City of Dust
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“If there are discrepancies, I want to know about them. If people have been feeding information into our data bank that is not accurate or for which they wish to escape, I want to know about it. If there’s been fraud, I want to know about it,” Hellerstein said, looking out over the plaintiffs’ lawyers seated in front of him, “and so does the United States attorney.”
He also demanded transparency, accountability, and judicial control over the settlement process. Then, just about half an hour after he had stood up to address the court room, Hellerstein was finished. “That is the end of the program,” he told the stunned lawyers. He thanked them, and quickly left.
Hellerstein’s impassioned tirade blew up the settlement that had taken two years to draft, and left both sides bewildered and concerned. After weighing their options, the city and its contractors challenged Hellerstein’s authority to interfere in the settlement, filing an appeal that bounced the matter back to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. It had become clearer than ever that no matter what legal routes could be navigated, the city would continue to be burdened for the foreseeable future with the uncertainties of 9/11 and its afterclap. The judge’s strong reaction would undoubtedly make it more difficult to reach the kind of consensus that a broad settlement requires, although few doubted that a settlement eventually would emerge. Some plaintiffs praised Hellerstein for literally standing up for them in court, yet they were left even more confused than ever about what would happen to them, and how long they would have to wait for help to arrive.
For a brief time, the draft settlement had seemed to offer a way out of the darkness. It did not answer the burning questions about the dust, but it did provide a framework for getting on with life in a city that had spent too long already in the shadows of that day at the dawn of the new millennium. Science hadn’t upended the settlement. Neither had the law. It was scuttled because Hellerstein stood up and declared that the system had not worked. Nearly a decade after the towers fell, the courts had not proved liability on the part of the city or its contractors, and had not produced scientific evidence linking the dust to serious disease. Regardless, Hellerstein believed that the $1 billion ought to be spent. The fixes he demanded in essence created a successor to the original compensation fund, but one that would end up burning through as much as $400 million in legal fees to distribute the money. This outcome made it clear that putting up such a bounty may be the least effective way of providing help in the aftermath of a disaster. By avoiding the tough decisions, by winking at the law and bypassing the science, Hellerstein earnestly hoped to satisfy the public’s concern that justice be done. But it won’t be clear for a long time whether what he did really satisfied anyone.
Index
Symbols
$1 billion fund, 273
lawsuits, 264–265
21 MC 100, 256–259
50-H hearings, 266
1975 fire at telephone company switching station, 90
1993 World Trade Center attack, 104
9/11 studies
reliability, 217
results of
Mount Sinai studies, 223–225
Mount Sinai study 2006, 218–223
A
Abadie, James, 60, 268
accelerated latency, 246
advocacy, 305, 307
afterclap, 313, 315
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 154
Agent Orange, 274
air monitors, 77
air quality, 37, 39–40
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 256
air-monitoring equipment, 49
Airborne Visible/Infrared Imaging Spectrometer (AVIRIS), 22
alkalinity of dust, EPA reaction, 296
AMEC, 58
American Home Products, 249
anguish of families, 272
Anna (rescue dog), 129–131
anosmia, 305
apartments, decontaminating, 150
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, 182
Army Corps of Engineers, 55
asbestos, 15, 19, 102, 296
dust, 20
exposure levels, 35
mesothelioma, 102
safety standards, 35–37
aspergillosis, 131
asthma, 158, 223
Asthmamoms.com, 146
AstraZeneca, Budesonide inhalers, 90
ATC Associates of New York, 70
Atlas, Sarah, 128–134, 275
Ausmus, David, 58, 72–74
autopsies
guidelines for, 235
of Zadroga, James, 229–231
AVIRIS (Airborne Visible/Infrared imaging Spectrometer), 22
B
B-cell lymphoma, 140
Baden, Dr. Michael, 232
Baker, Al, 210
Baker, Candiace, 320
Barash, Michael, 232
Barbaro, Frank, 109
Barnett, Tommy, 69
Bechtel, 58
Bellone, Michael, 277
Ben-Veniste, Richard, 152
Bennett, Kiki, 287
