In 1943 the Japanese did not want to start a full scale war with the British. They were still consolidating their position in Far Eastern Russia and eastern Mongolia where, now that the Soviet Union had collapsed, they had finally taken the site of their defeat at Khalkin Gol. However, Colonel Keiji Suzuki, an intelligence officer in the Japanese Army, had founded a group called the Burma Independence Army (BIA) in 1941. He had been in Bangkok since the 1930s recruiting Burmese dissidents including Aung San, Ne Win and Bo Let Ya. The organisation was decidedly amateurish. As well as giving the dissidents some limited military training, Suzuki told them he was descended from Burmese royalty and had them engage in bizarre ceremonies where they pledged allegiance to Burma and drank each other’s blood. In 1942 Suzuki was recalled to Japan and the BIA was ordered to carry out guerrilla operations against the Burma Road. It was placed under the direction of Aung San.
When the BIA entered Burma in January 1943 it was made up of roughly 2,000 men. They crossed the Mekong into Burma’s Shan province which bordered western Laos. Many fell sick on the journey but the BIA found support from the civilian population and were bolstered by many Burmese volunteers which caused their numbers to grow to about 5,000. Many of the ‘volunteers’ however were simply criminal gangs who took to calling themselves BIA to advance their own agendas. The Japanese had provided few weapons, so the volunteers had to arm themselves with what they could. A large number of pointless attacks were made on the tribal peoples of the area, particularly the Karen. Many Karen villages were destroyed by the BIA and as many as 1,500 Karen people may have been murdered by Aung San’s Army.
Their first major attack on the Burma Road came on 19th March when they mounted an assault on Wan Ling. Other operations followed until 13th May when an attack on a fuel dump on the road outside Lashio by 1000 men was met by two companies of the Cheshire Regiment. A pitched battle ensued, but the half trained and poorly equipped BIA suffered heavy casualties; 120 killed, 300 wounded, 60 captured and 350 missing (all of whom had deserted). Bo Let Ya and Ne Win were both killed. The Cheshire’s suffered 11 dead and 16 wounded.
Once the BIA made its presence known with attacks on the road, the British had sent a few loyal Burmese to infiltrate it. Now, every attack they made was met by British troops. Aung San dismissed most of the recruits the BIA had gained in Burma but their campaign had run out of steam. Minimal Japanese assistance, British infiltration, a lack of genuine commitment from most of the recruits and mounting casualties had doomed it.
By 1944 the Japanese had to accept that the BIA campaign had utterly failed, but it was still imperative for them to cut the Burma Road. Now, closing the supply route was seen in the context of ejecting the British from South East Asia entirely. The only problem with this was that any attempt to attack Malaya, Borneo and the Dutch East Indies meant war with America, so subduing the Philippines first was also a priority. This was a tall order even for a state with as much self-belief as Japan.
A Japanese delegation met with Hitler, Ribbentrop and various members of the German high command in Berlin on the 17th November 1943. At this meeting the Germans urged restraint upon the Japanese, putting forward the prospect of joint action by the entire Axis against the United States in the future.
Japanese-German relations were at that time slightly soured by the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by the German armaments maker Krupp in Japan. This was against various Japanese engineering firms who had reverse engineered Krupp and Bofors products captured in China and were producing unlicensed copies. These included the 75mm and 88mm anti-aircraft guns, the 88mm being a Krupp product and the 75mm being a Bofors product. Bofors were a Swiss armaments firm taken over by Krupp after Operation Tannenbaum. The main upshot of this was a reluctance to share technology between the two primary Axis partners.
The Japanese decision in 1943 to postpone an attack on the British, Dutch and American territories in South East Asia was made easier by the strategic situation. Oil and raw materials supplies were stable and large stockpiles were developing. This was in part because Japan had secured imports of oil from the DEI via Thailand, and in part because at that time it appeared that the transfer of German synthetic fuel technology to Japan would improve the situation still further.
