The same day I saw my first horror camp. It was near the town of Gotha. I have never felt able to describe my emotional reactions when I first came face to face with indisputable evidence of Nazi brutality and ruthless disregard of every shred of decency. Up to that time I had known about it only generally or through secondary sources. I am certain, however, that I have never at any other time experienced an equal sense of shock.
I visited every nook and cranny of the camp because I felt it my duty to be in a position from then on to testify at first hand about these things in case there ever grew up at home the belief or assumption that “the stories of Nazi brutality were just propaganda.” Some members of the visiting party were unable to go through the ordeal. I not only did so but as soon as I returned to Patton’s headquarters that evening I sent communications to both Washington and London, urging the two governments to send instantly to Germany a random group of newspaper editors and representative groups from the national legislatures. I felt that the evidence should be immediately placed before the American and British publics in a fashion that would leave no room for cynical doubt.7
The day of April 12 ended on a note of dramatic climax. Bradley, Patton, and I sat up late talking of future plans, particularly of the selection of officers and units for early redeployment to the Pacific. We went to bed just before twelve o’clock, Bradley and I in a small house at Patton’s headquarters, and he in his trailer. His watch had stopped, and he turned on the radio to get the time signals from the British Broadcasting Corporation. While doing so he heard the news of President Roosevelt’s death. He stepped back into the house, woke up Bradley, and then the two of them came to my room to tell me the shocking news.
We pondered over the effect the President’s death might have upon the future peace. We were certain that there would be no interference with the tempo of the war because we already knew something of the great measures afoot in the Pacific to accomplish the smashing of the Japanese. We were of course ignorant of any special or specific arrangements that President Roosevelt had made affecting the later peace. But we were doubtful that there was any other individual in America as experienced as he in the business of dealing with the other Allied political leaders. None of us had known the President very well; I had, through various conferences, seen more of him than the others, but it seemed to us, from the international viewpoint, to be a most critical time to be forced to change national leaders. We went to bed depressed and sad.
With some of Mr. Roosevelt’s political acts I could never possibly agree. But I knew him solely in his capacity as leader of a nation at war—and in that capacity he seemed to me to fulfill all that could possibly be expected of him.
During the First Army’s advance more, than 15,000 of the enemy were cut off in the Harz Mountains. The defenders fought stubbornly and held out until April 21. The country was exceedingly difficult. The week-long fighting to reduce the pocket and to beat off other German troops who attempted to relieve the garrison was of a bitter character.8 Still farther to the north Simpson’s Ninth Army kept equal pace with the advance in the center and the south. By April 6 the Ninth had established a bridgehead over the formidable Weser River and thereafter dashed for the Elbe, which it reached just south of Magdeburg April 11. The next day the 2d Armored Division of the Ninth Army achieved a small bridgehead over the Elbe, ten miles below. Establishment of another small bridgehead by the 5th Armored Division of the XIII Corps north of Magdeburg was thwarted when the enemy blew the bridge. In this sector the enemy appeared to be willing to abandon the country west of the Elbe but savagely opposed any attempt to cross the river. The Germans immediately counterattacked the bridgehead of the 2d Armored Division, which was abandoned April 14. A crossing farther south by the 83d Division was maintained.9
Almost coincidentally with our arrival on the Elbe the Red Army launched a powerful westward drive from its positions on the Oder. The attack was on a front of more than two hundred miles. The Red drive made speedy progress everywhere. Its northern flank pushed in the direction of the Danish peninsula, the center toward Berlin, and the southern flank toward the Dresden area. On April 25 patrols of the 69th Division of the V Corps met elements of the Red Army’s 58th Guards Division on the Elbe. The meeting took place at Torgau, some seventy-five miles south of Berlin. The V Corps, like the VII, had participated in the initial assault on the beaches of Normandy and it seemed eminently fitting that troops of one of these corps should be first to make contact with the Red Army and accomplish the final severance of the German nation.10 The problem of liaison with the Russians grew constantly more important as we advanced across central Germany. The pressing questions were no longer those of major strategy but had become tactical in character. One of the principal difficulties was that of mutual identification.
Because of differences in language front-line radios were useless as a means of communication between the two converging forces. The only solution to the problem seemed to lie in timely agreements upon markings and procedures. As early as the beginning of April the air forces of the Western Allies and the Russians had come into contact, with some unfortunate results. Shots had been exchanged between Red aircraft and our own, and the danger of major clashes continued to increase. The task of organizing a system of recognition signals was laborious and was not fully accomplished until April 20. However, both sides had already agreed upon restraining lines for the use of their air forces, and by the exercise of care, accompanied by a considerable degree of good fortune, no really serious errors took place.11
It was also agreed between ourselves and the Russians that when troops of the two converging forces met local commanders would arrange satisfactory junction lines between the two, based upon local and operational considerations. For the general junction line between the two forces we were anxious to have an easily identified geographical feature. For this reason the agreed-upon line, in the center of the front, followed the Elbe and Mulde rivers. It was understood that the withdrawal of our forces to their occupation zone would take place at whatever future date might be agreed upon by our respective governments.