Bennett, Rick, 199–201, 287
Benson, Samuel, 49
benzene, 242
Bern, Marc, 249
Bienenfeld, Dr. Laura, 136
biomonitoring, 93
Bloomberg, Mayor Michael, 174, 183
lawsuits, 240
reaction to 9/11 studies, 221
victim’s list; Godbee Jr., James, 206
Zadroga, James, comments on, 235
bodies, removal of, 61
Borja, Ceasar, 187–188, 209, 212
Borja, Cesar A., 186–188, 192, 210, 214
Times, 210–214
Borja, Eva, 214
Bovis, 60
Abadie, James, 268
Bovis Lend-Lease, 58
brawl between firefighters and police officers, 293
Breton, Dr. Gerard, 183, 192, 229
Budesonide inhalers, 90
Burton, Michael, 44–46, 267
Bush administration
ground zero health claims, 184
Howard, Dr. John, 184
missed opportunities, 294–295
money, 176–179
Bush, President George W., 35
Borja family, 209
C
cancer, 304, 307
cancer policy, 319
Caporale, Barbara, 161
Centers for Disease Control, 50
Central Labor Council, 107, 112
certainty, 302, 312
Chan, Sewell, 210
characteristics of dust, 17
chemicals, 303
Chertoff, Michael, 264
Chevat, Benjamin, 173
children, dust’s effect on, 158
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; Rogers, Kevin, 135
Church of Scientology, 112
class-action lawsuit on behalf of public and private employees, 253–259
Clinton, Bill, 32
Clinton, Senator Hillary, 107, 152–153, 159, 171–173
Borja, Ceasar, 187
reaction to studies of 9/11, 220
closing schools, 150, 152
Cohen, Neal L., 28
Coles, Tony, 44
collapse of Twin Towers, 16
proving links to, 191–193
collecting dust, 12–15
command structure, 292–293
Community Board 1, 147
compensation, 179, 303
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 179–180
complaints against EPA, 78, 154
composition of dust, 18–22, 254
Con Edison’s Brooklyn-Queens Emergency Electric Operations Unit, 134
Connaughton, James L., 160
consistency, evidence, 308
Consolidated Edison, 47
construction companies, 58
depositions, 267
insurance, 61
construction workers, 99–100
Mount Sinai Med
ical Center clinic, 106–107, 110
contractors, construction companies, 58
insurance, 61
contracts, safety rules, 54
Corrigan, Malachy, 92
coughs, World Trade Center cough, 96
Council on Environmental Quality, 40
counterterrorism, 34
Couric, Katie, 184
CPK (creatine phosphokinase), 125
Crisci, Diane, 46
D
daily incident action plan, 57
Daily News, Pulitzer, 214
Damato, John, 320
Daniels, Mitch, 176
Daubert Principles, 246
de la Hoz, Dr. Rafael, 136
deaths, New York State Department of Health study, 277–278
Deborah Heart and Lung Center, 181
debris, sorting through, 55–56
debris pile, 53
decontaminating apartments, 150
Department of Design and Construction, 44, 292
Department of Environmental Protection (New York City), 150
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 150
Department of Sanitation, 55
depositions, 267–268
Detectives’ Union, 310
DiRubbo, Leo, 60
dose reconstruction, 303
dose response curve, 308
doubts about dust, 215–218
dual nature event, 20
Dunn-Jones, Felicia Gail, 193–202, 287
victim’s list, 202–204
dust
alkalinity of, EPA reaction, 296
asbestos, 20
characteristics of, 17
collecting, 12–15
components of, 254
composition of, 18–22
effect on children, 158
effects of replicating, 19
pH values, 23
proving links to, 191–193
samples
collected by EPA, 33
collected by Joel Kupferman, 69–72
EPA results, 75
storage of, 24
dust masks, 17
dust plumes, 23
dust samples, EPA results, 75
E
earthquakes, Mexico City (1985), 43
Edison crew, 33
effects of dust on firefighters, 82–83, 90–91
emergency command center, 27–29
environmental health, 10
Environmental Health Perspectives article, 220–222
EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), 32, 35
air quality, 39–40
alkalinity of dust, 296
asbestos safety standards, 35–37
complaints, 154
complaints against, 78
dust samples, 33, 75
indoor contamination, 149, 153–157
clean up, 157–160, 163–165
missed opportunities, 290–292
Office of Inspector General, 159
sampling stations, 49
withholding of files, 245
epidemiologists, 300
ETI Laboratory, 70
evidence
certainty, 303
lack of definitive proof, 308–309
presumptive proof, 309–311
proving dust caused problems, 215–218
self-reported data, 216
exposure levels, asbestos, 35
extensive discovery, 280
F
fair compensation, 303
fallout from release of Kupferman’s dust samples results, 72–77
Feal, John, 215
federal compensation, 303
Federal Emergency Management Agency. See FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency)
federal government
compensation programs, 179
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 179–180