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German proxy control over the Dutch East Indies was no more than theoretical while the Americans were reluctant to take on a new colonial responsibility. This left the status of the NEI and the authority of the Dutch Government-in-Exile somewhat unclear, but because of their distance from Europe it was not an issue the Germans felt should be forced to a point of crisis. They were certain a new war was coming in which they were happy for the Japanese to take over the NEI.
Queen Wilhelmina was acutely aware that the Netherlands’ only hope for liberation was The United States. She had dismissed the sitting Dutch Prime Minister, Dirk Jan De Geer, in September 1940 and replaced him with Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy, but the first concern of all members of the Dutch Government was the welfare of the people of Holland. This impelled their reluctance to support calls for a total oil embargo to Japan which seemed almost certain to lead to reprisals on them.
The Queen seriously considered returning to the Netherlands to be with her people and share their suffering; however it was felt by her advisors and by the US State Department, that by so doing, she might confer legitimacy on the puppet regime the Nazis had installed and they urged her not to. One of the Dutch Government-in-Exile’s chief claims to legitimacy was that it was appointed by the Sovereign of the Netherlands. Queen Wilhelmina eventually realised that the gesture of returning would be a serious mistake.
At this time the Germans were planning for a war with the United States in 1946 or 1947 at the latest and the Japanese were persuaded to wait for at least a little while. These plans were also made known to Benito Mussolini who viewed them with some disquiet. Unlike Hitler, the Italian dictator was not convinced that the British Empire was a spent force. In fact, Italy’s strategic position in Africa looked particularly vulnerable to the British should they choose to attack it.
Mussolini’s great hope was that a resumption in hostilities with Britain in concert with Germany would quickly lead to the destruction of the British Empire and the realisation of his ‘New Roman Empire’. His great fear was that Italy’s entanglement with the Axis would inevitably lead to Italy becoming embroiled in war with America. Even then he realised that it would be very difficult to deflect German requests for the participation of the Italian fleet in an attack on the United States.
From ‘Mussolini and Franco; Their Plans for Empire in Africa, Asia and the Americas’ by Umberto Scilacci writing in The Historical Society Record volume 236 issue 11
Il Duce’s ambitions in Africa and Arabia were extensive. [134] Initial plans involved the acquisition of a vast area stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Guinea. Under this plan Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Libya, half of Algeria, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya as well as Sierra Leone and the islands of the western Indian Ocean would all be under Italian rule.
At the time this first plan was drawn up it was also believed that a vast swathe of territory across the centre of Africa would be subjugated by the Third Reich. However, it became apparent that Hitler had little interest in reacquiring the African colonies of Willhelmine Germany, let alone new territories in Africa and this, along with the terms of the Treaty of Leamouth, seems to have acted to cause a reappraisal in the plan and the setting of more modest goals.
Still, the modified plan was not un-ambitious and now included a third of Algeria, half of Niger, and all of Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia as well as Kenya and Uganda. The dictated peace with France enabled Mussolini to realise his territorial goals at the expense of the French, but not all of those he planned at the expense of the British. This was partly because of a lack of support from the Germans and in consequence Kenya, Uganda and the Sudan r
emained under British administration.
In Arabia, Mussolini’s plans were also extensive. Aden, Kuwait, the Sinai and the island of Socotra were all British territories of one sort or another, and he wished to turn all of them into Italian colonies. Oman, Qatar and the Sheikhdoms of the Trucial Coast, as well as the eastern half of the Rub al Khali of Saudi Arabia were to become Italian protectorates.
It was readily apparent to the dictator of Italy that the main obstacle to the realisation of his territorial ambitions was the United Kingdom and its Commonwealth but, unlike Hitler, Il Duce did not consider the British Empire to be neutralised. He made the logical and prescient calculation that German plans to attack America must certainly result in drawing the British into the conflict. This was not something that Hitler was able to grasp, and while many others in the Nazi hierarchy certainly saw the danger, their voices went unheard or were ignored.
