by Hall Gardner
TRUMP'S PLAN TO BOOST INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS
It is true that Trump's plans to boost defense expenditure will most likely generate high-skill high-tech work in the military-industrial complex throughout many of the fifty states, with some trickle-down effect. But increased defense spending risks reducing government funding available for other much-needed non-defense alternatives and alternative-energy projects, while augmenting the national debt. The irony raised here is that the roots of the US infrastructure crisis stems from mistakes that Ronald Reagan had already made with high military spending hikes and supply-side tax cuts. Reagan's policies did help expand the economy in the 1980s, but they also resulted in “insufficient investment in physical public capital such as highways, bridges, mass transit, waste water facilities, hazardous waste sites, and the like.”61
To improve American infrastructure, Trump has proposed using $200 billion in public money as a means to leverage $1 trillion in private funding. This amount, for example, is expected to include some $40 billion in Saudi funding that was promised after the $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia that was announced in May 2017.62 Trump thus hopes to raise money by leveraging public funding, while replacing publicly supplied services and infrastructure with private-supplied goods and services. This approach will nevertheless continue to diminish and weaken the public sector—with uncertain consequences.
Perhaps more ironically, the Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC) has been looking to invest in Trump's infrastructure projects ostensibly in an effort to build trust between the two countries. Beijing's CIC claims that the United States will need as much as $8 trillion in infrastructure development, not just $1 trillion.63 Contrary to Trump's anti-Saudi and anti-Chinese presidential campaign stances, it looks like both Saudi and Chinese finance are needed to save Trump's infrastructure program—and will help indirectly pay for his major military buildup while also exposing American politics to greater Chinese and Saudi political-economic influence.
It is furthermore not yet clear what kind of infrastructure projects would be funded—as Democrats oppose the use of healthcare as an infrastructure project, for example. Trump's ideology of “economic nationalism” emphasizes some areas of US “infrastructure development.” These areas include the military-industrial complex and fossil fuels, for example, and roads, bridges, navigable waterways, and dams. But the Trump administration might not consider the infrastructure needed for mass transit, healthy drinking water, waste recycling, housing, alternative energy, and ecologically safe technologies. The dilemma is that much of the money spent on the defense buildup could be better spent on college scholarships for increasingly expensive education, for example, among other crucial nondefense needs.64 Trump's emphasis on physical infrastructure development also overlooks the fact that a solid education in both practical studies and liberal arts provides the basis for all infrastructure development and for future innovations.
CONGRESS AND THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Not only does Trump's leadership and the US democratic process appear more closely linked with capitalist elites, but also it appears even more perilously linked with the military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower warned about in his 1961 farewell address: “we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions.”
The problem is that the American system of spoils leads congresspeople to push for news arms projects. Arms lobbyists often try to press the US Congress to accept their policy, development, and even military-technology proposals upon promises of investment and additional jobs for the state—or else upon their particular definition of “national security.”65 On at least two occasions since the sequestering laws that seek to automatically cut defense costs went into effect in 2011, it was Congress (and not the Pentagon) that had decided to lift the spending caps so as to increase defense spending. The concern raised here is that the military-industrial complex operates and provides jobs in a vast majority of US states, so that the more weapons systems or parts of weapons systems that a state receives to construct, the more jobs (combined with the trickle-down effects of military Keynesianism) the state will support and more votes Congress can expect. The system is difficult to break, particularly because the House of Representatives is elected on two-year terms and congresspeople need show positive results as soon as possible. (This represents a significant reason to restructure the bicameral legislative system. See chapter 10.)
The fact that Vice President Mike Pence has supported the building of the extremely costly F-22 Raptor, among other excessively expensive and strategically unnecessary weapons systems, indicates the influence of the military-industrial-congressional complex.66 Here, contrary to his pretended opposition to wasteful and excessive military spending, Trump himself has stated: “Accomplishing this military rebuild will be a fifty-state effort—every state in the union will be able to take part in rebuilding our military and developing the technologies of tomorrow.”67 Yet this linkage between the federally financed military-industrial complex and the fifty states is the root of the overspending!
POLITICIANS AND THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Perhaps more ironically, of the top five presidential candidates, it was the Democrat Hillary Clinton who obtained more money during the 2015–2016 election cycle from defense contractor employees than the next four presidential candidates combined. And the proclaimed democratic socialist Bernie Sanders actually obtained $100,000 more from defense contractors than did Donald Trump. And among Senators, Bernie Sanders also obtained more funding from defense contractor employees than Republican Senators Ted Cruz and John McCain—who are strong supporters of Peace through Strength.