missed opportunities, 297
Fein, Dr. Alan, 200
Feinberg, Kenneth R., 179–180, 200
Zadroga, James, 226
FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), 93
money appropriated for workers, 112
fen-phen, 249–250
Fiero, Columbia, 69
The Filipino Reporter, 213
fines for safety violations, 54
fire departments, 50
firefighter radios, 272–273
firefighters, 51–52
brawl with police officers, 293
command structure, 293
effects on, 82–83, 90–91
forest service rangers, 52
Fossella, Vito, 171
Fox Lane High School, 241
fraud, 276–278, 281
Fresh Kills, 55–56
Frieden, Dr. Thomas, 297
Fullam, Dave, 117, 121–124, 127
Fullam, Marty, 117–124, 127–128, 275, 281
lung transplant, 126
polymyositis, 125
future illnesses, 276
future liability, 319
G
Ganci, Peter, 28–29
GAO (Government Accountability Office), 178
gastrointestinal issues, 305
Gavett, Stephen H., 18
German Shepherds, 131
Giuliani, Mayor Rudy, 30–31, 293
air quality, 30
emergency command center, 27–29
firefighters, 293
liability protection, 175
Godbee, James, 237
Godbee Jr., James, 205–206
Godbee, Michelle Haskett, 205
Gonzalez, Juan, 71–72, 75, 186
Government Accountability Office (GAO), 178
ground zero, 56, 61
clearing of, 60
debris pile, 53
ground zero presumption bill, 142
Gulack, Robert, 161
H
Handerson, James A., 258
Hariton, D’Angelo, 250
Hauber, Raymond, 281
Hayden, Deputy Chief Peter, 51–52
“Health for Heroes,” 136
heart problems, 305
Heintz, Mark, 120
Hellerstein, Judge Alvin K., 255–259, 272–274
settlement, 320–324
Henderson, James, 279
Herbert, Dr. Robin, 218–219
Heyward, Leon, 313
Hill, Sir Austin Bradford, 308
Hirsch, Dr. Charles S., 46, 191, 239
autopsies, 235
Dunn-Jones, Felicia Gail, 202–204
Godbee, Jr., James, 205–206
victim’s list, reconsiderations, 225, 229–234
Holden, Kenneth, 45, 59–60
Hon, Jeffrey, 295
Howard, Dr. John, 183–184, 218, 240, 297
autopsy guidelines, 235
reaction to 9/11 study, 222
research, 301
Hughes, Catherine McVay, 145, 313
Hughes, Tom, 148
human hair, 21
I
idiopathic anaphylaxis, 132
illnesses, future illnesses, 276
immunity, New York City, 268–272
indoor contamination, 152–153
EPA, 149, 153–157
clean up, 157–160, 163–165
schools, 152
closing of, 150–152
Fox Lane High School, 241
Stuyvesant High School, 151
Inspector General for the EPA, 40
insurance, construction companies, 61
insurance company created to defend NYC from 9/11 lawsuits, 263
International Association of Firefighters, 92
It’s Time to Sue, 243
J
J. Selikoff Center for Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 100, 107, 110
James Zadroga Act, 185, 236
Jenkins, Kate, 245
Jimmy Nolan’s law, 282
Jones, Joseph, 196–198, 287–288
Judge, Father Mychal, 120
K
Kayle
e (rescue dog), 132
Kelly, Commissioner Raymond, 237
Kelly, Dr. Kerry, 82–83, 88–91, 95, 97, 306
Kenny, Jane M., 155–156
Kerik, Bernard, 28
Kilbourne, Dr. Edwin, 154
Kupferman, Joel, 65–69, 78
class action lawsuit, 164
dust samples, 69–72
L
labs
ATC Associates of New York, 70
ETI Laboratory, 70
Landrigan, Dr. Philip, 24, 108–114, 154, 219–221
Responders, number of, 217
latency periods, 246
Latham & Watkins, 264
lawsuits, 164, 240–241, 263, 270–271
$1 billion fund, 264–265, 273
class-action lawsuit on behalf of public and private employees, 253–259
culling the cases, 280–281
depositions, 267–268
fen-phen, 249–250
future illnesses, 276
Jimmy Nolan’s law, 282
limited discovery, 279
medical records, 275–276
motion to dismiss, 268
settlement, 274–275
negotiations, 282–283
summary judgment, 266
Walcott, John, 242–244
lead, 162
leadership, Rudy Giuliani. See Giuliani, Rudy
Leavitt, Michael, 159, 184
leukemia, 244
Levin, Dr. Stephen M., 101–107, 218
respirators, 104
Levy, Harold O., 150
liability, future liability, 319
liability protection, 175
Libby, Montana; asbestos contamination, 156
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 59
life expectancy, loss of, 303–306
Lilis, Dr. Ruth, 109
limited discovery, 279
Lioy, Dr. Paul J., 9–11, 25, 97, 160, 313
dust masks, 17
litigation, 271
lower-respiratory problems, 305
lung transplants; Fullam, Marty, 126
Luongo, Deputy Inspector James, 55
M
mainliner’s lung, 231
Maloney, Rep. Carolyn, 153, 171–179
response to James Zadroga’s denial to victim’s list, 233
Zadroga bill, 309
Manhattan Project, 303
Martin, Robert, 154–155
Mattei, Suzanne, 38, 245
Mayo Clinic, fen-phen, 249
McKinney, Kelly, 46–49, 78
McVay Hughes, Catherine, 146–149, 152–153, 163, 166
panel to study aftermath of World Trade Center attacks, 160–166
McVay, Scott, 146
medical records, lawsuits, 275–276
Melius, Dr. James, 110