculture, 1928–1945, London, 1976, 166–8.
257. BAK, R58/535, Fols.91–6, Stapo Berlin, October 1935.
258. TBJG, I.2, 522 (5 October 1935); see also BAK, R43II/863, Fols.69–83; R43II/318a, Fol.15.
259. BAK, R58/567, Fols.84–93, Stapo Berlin, January 1936. Police reports frequently pointed to a revival of the activities of the illegal KPD in the winter of 1935–6. It is doubtful whether much of the unrest was attributable to organized Communist agitation. Rather, underground opposition groups were easily able to exploit the prevailing poor mood (Detlev J. K. Peukert, Die KPD im Widerstand. Verfolgung und Untergrundarbeit an Rhein und Ruhr 1933 bis 1945, Wuppertal, 1980, 204–50). The renewed Communist activity predictably brought an intensified onslaught by the Gestapo, to the point where the KPD had to recognize that there was no longer the slightest prospect of mass action against the regime, and that this would only bring needless sacrifices. By spring 1936, the ferocity of Nazi repression drastically reduced KPD resistance groups in size and greatly limited the possibilities of contact between underground activists (Allan Merson, Communist Resistance in Nazi Germany, London, 1985, 186–7).
260. IML/ZPA, St.3/44/I, Fols.103–7, Stapo Berlin, 6 March 1936. See also DBS, ii.1013, 1251–5 (16 October 1935, 12 November 1935). There were increased numbers of strikes in 1935–6, and widespread reports of the revival of illegal opposition groups. The strikes were invariably on a small scale and lasted only a matter of hours. Details of many such small strikes are contained in a 381-folio file, ‘Streikbewegung’, in IML/ZPA, St.3/463.
261. Wiedemann, 90.
262. BAK, R54II/193, Fol.157, Lammers to Darré, 30 September 1934. Complaints from different parts of Prussia, forwarded by Göring to the Reich Chancellery, are in the file.
263. BAK, R43II/193, Fols.122–245.
264. BAK, R43ll/315a, FoI.31.
265. BAK, R43II/318, Fol.2; the reports are included in Fols.1–29.
266. BAK, R43II/318, Fols.62–4.
267. BAK, R43II/318, Fol.31, 205–13; R43ll/318a, Fols.45–53.
268. The title of Reichel’s study on the stage-management and aesthetics of coercion and force in Nazi imagery and propaganda: Der schöne Schein des Dritten Reiches.
269. BAK, R43II/318, Fols.219–22 ‘Vermerk’ for Lammers, brought to Hitler’s attention; (also Fols.205–13 and R43ll/318a, Fols.45–53).
270. TBJG, I.2, 516 (19 September 1935).
271. BAK, R4311/318a, Fols.11–31. See also Ritter, 79. According to the later account of Alfred Sohn-Rethel, at the time aware of thinking in business circles, Goerdeler’s memorandum encountered considerable support in some sections of industry and prompted a good deal of debate, with even some talk of a possible putsch (Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Ökonomie und Klassenstruktur des deutschen Faschismus, Frankfurt am Main, 1975, 177).
272. Similar ideas advanced by Goerdeler some months later, at the time of the introduction of the Four-Year Plan, were rejected out of hand by Göring in early September 1936 as ‘completely unusable’ (‘völlig unbrauchbar’) (Dieter Petzina, Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich. Der nationalsozialistische Vier jahresplan, Stuttgart, 1968, 47; and see Ritter, 80).
273. Ritter, 80. More critical and penetrating as an analysis of Goerdeler’s actions in the early years of the regime, which gradually shaped his growing opposition to it, is Michael Krüger-Charlé, ‘Carl Goerdelers Versuche der Durchsetzung einer alternativen Politik 1933 bis 1937’, in Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach (eds.), Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, Munich, 1986, 383–404.
274. BAK, R43ll/318a, Fols.35, 66.
275. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 32–3; Farquharson, 168.
276. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 32–3.
277. BAK, ZSg. 101/28, Fol.331, ‘Informationsbericht Nr.55’, 7 November 1935.
278. Goebbels reflected the concern on a number of occasions in his diaries: TBJG, I.2, 501 (11 August 1935); 503–4 (19 August 1935); 505 (21 August 1935); 506–7 (25 August 1935); 507 (27 August 1935); 522 (5 October 1935).
279. TBJG, I.2, 504 (19 August 1935).
280. TBJG, I.2, 529 (19 October 1935).
281. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 33–4.
282. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 35.