Mussolini was uncertain as to whether the coming war would result in America’s total defeat, but it seems that he was willing to commit the Regia Marina (Italian Navy) in pursuit of Hitler’s aims because he believed that German assistance must certainly result in Italian triumph over Britain. However, his increasing support of Hitler bought him into conflict with King Victor Emanuel III. The King had become distrustful of the Nazi regime, particularly after the dismissal of his son-in-law Philipp of Hesse, the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel. [135] The King was concerned that Italy would once again be drawn into war – a prospect he found alarming, but he knew that Mussolini was extremely popular with the armed forces after Italy’s territorial gains in 1940 and 41. He rightly supposed that in any power struggle between the crown and Il Duce, he would be the loser.
Some of Mussolini’s enthusiasm rubbed off on Franco. Spain’s economic condition in 1944, even five years after the conclusion of the civil war, was not good and the Spanish annexation of French Morocco – while helpful – did not do enough to alleviate the situation. Against this backdrop it was easy for him to be tempted by the prospect of reacquiring some, or all, of Spain’s former colonies in the Americas. Franco, up to this point, had been a steely realist; but the temptation of reviving the days of Spanish glory and the seeming invincibility of Germany was too much even for him to dismiss out of hand.
Franco’s acceptance of substantial loans from the Third Reich to enlarge and modernise the Spanish armed forces also served to compromise his independence of action. It was not just that Franco had accepted German bribes however; other factors standing in the way of closer co-operation between Spain and Germany were also in abeyance. Admiral Canaris, the head of the Abwehr had previously been quick to warn Franco against joining the Axis and, even after Spain did join, had still continued to advise him against too close involvement in Hitler’s more ambitious schemes. However, Canaris had been impelled into the 1943 infighting in the Nazi hierarchy and his backing of Bormann had largely been a product of the suspicions about his motives and loyalty harboured by Himmler, Goebbels and Heydrich. The deaths of these three certainly alleviated what was becoming a very difficult position for Canaris, but afterwards he was much more circumspect in his dealings with Franco and the admonitory tone of his advice was gone entirely. Instead, Canaris began to warn Franco of the threat posed to his leadership by General Augustin Muñoz Grandes.
The Spanish Army’s most prominent leader, General Muñoz Grandes, was a firm supporter of the Nazis and a true believer in the invincibility of the Third Reich. Muñoz Grandes had led the Spanish Blue Division in Russia and was a popular figure. As a young officer, he had served with distinction in Morocco and had held key positions in government. During the Civil War he had been a competent leader. With his military background, experience as Secretary General of the Falange, popularity and proven battlefield leadership, he became the focus of an impressive amount of attention. His speeches were even broadcast over Spanish radio. They tended toward the histrionic.
“Hard is the enemy, and harder still is the Russian winter. But it does not matter: even harder is my race, supported by reason and the courage of its sons who, embracing their heroic German comrades, will in the end achieve the victory, towards which we fight without ceasing.”
Muñoz Grandes had also been noticed by Hitler, who saw in him a potential replacement for Franco. The Fuhrer met many times with the Spanish general, gave him high decorations and encouraged him to become more involved in politics. Franco became alarmed by this, and wanted to replace Muñoz Grandes as commander of the Blue Division but as the formation was nominally a part of the German Army his replacement was refused. Hitler thus ensured that the Blue Division’s commander gained sufficient recognition to become even more popular in Spain.
Upon his return in January 1943, to a hero’s welcome, Franco promoted Muñoz Grandes to the rank of Lieutenant General and appointed him to the General staff. It was a case of ‘keep your friends close and your enemies’ closer’, because Franco now realised that because of his previous reluctance to join in the attack on America, Hitler had lined up his successor.
Despite an outward appearance of unity, the Spanish regime was split by hostile factions, undermined by incompetence and tended to a vague authoritarianism that reflected the schisms within it. Muñoz Grandes represented a real threat. It was hard for a proud man like Franco to realise that his leadership of Spain now rested only on the good offices of the Germans, but accept it he had to. All of this very much cleared the way for Spain to be drawn closely into Hitler’s scheme to attack America.
