And now after having “left the Friends [Quakers]” with a clear conscience to cast his fate with America’s sacred cause of liberty, General Greene possessed a double motivation to strike a devastating blow this morning. This reflective man was haunted by his own responsibility for Fort Washington’s devastating loss. With convincing arguments, he had swayed a reluctant Washington, who later graciously took full responsibility for the disaster in his report to Congress, to commit the folly of attempting to hold the indefensible fort. Therefore, by this time, this former lowly blacksmith and merchant from Rhode Island was very much a troubled soul. Greene yet felt “mad, sick and sorry” for the most grievous tactical mistake of his military career, thanks largely to that pervasive tactical disease known as Bunkerhillism. Consequently, no senior commander in Washington’s Army was now more motivated to redeem himself at Trenton this early Thursday morning than Greene.
Appropriately for Greene’s bid for personal and professional redemption, the very enemy troops who were most responsible for the considerable feat of capturing Fort Washington—the Rall, Knyphausen, and von Lossberg Regiments—were now garrisoned at Trenton. As penned in a letter to wife Kitty, who was fourteen years his junior, Greene was most of all determined to reap a victory at Trenton to sever forever “the chains of slavery forging for posterity [and] to defend our common rights, and repel the bold invaders of freedom [as] The cause is the cause of God and man.”3
All of Trenton now lay invitingly before the onrushing troops of the Second Division, lifting Greene’s spirits and those of his eager men, who had old scores to settle this morning. From the high ground above Trenton and looking south through the falling snow, Washington could see much of the length of prosperous commercial town located at the intersection of the Delaware and Assunpink Creek. Here, at the most unlikely of places, the fate of America was about to be decided.
As a native Rhode Islander whose bright potential was limitless, Greene possessed no prior knowledge that Trenton had been established in 1679 by Quakers, who had idealistically sought to create their own special version of God’s kingdom, from Yorkshire, England. In 1719, wealthy merchant William Trent arrived from Philadelphia to build his stylish brick mansion near the wide, fast-flowing river to escape the city’s urban blight, congestion, and summer diseases. He had then laid out the town’s blueprint in a triangular design based upon two lengthy, parallel main streets, King and Queen, running north-south from the commanding heights on the north and down to nearly the Delaware’s waters and the low-lying river bottoms.
On the high ground to the north gained by the foremost troops of central column of Greene’s Division, these two main streets of Trenton gradually narrowed to meet, along with the intersection Pennington Road, which reached the town from the northwest, and the Princeton-Trenton Road that entered this intersection from the northeast, on the commanding heights. Near the head of Trent’s carefully laid out triangle, all of these roads intersected on dominant terrain overlooking Trenton. The founder’s beautiful Queen Anne-style brick mansion, the Trent House, which was situated on the river’s level floodplain, was now occupied by a thirty-man Hessian detachment under Ensign Heinrich Zimmerman.
