ANNEX 5:
OPERATION MATCH-POINT AND OPERATION SET-PIECE
From: ‘The Battle of Britain’ by Brian Winthrop and Basil Hanrahan, Tetrach Press 1968
The attack by aircraft of the RNAA on the German fighter bases in the Pas de Calais on the evening of Saturday 14th September 1940 was a singular success, in part because, unbeknown to the British, it was executed at an extremely fortuitous time.
From the point of view of British strategy it proved immensely useful for the United Kingdom to possess what was essentially a second air force. Fighter Command of the RAF was fully occupied with defending Britain from German air attack. Bomber Command was engaged in the twin tasks of preparing to interdict German invasion forces after the expected German landing in Britain and of destroying and disrupting German preparations for that invasion. Under these pressures it proved impossible for the Royal Air Force to undertake the necessary and obvious task of attacking the Luftwaffe at its bases in France. The success of such attacks in disrupting the cohesion of an aerial force had been bought home to the British by the success of German attacks on British bases and repaying the compliment in kind had been contemplated since mid-August. However, fully occupied as the RAF was, it proved impossible to spare the assets required to conduct such an operation. The Royal Navy Air Arm however, while principally a ship-borne force, had both the time and the ability to plan and execute one.
Since the commencement of hostilities, two British aircraft carriers had been lost, Ark Royal to a U-boat in the first days of the war, and Glorious to the guns of German surface units off the coast of Norway. Another carrier, Courageous, was being repaired after suffering damage in The Battle of Lofoten while both Furious and Intrepid were undergoing major reconstructions. This left Fearless, Illustrious, Victorious and Formidable of which Illustrious was operating in the Mediterranean and the other three were attached to the Home Fleet (Formidable was a new ship and was barely worked up).
The neutralisation of the Kreigsmarine’s surface forces (most of which had been sunk or were under repair) in the Norwegian campaign, meant that the heavy units of the Royal Navy were engaged in waiting for the German invasion which was predicted to take place in September. This forced inaction did not sit well with many senior officers in particular Vice-Admiral Fredrick Bowhill. [159] Bowhill put together the plan to attack the German airfields in the Pas de Calais in late August though it was initially rejected by the Cabinet. Bowhill argued that in the event of a German invasion, the aircraft carriers would be of only limited use as their operation in the narrow seas of the English Channel would be extremely hazardous. Their aircraft however, were likely to be very useful if operated from shore bases.
It was noted very early in the Battle of Britain that the German bombers were extremely vulnerable when unescorted. As the battle entered its final phase, which was characterised by attacks on London, the chief restraint on the ability of fighter command to disrupt German formations and shoot down German bombers was again their escorting fighters, in particular the Messerschmitt Bf 109s. These aircraft had very short range however, and in consequence their bases had to be as close to the British Isles as possible. Several of the bases in the Pas de Calais were within sight of the English Channel, few were more than 5 miles inland and the exact locations of the airfields were identified by RAF reconnaissance aircraft in late August.
Operation Match-Point, as it was named, required the air groups of Fearless, Formidable and Victorious. These consisted of some 150 aircraft. Although the establishment of the three carriers was more than 200 aircraft this had been reduced by losses and attrition. As well as flights from the decimated Courageous air group, several squadrons from Ark Royal’s air group (most of the personnel of whom had been saved when the ship sank after being torpedoed on 17th September 1939) and several squadrons from the Indomitable air group (the construction of Indomitable had been suspended in May when she was almost complete, her air group however had been partly formed and was training) two RAF fighter squadrons were also bought down from the North of England to provide extra cover.
The plan fell into two parts, Operation Match and Operation Point. Operation Match was intended to be an evening attack by RNAA aircraft timed to begin 30 minutes before sundown. The attack was to use large numbers of small bombs. At least half of the bombs were delayed action. Of these 25% were high explosive and the rest flares. The intention was not only to destroy enemy aircraft on the ground but to make the actual airfields unusable due to unexploded ordinance. The flares were on timers set to go off at five minute intervals commencing an hour after sunset and continuing for an hour after that. These were for the second part of the venture, Operation Point.
This consisted of a force of RAF bombers operating at around 5,000 feet who would then drop their bomb loads on the targets marked by the delayed action flares already dropped by the RNAA aircraft. By using a large number of delayed action flares it was hoped that the Germans would be unable to defuse all of them before the bombers arrived. These were also booby trapped to further inhibit defusing operations, the timers were simple and largely improvised in RAF ordnance depots in the weeks prior to the operation.
Some anxiety was expressed in Cabinet meetings that the operation was likely to result in the deaths of French civilians. Though it was noted that none of the airfields considered for attack were close to large centres of population, all were adjacent to villages. Bowhill argued that the situation warranted desperate measures and while deaths or injuries caused to French civilians would be regrettable, it was vital that the operation proceed.