From ‘Hitler’s Health’ by Doctor Irene Kerr writing in The Medical Journal of Britain Volume 291 Issue 562
Healthcare in Nazi Germany became an increasingly haphazard affair. The man whom Hitler made Führer of National Socialist Health in 1934, Dr. Gerhard Wagner, licensed naturopaths, faith-healers and all manner of quacks. He was jointly responsible for the policies of euthanasia and sterilization carried out against Jews and the handicapped, and was a staunch proponent of Nazi Germany’s racial policies. He died in 1939 at the age of 51.
His successor was a paediatrician named Leonardo Conti, the son of Hitler’s “Führerin of Midwives.” In 1940 Conti distributed to American doctors a range of statistics on German health that purported to show the advances made in healthcare in Germany. However, in Heil Hunger! by Dr. Martin Gumpert published in the United States by Alliance Books in the same year, these were analysed and found to show not an advance in German healthcare but its rapid deterioration. [136]
Even the Fuhrer himself could not obtain good medical treatment. By January 1945, Adolf Hitler was a very sick man in the throes of tertiary-stage syphilis and was becoming increasingly erratic and delusional. He appears to have suffered from a range of ailments and his physician, Dr Theodor Morell, was inclined to overprescribe medication, some of which would be viewed as dangerous today and certainly made Hitler’s mental condition worse. [137]
By late 1944, the Fuhrer had become dependent on methamphetamines that Morell supplied to him daily, along with other medicines including Nux Vomica (which contains strychnine) and cocaine which Morell administered via eye drops. During the 1920s, 30s and 40s in Germany, both cocaine and methamphetamines were routinely prescribed for many ailments. In combination with Hitler’s deteriorating mental condition the ingestion of narcotics can hardly have had other than a ruinous effect.
The result of the Fuhrer’s increasing instability was that more and more responsibility fell on the shoulders of Martin Bormann, a man who, although most adept at Nazi Germany’s brutal domestic politics, lacked any of the subtlety and understanding required of international diplomacy. Bormann’s greatest oversight was unquestionably his mis-estimation of the intentions of Britain, though it must be noted that he did not receive good intelligence from Canaris or good advice from either the disgruntled Keitel or the increasingly disengaged Goering. It is also true that he was faithfully following Hitler’s flawed policy.
Although Bormann wished to
be Hitler’s instrument, he was an instrument that was out of tune and played by a sick and progressively more delusional musician. We can speculate that if Hitler had not been ill and addled by drugs, he would have proceeded more cautiously with the annexation of Belgium and the Netherlands, might have comprehended more clearly the consequences of failing to rein in his Japanese allies and might have grasped that annexation of the Azores could only be seen in Washington as Casus Belli.
Yet, in one of history’s ironies, shortly before the outbreak of war in 1945, there was a marked improvement in Hitler’s prognosis, courtesy of the American pharmaceutical industry. At the Pfizer company in Brooklyn, New York, a bio-chemist named Jasper Kane led a team of scientists in the development of the deep-tank fermentation method that was critical to the production of large quantities of pharmaceutical-grade penicillin. Although penicillin had been discovered in 1928, it was not until Pfizer’s research in 1941–1944 that it was possible to manufacture it in commercial quantities. Hitler’s physician, Dr Theodor Morell, began administering the drug to Hitler shortly after its release in Europe in March 1945. [138]
Before April 1945, Hitler had been seen in public only rarely for more than a year. Speculation as to the state of his health was rife but, thanks to Pfizer, his illness was now in remission and he was once more full of his characteristic ferociousness and ready to take up the reins of the Third Reich once more.
From ‘The Hitlerian Wars’ by Jason Corell, Tormeline 1973
Part of the Treaty of Leamouth included a clause whereby Britain agreed not to harbour any governments in exile. The Polish, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian governments who had taken refuge at their embassies in London were compelled to decamp to Washington providing a further reason for diplomatic conflict between Germany and the United States. Brazilian forces, with American approval, had occupied French and Dutch Guyana in 1941, however President Willkie warned the Brazilians off any attempt to annex either territory.
The Peace of Amiens Page 27