To his credit, Senator McCain has criticized excessive defense spending on some projects, such as the extremely costly F-35 stealth fighter. Yet McCain also proposed a $640 billion base defense budget for 2017, much larger than that of Trump.68 For his part, Sanders has nevertheless continued to argue for much deeper defense cuts than McCain—despite his continued support for the controversial F-35 fighter jet, which has three production plants based in Sanders's home state of Vermont.69
THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF A NEW ARMS RACE
How will Trump's America First military buildup impact American society? Will it really lead to a form of growth that more equitably distributes wealth, as Trump promised during his election campaign? Will excessive US governmental spending in the highly capital-intensive military-industrial complex really trickle down to benefit the general population, even if military industries are spread throughout most of the fifty states? Or will Trump's military buildup simply exacerbate the growing gap in the United States between rich and poor and indirectly press young people into state-financed military careers? And will Trump's display of a big stick necessarily result in peace—if the tools of diplomacy are undermined by excessive emphasis on military power?
The point is that government funding for the military-industrial complex—ostensibly in order to sustain US military superiority against all potential rivals alone—is not necessarily sufficient to keep the peace. On the international side, the dilemma is that the United States as a global hegemonic power cannot cover all regional contingencies where rival major and lesser powers and anti-state movements may possess a tactical advantage—or believe that they can seize one. On the domestic side, should Trump's new military Keynesian version of trickle-down economics fail to lift the economy, the result will be a major political-economic crisis and the augmentation of social and political conflict at home.
The danger is that Trump's massive military program will create more pork-barrel projects, significantly boost the national debt, and antagonize firms and workers who do not partake directly or indirectly in the military-industrial complex—while fomenting a global arms race among those state and anti-state partisan movements most opposed to America First policies. And because the United States still represents the predominant global power, a failure to lead t
he country at home will lead to even greater social and geopolitical strife abroad.
What is needed is a greater, not lesser, emphasis on omnidirectional peace-oriented diplomacy in an effort to prevent a new arms race—so as to thoroughly reduce excessive government spending on armaments and to foster positive conditions for national and international socioeconomic development and environmental protection. (See chapters 9 and 10.)
The fact that Donald Trump did not obtain a clear mandate from the American people—in an election in which only roughly 58 percent of eligible voters participated—has appeared to delegitimize the very nature of the American democratic system. Yet what has additionally worked to discredit the American elections have been accusations by both Trump and his opponents that foreign influence—both “illegal” immigrants and the “Kremlin”—had tampered with this important dimension of American society. This is not to overlook Trump's earlier allegations that the elections were supposedly rigged in advance—but he nevertheless won unexpectedly and without a majority of the popular vote!1 (See also chapter 10.)
THE ALLEGED ROLE OF MOSCOW
Just after the presidential vote count was in, President Obama rapidly accused Moscow of tampering with the US election process through cyber-intrusions. Obama ordered the FBI and five other law enforcement and intelligence agencies to start an investigation as to whether the Kremlin had attempted to influence the presidential election.2 Republican Senator John McCain declared that alleged Russian hacking into American domestic affairs represented an “act of war.”3 Senator McCain, with Senator Lindsey Graham, then pressed for a full-fledged Senate Select Committee investigation. In response, Trump replied in a tweet that urged McCain and Graham to halt their investigation into Russia and to “focus their energies on ISIS, illegal immigration and border security instead of always looking to start World War III.”4 Nevertheless, both the House Committee and a Senate Select Committee continued to investigate Russian activities in the US elections and Trump's relations with Moscow, as have two other committees. For his part, Senator McCain also pushed for an independent inquiry.5
McCain not only sought to inflame the American public opinion against Russia, but also sought to condemn Trump for his ostensibly pro-Putin political stance. McCain did state that he would not, however, actually go to “war” with Russia over the issue. From a legal standpoint, such actions involving interference in the election process, assuming they could be proven, could not be considered a rationale for an initiation of armed conflict. At the same time, such intrusions would represent an “illegal” external intrusion in American internal affairs and could therefore invite some form of retorsion.6
By mid-May 2017, as events unfolded, and just after Trump fired FBI Director James Comey, who had begun to investigate Trump's alleged connections to Russia, former FBI Director Robert Mueller was appointed as a special counsel with the power to investigate whether Moscow had in any way covertly aided President-elect Donald Trump, and whether or not Trump himself, or any of his associates, were hoping to profit, for example, from its contacts with Russian officials. One accusation was that the Trump administration could put an end to the sanctions placed on Moscow in 2014 in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea and its political-military interference in eastern Ukraine, in exchange for business favors. Specific areas of investigation have included the alleged Trump compliance with the hacking and leaks of emails written by key figures in the Democratic Party; Donald Trump Jr.'s meeting with a lawyer with purported Russian government connections, in an effort to obtain “dirt” on Hillary Clinton; whether or not the Trump campaign was involved in Russian efforts to spread fake news targeted at voters in key states; and whether or not Moscow did attempt to hack into US election-related computer systems. Unlike the investigations of the congressional committees, Mueller has the power to file federal charges.7 By late October, Mueller indicted three people, Trump's former campaign chief, a former Trump business associate, and Trump's ex-foreign policy adviser, with alleged crimes that included money laundering, lying to the FBI, and conspiracy against the United States.8
