Voroshilov was assisted in this slaughter by one man who personified the tragedy that was to befall the Red Army. Stalin and Yezhov planned the publicity with the editor of Pravda, Lev Mekhlis, one of the most extraordinary of all his courtiers who now exploded onto the national stage, transformed from the scourge of the media to a military Mephistopheles, compared to a “shark” and a “gloomy demon.” Even Stalin called him a “fanatic,” found him hard to restrain, and enjoyed telling stories of his “ludicrous zeal.”
With a nimbus-like plumage of black hair and a pointed, bird-like face, Mekhlis played a part as large in his way as Molotov or Beria. Born in Odessa in 1889 of Jewish parents, leaving school at fourteen, he only joined the Bolsheviks in 1918 after working with the Jewish Social Democratic Party but he served as a ruthless commissar in the Crimea during the Civil War, executing thousands. He first met Stalin during the Polish campaign, becoming one of his assistants, learning all the secrets. Devoted to “my dear Comrade Stalin,” for whom he worked in a neurotic, blood-curdling frenzy, he was too energetic and talented to remain hidden in the back rooms like Poskrebyshev. Married to a Jewish doctor, he placed Lenin’s portrait with a red ribbon in his baby’s cot and recorded the reactions of this New Man in a special diary. In 1930, Stalin appointed him Pravda editor where his management of writers was impressively brutal.108
Mekhlis, who left the Tsarist army as a bombardier, was now promoted to Deputy Defence Commissar, Head of its Political Department, descending on the army like a galloping horse of the Apocalypse.14 Stalin and his Five now devised an astonishing lottery of slaughter designed to kill a whole generation.
20
Blood Bath by Numbers
They did not even specify the names but simply assigned quotas of deaths by the thousands. On 2 July 1937, the Politburo ordered local Secretaries to arrest and shoot “the most hostile anti-Soviet elements” who were to be sentenced by troikas, three-man tribunals that usually included the local Party Secretary, Procurator and NKVD chief.
The aim was “to finish off once and for all” all Enemies and those impossible to educate in socialism, so as to accelerate the erasing of class barriers and therefore the bringing of paradise for the masses. This final solution was a slaughter that made sense in terms of the faith and idealism of Bolshevism which was a religion based on the systematic destruction of classes. The principle of ordering murder like industrial quotas in the Five-Year Plan was therefore natural. The details did not matter: if Hitler’s destruction of the Jews was genocide, then this was democide, the class struggle spinning into cannibalism. On 30 July, Yezhov and his deputy Mikhail Frinovsky proposed Order No. 00447 to the Politburo: that between 5 and 15 August, the regions were to receive quotas for two categories: Category One—to be shot. Category Two—to be deported. They suggested that 72,950 should be shot and 259,450 arrested, though they missed some regions. The regions could submit further lists. The families of these people should be deported too. The Politburo confirmed this order the next day.
Soon this “meat grinder” achieved such a momentum, as the witch hunt approached its peak and as the local jealousies and ambitions spurred it on, that more and more were fed into the machine. The quotas were soon fulfilled by the regions who therefore asked for bigger numbers, so between 28 August and 15 December, the Politburo agreed to the shooting of another 22,500 and then another 48,000. In this, the Terror differed most from Hitler’s crimes which systematically destroyed a limited target: Jews and Gypsies. Here, on the contrary, death was sometimes random: the long-forgotten comment, the flirtation with an opposition, envy of another man’s job, wife or house, vengeance or just plain coincidence brought the death and torture of entire families. This did not matter: “Better too far than not far enough,” Yezhov told his men as the original arrest quota ballooned to 767,397 arrests and 386,798 executions, families destroyed, children orphaned, under Order No. 00447.109
Simultaneously, Yezhov attacked “national contingents”—this was murder by nationality, against Poles and ethnic Germans among others. On 11 August, Yezhov signed Order No. 00485 to liquidate “Polish diversionists and espionage groups” which was to consume most of the Polish Communist Party, most Poles within the Bolshevik leadership, anyone with social or “consular contacts”—and of course their wives and children. A total of 350,000 (144,000 of them Poles) were arrested in this operation, with 247,157 shot (110,000 Poles)—a mini-genocide. As we will see, this hit Stalin’s own circle with especial force.110 Altogether, the latest estimates, combining the quotas and national contingents, are that 1.5 million were arrested in these operations and about 700,000 shot. 1