283. BAK, R43II/533, Fols.91–6.
284. As we have noted, the savage repression of the Gestapo, able to infiltrate and smash KPD cells, meant that any new life in Communist illegal activity was rapidly extinguished. Material discontent rather than ideological commitment of the level needed to court exposure to the enormous personal risks involved had provided the background to the short-lived increased appeal of Communist verbal propaganda in urban working-class areas. For the adjustment of the KPD in western Germany to the far less favourable circumstances from 1936 onwards, see Peukert, Die KPD im Widerstand, 252ff. The poor morale of Nazi Party members in early 1936 is highlighted by Orlow, ii.170–75.
285. IMT, XXV, 402–13 (here 409), Doc. 386–PS.
286. Esmonde Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, VfZ, I0 (1962), 178–205, here 203. See Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 50–55 for evidence of popular unrest to support the view that internal causes were decisive.
287. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 204.
288. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 204–5; Manfred Funke, ‘7. März 1936. Fallstudie zum außenpolitischen Führungsstil Hitlers’, in Wolf gang Michalka (ed.), Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, Darmstadt, 1978, 277–324, here 279.
289. See BAK, R58/570, Fols. 104–8, report to Gestapo Cologne, 6 February 1936; and BAK, NS22/vorl-583, reports of Gauleiter Grohé of Cologne-Aachen, 8 June, 6 July, and 10 December 1935, for comments on the poor economic position of the demilitarized zone and the strength of the Catholic Church’s position there. See also TBJG, I.2, 374 (19 February 1936).
290. The cancellation at the last minute of the Works Councils elections scheduled for April 1936 can probably be attributed to the assumption that the results would have been less favourable than those of the plebiscite (Mason, Sozialpolitik, 206). Labour Minister Seldte was told (after learning of the postponement in the evening papers) that Hitler wanted the elections postponed to prevent a large part of the population having to go to the polls again immediately after the Reichstag election (BAK, R43ll/547b, Fols. 2, 19).
291. DRZW, i.424.
292. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 195; DGFP, C, IV, 1166.
293. Weinberg, i.240–42; James T. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis, 7 March 1936. A Study in Multilateral Diplomacy, London, 1977, 63.
294. Petersen, 466–71.
295. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 196–9; Funke, ‘7. März 1936’, 298–9; Petersen, 468.
296. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 320; Emmerson, 46; Taylor, 126–7.
297. Emmerson, 39–41, 47–8, 51–2; Weinberg, i.243.
298. Emmerson, 77; Funke, ‘7. März 1936’, 287–9.
299. Emmerson, 57, 80; Funke, ‘7. März 1936’, 283–6; Weinberg, i.244
–5; DRZW, i.604.
300. See Dülffer, ‘Zum “decision-making process”’, 194–7.
301. Marquess of Londonderry (Charles S.H. Vane-Tempest-Stewart), Ourselves and Germany, London, 1938, 114.
302. Hoßbach, 97.
303. The Pact, signed on 2 May 1935, was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies on 11 February. The final vote in the Chamber took place on 27 February. The ratification bill was laid before the Senate on 3 March (DGFP, C, IV, 1142 n.4, 1145 n.).
304. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 192, 194–6, 203–4; Funke, ‘7. März 1936’, 279–82; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 323–4; DGFP, C, IV, 1164–6. The German Chargé d’Affaires in Paris, Dirk Forster, had also argued against unilateral action – meeting a sarcastic response from Hitler (Emmerson, 83–4 and 285 n.106).
305. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 192. For Hitler’s later remarks that he had envisaged remilitarization in 1937, but that circumstances had favoured accomplishing it a year earlier, see Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Das Dritte Reich. Dokumente zur Innen- und Außenpolitik, 2 vols. Munich, 1985, i.267–8 (Hitlers Geheimrede vor den Truppenkommandeurern, 10 February 1939).
306. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 194–6, 203–4; DGFP, C, IV, 1165.
307. TBJG, I.2, 575 (29 February 1936).
308. TBJG, I.2. 576 (29 February 1936).
309. TBJG, I.2, 576 (29 February 1936).
310. TBJG, I.2, 577 (2 March 1936).
311. TBJG, I.2, 578 (4 March 1936). See also NCA, v. 1102, D0C.3308–PS, testimony of Paul Schmidt; Hoßbach, 97; Emmerson, 98, for military anxieties.
312. TBJG, I.2, 579 (4 March 1936), 580 (6 March 1936). Goebbels instigated a rumour (580) that the Reichstag would meet again on 13 March.
313. TBJG, I.2, 579–81 (6–8 March 1936).
314. Domarus, 582.
315. TBJG, I.2, 581 (8 March 1936); Hoffmann, 83; and see Shirer, 46–7. The surprise element was maximized by staging the coup on a Saturday, when British and French cabinet members had dispersed for the weekend (Emmerson, 100). And see Shirer, 51.