Pareto’s life work is essentially divided between two enormous books: The Treatise on General Sociology and Socialist Systems. His Treatise, published for the first time in 1916, has been compared to Machiavelli’s and Vico’s315 greatest works. Professor Arthur Livingston, who translated it into English (Mind and Society, 1935), summarised the book with a single formula: two-thousand pages, one million words.
It is a thick book, and a very thick one at that. In comparison with it, Marx’s Capital comes across as a mere staffing model; Pareto has, in fact, been labelled the ‘Karl Marx of the bourgeoisie’.
Fascinated by Pareto’s thoughts, a twenty-three-year-old law student decided, in 1923, to make the content more accessible to the public; to produce a ‘sketch of its skeleton’. A few months before his passing, Pareto gave him permission to do so. The student’s name was Georges-H. Bousquet, a man who would subsequently teach at the universities of Algiers and Bordeaux and turn out to be a remarkable expert on Islamic issues. His Précis de sociologie d’après Vilfredo Pareto316 was republished in 1971.
Pareto’s scientific sociology is a logical-experimental science, one that is founded upon the observation of facts and experimentation. A priori principles cannot be included in it, and neither can speculation, moralisation or dogmatic reasoning. It is impervious to the notions of ‘absolute truth’, ‘necessity’, ‘socialism’ and ‘equality’. Sociological affirmation can thus only be relative and subject to revision. This conception is similar to that of modern logic, resembling the theories of Max Weber, Karl Pearson,317 Ernst Mach318 and Henri Poincaré319 and diverging greatly from Marxist and Durkheimian320 dogmas.
‘Metaphysical-socialistic’ sociologies introduce a single explanatory factor (production relationships, the unconscious, and so on) into their analyses. Such are the so-called ‘unilateralisms’, to use the expression coined by Mr Jules Monnerot.
A certain Italian magazine once asked Pareto to write an article about progress. This is how he responded: ‘I cannot send you anything that relates to the question of “progress”, since the purpose of my entire sociology is to rid science of all such terms, which seem to lack any and all precision and only serve to generate ambiguity’.
In terms of classification, usefulness and truth must not be confused either. As noted by Mr Bousquet, ‘some propositions may be truthful, but harmful; or perhaps even very harmful. Others, on the other hand, might be false, but socially useful. Theoretically inferring truth from usefulness or vice versa is thus one of those “absolutes” that are foreign to science. For the latter must, on the contrary, ascertain the facts that apply in every single case’.
There are multiple explanatory factors. Social phenomena are in a state of interdependence. Facts thus lose their rigid and supposedly ‘inevitable’ aspect. They are governed by simple calculations of probability. The notions of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, whose content is equivocal, must be replaced with the concepts of variables and functions. The idea of ‘causality’ must give way to that of functional rapport.
Mr Bousquet writes: ‘In order to comprehend reality in all of its complexity, we proceed by means of successive approximations, while simultaneously trying to bring theory ever closer to the facts. One presupposes, for instance, that bodies fall freely under the impact of gravity, before adding air resistance and taking into account the fact that acceleration is not strictly constant when the body in question draws closer to the Earth’s surface; and so on’.
Society itself comes across as a ‘system of human molecules’ that are involved in a complex interrelationship, as is the case in an organism. As a result, there are no linear rules of social evolution; instead, one encounters ceaseless fluctuations, an eternal return of periodic oscillations.
Rejecting all habitual explanations for being both absurd and puerile, Pareto introduces two novel notions: ‘residues’ and ‘derivations’.
The Manifestation of Feelings
Throughout history, one notices the permanent presence of certain psychological inclinations, which are constant (residual) compared to temporary phenomena. Hence their appellation: residues. Pareto writes: ‘Residues are the manifestation of instincts and feelings, just like the rise of the mercury level in a thermometer is the manifestation of an increase in temperature’.