“Beat, destroy without sorting out,” Yezhov ordered his henchmen. Those who showed “operational inertness” in the arrests of “counter-revolutionary formations within and outside the Party . . . Poles, Germans and kulaks” would themselves be destroyed, but most now “tried to surpass each other with reports about gigantic numbers of people arrested.” Yezhov, clearly taking his cue from the Five, actually specified that “if during this operation, an extra thousand people will be shot, that is not such a big deal.” Since Stalin and Yezhov constantly pushed up the quotas, an extra thousand here and there was inevitable but the point was that they deliberately destroyed an entire “caste.” And, like Hitler’s Holocaust, this was a colossal feat of management. Yezhov even specified what bushes should be planted to cover mass graves.2
Once this massacre had started, Stalin almost disappeared from public view, appearing only to greet children and delegations. The rumour spread that he did not know what Yezhov was doing. Stalin spoke in public only twice in 1937 and once in 1938, cancelling all his holidays (he did not go southwards again until 1945). Molotov gave the 6 November addresses in both years. The writer Ilya Ehrenburg met Pasternak in the street: “He waved his arms around as he stood between the snowdrifts: ‘If only someone would tell Stalin about it.’ ” The theatrical director Meyerhold told Ehrenburg, “They conceal it from Stalin.” But their friend, Isaac Babel, lover of Yezhov’s wife, learned the “key to the puzzle”: “Of course Yezhov plays his part but he’s not at the bottom of it.”3
Stalin was the mastermind but he was far from alone. Indeed, it is neither accurate nor helpful to blame the Terror on one man because systematic murder started soon after Lenin took power in 1917 and never stopped until Stalin’s death. This “social system based on blood-letting” justified murder now with the prospect of happiness later. The Terror was not just a consequence of Stalin’s monstrosity but it was certainly formed, expanded and accelerated by his uniquely overpowering character, reflecting his malice and vindictiveness. “The greatest delight,” he told Kamenev, “is to mark one’s enemy, prepare everything, avenge oneself thoroughly and then go to sleep.” It would not have happened without Stalin. Yet it also reflected the village hatreds of the incestuous Bolshevik sect where jealousies had seethed from the years of exile and war.
Stalin and his faction regarded the Civil War as their finest hour: 1937 was a Tsaritsyn reunion, as Stalin even reminisced to a group of officers: “We were in Tsaritsyn with Voroshilov,” he began. “We exposed [Enemies] within a week, even though we didn’t know military affairs. We exposed them because we judged them by their work and if today’s political workers judge men by their actual work, we would soon expose the Enemies in our army.” 4
The anti-Bolshevik resurgence of Germany was real enough, the Spanish War setting new standards for betrayal and brutality. Economic disasters were glaring: Molotov’s papers reveal there was still famine and cannibalism,111 even in 1937.5
The corruption of grandees was notorious: Yagoda seemed to be running palaces and diamond deals out of official funds, Yakir renting out dachas like a landlord. The wives of marshals, such as Olga Budyonny and her friend Galina Yegorova, Stalin’s fancy at Nadya’s last supper, blossomed at embassies and “salons, reminiscent of glittering receptions . . . in aristocratic Russia” with “dazzling company, stylis
h clothes.”
“Why have the prices flown upwards 100% while nothing is in the shops,” Maria Svanidze asked her diary. “Where is the cotton, flax and wool when medals were won for beating the Plan? And the construction of private dachas . . . crazy money spent on magnificent houses and rest homes?”6
The responsibility lies with the hundreds of thousands of officials who ordered, or perpetrated, the murders. Stalin and the magnates enthusiastically, recklessly, almost joyfully, killed, and they usually killed many more than they were asked to kill. None were ever tried for these crimes.7
Stalin was surprisingly open with his circle about the aim to “finish off” all their Enemies. He could tell his cronies this quite openly at Voroshilov’s May Day party, as reported by Budyonny. He seems to have constantly compared his Terror to Ivan the Terrible’s massacre of the boyars. “Who’s going to remember all this riffraff in ten or twenty years’ time? No one. Who remembers the names now of the boyars Ivan the Terrible got rid of?112 No one . . . The people had to know he was getting rid of all of his enemies. In the end, they all got what they deserved.”