The attack was led by Commander Eugene Esmonde. The airfields selected for attack were Audembert (which was home to I/JG26), Caffiers (III/JG26), Coquelles (I/JG 52), Guines (I&III JG53), Marck (Lehr Geshwader II), Marquise (II/JG26), Peupingues (II/JG52) and Wissant (I&II/JG51). The actual number of aircraft engaged was as follows;
Swordfish 55
Albacores 32
Skuas 47
Gannets 51
Gladiators 18
Sea Hurricanes 16
Spitfires 12
Hurricanes 12
Wellingtons 73
Hampdens 41
Whiteleys 54
Blenheims 48
Inevitably the attack did not go entirely as planned. There was some confusion over targets and three of the airfields (Guines, Marck and Caffiers) went almost unmolested while two, Wissant and Coquelles, were practically obliterated.
The RNAA aircraft coming from different airfields in the south of England arrived at different times over the target in the space of about 30 minutes. They were supposed to arrive at the same time generally however, it was the fighters that arrived first. Surprise was achieved and many German aircraft were destroyed by strafing on the ground. Despite this, some German fighters were scrambled to intercept and a large dogfight took place against the backdrop of the setting sun. During this action the first strike aircraft began to arrive consisting of two dozen Albacores from 869 and 851 Squadrons. Of these, eight were shot down, however this was only a small part of the strike force and believing that the attack was over the German fighters began to land when the British aircraft in the first attack withdrew. In consequence they were largely caught on the ground when the rest of the RNAA strike force arrived.
As well as the losses suffered by the Luftwaffe fighters to bombing, strafing and in the aerial actions; several more were lost attempting to land in the dark. At least one German pilot set off an unexploded British bomb when he landed his Bf 109 on top of it. In perhaps the most extraordinary incident of the day, a Swordfish piloted by Lieutenant Rupert Brabner RNVR, the Member of Parliament for Hythe and a future Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, shot down the aircraft of German ace Major Werner Moelders, the commanding officer of JG51. Brabner was flying low over Wissant just as Moelders became airborne. The German pilot was unhurt, but the incident seemed to sum up the day’s action for the Luftwaffe.
British losses were heavy, more than 25% of the attacking Albacores, Skuas and Swordfish were shot down by anti-aircraft fire and German fighters, but German losses were also severe. Many aircraft were destroyed, several pilots killed and injured and most important of all the airfields at Audembert, Coquelles, Peupingues and Wissant were rendered unusable.
Unbeknown to the British the following day, Sunday 15th September, was meant to see the largest attacks yet made on the British Isles by the Luftwaffe. Goering had ordered a maximum effort, though Kesslering – the commanding officer of Luftflotte 2 – after being informed of the damage and the losses to the Jagdegruppen based in the Pas de Calais area requested a postponement. Goering vacillated, but when Hitler was informed he flew into a rage and ordered that the attack go ahead stating that the Luftwaffe’s own intelligence reports were claiming that Fighter Command was on its last legs. In consequence, less than half of the planned strength of the fighter escort for the German bombers was available on the following day. The results were catastrophic.
The weather was excellent and from mid-morning on very large formations of German aircraft began to mass over France and then to make their way towards London. These formations were met by RAF fighters and were mostly broken up before reaching their target. Some bombs certainly fell on London and the South of England but so effective was the defence on this day that the German attacks were panicky, uncoordinated and largely ineffectual. Only small numbers of Messerschmitt Bf 109s were met by the defending fighters and the losses of German aircraft were very serious indeed.
Fighter Command claims of 237 enemy aircraft destroyed proved wildly optimistic, nevertheless the actual German losses in the air fighting of September 15th were 87 aircraft destroyed. The RAF lost only 19 aircraft.
A second operation, Operation Set-Piece, was conducted on the night of 16th September, under the full moon [160] by 23 Swordfish aircraft again led by Esmonde. Many of the same Royal Navy crews that flew in Operation Match-Point returned for the mission and again the targets were the German airfields in the Pas de Calais – in particular those that aerial reconnaissance had shown to be only lightly damaged by Match-Point.
Unlike Match-Point, the RNAA aircraft for Set-Piece used only flares and again, half were delayed action. Their role was solely to mark the locations of the airfields for the main force and this operation was also a success. The airfields attacked in this operation where Audembert, Coquelles, Marck, Peupingues and Wissant (it was not realised that Wissant and Coquelles had been abandoned and the Luftwaffe units based there relocated).