Within a given society, the conformation and repartition of residues may sometimes vary (under the impact of wars, mentality evolution, miscegenation, political situations, economic structures, etc.). Whenever this happens, the social system changes form. The same is true of individuals, who, more often than not, tend to display illogical behaviour as a result of amassing a variety of residues, their actions depending on which specific residue ends up prevailing.
‘What theories or principles do misers or tulip lovers abide by? None, really. And is it not the case that what applies to the individual is also true of society? As soon as one steps outside metaphysical abstractions, one finds themselves compelled to acknowledge the fact that the very character of a people or individual has an obvious effect upon the latter’s behaviour, which is thus not merely the consequence of pure logic’.
Residues, which Pareto classifies into 6 main categories, are the ‘fathers of ideologies’. They determine and bring about a certain number of human actions that Pareto has baptised ‘derivations’.
One often believes themselves to be acting upon profound motivations (residues), when one is, in fact, only reacting to their manifestations (derivations). It is thus crucial to clearly distinguish the former from the latter, especially since residues, ever reflecting the latest fashion, can take on a great variety of shapes, whereas ideologists, who apparently give priority to derivations, are, generally speaking, only motivated by residues.
Politically, exclusive anti-communism and anti-fascism may, at first sight, seem contradictory, but Pareto considers them to be different derivations of a single ‘residue of obsession’.
Commenting on one of Pareto’s essays entitled The Virtuist Myth (Marcel Rivière), Pitirim Sorokin321 wrote the following words in his Contemporary Sociological Theories (Payot, 1938): ‘In relation to sex, the verbal reactions of numerous ascetics are highly hostile, and yet the very fact that they speak of it so often and target it with such bitter attacks indicates that the residue of these “derivations” is identical to the one that relates to the obscene verbal responses of a depraved person’.
The behaviour of an atheistic socialist who quotes Lenin and that of a primitive man who venerates his fetish are but derivations of the same ‘residue of deification’, just as Christian universalism and the Declaration of Human Rights are derivations of the same residue, namely the ‘residue of a tendency towards aggregation’.
The correlation between residues and derivations is the focus of the longest chapter in the Treatise on Sociology. In it, Pareto emphasises the complexity of this interrelationship, as well as the necessity to conduct an analysis that makes use of the principles of interdependence and those of multiple causality. Indeed, there is clear interaction between the two categories. At times, residues may affect derivations, while, at others, impacting other residues; likewise, derivations might sometimes impact residues, while influencing other derivations in further cases. Derivations may, furthermore, find their source in contradictory residues or be at odds with one another behaviour-wise. This is perhaps also the reason why, despite mostly acting in an entirely illogical manner, men still manage to achieve positive results.
Pareto expands on the issue: ‘What is noteworthy is that a residue that deviates from experience can still be corrected through a derivation which deviates from logic, in a manner that allows the conclusion to draw closer to experimental fact’.
The Circulation of Elites
Whether physically, morally or intellectually, men differ from one another. Based on this elementary observation, Pareto proceeds to violently criticise the egalitarian illusion.
He remarks that equality has always been desired
, but never achieved. Regardless of what regime is in power and no matter what stratagem is employed, factual inequalities always lead to social stratifications. In all eras and all countries, one encounters both ‘high’ social layers and ‘low’ ones; ruling classes and governed ones.
One may question whether those ‘high’ social stratums deserve to occupy the position in which they find themselves; but whether they do or not, they will come up against the law of power erosion. The day will come when every ruling class will find itself compelled to make way for another. ‘History is the tomb of aristocracies’, says Pareto. The void generated by the vanishing of the ruling elite must be filled. And it does not matter whether the new elite represents a conscious oligarchy or whether it believes itself to be defending the interests of workers or the cause of the people; the result is still the same: what occurs is a circulation of elites.
The latter is not always noticeable, precisely because derivations tend to mask residues. Mr G.-H. Bousquet writes: ‘And yet, the struggle between patricians and plebeians, senators and knights, Jacobins and aristocrats, or socialists and the bourgeoisie is nothing but a struggle between minorities that compete for power; simultaneously, what derivations allow us to admire is the ceaselessly renewed and never definitive struggle in which the masses clash with the privileged (its perpetuity is, of course, not without reason!)’.