As dully noted by Zimmerman and his men, one of Trenton’s popular taverns was distinguished by its colorfully painted sign of a energetic beaver felling a tree above the virtuous Latin word “perseverando,” which symbolized two primary sources of American national pride and amazing success as a people in the New World: hard work and industriousness. In his diary and with the keen eye of an Irish immigrant from Ulster Province, Colonel Fitzpatrick described Trenton as “a pretty village, containing about 130 houses and a Presbyterian meeting-house [and] There are apple orchards and gardens.”4
The “greatest English political writer” of the eighteenth century, who so masterfully articulated the very essence of the revolutionary struggle’s meaning with an unmatched eloquence of the common people, Thomas Paine described how “Trenton is situated on a rising ground” that gradually rose northward from the low-lying Delaware.5 And in a letter to his wife, Colonel Knox, who early detected Trenton’s serious defensive limitations because of the lack of fortifications and the blessings of geography that benefitted Washington’s attackers once they gained the all-important high ground north of town, explained how “Of these [British] cantonments Trenton was the most considerable [and] Trenton is an open town, situated nearly on the banks of the Delaware, accessible on all sides.”6
Presenting Washington with the most golden opportunity of his military career, Trenton was indeed easily “accessible” on every side, especially the strategic heights at the north end of King and Queen Streets partly because the military manual of Hessian regulations had been ignored by Rall and his British superiors, who were unable to read German. This revered German textbook specifically emphasized how whenever a German “Regiment or Battalion is posted in village, which is not far from the enemy, the Chief or Commander must immediately cause a Redoubt to be erected on a chosen spot or height, or where it is in some way advantageous” for the town’s defense.7
After having been defeated in four major battles and then driven back around a hundred miles from New York to eastern Pennsylvania’s cold woodlands at a time when seemingly everything had gone to “the Devil,” in Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Blachley Webb’s words, Washington’s troops now had much to prove to themselves and their infant nation, hovering on the verge of a premature death. Ironically, like the General Greene whose ill-found tactical judgment paved the way for Fort Washington’s loss, the New Englanders, mostly in Sullivan’s First Division, were determined to demonstrate their combat prowess to the non-New Englanders, especially the Virginians, because of their long-existing, intense rivalry.8
Hurrying forward his two New York six-pounders at the head of Stirling’s Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Delaware brigade over bumpy ground and the freshly fallen snow without falling behind in Greene’s column, the rambunctious Captain Alexander Hamilton, always eager for a fight, noticed the heightened esprit de corps that now bolstered the Second Division’s surging ranks, martial sinews, and combat capabilities. Therefore, the young, irrepressible New Yorker was convinced that Washington’s homespun warriors of diehard faith, both revolutionary and religious, were now ready to “storm hell’s battlements,” if necessary, and never more so than on the morning of December 26.9
With newfound confidence, recently issued flints, and full cartridge-boxes and all available bayonets now fixed on muskets, Washington’s young men and boys from Massachusetts, Virginia, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York, Maryland, New Hampshire, and New Jersey had finally put aside all past sectional and cultural differences to come together as one and as free Americans to face their supreme crisis together. More than ever before, these soldiers were now united by a solitary purpose and goal: to reap the most desperately needed victory of the war to ensure a new republic’s survival.
Most of Washington’s Continentals were yeomen farmers, not unlike the mostly lower class farmers who primarily filled Rall’s enlisted ranks. The ad hoc composition of Washington’s main strike force, so hurriedly thrown together by fate and circumstances for this desperate attack to save the day, was actually its hidden strength and one secret of its newly forged resiliency and confidence: the series of past reversals and retreats no longer weighed so heavily to sap confidence about what they could accomplish this morning, because this newly formed contingent of freedom fighters had not previously experienced humiliating defeats together. But most of all, Washington’s common soldiers, now coughing, sneezing, and snorting from having caught colds during the tortuous river crossing and the night march, felt the added weight of a heavy burden on their shoulders,, while pushing at a good pace across the white landscape under a cold, leaden sky. Surging ahead through the deluge of steadily falling snow, the fighting men from across America felt a solemn, if not sacred, responsibility because “America in 1776 could have field[ed] an army
of 280,000 men, but [now] just 2,400 held the fate of a continent in their hands.”10
But Washington’s remaining soldiers, the most never-say-die Continentals in America, were determined to succeed at any cost this eventful morning. Perhaps some of these men now remembered a Pennsylvania minister’s inspiring words to the troops who had been humiliated so often by the British and Hessians: “Courage, my brave American soldiers, if God be for you, who can be against you? . . . be equipt for this warfare [and] put on . . . the gospel armour.”11
For Captain Alexander Hamilton, a most promising, self-made man who had risen far and fast and must have wished that he was still enjoying sun-splashed days of his youth in his native West Indies, this confrontation at Trenton was much more than simply a desperate, last-ditch attempt by Washington to vanquish the three well-trained regiments of a Hessian brigade, despite the seemingly impossibility of that feat. To Hamilton, this sudden clash of arms that had descended upon the little town of Trenton like a summer thunderstorm was also much about a long-term national destiny of limitless potential.