“The people understand, Joseph Vissarionovich, they understand and they support you,” replied Molotov. Similarly, he told Mikoyan, “Ivan killed too few boyars. He should have killed them all, to create a strong state.” The magnates were not as oblivious of Stalin’s nature as they later claimed.8
While the regions fulfilled their nameless quotas, Stalin was also killing thousands whom he knew well. Yezhov visited Stalin virtually every day. Within a year and a half, 5 of the 15 Politburo members, 98 of the 139 Central Committee members and 1,108 of the 1,966 delegates from the Seventeenth Congress had been arrested. Yezhov delivered 383 lists of names—which were known as “albums” since they often contained photographs and potted biographies of the proposed victims—and proposed: “I request sanction to condemn them all under the First Category.”
Most of the death lists were signed by Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov but many were also signed by Zhdanov and Mikoyan. On some days, for example 12 November 1938, Stalin and Molotov signed 3,167 executions. Usually they simply wrote: “For,” VMN or Vishka. Molotov admitted: “I signed most—in fact almost all—the arrest lists. We debated and made a decision. Haste ruled the day. Could one go into all the details? . . . Innocent people were sometimes caught. Obviously one or two out of ten were wrongly caught, but the rest rightly.” As Stalin had put it, “Better an innocent head less, than hesitations in the war.” They ordered the deaths of 39,000 on these lists of names. Stalin marked lists with notes to Yezhov: “Comrade Yezhov, those whose names I’ve marked ‘arr’ should be arrested if not already.” Sometimes Stalin simply wrote: “Shoot all 138 of them.” When Molotov received regional death lists, he simply underlined the numbers, never the names. Kaganovich remembered the frenzy of that time: “What emotions!” They were “all responsible” and perhaps “guilty of going too far.”9
Stalin declared that the son should not suffer for the sins of the father but then carefully targeted the families of Enemies: this may have reflected his Caucasian mentality or merely the incestuous labyrinth of Bolshevik connections. “They had to be isolated,” explained Molotov, “otherwise they’d have spread all kinds of complaints.” On 5 July 1937, the Politburo ordered the NKVD to “confine all wives of condemned traitors . . . in camps for 5–8 years” and to take under State protection children under fifteen: 18,000 wives and 25,000 children were taken away. But this was not enough: on 15 August, Yezhov decreed that children between one and three were to be confined in orphanages but “socially dangerous children between three and fifteen” could be imprisoned “depending on the degree of danger.” Almost a million of these children were raised in orphanages and often did not see their mothers for twenty years.11310
Stalin was the engine of this murderous machine. “Now everything will be fine,” he wrote on 7 May 1937 to one of his killers who complained that he had not “lost his teeth” but had become somewhat dazed: “The sharper the teeth the better. J.St.” This is just one of the many notes in the newly opened archives that show not merely Stalin’s bureaucratic orders but his personal involvement in encouraging even junior officials to slaughter their comrades. The teeth were never sharp enough.11
While all the leaders could save some of their friends—and not others—Stalin himself could protect whoever he wished: his whims only added to his mystique. When his old friend from Georgia, Sergo Kavtaradze, was arrested, Stalin did not approve his death but put a dash next to Kavtaradze’s name. This tiny crayon line saved his life. Another old friend, Ambassador Troyanovsky, appeared on a list: “Do not touch,” wrote Stalin.114 However much someone was denounced, Stalin’s favour could be well nigh impregnable, but once his trust was shattered, damnation was final though it might take years to come. The best way to survive was to be invisible because sometimes ghastly coincidences brought people into fatal contact with Stalin: Polish Communist Kostyrzewa was tending her roses near Kuntsevo when she found Stalin looking over her fence: “What beautiful roses,” he said. She was arrested that night—though this was at the time of the anti-Polish spy mania and perhaps she was on the lists anyway.