In his Communist Manifesto, Marx writes the following words: ‘All historical movements have, thus far, been movements of minorities in the interest of minorities’. In spite of the style clause, the proletarian revolution has not been an exception to the rule.
Mr Julien Freund, who is also the author of a work on Pareto, makes the following observation in this regard: ‘Displaying a lucidity that is as perspicacious as it is profound, Pareto realised that Marx’s concept of ideology was itself of an ideological nature, considering the fact that it is destined to serve the will to power of a specific group, namely the proletarian class; that critical awareness vanishes before the perspectives of revolution; and that its sole remaining purpose is thus to justify and legitimise, in a non-critical fashion, the endeavour and consequences of this very revolution’.
He then goes on to add: ‘In Pareto’s eyes, there is no difference at all between the belief in a classless society and the belief in the existence of devils and angels; the end purpose is different, but not the nature of the belief, nor the methods of argumentation’.
In order to remain in power, the ruling classes whose elites no longer circulate have but one final recourse: the use of force. As remarked by Georges Sorel, it is a fact that cruel aristocracies have proven to be more long-lasting than kind ones. In Mr Bousquet’s view, if the noblemen who governed France during the 18th century ‘had imitated the ancient feudal rulers in their ability to suppress the peasant revolt through violence’, instead of attempting to play a pastoral role, ‘they would never have perished under the guillotine. The real cause behind the outbreak of the Revolution, however, lay in the suspension of elite circulation’.
On Ideology
The question is now whether residues could ever be completely eliminated. Such a development is, in truth, highly unlikely. Scientists must strive to achieve the highest possible degree of objectivity, but, whatever they do, they will never be able to fully accomplish this, for they are part of the very same universe that they strive to familiarise themselves with. They are the subjects of the universe, just as the universe is theirs. A scientist is thus necessarily both a judge and a party in the proceedings.
This fact is even more obvious on the level of people’s daily behaviour. Since residues are the expression of character traits and inner impulsions, it would be absurd to imagine that these could ever be eliminated, thus allowing us to achieve an entirely rational sort of behaviour. What is more, it has not even been shown that such an outcome is to be desired. What is part of man’s nature is his inclination towards rationality, not the fact of being rational. He could, at best, seek to rationally study the irrational being that he is destined to remain.
This is perhaps where the limits of Pareto’s thought become visible: too literal in essence, the latter could induce a mechanical conception of social rapports. Following in Cournot’s322 footsteps, Pareto did initially propose a theory of ‘pure social science’, one that corresponded to a ‘rational mechanism’. It was only at a later point that he qualified his statements, remaining mechanistic ‘only insofar as one designates the highest and most concise description of the analysed phenomenon as a “mechanistic method”’ (Sorokin).
However, it must be said that Pareto’s criticism of ideology is so radical that the latter loses virtually all specific meaning. In his eyes, as pointed out by Mr Julien Freund, ‘all the dogmas, conceptions, systems, doctrines, beliefs, programmes, charters and position statements that the human mind comes up with — either in an effort to justify certain interests and needs in a disinterested manner or to conceal one’s hunger for power, domination, struggle and conquest behind notions of freedom, justice, peace and so on — are nothing but ideologies’. Hence the utter and demobilising scepticism displayed by Pareto with regard to the mind’s impact upon society.
Such criticism is certainly excessive. Indeed, what Pareto confuses is, on the one hand, one’s conception of the world (Weltanschauung) and worldview (Weltsicht), and on the other, ideology in its strict sense. Only the latter, defined as action-oriented thinking and a polemical line of thought striving towards specific ends, could ever be considered an opinion.