This time the bombers of the main force also used a quantity of small delayed action bombs. This was on the suggestion of Vice-Admiral Bowhill who upon seeing the photographic reconnaissance pictures of the targets the following day, expressed some surprise as to how widely the RAF’s bomb craters were scattered. He immediately grasped that their inaccuracy could be turned to advantage if delayed action bombs were used, surmising that if these continued to detonate throughout the night the noise would deny sleep to the German pilots in the vicinity.
The RAF were very impressed by the abilities of the RNAA’s navigators in finding and marking the targets but it should be noted that;
1. The airfields attacked were close to the coast.
2. The very slow speeds and open cockpits of the Swordfish aircraft and the light offered by the full moon (the exhausts of the aircraft’s engines were masked) meant that the countryside was clearly visible to crews who had already seen it in daylight and so had a passing familiarity with it.
3. RN navigators were accustomed to operations over the featureless ocean where they were tasked with flying to and from small ships frequently in bad weather and so they tended to be extremely skilful – much more so than those of Bomber Command!
4. The Royal Navy trained for night actions and all arms of that service had reached a very high state of proficiency in night operations.
Again, on September 17th, the exhausted and demoralised German bomber crews were required to attack London with inadequate escort. Again, sustained and well-coordinated attacks by RAF fighters destroyed the cohesion of the Luftwaffe formations and many of the Germans dropped their bombs well short of the target and fled for home. Again Luftwaffe losses were heavy. On the 18th of September, Kesslering was forced to report to Goering that Luftflotte 2 would only be able to continue daylight attacks with great difficulty and recommended that the switch be made to night operations only.
So shocked and dismayed was the German high command by these reverses that operation Sea Lion (the planned invasion of the United Kingdom) was cancelled on 19th September and the Battle of Britain swiftly wound down until by the end of the month there were almost no German air operations being conducted against the British Isles either by night or by day.
ANNEX 6:
A SUMMARY OF THE MOSLEY REPORT OF 1941 AND ITS SUBSEQUENT INFLUENCE ON BRITISH POLICY
From ‘The British Empire from 1914 to 1948’ by Ian Shaw, Longacre 2005
Territories of the British Empire in 1940
The list below details the territories of the British Empire considered by the report of the Mosley Committee. It does not include the eight already existing or about to be created Dominions of Australia, Canada, Egypt, Eire, India, New Zealand, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia had a kind of ‘semi-Dominion’ status, being large enough to self-govern but too small to handle its own foreign and defence affairs. Both Ireland and Egypt had technically been dominions since 1922 but were not enthusiastic members of the Commonwealth.
Territory
Status in 1940
Aden
Crown Colony
Antigua and Barbuda
Crown Colony
Ascension Island
Crown Colony
Bahamas
Crown Colony
Bahrain
British Protectorate 1882
Barbados
Crown Colony
Bechuanaland
British Protectorate 1885
Bermuda
Crown Colony
British Honduras
Crown Colony
British Indian Ocean Territory
Crown Colony
Brunei
British Protectorate 1888
Bushire
Crown Colony
Burma
Crown Colony
Cameroon
British Mandate 1919
Ceylon
Crown Colony
Cook Islands
Crown Colony
Cyprus
British Protectorate 1878
Dominica
Crown Colony
Falkland Islands *
Crown Colony
Fiji
Crown Colony
Gambia
Crown Colony
Gibraltar
Crown Colony
Gilbert Islands
UK/US Condominium
Ghana
Crown Colony
Grenada
Crown Colony
Guyana
Crown Colony
Hong Kong
Crown Colony
Iraq
British Mandate 1920
Jamaica
Crown Colony
Jordan
British Mandate 1920
Kenya
Crown Colony
Kuwait
British Protectorate 1899
Malaya
Crown Colony
Maldives
British Protectorate 1887
Malta
Crown Colony
Mauritius
Crown Colony
Montserrat
Crown Colony
Nauru
British Mandate 1919
Nepal
British Protectorate 1816
Newfoundland
Crown Colony
New Guinea
Austr
alian Mandate 1906/1919
New Hebrides
UK/France Condominium
Nigeria
Crown Colony
Northern Rhodesia
Crown Colony
Nyasaland
Crown Colony
Oman
British Protectorate 1800
Palestine
British Mandate 1920
Pitcairn Island
Crown Colony
Qatar
British Protectorate 1916
Saint Helena
Crown Colony
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Crown Colony
Saint Lucia
Crown Colony
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Crown Colony
Sabah (North Borneo)
British Protectorate 1881
Samoa
New Zealand Mandate 1919
Sarawak
Administered from Malaya
Seychelles
Crown Colony
Sierra Leone
Crown Colony
Solomon Islands
British Protectorate 1893
The Peace of Amiens Page 31