Stalin often forgot—or pretended to forget—what had happened to certain comrades and years later assumed an air of disappointment when he heard they had been shot. “You used to have such nice people,” he later remarked to Polish comrades. “Vera Kostyrzewa for example, do you know what’s become of her?” Even his remarkable Rolodex of a memory could not remember all his victims.12
Stalin enjoyed rattling his colleagues: one such was Stetsky, formerly in Bukharin’s kindergarten of young protégés who had successfully joined Stalin’s CC Cultural Department. Now Bukharin, at one of his “confrontations” with his accusers, gave Stalin an old letter Stetsky had written criticizing him: “Comrade Bukharin,” Stalin wrote to Stetsky, “gave me your letter to him [from 1926–27] with the hint that everything about Stetsky is not always clean. I have not read the letter. I’m giving it back to you. With Communist greetings, Stalin.”
Imagine Stetsky’s terror on receiving this handwritten note. He wrote back immediately: “Comrade Stalin, I’ve received your letter and thank you for your trust. On my letter . . . written when I was not clean . . . I belonged to the Bukharin group. Now I’m ashamed to remember it . . .” He was arrested and shot. 13
Stalin played games even with his closest comrades: Budyonny, for example, had performed well at the trial but when the arrests reached his own staff, he went to Voroshilov to complain with a list of innocent men under investigation. Voroshilov was terrified: “Speak to Stalin yourself.”
Budyonny confronted Stalin: “If these are the Enemy, who made the Revolution? It means we must be jailed too!”
“What are you saying, Semyon Mikhailovich?” Stalin laughed. “Are you crazy?” He called in Yezhov: “Budyonny here claims it’s time to arrest us.” Budyonny claimed that he gave his list to Yezhov who released some of the officers.14
Stalin himself specialized in reassuring his victims and then arresting them. Early in the year, the wife of one of Ordzhonikidze’s deputies at Heavy Industry was called by Stalin himself: “I hear you’re going about on foot. That’s no good . . . I’ll send you a car.” Next morning, the limousine was there. Two days later, her husband was arrested.
The generals, diplomats, spies and writers, who had served in the Spanish War, sunk in a quagmire of betrayals, assassinations, defeats, Trotskyite intrigues and denunciations, were decimated even when they had apparently done little wrong. Stalin’s Ambassador to Madrid, Antonov-Ovseenko, an ex-Trotskyite, entangled himself by trying to prove his loyalty; he was recalled, affably promoted by Stalin, and arrested the next day. When Stalin received the journalist Mikhail Koltsov, he teased him about his adventures in the Spanish Civil War, calling him “Don Miguel,” but then asked: “You don’t intend to shoot yourself? So long, Don Miguel.” But Koltsov had played a
deadly game in Spain, denouncing others to Stalin and Voroshilov. The “Don” was arrested.15
Stalin’s office was bombarded with notes of execution from the regions: a typical one on 21 October 1937, listed eleven shot in Saratov, eight in Leningrad then another twelve, then six in Minsk then another five . . . a total of 82. There are hundreds of such lists, addressed to Stalin and Molotov.16
On the other hand, Stalin received a stream of miserable cries for help. Bonch-Bruevich whose daughter was married into Yagoda’s circle, insisted: “Believe me, dear Joseph Vissarionovich, I’d bring a son or daughter to the NKVD myself if they were against the Party...”17 Stalin’s own secretary from the twenties, Kanner, who had been in charge of his dirty tricks against Trotsky and others, was arrested. “Kanner cannot be a villain,” wrote a certain Makarova, perhaps his wife. “He was friends with Yagoda but who could think the Narkom of Security could be such scum? Believe, Comrade Stalin, that Kanner deserved your trust!” Kanner was shot.
Often the appeals were from Old Bolsheviks who had been close friends, such as Viano Djaparidze whose tragic letter read: “My daughter’s been arrested. I cannot imagine what she could have done. I ask you dear Joseph Vissarionovich to ease the terrible fate of my daughter...”18
Then he received letters from doomed leaders desperate to save themselves: “I am unable to work, it’s not a question of Party-mindedness, but it’s impossible for me not to react to the situation around me and to clear the air and understand the reason for it . . . Please give me a moment of your time to receive me . . .” wrote Nikolai Krylenko, the People’s Commissar of Justice no less and signer of many a death sentence. He too was shot.19
Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar Page 28