DOMESTIC ATTACKS AGAINST TRUMP
The key domestic dilemma for the Trump administration is that President Trump's campaign promises to engage in a rapprochement with President Putin immediately evoked strong congressional opposition. Both Republicans and Democrats have strongly opposed the lifting of economic sanctions on Russia without also seeking a guarantee that Moscow will withdraw its clandestine forces from eastern Ukraine and then return Crimea, which Moscow annexed in early 2014, back to Ukraine. This was seen in the passing of the August 2016 H.R. 3364 Act, “Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act.” Given its strong bipartisan congressional backing, Trump was pressed to sign the bill into law despite the fact that he considered it to be “flawed”; Trump argued that the bill “encroaches on the executive branch's authority to negotiate” and “makes it harder for the United States to strike good deals for the American people and will drive China, Russia and North Korea much closer together.” The bill could also “hinder our important work with European allies to resolve the conflict in Ukraine,” he argued.9
In American domestic debates, the crisis in Ukraine has generally been blamed on Moscow alone due to the Russian annexation of Crimea and its political-military interference in eastern Ukraine. American observers tend to downplay issues concerning the highly centralized nature of the Ukrainian domestic power structure and Kiev's discrimination against the Russophone Ukrainian minority. There is thus a tendency for Moscow alone to be blamed for the continuation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine by arming the autonomist movements—as opposed to Kiev's failure to follow up on the Minsk II accords and its refusal to negotiate directly with the “autonomist” factions in the Donbas region due to Kiev's strong opposition to federalism and decentralization of power. (See chapters 5 and 9.)
That Trump has realized that his efforts to seek a rapprochement with Russia are not “good” for him in political terms is seen in his following statement: “If we could get along with Russia, that's a positive thing. We have a very talented man, Rex Tillerson, who's going to be meeting with them shortly, and I told him, I said, ‘I know politically it's probably not good for me…. I would love to be able to get along with Russia. Now, you've had a lot of presidents that haven't taken that tack. Look where we are now.”10
Trump has largely based his hopes on greater cooperation with President Putin through concerted cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism—in the hope that such cooperation will lead to cooperation in other areas. Trump accordingly said: “I respect a lot of people, but that doesn't mean I'm going to get along with him. He's a leader of his country. I say it's better to get along with Russia than not. And if Russia helps us in the fight against ISIS, which is a major fight, and Islamic terrorism all over the world—that's a good thing. Will I get along with him? I have no idea.”11 In his own eccentric way, Trump has argued that his efforts to deal with Putin are not personal—but a national security issue, an affair of the state. Nevertheless, Trump has been suspected of seeking personal profit from his dealings with Moscow.
Trump's off-the-wall and off-key statements regularly bring him political trouble. When a journalist insisted that Putin was a killer, Trump replied: “There are a lot of killers. We have a lot of killers…. Well, you think our country is so innocent?”12 It has been alleged without absolute proof that that Putin had ordered the death of Russian journalists (including Anna Politkovskaya, who reported on human rights abuses during the brutal Russian military intervention in Chechnya) and other opponents of the regime (such as Boris Nemtsov, an opposition politician who strongly denounced Putin's corruption and Russian intervention in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine).13 Putin has also been accused of killing Alexander Litvinenko, former FSB and KGB agent, who denounced Putin as coming to power with the help of the Russian secret police, the FSB.14 Litvinenko was murdered by the use of the radioactive substance po
lonium in a London restaurant in 2006—an affair that soured Anglo-Russian diplomatic relations for years. Litvinenko had openly accused Putin of killing the Russian investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and engaging in other criminal actions.
Although it does not justify murder, of course, the fact of the matter is that Putin is far less repressive, in comparative historical terms, than Lenin or Stalin, or even previous tsars. And Washington has had to negotiate with the leadership of far more repulsive regimes (including Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, among others, who have engaged in mass murder) as part of geopolitical realities. And although Trump could have replied more tactfully, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has, in fact, been accused of assassination, both before and after the Cold War, and has engaged in so-called targeted killing, with the use of drones in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The US government has also been accused of torturing or attacking journalists critical of US policy. NATO, for example, as the US-led defense organization, bombed Radio Television Serbia in downtown Belgrade, Serbia (a Russian ally) in 1999 during the war over Kosovo, for example, killing sixteen people.15 Washington has likewise been accused of killing and torturing Al Jazeera journalists, among others. In addition to the use of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques (which included waterboard torture) at Guantanamo Bay, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal—which involved torture, rape, and murder—has represented a national disgrace.16 Since the scandals at both prisons have worked to undermine fundamental American values, the United States cannot claim the higher moral ground versus Putin's Russia. Moreover, Putin's preclusive interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014 without a UN mandate have not caused even close to the same degree of death and destruction as has George W. Bush's so-called preemptive decision to engage in a major military intervention in Iraq in 2003, for example, also without a UN mandate. In this sense, one cannot point the finger at Putin alone.