At this stage, one could go back to the distinction introduced around 1925 by Karl Mannheim323 (in Ideology and Utopia, Paris, 1956) between polemical ideology, whose essence is both psychological and individual and whose main function lies in disqualifying an adversary, and total ideology, which is of a collective and social nature, alternately expressing the general mentality, the collective unconscious, and the perspectives, implicit values and spontaneous beliefs espoused by a certain population group at a specific time. The former can either be declared true or false, and thus be rejected. The second notion, which bears a strong resemblance to myths (in the sense that it can neither be defined as true nor false), is characterised by a certain fateful aspect; furthermore, it is likely to become the auxiliary of both the sociology of knowledge and that of civilisational history.
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Précis de sociologie d’après Vilfredo Pareto,324 an essay by Georges-H. Bousquet, Dalloz, 207 pages.
Pareto. La théorie de l’équilibre,325 authored by Julien Freund, Seghers, 206 pages.
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Under the management of Mr Giovanni Busino, the publication of Pareto’s complete works (in twenty-three volumes, Droz editions, Geneva) is now nearing completion. The 5th volume (1965) corresponds to his Socialist Systems; volume six (1966) to Myths and Ideologies; volume nine (1966) to Marxism and Pure Economics; volume twelve (1968) to the Treatise on General Sociology; volume thirteen (1970) to The Transformation of Democracy; and volume fifteen (1971) to the Virtuist Myth and Immoral Literature.
As for the important studies conducted into Pareto’s works, one had better refer to what Mr Raymond Aron wrote in Les étapes de la pensée sociologique,326 Gallimard, 1967) and to Mr Giovanni Busino’s Introduction à une histoire de la sociologie de Pareto327 (Droz, Geneva, 1967), rather than to Mr Guy Perrin’s Sociologie de Pareto328 (PUF, 1966), which is fraught with misinterpretations. In the German domain, it is recommended to read Gottfried Eisermann’s Vilfredo Pareto als Nationalökonom und Soziologe (J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1961); in the Italian spectrum, Paola Maria Arcari’s Socialismo e democrazia nel pensiero di Vilfredo Pareto (Giovanni Volpe, Rome, 1966) and Carlo Mongardini’s Vilfredo Pareto, dall’economia alla sociologia (Rome, 1973); and for Dutch readers, Piet Tommissen’s De economische epistemologie van Vilfredo Pareto (Sint-Aloysiushandelshogeschool, Brussels, 1971). The most exhaustive bibliography is to be found in the latter.
Headed by Mr Giovanni Bus
ino, the Vilfredo Pareto Notebooks have been published by Droz editions since 1963. The publication has recently been re-baptised European Magazine for Social Sciences (11 Massot Street, 1211 Geneva 12, Switzerland).
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Gustave Le Bon
‘The crowd is always intellectually inferior to isolated men. However, as regards feelings and the actions that these feelings generate, it may actually be better or worse, in accordance with the circumstances. It all depends on the manner in which one exerts influence upon it’.
The one who made this assessment was a man of impressive stature. His bearing was one of irony and severity, displaying a slightly haughty look, wide forehead, piercing eyes, and an antique-looking beard resembling that of Renaissance gods. His name was Gustave Le Bon. He was born in 1841, in Nogent-le-Rotrou.
Born into a family of militaries and magistrates of Burgundian and Breton descent, Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931) was a friend of Théodule Ribot (who authored Les maladies de la personnalité)329 and Henri Poincaré (La science et l’hypothèse).330 His work, one of the most crucial ones in the intervening period between the two centuries, is dominated by two titles: Psychologie des foules,331 (1895) and L’évolution de la matière (1905).332
A tireless traveller, it is his accounts of his first expeditions (to North Africa, India and Nepal) that attract attention to him. In Les lois psychologiques de l’évolution des peoples333 (Félix Alcan, 1894), he writes the following: ‘What has remained clearest in my mind is that every nation has a mental constitution that is as immutable as its anatomical characteristics, a constitution which all its feelings, thoughts, institutions, beliefs and arts derive from’.
A precursor of social psychology, he expresses equal interest in ethnography, anthropology, sociology, historical philosophy, physics, biology, the history of civilisations and political doctrines, cartography, and even horse psychology and equitation!
Systems and Debates Page 17