While this decisive advance was taking place in the center the Twenty-first Army Group on the north and the Sixth on the south were both carrying out the operations assigned to them.
In the north Montgomery’s Twenty-first Army Group advanced toward Bremen and Hamburg and pushed a column forward to the Elbe to protect the northern flank of Bradley’s advance. Montgomery’s eastward advance was carried out mainly by the British Second Army, while the Canadian Army thrust northward through Arnhem to clear northeast Holland and the coastal belt eastward toward the Elbe. The eastward advance of the British Second Army, with three corps in the front line, reached the Weser April 6 and the Elbe April 19. At Bremen the British Army encountered an enemy force determined to resist to the bitter end. The British 30 Corps reached the outskirts of the city April 20, but a week of bitter fighting was necessary before Bremen finally surrendered.12
Likewise, the northward advance of the Canadian Army on Montgomery’s left initially encountered some desperate resistance. However, satisfactory advances were made all along the line and Arnhem was captured April 15. The fall of Arnhem was the signal for the enemy in that sector to withdraw into the Holland fortress behind flooded areas which posed a serious obstacle to an advance into western Holland.
Montgomery believed, and I agreed, that an immediate campaign into Holland would result in great additional suffering for that unhappy country whose people were already badly suffering from lack of food. Much of the country had been laid waste by deliberate flooding of the ground, by bombing, and by the erection of German defenses. We decided to postpone operations into Holland and to do what we could to alleviate suffering and starvation among the Dutch people.13
The mission of Devers’ Sixth Army Group during the early days of April was to protect the right flank of Bradley’s advance. To carry out this mission Devers organized a methodical advance by Pa
tch’s Seventh Army on his left and the French First Army on his right.14
Initially the opposition on the front of the Sixth Army Group was general and, despite the debacle in the north and the daily losses of battle, the Germans continued stubbornly to resist. When the Seventh Army reached the Neckar River it had to fight hard to establish a crossing and then required a week to reduce the garrison in the town of Heilbronn. The German troops in this region were not so seriously demoralized by the great Allied advances of February and March as were those who had borne the brunt of our attacks. On April 7 the 10th Armored Division made a thrust in the direction of Crailsheim but German reaction was so speedy and strong that the division had to withdraw hastily from its exposed position. The XV Corps reached Nürnberg April 16 but again several days of fighting were necessary before the defenses of the city finally collapsed.15
Resistance in the French sector was not so strong. After some sharp fighting in the immediate vicinity of the Rhine the French advance became rapid.
The French Army, of course, went into the attack under the orders of General Devers, who was responsible for the allocation of army boundaries, routes of supply, and all the other administrative arrangements necessary for troop maintenance throughout his army group. These boundaries placed the city of Stuttgart in Patch’s Seventh Army zone, because the supply routes of the Americans would necessarily run through that place. The city was captured by the French, who afterward refused to evacuate to permit its use by Patch. So unyielding were the French in their assertion that national prestige was involved that the argument was referred to me. I instructed Devers to stand firm and to require compliance with his plan. The French still proved obstinate and referred the matter to Paris. Not content with this, General de Gaulle continued to maintain an unyielding attitude on the governmental level in his reply to a sharply worded message from the President of the United States on the subject. In the meantime I had warned the French commander that under the circumstances it was necessary for me to inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that I could no longer count with certainty on the operational use of any French forces they might be contemplating equipping in the future. This threat of a possible curtailment of equipment for the French forces proved effective, and the French finally complied.16
A somewhat similar instance occurred on the French-Italian border, where there was a tiny bit of territory to which the French and Italians had each asserted moral and legal rights of possession. In that region I had made a boundary arrangement with Field Marshal Alexander, and this agreement was violated by the French in their anxiety to strengthen their claims to the disputed piece of territory.17
The French position in the war was, of course, not an easy one. Once known as the foremost military power of Europe, their Army as well as their pride had been shattered in the great debacle of 1940. Consequently when the Torch invasion of 1942 again gave patriotic Frenchmen an opportunity to join in the fight against the Nazis they were sensitive to all questions of national pride and honor. Added to this was their bitter hatred of the Nazi, a hatred which seemed to be intensified against some of their own former political and military leaders. On top of all this was the uncertain basis on which rested De Gaulle’s authority and that of the governmental organization he had installed in France. A further factor was the complete dependence of the French Army, and indeed of considerable portions of the population, upon American supplies. This was an additional irritant to their pride and, although they constantly insisted upon the need for greater amounts of every kind of equipment and matériel, they were naturally galled by the realization that without those supplies they were completely helpless. All this tended to make them peculiarly sensitive and therefore difficult to deal with when they could find in any question, no matter how trivial, anything that they thought involved their national honor. Nevertheless, America’s investment in the French forces paid magnificent dividends.