Despite being a relative newcomer to America’s shores, the ambitious Hamilton was already an early nationalistic visionary imbued with a vivid sense of what would later be called Manifest Destiny. Hamilton, ever perceptive and precociously analytical, saw the real root of this conflict as having largely stemmed from “a jealousy of our dawning splendour [and] The boundless extent of the territory we possess, the wholesome temperament of our climate, the luxuriance and fertility of our soil, the variety of our products, the rapidity of our population [growth], the industry of our country men,” which ordained America’s grandiose national destiny and a bright future for the United States second to none.
But Hamilton, Washington, and their soldiers’ utopian visions of a great republican empire and bright future could not be fulfilled unless a dramatic victory was first secured this bitterly cold morning of December. Therefore, these idealistic, God-fearing men firmly believed that Colonel Rall and his elite German brigade were all that now stood in the way of America’s future rising to eventually fulfill a grand, divinely sanctioned destiny as a great nation, an inspirational shining beacon of hope for the rest of the world, and a new, brighter day for all mankind.12
For such pressing reasons that were as personal as they were national for Washington’s men, Rall’s three crack regiments had to be swiftly eliminated in one stroke and as thoroughly as possible because so much was now at stake. In Washington’s own strategic view and words, the attack on Trenton was very much about “preserving a city [the capital of Philadelphia and also the larger Puritan-inspired national vision of a “City on a Hill”], whose loss must prove of the most fatal consequence to the cause of America.”13 Quite simply, the battle of Trenton was also very much about preserving what was in essence the best hope for mankind.
Consequently, on multiple levels, the motivation among Washington’s troops, now moving at a smart trot over the snowy terrain and closer to their great goal of Trenton, could not have been higher this morning. Not long after 8:00 a.m., Washington ordered the foremost soldiers of the central column of Greene’s Division, Stephen’s vanguard brigade just behind Captain Washington’s Virginians, to form in battleline along the cold, wind-swept heights about a quarter mile north from Trenton’s center and at King Street’s head. Moving forward into their hastily assigned, but excellent, commanding positions on the high ground at a time when knapsacks never seemed heavier and legs more weary, Greene’s breathless soldiers, panting from almost unbelievable exertions that had begun more than twelve hours before, shifted swiftly into their assigned places. All the while, Washington looked on through the cascading snow, as if yet attempting to gauge the fighting spirit among his troops, and with some satisfaction.
Most importantly in overall strategic terms, Washington was in the process of gaining a tighter and more firm grip on the high ground that dominated Trenton. In record time, Stephen’s Virginia troops hustled across the strategic high ground, which was the key to Trenton this morning, with the easy precision of veterans, despite the thick snow covering the ground. Like the rest of Washington’s soldiers, the Virginians were worn-down from the nightmarish Delaware crossing and the harrowing march through the snowstorm and over seemingly endless miles, but they were now ready for the challenge, thanks to no small part of Washington’s inspired leadership that bestowed confidence and bolstered fighting spirit. Washington’s example ensured that the often-defeated soldiers now would do their best and perform at their highest levels, which was unprecedented at this point in the war.
Here Washington “ordered us to form, that the [foremost two] cannon [of Captain Forrest’s artillery which had advanced at the column’s head with Mercer’s brigade, so that they] might play” upon the enemy, wrote Major George Johnston, Fifth Virginia Continental Regiment. Washington skillfully orchestrated the deployment of Greene’s troops of the center column with precision. Washington now demonstrated an uncanny ability in knowing exactly where and how to position his units to order to get the best out of them and their commanders. Because he rode at the column’s head, Washington had earlier ascertained the best terrain to exploit it to the fullest. Along with the reassuring conviction that he now held the most strategic ground that completely dominated the town and spanned southward a considerable distance to the lower ground, Washington also possessed the vital intersection of the two most important roads—King and Queen Streets—that ran downhill through the heart of Trenton and toward the river. Too many times in the past, Washington had been forced to fight on less than favorable terrain not of his choosing. Quite simply, he had been almost always out-generaled. And now this most favorable of tactical situations was the exception to the rule for the hard-luck Virginian. Indeed, Washington was now the master of Trenton’s most dominant terrain and literally king of the hill.