In the African campaign the French were helpful but extremely weak. So far as heavy fighting was concerned they first took a significant part in the war in Italy. In late 1943 and early 1944 the French corps in that theater did excellent work. Moreover, they performed brilliantly in the invasion of southern France, in the penetration of the Vosges Mountains, and the advance to the upper Rhine. Their efficiency rapidly fell off with the arrival of winter weather in late 1944 because of the large proportion of African native troops in their Army, who were unable to endure the cold and exposure incident to campaigning in a European winter. In the spring of 1945, however, during the final operations of the war, the French Army advanced gallantly and effectively to occupy great portions of southern Germany. At the same time they conducted a ground and air campaign against the Germans on the Bay of Biscay that resulted in the liberation of Bordeaux and the island of Oléron. This operation had been repeatedly postponed since the autumn of 1944 because of more urgent demands elsewhere. The battle commenced on April 14; a week later the Gironde had been cleared to the sea; by May 1, Oléron had fallen. When inspired, the French are great fighters.
Among the French were numbers of important individuals who never caused the slightest trouble; men whose breadth of vision and understanding of the issues at stake made them splendid allies. I personally liked General de Gaulle, as I recognized in him many fine qualities. We felt, however, that these qualities were marred by hyper-sensitiveness and an extraordinary stubbornness in matters which appeared inconsequential to us. My own wartime contacts with him never developed the heat that seemed to be generated frequently in his meetings with many others.
Giraud was my friend. He was a fighting man and thoroughly honest and straightforward. His complete lack of interest in political matters, however, obviously disqualified him for any political post in his country’s service. Generals Juin, Koenig, Koeltz, and innumerable junior officers were courageous, honest, and capable professionals. The names of Generals Mast and Bethouart and their associates who first risked their lives in order to bring about restoration of France through Allied intervention in Africa will always live as symbols of the highest kind of patriotism and greatness of character.
With Bradley’s army group firmly established on the Elbe, the stage was now set for the final Allied moves of the campaign. The enemy was split into independent commands in the north and south and had no means of restoring a single front against either the Russians or ourselves. With his world collapsing about him, the German soldier lost all desire to fight. Only in isolated instances did commanders succeed in maintaining cohesion among their units. During the first three weeks of April the Western Allies captured more than a million prisoners.18
Even before the Allied advance across central Germany began, we knew that the German Government was preparing to evacuate Berlin. The administrative offices seemed to be moving to the southward, possibly, we thought, to Berchtesgaden in the National Redoubt. Continuation of the movement was no longer possible after Bradley’s speedy advance barred further north-south traffic across the country. We knew also that Hitler had been unable to go south and that he was making his last stand in Berlin. Nevertheless, the strong possibility still existed that fanatical Nazis would attempt to establish themselves in the National Redoubt, and the early overrunning of that area remained important to us.19 In the north also there remained weighty reasons for speeding up the planned attack in the direction of Lübeck.
The Lübeck advance would capture the last remaining submarine bases of the German and would effectively eliminate the final vestiges of that once serious menace.
We could not predict the action of the German occupation forces in Denmark. It was possible they would choose to defend that region stubbornly and in that event we planned to conduct a lightning campaign against them.
In early April, Montgomery had estimated that, to carry out the mission assigned him, he would need no strength beyond the seventeen divisions then in his Twenty-first Army Group. I offered him additional logistic assistance by reserving for him a portion of t
he capacity of the American railroad bridge at Wesel. This help he declined.20 But as the operations developed on his flank, he found his troops rapidly used up and in the interests of speed asked for additional strength and supply assistance. Both I was glad to provide. I attached temporarily to Montgomery’s force the U. S. XVIII Airborne Corps under General Ridgway. It was to operate in a ground role to support Montgomery’s attack. But we were also prepared, in the event the Germans in Denmark should decide to fight to a finish, to provide additional strength for an airborne attack to cross the Kiel Canal.
When Bremen finally fell to Montgomery’s force April 26, the resistance in his front became markedly weaker. He quickly transferred his main effort to the sector of the British 8 Corps, which launched an attack across the Elbe April 29. The U. S. XVIII Corps made a simultaneous crossing somewhat to the south and provided right-flank protection to the British Second Army in its further advances.
On May 1 the 11th Armored Division of the British 8 Corps began a brilliant dash across Schleswig-Holstein to the Baltic and entered Lübeck on the afternoon of May 2. This sealed off the enemy in Denmark and also prevented any of the defeated forces in Germany from withdrawing into that country.
Montgomery now rapidly consolidated his gains all along his front and on May 3 the U. S. XVIII Corps made contact with the Russians in Montgomery’s sector. With Berlin in flames and the northern flank of the Red Army attack sweeping in our direction across Germany, all resistance collapsed. Swarms of Germans streaming back from the Russian front now began giving themselves up to the Anglo-American armies. American troops standing on the Elbe daily received these prisoners by the thousands.
On Montgomery’s left his Canadian Army had, in the meantime, continued its successful operations and rapidly cleaned up its entire front except that it made no attempt to turn back into western Holland, where the German Twenty-fifth Army was entrenched.
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