As if performing on a drill field, the fast-moving troops of Mercer’s brigade, the right column of Greene’s Division, continued to move west at a brisk pace to secure the most advantageous positions as directed by Washington. Very likely wondering if he would survive this day to finally see his son, who had been born last August back at his modest Fredericksburg home and named after him, General Mercer quickly deployed his veteran Maryland, Connecticut, and Massachusetts brigade along the high ground west of King Street. Meanwhile, Stirling’s brigade of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia troops, coming up fast behind Mercer, was aligned in Washington’s center, and stood astride the head of King Street, but mostly to its west. Eventually, Stirling’s line was extended farther east so that the brigade’s left extended to a point just northeast of the head of Queen Street.
Chevalier Matthias Alexis Roche de Fermoy’s Pennsylvania brigade, including the bulging ranks of the robust German Regiment, secured the left of Washington’s fast-forming battleline to the east. Mercer now commanded a newly created brigade of veteran regiments and knew how to use them with skill. This fine Continental brigade had been recently clubbed together by Washington so that his tactically astute Scottish friend would have an opportunity to lead it into action in just such key combat situations, after the troops of Mercer’s Flying Camp had been either captured at Fort Washington or faded away when the Maryland and New Jersey enlistments expired. But to Mercer’s absolute delight at this time, one of the hard-hitting regiments that now protected his left flank was his reliable old regiment, the Third Virginia Continental Regiment, Stirling’s brigade, which was now commanded by the Scotsman’s own brother-in-law Colonel Weedon.
A rarity in this army, Fermoy’s Continental brigade was led by an aristocratic Frenchman. In part because America was so desperately in need of professionally trained soldiers, General Fermoy was very much of a mystery man of an entirely unknown ability, which was an unsettling fact that might yet come back to haunt Washington this morning. However, Washington had been saddled with this proud, aristocratic French volunteer, who could not speak English, for political purposes. A
n ever-meddling Congress had recently bestowed a brigadier general’s rank upon the Frenchman based upon hardly more than his dubious word. Nevertheless, it was both necessary and symbolic that a French volunteer general, despite his highly-questionable and unverified qualifications, now commanded one of Washington’s brigades, including his largest regiment.
Most of all, America desperately needed France as an official ally for any hope of surviving a war of attrition. Suddenly more hesitant to assist the young republic after so many miserable defeats, especially New York City’s loss, the carefully calculating French king and government now only awaited for the good news of a rebel victory from the Mount Vernon planter to continue the flow of secret military aid—such as Captain Moulder’s three French four-pounders—and inch closer to the all-important official recognition. Clearly, in regard to the prospects for the young republic’s bid to gain foreign recognition, everything was now at stake at Trenton. And now vanquishing an entire battle-seasoned Hessian brigade at Trenton would send a powerful and most timely message to the French king and his pro-interventionist cronies.
As throughout this winter campaign, Washington continued to think ahead in tactical terms. Indeed, just before reaching Trenton’s northern outskirts immediately northwest of the head of King and Queen Streets, Washington had dispatched Fermoy’s brigade, the last brigade in column behind Stirling’s brigade, to “file off” from Greene’s main Second Division column, march across country to the east, and bypass Trenton’s upper end in an attempt to gain the Princeton-Trenton Road and extend Washington’s left east toward Assunpink Creek. Washington’s farsighted and timely tactical maneuver to block the Princeton-Trenton Road was also calculated: most importantly, to prevent the Rall brigade’s escape and to stop the arrival of any reinforcements, General Leslie’s British troops, who might be dispatched south from Princeton and down this icy road, that led northeast from Trenton to Princeton, to assist the isolated Rall, who was on his own.
George Washington's Surprise Attack Page 35